US nuclear forces, 2008

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Vol. 64, No. 1, p. 50-53, 58
DOI: 10.2968/064001012
U.S. nuclear forces, 2008
BY Robert S. Norris & Hans M. Kristensen
he past year was an im­
portant one for nuclear devel­
the responsive force or inactive stock­
pile.1 The Defense Department removed
opments in the United States. an additional 5,150 warheads from the
In 2007, it restarted small­ stockpile for future dismantlement, a
scale production of nuclear consequence of the administration’s De­
weapons for the first time in 15 years, cember 18, 2007 announcement to reduce
though reduction of the stockpile contin­ the stockpile by “nearly 50 percent” by
ues; nuclear weapons were flown across the end of 2007.2 An additional 15-percent
the country accidentally; and Congress reduction will be achieved by 2012, leav­
rejected administration plans for new ing a stockpile of nearly 4,500 warheads.
warheads, asking instead for a far-reach­
The requirement for this many weap­
ing review of U.S. nuclear deterrence ons arises from National Security Pres­
policy and strategy.
idential Directive 14,
In 2002, the United
signed by President
States signed an agree­
George W. Bush on June
ment with Russia to
28, 2002, and the Nucle­
reduce “operational­
ar Weapons Employ­
The United States
ly deployed” strategic
ment Policy, signed by
reduced its nuclear
warheads to between
then–Defense Secre­
stockpile to 5,400
1,700 and 2,200 by the
tary Donald Rumsfeld in
end of 2012. The Unit­
2004. The latter states:
ed States passed the
“U.S. nuclear forces
production of
halfway mark in 2007
must be capable of, and
warheads resumed
toward implement­
be seen to be capable of,
at Los Alamos
ing this agreement, the
destroying those critical
National Laboratory.
Moscow Treaty (also
war-making and war­
known as the Strategic
supporting assets and
Plans for new
Offensive Reductions
capabilities that a poten­
nuclear warheads
Treaty, or SORT). Ac­
tial enemy leadership
cordingly, reduction
values most and that it
o f U . S . i n t e r c o n t i ­­would rely on to achieve
nental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and its own objectives in a post-war world.”3
nuclear cruise missiles continued, as
The military translation of this guid­
did the readjustment to deployments ance is Operations Plan (OPLAN) 8044
of nuclear-powered ballistic missile Revision 05, the national nuclear war
submarines (SSBNs).
plan from October 2004. This differs
As of January 2008, the U.S. stockpile from the Cold War-era Single Integrat­
contained an estimated 5,400 nuclear ed Operational Plan (SIOP) because
warheads: approximately 4,075 opera­ it includes “a family of plans applicational warheads comprised of 3,575 stra­ ble in a wider range of scenarios” and
tegic and 500 nonstrategic warheads; and “provides more flexible options to as­
about 1,260 additional warheads held in sure allies, and dissuade, deter, and if
Bu lleti n of th e Atom ic Sc ien tists
necessary, defeat adversaries in a wider
range of contingencies.”4 It also includes
executable, scenario- based strike op­
tions against regional states, including
North Korea and Iran, that were origi­
nally added to the March 2003 OPLAN
8044 Revision 03.5
ICBMs. Reduction of the Minuteman
III missile force began on July 12, 2007,
with the deactivation of the first of 50
ICBMs (and five launch control centers)
of the 564th Missile Squadronof the 341st
Space Wing at Malmstrom Air Force
Base (AFB) in Montana. The air force
plans 0 reduce the ICBM force from
500 to 450 by mid-2008. The 1994 Nu­
clear Posture Review (NPR) established
an ICBM force of “450/500 Minuteman
III missiles, each carrying a single war­
head,” but the air force was not ordered
to implement the decision until the 2006
Quadrennial Defense Review.
Six years after SORT was signed, the
air force is gradually reducing the num­
ber of warheads on ICBMs from rough­
ly 1,600 in 2003 to approximately 764
today, with a goal of 500 warheads on
450 missiles by the end of 2012. This­
means that there will be multiple war­
heads on some ICBMs, a reversal of the
single-warhead decision stated in the
1994 Nuclear Posture Review. Hundreds
of additional warheads will be kept in
reserve for redeployment if necessary.
To compensate for the lost capability,
the air force is upgrading some ICBMs
with new warheads. Beginning in Oc­
tober 2006, the more powerful W87
warhead (from retired MX Peacekeep­
er ICBMs) replaced W62 warheads at
Warren AFB in Wyoming. (See January/
February 2007 Bulletin.) This upgrade,
scheduled to be completed in 2011, is
part of a multibillion dollar, eight-part
overhaul of the entire Minuteman III
force that involves replacing the en­
gines, fuel, guidance sets, and software.
