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World Trade Report 2011 The WTO and preferential trade agreements: From co-existence to coherence
World Trade Report
The ever-growing number of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) is a
prominent feature of international trade. The World Trade Report 2011
describes the historical development of PTAs and the current landscape
of agreements. It examines why PTAs are established, their economic
effects, and the contents of the agreements themselves. Finally it
considers the interaction between PTAs and the multilateral trading
system.
Accumulated trade opening – at the multilateral, regional and unilateral
level – has reduced the scope for offering preferential tariffs under
PTAs. As a result, only a small fraction of global merchandise trade
receives preferences and preferential tariffs are becoming less
important in PTAs.
The report reveals that more and more PTAs are going beyond
preferential tariffs, with numerous non-tariff areas of a regulatory
nature being included in the agreements.
Global production networks may be prompting the emergence of these
“deep” PTAs as good governance on a range of regulatory areas is far
more important to these networks than further reductions in already
low tariffs. Econometric evidence and case studies support this link
between production networks and deep PTAs.
The report ends by examining the challenge that deep PTAs present to
the multilateral trading system and proposes a number of options for
increasing coherence between these agreements and the trading
system regulated by the WTO.
9 789287
037640
World Trade
Report 2011
The WTO and preferential trade agreements:
From co-existence to coherence
What is the World
Trade Report?
The World Trade Report is an
annual publication that aims to
deepen understanding about
trends in trade, trade policy
issues and the multilateral
trading system.
Using this report
The 2011 World Trade Report
is split into two main parts.
The first is a brief summary
of the trade situation in 2010.
The second part focuses on
the special theme of preferential
trade agreements.
Find out more
Website: www.wto.org
General enquiries:
[email protected]
Tel: +41 (0)22 739 51 11
This report is also available in
French and Spanish.
To order, please contact:
WTO Publications
World Trade Organization
154, rue de Lausanne
CH-1211 Geneva 21
Tel: (41 22) 739 52 08
Fax: (41 22) 739 54 58
Email: [email protected]
Online WTO bookshop:
http://onlinebookshop.wto.org
ISBN 978-92-870-3764-0
Printed in Switzerland
Cover designed by triptik
Report designed by Services Concept
© World Trade Organization 2011
Image credits (cover):
Cover top left – Brian Jackson – iStockphoto
Cover left centre – Hande Guleryuz Yuce – iStockphoto
Cover bottom left – geopaul – iStockphoto
Cover bottom centre – Christian Lagereek – iStockphoto
Cover bottom right – René Mansi – iStockphoto
Cover image top right – Heather Sapey-Pertin
Contents
Contents
Acknowledgements and Disclaimer
2
Foreword by the WTO Director-General
3
Executive summary
5
I
World trade in 2010
18
II
The WTO and preferential trade agreements:
From co-existence to coherence
40
A Introduction
42
1. Perspectives and insights in the World Trade Report 2011
44
2. Structure of the report
45
B Historical background and current trends
46
1. The formation of PTAs: a historical perspective
48
2. The evolution of PTAs: stylized facts
54
3. Trade flows related to PTAs
63
4. How preferential is trade?
72
5. Conclusions
85
C Causes and effects of PTAs: Is it all about preferences?
