Argumentation

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Argumentation
Based on the material due to
P. M. Dung, R.A. Kowalski et al.
1. Introduction
Argumentation constitutes a major component of human’s
intelligence. The ability to engage in arguments is essential for
humans to understand new problems, to perform scientific reasoning,
to express, clarify and defend their opinions in their daily lives.
The way humans argue is based on a very simple principle which is
summarized succinctly by an old saying
"The one who has the last word laughs best".
To illustrate this principle, let us take a look at an example, a mock
argument between two persons I and A, whose countries are at war,
about who is responsible for blocking negotiation in their region.
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Example 1 Consider the following dialog
I: My government can not negotiate with your government because your
government doesn’t even recognize my government
A: Your government doesn’t recognize my government either
Consider the following continuation of the above arguments:
I: But your government is a terrorist government
This represents an attack on the A’s argument. If the exchange stops
here, then I clearly has the "last word", which means that he has
successfully argued that A’s government is responsible for blocking the
negotiation.
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Part 1: Acceptability of Arguments
Definition 1 An argumentation framework is a pair
AF = <AR,attacks>
where AR is a set of arguments, and attacks is a binary relation on AR,
i.e. attacks  AR × AR.
For two arguments A,B, the meaning of attacks(A,B) is that A represents
an attack against B.
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The dialog between persons I and A from Example 1 can be
represented by an argumentation framework <AR,attacks> as follows:
AR = {i1,i2,a} and attacks = {(i1,a),(a,i1),(i2,a)}
with i1,i2 denoting the first and the second argument of I, respectively,
and a denoting the argument of A.
We can depict the end of the above dialog by the following oriented
graph
i1 ← a ← i2
Fig. 1
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Remark 1 From now on, if not explicitly mentioned otherwise, we always
refer to an arbitrary but fixed argumentation framework
AF = <AR,attacks>.
(i) Further, we say that A attacks B (or B is attacked by A) if attacks(A,B)
holds.
(ii) Similarly, we say that a set S of arguments attacks B  Arg
(or B is attacked by S) if B is attacked by an argument in S i.e.
S attacs B  (A  S)(attacs(A,B)
B
S
A
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Definition 2 (conflict-free sets, acceptable arguments)
(i) A set S of arguments is said to be conflict-free if there are no arguments
A,B in S such that A attacks B .
B
S
A
Arg
(A  S
&
attack(A,B))
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=>BA
7
(ii) we say that an argument A is acceptable with respect to a set S
if S can defend A by an argument B  S against all attacks C on A.
A
S
C
(A  Arg & attacks(C,A))
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A
S
B
B
C
(A  Arg & attacks(C,A)) => (BS) (attacks(B,C))
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Definition 3 (admissible of sets of arguments)
(i) A conflict-free set of arguments S is admissible iff each argument
in S is acceptable wrt S i.e. S can defend all its arguments.
A
S
B
B  S & A  Arg & attacs(A,B)
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Note that a conflict-free set of arguments S is admissible iff
each argument in S is acceptable wrt. S i.e. S can defend all its
arguments.
Admissible sets are good prototypes for sets of arguments given to
reasoning agents.
A
B1
S
B
(B  S & A  Arg & attacs(A,B)) => (B1S)(attacs(B1,A))
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The (credulous) semantics for Argumentation
of an argumentation framework is defined by the notion of preferred
extesions.
Definition 4 A preferred extension of an argumentation framework AF is
a maximal (wrt. set inclusion) admissible set of AF.
(Continuation of Example 1). It is not difficult to see that the corresponding AF has exactly one prefered extension
{i1,i2}  Arg
Indeed, as depicted in Fig. 1
i1 ← a ← i2
the only argument attacking i1 is a , but it is attacked by i2.
And i2 no argument I attacking i2.
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Example 2 (Nixon Diamond). The well-known Nixon diamond example
can be represented as an argumentation framework AF = <AR,attacks>
with
AR = {A,B}, and attacks = {(A,B),(B,A)}
where A represents the argument "Nixon is anti-pacifist since he is a
republican", and B represents the argument "Nixon is a pacifist since he
is a quaker".