Vol. 64, No. 1, p. 50-53, 58
DOI: 10.2968/064001012
Boeing delivered the 513th guidance set
to the air force in March 2007, a pro­
duction run that is intended to continue
through early 2009.
Only one Minuteman III missile flight­
test was launched in 2007, compared to
four in 2006. The missile was launched
from Vandenberg AFB in California on
February 7, and delivered a single, un­
armed warhead approximately 4,200
miles (6,760 kilometers) with impact on
a water target east of Kwajalein in the
Marshall Islands.
Submarine-launched and submarine
ballistic missiles (SLBMs). The SSBN
fleet is comprised of 14 submarines (two
are in overhaul) that carry approximately
1,728 operational warheads—close to 38
percent of the operational nuclear arse­
nal. Many warheads have been removed
from Trident II submarines to meet
2001 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
(START) requirements and to keep pace
with future SORT goals.
The upgrade of Pacific-based SSBNs
from Trident I C4 SLBMs to the longer­
range and more accurate Trident II D5
is scheduled to be completed in 2008,
when the Alabama finishes its backfit.
In addition to the W76, the D5 carries
the W88, the highest-yield ballistic mis­
sile warhead in the U.S. arsenal.
In 2007, we obtained information
from the National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA) showing that
the Bush administration had decided
in 2005 that 63 percent of the approxi­
mately 3,200-warhead W76 inventory
will be modified under a life-extension
program (LEP) lasting through 2021.
The program will produce an estimated
2,000 W76-1/Mk-4A warheads with in­creased capability against hardened
targets.6 “With the accuracy of D5 and
Mk-4, just by changing the fuse in the
Mk-4 reentry body, you get a signifi­
cant improvement,” wrote the head of
the navy’s Strategic Systems Program in
1997. “The Mk-4, with a modified fuze
and Trident II accuracy, can meet the
original D5 hard target requirement,”
he explained.7 The first production unit
of the modified warhead, known as the
W76-1/Mk-4A, was scheduled to be de­
livered to the navy in October 2007 but
was delayed. Initial operational capabili­
ty is expected around March 2008, when
the first two launch tubes will be loaded
with W76-1/Mk-4A warheads.8
Beginning in 2014, if approved by Con­
gress, the navy plans to begin replacing
the W76 warheads in the D5s with new
ones from the Reliable Replacement
Warhead (RRW) Program, RRW-1 war­
heads (sometimes called WR-1s). The
RRW-1 is based on the never-deployed
Skua-9 (named after the predatory sea­
bird), a two-stage thermonuclear war­
head design developed by Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratory and
tested several times before the 1974
Threshold Test Ban Treaty, which lim­
ited underground tests to 150 kilotons.
With additional modern surety features,
the RRW-1 will be incorporated into the
Mk-5 reentry body that is used for the
W88. The navy has approximately 500
excess Mk-5s in storage.9
The navy continued its redeployment
of the SSBN fleet, transferring the Alas-
ka from the Pacific to the Atlantic for
homeporting beginning in 2008 at Kings
Bay, Georgia (after a refueling overhaul
at Virginia’s Norfolk Naval Shipyard). In
2007, the Henry M. Jackson returned to
Bangor, Washington, from its upgrade to
the D5 missile. Since 2002 the navy has
transferred five SSBNs from the Atlan­
tic to the Pacific in a reorientation of the
sea-based deterrent force’s focus to in­
crease coverage of targets in China, ac­
cording to navy officials. (The SSBNs
also target Russia and North Korea.)
More than 60 percent of all U.S. SSBN
deterrent patrols now take place in the
Pacific, compared to an average of only
15 percent during the 1980s.
Three Trident II D5 missiles were
test-launched during 2007 in two events.
The Tennessee launched two missiles
from the Eastern Test Range off the
Florida coast on May 15. The missiles
were the first to carry the new Lock­
heed Low-Cost Test Missile Kit, which
converts an operational missile into test
configuration and contains range safety
devices and flight telemetry instrumen­
tation. On November 29 the Henry M.
Jackson test-launched a single missile
from the Western Test Range in an op­
eration to certify the sub for deployment
after a lengthy shipyard period and con­
version from C4 to D5 SLBMs.