92
1. Motives for PTAs
2. The standard economics of PTAs
100
94
3. Going beyond the standard analysis
109
4. Conclusions
114
Technical Appendix: Systemic effects of PTAs
118
D Anatomy of preferential trade agreements
122
1. Are lower tariffs still important for PTAs?
124
2. Patterns in the content of PTAs
128
3. Production networks and deep PTAs
145
4. African regional cooperation: lessons from deep integration?
151
5. Conclusions
153
Appendix tables 157
EThe multilateral trading system and PTAs
164
1. Systemic effects of preferential tariff liberalization
166
2. Deep PTA provisions and the multilateral trading system
168
3. Regionalism and the WTO: historical perspective
182
4. The relationship between PTAs and the WTO
187
F Conclusions
196
Statistical appendix
199
Bibliography
228
Technical notes
239
Abbreviations and symbols
243
List of figures, tables, boxes and maps
245
WTO members
249
Previous World Trade Reports
250
1
world trade report 2011
Acknowledgements
The World Trade Report 2011 was prepared under the
general direction of the Deputy Director-General
Alejandro Jara and supervised by Patrick Low, Director
of the Economic Research and Statistics Division. The
writing of this year’s report was coordinated by Nadia
Rocha and Robert Teh. The principal authors of the
Report were Marc Bacchetta, Cosimo Beverelli, John
Hancock, Alexander Keck, Gaurav Nayyar, Coleman
Nee, Roberta Piermartini, Nadia Rocha, Martin Roy,
Michele Ruta, Robert Teh and Alan Yanovich. Other
written contributions were provided by Marc Auboin,
Manfred Elsig, Trudi Hartzenberg and Roy Santana.
Special acknowledgment is owed to Richard Baldwin
for his many suggestions and contributions to the
report. Trade statistics information was provided by the
Statistics Group of the Economic Research and
Statistics Division, coordinated by Hubert Escaith,
Julia de Verteuil, Andreas Maurer and Jurgen
Richtering. Aishah Colautti assisted in the preparation
of the graphical input and Paulette Planchette,
assisted by Véronique Bernard, prepared the
bibliography. Research assistance was provided by
Hans Baumgarten, Pavel Chakraborty, Claudia
Hofmann, Joelle Latina, Alen Mulabdic, Andreas
Lendle, and Gianluca Orefice.
Other Divisions in the WTO Secretariat provided
valuable comments on drafts at various stages of
preparation. The authors are particularly grateful to
several individuals in the Legal Affairs Division (Valerie
Hughes, Gabrielle Marceau and Edna Robles), the
Trade in Services Division (Rolf Adlung) and Trade
Policies Review Division (Rohini Acharya, Jo-Ann
Crawford, and Christelle Renard). The following
individuals from outside the WTO Secretariat also
made useful comments on earlier drafts: Dale
Andrews, Ann Capling, Manfred Elsig, Gary Hufbauer,
Lena Lindberg, Xuepeng Liu, Mark Manger, JeanChristophe Maur, Alessandro Nicita, Emanuel Ornelas,
Joost Pauwelyn, John Ravenhill, Robert Staiger, Kati
Suominen, Tania Voon, Peter Williams, and John
Whalley.
The production of the Report was managed by
Paulette Planchette of the Economic Research and
Statistics Division in close cooperation with Anthony
Martin, Heather Sapey-Pertin and Helen Swain of the
Information and External Relations Division. The
translators in the Languages, Documentation and
Information Management Division worked hard to meet
tight deadlines. This year the WTO Secretariat
launched a Webpage discussion on the topic of the
World Trade Report 2011. The Webpage, which
attracted many stimulating contributions, was
managed by Joelle Latina, in collaboration with
Anthony Martin.
Disclaimer
The World Trade Report and any opinions reflected therein are the sole responsibility of the WTO
Secretariat. They do not purport to reflect the opinions or views of members of the WTO. The main authors
of the Report also wish to exonerate those who have commented upon it from responsibility for any
outstanding errors or omissions.
2
Foreword
Foreword by the WTO Director-General
This year's World Trade Report takes an in-depth fresh
look at preferential trade. The choice of this topic
reflects two significant trends in international trade
relations, both of which carry far-reaching implications
for the multilateral trading system. The first and most
readily evident of these is the continuing growth and
increasing
prominence
of
preferential
trade
agreements (PTAs). In the last two decades, the
number of PTAs has increased more than four-fold, to
around 300 active agreements today. There is no
reason to assume that PTAs will cease to grow in
number or that they will not form part of the long-term
tapestry of international trade relations. Secondly, the
content of PTAs continues to evolve and deepen,
reflecting important changes in the world economy.