This argumentation framework has two preferred extensions
{A} , {B}
one in which Nixon is a pacifist and one in which Nixon is a quaker.
It is not difficult to see that if an argumentation framework consist a
circle,
e.g. Attacs = {(A,B),(B,C),(C,A),} then it has the preferred extension
consisting of
{A} , {B} , {C}
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Lemma 1 (Fundamental Lemma)
Let S be an admissible set of arguments and A , A’ be arguments which
are acceptable wrt S. Then
(i) S’ = S  {A} is admissible, and
(ii) A’ is acceptable wrt S’.
Proof (i) We need only to show that S’ is conflict-free. Assume the
contrary. Therefore, there exists an argument B  S s.t.
A attacks B or B attacks A.
From the admissibility of S and the acceptability of A, there is an
argument B’  S such that
B’ attacks B or B’ attacks A.
Since S is conflict-free, it follows that B’ attacks A. But then there is an
argument B" in S s.t.
B" attacks B’. Contradiction !!
(ii) Obvious.
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The following theorem follows directly from the fundamental lemma.
Theorem 1 Let AF be an argumentation framework.
(i) The set of all admissible sets of AF form a complete partial order wrt.
set inclusion.
(ii) For each admissible set S of AF, there exists an preferred extension E
of AF such that S  E.
Theorem 1 together with the fact that the empty set is always admissible,
implies the following corollary:
Corollary 2 Every argumentation framework possesses at least one
preferred extension.
Hence, preferred extension semantics is always defined for any
argumentation framework.
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Stable Semantics for Argumentation
We introduce the following notion of stable extension and show that
grounded stable extensions provide so called skeptical semantics.
Definition 5 A conflict-free set of arguments S is called stable extension iff
S attacks each argument which does not belong to S.
Formally,
(A  Arg) [A S => (B  S)(attacks(B,A)]
We will show later on that in the context of game theory, our notion of
stable extension coincides with the notion of stable solutions of n-person
games introduced by Von Neuman and Morgenstern in 1944.
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It is easy to see that the following holds
Lemma 3 S is a stable extension iff S = { A | A is not attacked by S}.
It will turns out later that this proposition underlines exactly the way
the notions of
•stable models in logic programming,
•extensions in Reiter’s default logic, and
•stable expansion in Moore’s autoepistemic logic are defined.
The relations between stable extension and preferred extension are
clarified in the following lemma.
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Lemma 4 Every stable extension is a preferred extension, but not vice
versa.
Proof It is clear that each stable extension is a preferred extension. To show
that the reverse does not hold, we construct the following argumentation
framework:
AF = (AR,attacks) with AR = {A} and attacks = {(A,A)}.
Here, the empty set is a preferred extension of AF which is clearly not
stable.
On the other hand, in examples 1 and 4, preferred extensions and stable
extension semantics coincide.
Though stable semantics is not defined for every argumentation system, an
often asked question is whether or not argumentation systems with no
stable extensions represent meaningful systems ???
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In part (2) of this paper, we will provide meaningful argumentation systems
without stable semantics, and thus provide an definite answer to this
question.
Fixpoint Semantics and Grounded (Sceptical) Semantics
We show in this chapter that argumentation can be characterized by a
fixpoint theory providing an elegant way to introduce grounded (skeptical)
semantics.
Definition 6 The characteristic function of an argumentation framework
AF, denoted by FAF, = <AR,attacks> is defined as follows:
FAF: 2AR -> 2AR
FAF(S) = { A | A is acceptable wrt S }
Notation As we always refer to an arbitrary but fixed argumentation
framework AF, we often write F instead of FAF for short.
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Lemma 5 A conflict-free set S of arguments is admissible iff S  F(S).
Proof The lemma follows immediately from the property
"If S is conflict-free then F(S) is also conflict-free".
So we need only to prove this property. Assume that there are A,A’ in F(S)
such that A attacks A’. Thus, there exists B is S such that B attacks A.
Hence there is B’ in S such that B’ attacks B. Contradiction !!
So F(S) is conflict free.