The navy has begun design develop­
ment studies of a new class of nuclear­
powered ballistic missile submarines,
tentatively known as SSBN(X).
Bombers and bomber weapons. Ap­
proximately 1,080 nuclear weapons are
earmarked for delivery by long-range
stockpile reduction milestones
The United
States begins
reducing its
Cold War
George H. W.
Bush speeds up
the reduction
of the stockpile,
which consists
of 21,000
President Bill
Clinton slows
the pace of
the stockpile
levels out at
around 10,500
The United
States completes
of the warheads
from previously
George W. Bush
a “nearly
reduction in the
stockpile, to
be achieved by
The 50 percent
reduction is
implemented five
years early.
The United
States aims
to reduce the
stockpile by an
additional 15
percent by 2012,
which will leave
roughly 4,600
MA R CH/A P R IL 2 0 0 8
B ul l e tin o f the Ato mic Sc ie nt i s t s
Vol. 64, No. 1, p. 50-53, 58
DOI: 10.2968/064001012
B-2A Spirit and B-52H
St ra t o fo r t re s s b o m b ­
The U.S. arsenal
ers. B-2 and B-52 aircraft
can carry various nutype /designation
year deployed
warheads x yield (kilotons) active/spares
clear bombs, including
the B61-7 strategic bomb
and the B83 high-yield
LGM-30G Minuteman III
strategic bomb. The B-2
1 W62 x 170
can also carry the B61-11
1–3 W78 x 335 (MIRV)
“bunker-buster” (rebuilt
2006 (1986)
1 W87 x 300*
B61-11s were delivered
to the air force in 2007),
and the B-52 can carry air­
launched cruise missiles
(ALCMs). A modif ied
UGM-133ATrident II D5 288
warhead for ALCMs, the
6 W76 x 100 (MIRV)
W80-3, was scheduled for
6 W88 x 455 (MIRV)
delivery in 2008, but plans
have been deferred while
the air force and Congress
determine the long-term
B-52H Stratofortress
ALCM/W80-1 x 5–150
requirements for nuclear
B-2 Spirit
B61-7/-11, B83-1
cruise missiles. (For more
on nuclear cruise missiles,
see November/December
2007 Bulletin.)
Nonstrategic forces
The advanced cruise
Tomahawk SLCM
1 W80-0 x 5–150
missile (ACM), which the
B61-3, -4 bombs
B-52 can carry, has been
withdrawn from active
service. The air force is
Grand total
studying whether to de­
stroy them or convert
them into convention­
ACM: advanced cruise missile; ALCM: air-launched cruise missile; ICBM: intercontinental ballistic missile;
MIRV: multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle; SLCM: sea-launched cruise missile; SLBM: submarineal cruise missiles. 10 The
launched ballistic missile.
W80-1 warheads are being
* The W87 was previously deployed on the MX Peacekeeper, that last of which was deactivated in 2005.
moved to an underground
** Two additional subs with 48 missiles are normally in overhaul and not available for deployment. Their 288
storage facility at Kirt­
warheads are considered part of the responsive force of reserve warheads. Deployment of the W76-1/Mk-4A is
scheduled to begin in March 2008.
land AFB in New Mexico
***The first figure is the aircraft inventory, including those used for training, testing, and backup; the second is the
until the air force decides
primary mission aircraft inventory, the number of operational aircraft assigned for nuclear and/or conven¬tional missions.
whether they should be
The large pool of bombs and cruise missiles allows for multiple loading possibilities depending on the mission.
We assume that half of the ALCM’s have been withdrawn from operational status as a consequence of the Bush
dismantled or used to re­
administration’s 2007 stockpile decision. The ACM was retired in 2007.
place older W80-1 war­
Approximately 1,260 additional warheads are in reserve, and roughly 5,150 await dismantlement. Spares are
heads on the ALCM fleet.
not counted by the administration as operational warheads.
The decision to retire the
ACM is part of the air
force’s contribution to meeting SORT were mistakenly loaded onto a B-52 in Military Times and was reported to
limits by reducing its inventory of nucle­ alongside six ACMs without warheads have been labeled by the government as
ar cruise missiles to 528 by 2012.11 In ad­ and flown across the United States to a “Bent Spear,” the second-highest nu­
dition, all ALCMs will be removed from Barksdale, where the live missiles sat clear incident level in the U.S. military,
Barksdale AFB in Louisiana and based at unattended on the tarmac. For more behind only “Broken Arrow.”12 However,
than a day, the air force did not know according to information we received
Minot AFB in North Dakota.