This too raises vital questions about the focus and
reach of the WTO, and the value assigned by
governments to globally-based trade relations.
As tariff preferences have
diminished in importance,
non-tariff measures have
become relatively more
significant as determinants
of market access and the
conditions of competition.
Non-tariff measures come
in many shapes. They may
be designed to influence
competitive conditions in
markets, just like tariffs, or
they may focus on public
policy concerns such as
health, safety, and the
environment. These public
policy interventions also have trade consequences and
may be more or less discriminatory in their effects.
The perennial concern about the relationship between
the multilateral trading system and PTAs has provoked
different reactions among commentators and analysts.
Some would emphasize a clash of systems and
inherent inconsistencies between discriminatory and
non-discriminatory approaches to trade relations.
Others would point to the growing prominence of PTAs
as a reflection of the demise of multilateralism. Others
still would assert that regional and multilateral
arrangements are in essence complementary and
need to be fashioned accordingly. None of these
perspectives can singly capture the complexity of
international trade relations in a globalizing world.
For the most part, it would seem that non-tariff
measures of the public policy variety have remained
focused on consumer welfare and not benefits to
producers. However, the fact that interventions
putatively designed to protect consumers may also
favour producers can lead to concerns over hidden
protection and unwarranted market segmentation. In a
world where the WTO is having difficulty advancing an
updated multilateral agenda, the risks of preferencebased discrimination and market disintegration built
around regulatory divergence should not be disregarded.
Our report seeks to navigate a way through these
complexities in bringing new data and analyses to
understand these issues. It acknowledges the multiple
motivations for preferential approaches. At the same
time, the report identifies important ways in which the
focus of trade policy, particularly of the preferential
variety, is being reshaped to reflect the consequences
of past policies as well as changes in production
structures internationally.
In earlier times PTAs were most likely to be motivated
by the desire to avoid relatively high most-favoured
nation (MFN) tariffs. The theory on free trade areas
and customs unions mirrored this reality by placing the
notions of trade creation and trade diversion centrestage. At the same time, considerable attention has
been paid to the discriminatory effects of rules of
origin on the trade of third parties. More recently, this
context has lost some of its relevance because
underlying realities have changed. As the report
documents, average tariffs have fallen markedly in
recent years, making tariff preferences a more minor
motivation for entering into PTAs. Furthermore, it
seems that where MFN tariffs remain high they are
also excluded from preferential reductions, additionally
weakening this motivation.
An important additional element in the equation,
stemming from the emergence of supply chain
production as a prominent mode of twenty-firstcentury integration, is that new regulatory matters are
increasingly on PTA agendas. These include issues
such as investment, competition policy, government
procurement and harmonization or mutual recognition
of product and process standards. The report analyses
the content of a large number of PTAs in terms of
whether they augment WTO provisions in particular
policy areas and introduce entirely new issues. Both of
these tendencies are identified in many PTAs,
particularly those that have entered into force more
recently. Here, then, is another reason why we need to
remain attentive to policy fragmentation. To the extent
that the desire for deeper integration under PTAs, in
both WTO and non-WTO areas of regulation, is driven
by the logic of vertically integrated international
production structures, one is less likely to encounter
discriminatory intent lurking behind regulatory
cooperation in PTAs. But we should be mindful of the
possibility that even in the absence of intent, market
segmentation and discriminatory outcomes could be
an unavoidable consequence of these arrangements.
The report pays explicit attention to the question of
what is needed in a multilateral context to ensure that
3
WOrld Trade repOrT 2011
PTAsandtheWTOdonotsimplyrunonparalleltracks,
offering plentiful opportunities for inconsistency and
conflict. This focus explains the subtitle of the report
–“Fromco-existencetocoherence”.Whatthen,should
the WTO be doing? It has often been said that if the
WTO made progress in multilateral negotiations, both
on market access and rules, this would soften the
likelihood of clashes and inconsistencies with PTAs.