It is easy to see that if an argument A is acceptable wrt S then A is also
acceptable wrt. any superset S’ of S. From this fact follows immediately
the next lemma.
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Lemma 6 FAF is monotonic (wrt. set inclusion).
Definition 7 An argumentation framework AF = <AR,attacks> is finitary
iff for each argument A, there are only finitely many arguments in AR
which attack A.
Lemma 7 If AF is finitary then FAF is ω-continuous.
Proof Let S0  ...  Sn  .. be an increasing sequence of sets of
arguments, let
S = { Si | i  N}
Let A  FAF(S). Since there are only finitely many arguments which
attack A, there exists a number m such that A  FAF(Sm).
Therefore,
FAF(S) = {FAF(Si) | i  N}
and FAF is ω-continuous.
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Consequently, it follows from the Theorem of Knaster and Tarski that
function FAF has the least fix point.
Thus the following definition is justified.
Definition 8 The grounded extension of an argumentation framework
AF, denoted by GEAF, is the least fixed point of FAF.
Example 3 (Continuation of example 1)
It is easy to see: FAF(Ø) = {i2},
FAF2(Ø) = {i1,i2},
FAF3(Ø) = FAF2(Ø)
…
Thus GEAF = {i1,i2}. Note that GEAF is also the only preferred extension
of AF.
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Example 4 (Continuation of the Nixon-example).
Let
AF = <AR,attacks> with AR = {A,B} and attacks = {(A,B),(B,A)}
Then it follows immediately that the grounded extension is empty, i.e.
a sceptical reasoner will not conclude anything.
The following notion of complete extension provides the link between
preferred extensions (credulous semantics), and grounded extension
(sceptical semantics).
Definition 9 An admissible set S of arguments is called a complete
extension iff each argument which is acceptable wrt. S, belongs to S.
Intuitively, the notion of complete extensions captures the kind of
confident rational agents who believes in everything he can defend.
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Lemma 8 A conflict-free set of arguments E is a complete extension iff
E = FAF(E).
Proof Note that
FAF(E) = {A | A is acceptable wrt. E}
The relations between preferred extensions, grounded extensions and
complete extensions is given in the following theorem.
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Definition 8 The grounded extension of an argumentation framework
AF, denoted by GEAF, is the least fixed point of FAF.
Example 5 (Continuation of example 3). It is easy to see:
FAF(Ø) = {i2}
FAF2(Ø) = {i1,i2}
FAF3(Ø) = {i1,i2} = FAF 2(Ø)
Thus GEAF = {i1,i2}. Note that GEAF is also the only preferred extension of AF.
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The relations between preferred extensions, grounded extensions and
complete extensions is given in the following theorem.
Theorem 2 (i) Each preferred extension is a complete extension, but
not vice versa.
(ii) The grounded extension is the least (wrt set inclusion) complete
extension.
(iii) The complete extensions form a complete semilattice wrt. set
inclusion.
Proof (i) It is obvious from the fixpoint definition of complete extensions
that every preferred extension is a complete extension.
The Nixon diamond example provides a counter example that the
reverse does not hold since the empty set is a complete extension but
not a preferred one.
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(ii) Obvious
(iii) Let SE be a non-empty set of complete extensions.
Let LB = { E | E is admissible and E  E’ for each E’ in SE }.
It is clear that GE  LB. So LB is not empty. Let S = E{ E | E  LB}.
It is clear that S is admissible, i.e. S  F(S). Let E = lub(Fi(S)) for ordinals i.
Then it is clear that E is a complete extension and E  LB.
Thus E = S. So E is the glb of SE.
Remark In general, the intersection of all preferred extensions does not
coincide with the grounded extension.
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Sufficient Conditions for Coincidence between Different Semantics
Well-Founded Argumentation Frameworks
We want to give in this paragraph a sufficient condition for the
coincidence between the grounded semantics and preferred extension
semantics as well as stable semantics.
Definition 9 An argumentation framework is well-founded iff there exists
no infinite sequence A0,A1,...,An,... such that for each i, Ai+1 attacks Ai.