A serious safety breach occurred on that the nuclear weapons had left their from the air force, the mishap is not on
August 30, 2007, during the transfer of high-security storage site at Minot. The Air Combat Command’s list of nuclear
some ACMs from Minot AFB. Six ACMs dramatic failure of the nuclear command weapons incidents. An initial air force
with nuclear warheads still installed and control system was first described investigation has been broadened to
Bu lleti n of th e Atom ic Sc ien tists
Vol. 64, No. 1, p. 50-53, 58
DOI: 10.2968/064001012
other agencies, and Congress has stated
that it plans to hold hearings.
Nonstrategic nuclear weapons. The
size of the U.S. operational nonstrategic
(tactical) nuclear weapons arsenal re­
mains approximately 500, with another
790 in the inactive stockpile. Nonstrate­
gic weapons include the B61-3 and B61-4
gravity bombs, as well as the W80-0
warhead used on the nuclear Tomahawk
land-attack cruise missile.
In 2007, we disclosed that the U.S.
Air Force had quietly removed nucle­
ar weapons from Ramstein Air Base in
Germany.13 Seven other bases in six Eu­
ropean countries host an estimated 350
B61-3 and B61-4 gravity bombs for de­
livery by various U.S. and NATO air­
craft. The 4th Fighter Wing at Seymour
Johnson AFB in North Carolina also has
a nuclear strike mission in support of
overseas contingencies. Additional in­
active tactical bombs are in reserve sta­
tus stored at Nellis AFB in Nevada and
Kirtland AFB.
Approximately 100 active Tomahawk
sea-launched cruise missiles have nuclear warheads, and another 200 are
kept in inactive reserve. None of the
weapons is deployed at sea, kept in­
stead at the Strategic Weapons Facili­
ties at Bangor, Washington, and King’s
Bay, Georgia, alongside strategic weap­
ons for the SSBNs.
Nuclear warhead production. The
United States has formally resumed
small-scale production of nuclear weap­
ons for the first time since 1992. The
NNSA announced in September 2007
that it had certified the first-ever W88
warhead equipped with a replacement
plutonium core (pit) for entry into the
nuclear stockpile. The pit was produced
by the TA-55 facility at Los Alamos Na­
tional Laboratory in July 2007 after
more than a decade of planning and en­
gineering; the goal is to be able to manu­
facture 10 W88 pits per year to replace
those destroyed during routine evalua­
tion. After W88 production is complet­
ed, the intention is to produce pits for
other stockpiled warheads and expand
Los Alamos’s capacity to 30–50 pits per
year. NNSA has also proposed building
a larger factory with a capacity of ap­
proximately 125 pits per year.
The Bush administration has proposed
large-scale production of so-called
reliable replacement warheads, the first
of which (RRW-1s) would complement
W76-1 and W88 warheads on Trident
II D5 SLBMs. In the medium term, the
plan involves mixing existing and RRW
warheads in the stockpile to increase
the diversity of warheads on each of
the three legs of the nuclear triad. The
new warheads will, the administration
claims, have more flexible design pa­
rameters and be simpler and cheaper
to maintain without nuclear testing. In
the long term, all warhead types in the
“enduring” stockpile could be replaced.
In addition to providing a warhead for
the navy’s Mk-4 reentry body, the first
phase of RRW also includes a warhead
for the Mk-21 (W87) and Mk-12A (W78)
reentry vehicles for the ICBM force.14
The Nuclear Weapons Council (a joint
body of the Defense Department and
NNSA) apparently has approved pre­
liminary design work on an RRW-2, a
candidate warhead to replace a portion
of the W78 warheads.15
The administration’s plan, which
would require refurbishment of the nu­
clear weapons production complex, ran
into congressional opposition in 2007,
when the House and Senate agreed to
deny funding for the program until a
comprehensive review of the nuclear
posture has been carried out.16
Additionally, a technical review by the
Jasons panel in September 2007 conclud­
ed that the administration’s RRW certi­
fication plan was inadequate, and that
“additional experiments and analysis
are needed that explore failure modes,
and assess the impact on performance
of new manufacturing processes. Sub­
stantial work remains on the physical
understanding of the surety mechanisms
that are of high priority to the RRW pro­
gram.” The group also said, “It is too
early to assess how the [RRW] will im­
pact the modernization and streamlining
of NNSA’s production complex.”17
Warhead dismantlement. The
NNSA announced in October 2007 “an
astounding 146 percent increase in dis­
mantled nuclear weapons over the pre­
vious year’s rate, almost tripling its
goal of a 49 percent increase.” This
achievement “sends a clear signal to the
world that this administration remains
committed to reducing the number of
nuclear weapons in the U.S. nuclear
stockpile,” NNSA declared.18
While such a percentage looks impres­
sive, the actual number of dismantled
warheads is less so—and the real figures
are secret. What NNSA failed to say was
that because it dismantled few warheads
in 2006, even a 146-percent increase does
not amount to much when compared to
the overall size of the stockpile. Furthermore, the rates are miniscule compared
to the number dismantled annually in
the 1990s. (See January/February 2004
Bulletin.) We estimate that approximate­
ly 100 warheads were dismantled in 2006
and roughly 250 in 2007, about the same
number as in 2003. That is a far cry from
the average of almost 1,800 warheads
dismantled per year during the 1990s.