Thisisundoubtedlyavalidpoint,buttheexperienceof
the Doha Development Round during the last decade
hasraisedquestionsabouttheabilityandwillingness
of governments to advance the multilateral agenda. It
has also raised the need to connect the multilateral
andbilateral“brains”oftradepolicydriversandactors.
We need a better record if we are to attain greater
coherence between the WTO and PTAs through
successfulmultilateralnegotiations.
A second possibility is to continue the quest for
greaterlegalclarityanddetailintheWTOrulesabout
what is permissible under PTAs. Progress here could
blunt the likelihood of damaging discriminatory
outcomes under PTAs, whether intentional or
otherwise. Here again, however, years of effort in the
Doha Round and before to address multilateral
provisionsonPTAshaveyieldedlimitedresults.Itisfor
governments to determine whether they need greater
legal certainty in this domain. If they do, perhaps a
more circuitous route to the objective is precisely the
one that members have recently embarked upon. The
provisional establishment of the Transparency
Mechanism for Regional Trade Agreements may pave
thewayfornon-litigiousdeliberationsthatcouldbuild
confidence and understanding among members
regardingthemotives,contentsandpolicyapproaches
underpinningregionalinitiatives,leadingovertimetoa
sharedvisionandreinforcedlegalprovisions.
4
Thirdly, to the extent that PTAs are motivated by a
desire for deeper integration rather than market
segmentation, there could be a role for the WTO to
promotegreatercoherenceamongnon-competingbut
divergent regulatory regimes that in practice cause
geographical fragmentation or raise trade costs. This
agenda has been referred to as multilateralizing
regionalism. In some cases the multilateralization
effect occurs de facto because regulatory reforms
undertaken in a PTA context are applied in a nondiscriminatory manner. This MFN dividend could be
built upon in other policy areas. The feasibility of this
approachwouldneedtoberesearchedfurther.
Whateverviewonetakesofpreciselyhowtopromote
aglobalorientationintraderelations,thereisnodoubt
that we need to build towards a more stable and
healthier trading environment, where alternative trade
policyapproachesaremutuallysupportiveandbalance
equitablytheneedsofallnations.Itistothediscussion
of this agenda that this year's World Trade Report
seeks to make a contribution. I hope members will
haveafirstopportunitytoconsidersomeoftheissues
in this report at the upcoming 8 th WTO Ministerial
ConferenceinDecember2011.
Pascal Lamy
Director-General
Executive summary
Executive summary
Section A: Introduction
The report is divided into four main parts. The first
provides an historical analysis of preferential trade
agreements (PTAs) and a description of the current
landscape. It documents the large increase in PTA
activity in recent years, breaking this down by region,
level of economic development, and type of integration
agreement. It provides a precise estimate of how much
trade in PTAs receives preferential treatment.
The second section discusses the causes and
consequences of PTAs, focusing on both economic
and political factors. A distinction is made between
shallow and deep integration in order to suggest that
traditional theories do not fully explain the emerging
pattern of PTAs. The report examines in particular the
role of international production networks in prompting
the creation of deep PTAs.
The third section focuses on the policy content of
PTAs, with particular reference to the depth and scope
of commitments compared with those contained in the
WTO agreements. It supports the link between
production networks and PTAs with both statistical
evidence and case studies.
The final section identifies areas of synergies and
potential conflicts between PTAs and the multilateral
trading system and examines ways in which the two
“trade systems” can be made more coherent.
See page 42
Section B: Historical background
and current trends
The formation of trading blocs:
a historical perspective
Global trade relations have never been uniform or
monolithic and regional trading arrangements
have been around for centuries.
Regional trading arrangements have encompassed
empires and colonial spheres of influence, bilateral
commercial treaties and, more recently, multilateral
agreements. They have often overlapped and
interacted, creating a trade landscape defined less by
clear-cut
choices
between
regionalism
and
multilateralism – or discrimination and nondiscrimination – than by the complex interplay, even
competition, among multiple trade regimes.