The following theorem shows that well-founded argumentation
frameworks have exactly one extension.
Theorem 3 Every well-founded argumentation framework has exactly
one complete extension which is grounded, preferred and stable.
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Proof Assume the contrary, i.e. there exist a well-founded argumentation
framework whose grounded extension is not a stable extension.
Let AF=(AR,attacks) be such a argumentation framework where
S = { A | A  AR-GEAF and A is not attacked by GEAF }
is nonempty.
Now
we want to show that each argument A in S is attacked by S itself.
Let A  S. Since A is not acceptable wrt GEAF, there is an attack B
against A such that B is not attacked by GEAF. From the definition of S,
it is clear that B does not belong to GEAF. Hence, B belongs to S.
Thus there exists an infinite sequence A1, A2, ... such that for each i, Ai+1
attacks Ai. Contradiction.
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Coherent Argumentation Frameworks
Now, we want to give a condition for the coincidence between stable
extensions and preferred extensions.
In general, the existence of a preferred extension which is not stable
indicates the existence of some "anomalies" in the corresponding
argumentation framework.
For example, the argumentation framework
<{A},{(A,A)}>
has an empty preferred extension which is not stable. Note that this
argumentation framework corresponding to the logic program p ← not p
is of this kind.
So it is interesting to find sufficient conditions to avoid such anomalies.
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Definition 10 (i) An argumentation framework AF is said to be coherent if
each preferred extension of AF is stable.
(ii) We say that an argumentation framework AF is relatively grounded if its
grounded extension coincides with the intersection of all preferred
extensions.
It follows directly from the definition that there exists at least one stable
extension in a coherent argumentation framework.
Motivation. Imagine an exchange of arguments between you and me about
some proposition C. You start by putting forward an argument A0 supporting C. I don’t agree with C, and so I present an argument A1 attacking
your argument A0.
To defend A0 and so C, you put forward another argument A2 attacking my
argument A1. Now I present A3 attacking A2.
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If we stop at this point, A0 is defeated. It is clear that A3 plays a decisive
role in the defeat of A0 though A3 does not directly attack A0.
It is said that A3 represents an indirect attack against A0.
In general, we say that an argument B indirectly attacks A if there exists a
finite sequence A0,..,A2n+1 such that
(i) A = A0 and B = A2n+1, and
(ii) for each i, 0 <i < 2n, Ai+1 attacks Ai.
An argument B is said to be controversial wrt. A if B indirectly attacks
A and indirectly defends A. Hence if some C attacks A We have the
following picture
B →> A ← C <← B
An argument is controversial if it is controversial wrt. some argument A.
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Definition 11 (i) An argumentation framework is uncontroversial if none of
its arguments is controversial.
(ii) An argumentation framework is limited controversial if there exists no
infinite sequence of arguments
A0,...,An,... such that Ai+1 is controversial wrt Ai.
It is clear that every uncontroversial argumentation framework is limited
controversial but not vice versa.
Theorem 4 (i) Every limited controversial argumentation framework is
coherent.
(ii) Every uncontroversial argumentation framework is coherent and
relatively grounded.
Proof follows from the following lemmas 9,10.
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For the proof of lemmas 9,10, we need a couple of new notations. We
shall not prove these lemmas, but the concepts are intersting.
An argument A is said to be a threat to a set of argument S if A attacks S
and A is not attacked by S.
A set of arguments D is called a defense of a set of argument S
if D attacks each threat to S.
Lemma 9 Let AF be a limited controversial argumentation framework.
Then there exists at least a nonempty complete extension E of AF.
Lemma 10 Let AF be an uncontroversial argumentation framework, and A
be an argument such that A is not attacked by the grounded extension GE
of AF and A  GE.
Then
(i) there exists a complete extension E1 such that A  E1, and
(ii) there exists a complete extension E2 such that E2 attacks A.
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Corollary 11 Every limited controversial argumentation framework possesses
at least one stable extension.
This corollary in fact gives the answer to an often asked question about the
existence of stable semantics of knowledge representation formalisms like
Reiter’s default logic, logic programming or autoepistemic logic.
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