At the current rate, the backlog of re­
tired nuclear weapons—even including
the “nearly 50 percent” cut in the size of
the overall stockpile to be accomplished
by 2012—will take through 2023 to com­
plete, the lowest dismantlement rate of
any U.S. administration since the Eisen­
hower administration. The fiscal 2008
Defense Authorization Act calls for a
detailed report on the existing plan and
schedule for retiring and dismantling
excess warheads.19
The number of warheads scheduled for
dismantlement will force the Pantex Plant
in Texas to increase its storage capacity
to house plutonium pits. Pantex already
stores more than 14,000 pits but is ex­
pected to run out of room in 2014. To increase the storage capacity to 20,000 pits
(the maximum permitted by the environmental impact statement for the site), in
July 2007 plant operator Babcock & Wil­
cox asked the NNSA for authorization to
build six new storage magazines.20 <
For notes, please see p. 58.
Nuclear Notebook is prepared by Robert S. Norris
of the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC)
and Hans M. Kristensen of the Federation of American Scientists. Direct inquiries to NRDC, 1200
New York Ave. N.W., Suite 400, Washington, D.C.,
20005; 202.289.6868, and visit
for more nuclear weapons data.
MA R CH/A P R IL 2 0 0 8
B ul l e tin o f the Ato mic Sc ie nt i s t s
Vol. 64, No. 1, p. 50-53, 58
DOI: 10.2968/064001012
D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense, December
1997), available at
4. Janne E. Nolan, An Elusive Consensus: Nuclear
Weapons and American Security after the Cold War
(Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1999), pp. 35–39.
5. Ibid., p. 40.
Kyoto Protocol
continued from p. 48
1. Al Gore, Earth in the Balance: Ecology and the
Human Spirit (Houghton Mifflin: New York, 1992),
p. 240.
2. Eric Pianin, “Emissions Treaty Softens Kyoto
Targets,” Washington Post, July 29, 2001, p. A23.
3. Gwyn Prins and Steve Rayner, “The Wrong
Trousers: Radically Rethinking Climate Policy,”
London School of Economics Mackinder Centre and the James Martin Institute, joint discussion paper, November 18, 2007, available at www
4. Richard N. Cooper, “Toward a Real Global
Warming Treaty,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 77, no. 2,
pp. 66–79 (1998).
5. Edward A. Parson, Protecting the Ozone Layer:
Science and Strategy (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2003).
6. Dallas Burtraw and Karen Palmer, “The
­ aparazzi Take a Look at a Living Legend: The SO2
Cap-and-Trade Program for Power Plants in the
United States,” Resources for the Future, Discussion Paper 03-15, April 2003.
7. Gwyn Prins, The Heart of War: On Power,
Conflict and Obligation in the 21st Century (Routledge: London, 2001), pp. 22–23.
8. Various authors, “Special Issue: National
Case Studies of Institutional Capabilities to Implement Greenhouse Gas Reductions,” Global Environmental Change, vol. 3, no. 1 (1993).
9. Keith Bradsher, “Outsize Profits, and Questions, in Effort to Cut Warming Gases,” New York
Times, December 21, 2006, p. A1.
10. Michael Wara, “Is the Global Carbon Market
Working?” Nature, vol. 445, no. 7128, p. 595 (2007).
11. Ibid; Bradsher, “Outsize Profits, and Questions, in Effort to Cut Warming Gases.”
12. Gwyn Prins and Steve Rayner, “Time to
Ditch Kyoto,” Nature, vol. 449, no. 7165, pp. 973–975
(2007). See responses from John Schellnhuber,
“Kyoto: No Time to Rearrange the Deckchairs on
the Titanic,” Nature, vol. 450, no. 7168, p. 346 (2007),
and from Barry W. Brook, Nick Rowley, and Tim
F. Flannery, “Kyoto: Doing Our Best Is No Longer
Enough,” Nature, vol. 450, no. 7169, p. 478 (2007).
Nuclear notebook
continued from p. 53
1. According to the State Department, “the number of U.S. operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads was 3,696 as of December 31, 2006.”
State Department, Bureau of Verification, Compliance, and Implementation, “2007 Annual Report
on Implementation of the Moscow Treaty,” July 12,
2007, p. 1,
This number does not include some 288 warheads
on 48 submarine-launched ballistic missiles for
the two SSBNs in overhaul at any given time.
2. See White House, Office of the Press Secretary,
“President Bush Approves Significant Reduction in
Nuclear Weapons Stockpile,” December 18, 2007; Energy Department, National Nuclear Security Administration, “NNSA Releases Draft Plan to Transform
Nuclear Weapons Complex,” December 18, 2007;
“U.S. Accelerates Nuclear Stockpile Cuts: White
House,” Agence France Presse, December 19, 2007.
3. The Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy guidance is referenced in U.S. Joint Chiefs
of Staff, “Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations,” Final Coordination, JP 3-12, Comment
Matrix Combined Sorted December 21, 2004,
as of December 16, 2004, p. 5. Available at www
4. On the family of plans: Adm. J. O. Ellis, U.S.
Strategic Command (STRATCOM), Memorandum to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
“USSTRATCOM Request to Change the Name
of the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP)
to Operations Plan 8044,” January 3, 2003. On
flexibility: Gen. Richard B. Myers, Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs, “Written Posture Statement to
SAC-D,” Washington, D.C., April 27, 2005.
5. For a description of the STRATCOM document and recent updates to the strategic war plan,
Bu lleti n of th e Atom ic Sc ien tists
see: Hans M. Kristensen, “White House Guidance
Led to New Nuclear Strike Plans Against Proliferators,” Federation of American Scientists (FAS)
Strategic Security Blog, November 5, 2007, www
6. Hans M. Kristensen, “Administration Increases Submarine Nuclear Warhead Production
Plan,” FAS Strategic Security Blog, August 30,
7. Rear Adm. George P. Nanos, Strategic Systems Program director, “Strategic Systems Update,” Submarine Review, April 1997, pp. 12–17,
8. Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore national laboratories, “FY2007 National Hydrodynamic
Test Plan (Draft),” October 12, 2005, p. 76. Partially
declassified and released under Freedom of Information Act.
9. Hans M. Kristensen, personal conversation
with senior nuclear weapons lab official, 2007.
10. Hans M. Kristensen, “U.S. Air Force Decides to Retire Advanced Cruise Missile,”
FAS Strategic Security Blog, March 7, 2007,
11. It is possible that the air force has already
withdrawn the excess ALCMs from operational
12. Michael Hoffman, “B-52 Mistakenly Flies
with Nukes Aboard,” Military Times, September
10, 2007,
marine_nuclear_B52_070904w/; Joby Warrick and
Walter Pincus, “Missteps in the Bunker,” Washington Post, September 23, 2007, p. A1.
13. Hans M. Kristensen, “United States Removes Nuclear Weapons from German Base,
Documents Indicate,” FAS Strategic Security Blog, July 9, 2007, / blog /
14. Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore national laboratories, “FY2007 National Hydrodynamic Test Plan (Draft),” p. 143.
15. Hans M. Kristensen, personal conversation
with senior nuclear weapons lab official.
16. House Report 110-477, “Conference Report
to Accompany H.R. 1585, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008,” 110th Congress,
1st Sess., December 6, 2007, Sec. 1070.
17. Jasons, “Reliable Replace [sic] Warhead Executive Summary,” MITRE Corporation, JSR-07336E, September 7, 2007, p. 1.
18. NNSA, “Nuclear Weapons Dismantlement Rate Up 146 Percent,” October 1, 2007. This
achievement was repeated by Christine Rocca,
U.S. representative to the Conference on Disarmament, in a speech to the U.N. General Assembly as
proof of the U.S. commitment to disarmament and
nonproliferation. See: Christina Rocca, “Prepared
Statement to the General Debate in the First Committee,” October 9, 2007.
19. House Report 110-477, Sec. 3122.
20. J. Kent Fortenberry, BWXT technical director, Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, “Pantex Plant Weekly Report,” July 27, 2007.

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