Despite this complexity, in more recent times trade cooperation has become broader and more inclusive.
Defining landmarks in this trend have been the
establishment of the GATT in 1947 and the WTO in
1995. At the same time, trade relations have become
deeper and more far-reaching, incorporating areas
such as services trade, foreign investment, intellectual
property and regulatory regimes. These tendencies
are a clear reflection of the growing integration of the
world economy and the “internationalization” of
policies that were once considered domestic. In some
cases, regional agreements have progressed further in
this direction than the over-arching multilateral
framework.
Progress has not been continuous, and there have
been major set-backs and reversals along the way. The
economic depression of the early 1870s, for instance,
effectively brought the expansion of Europe's bilateral
trade treaties to an end, just as the “Great Depression”
of the early 1930s helped fuel the spread of defensive
and increasingly hostile trade blocs in the inter-war
period. Conversely, the push for a more open and
inclusive trading order has been strongest during
periods of economic expansion and international
peace. A main justification for creating the GATT in the
post-war period was the widely held belief that hostile
trade blocs had contributed directly to the economic
chaos of the 1930s and the outbreak of the Second
World War.
The establishment of the post-war multilateral
trading system did not diminish the attraction of
bilateral or regional approaches to trade
arrangements and led instead to a period of
creative interaction and sometimes tension
between multilateralism and regionalism.
5
world trade report 2011
The first wave of regionalism in the late 1950s and
1960s was driven by Western Europe's push for
continental integration, leading to the establishment of
the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957
and the European Free Trade Agreement (EFTA) in
1960. Throughout this period, GATT tariff cutting and
membership enlargement moved in tandem, first with
the Dillon Round in 1960-61 and then with the much
more ambitious Kennedy Round between 1964 and
1967.
Subsequent waves of regionalism, from around the
mid-1980s onwards, reflected an increasing embrace
of such arrangements in the Americas, Asia and Africa,
as well as in Europe. The continuing proliferation of
regional agreements over the last 25 years involves a
wide network of participants – including bilateral,
plurilateral and cross-regional initiatives – and
encompasses countries at different levels of economic
development – including “developed-developed”,
“developing-developing”, and “developed-developing”
alliances. These newest agreements also often
address WTO+ type issues, such as services, capital
flows, standards, intellectual property, regulatory
systems (many of which are non-discriminatory) and
commitments on labour and environment issues.
The Uruguay Round (1986-1994) coincided with a
period of growing regionalism and several issues,
including services and intellectual property, were
addressed for the first time both regionally and
multilaterally. The continuing proliferation of PTAs in
parallel with the Doha Round has provoked a debate
about coherence, compatibility and potential conflict
between multilateral and regional approaches to trade
cooperation. Among the questions addressed in this
debate are whether burgeoning regionalism signals a
weakening of international commitment to open trade,
and foreshadows a return to a more fragmented
trading system. Alternatively, PTAs may be part of a
broad pattern seen since the Second World War –
where some countries want to move “further and
faster” in trade rule-making than others, where
bilateral and regional agreements can have a positive,
“domino effect”, encouraging the pace of multilateral
cooperation (and vice versa), and where regional and
multilateral agreements are becoming coherent, not
conflicting, approaches to managing a more complex
and integrated world trading order.
Stylized facts about PTAs
PTA participation has accelerated over time and
become more widespread.
6
From the 1950s onwards, the number of active PTAs
increased more or less continuously to about 70 in
1990. Thereafter, PTA activity accelerated noticeably.
The number of PTAs in force in 2010 was close to
300. The surge in PTA activity is driven both by a
growing number of countries taking an interest in
reciprocal trade opening and by an increase in the
number of PTAs per country. All WTO members (with
the exception of Mongolia) belong to at least one PTA.
PTA activity has transcended regional boundaries.
One half of the PTAs currently in force are not strictly
“regional”. The advent of cross-regional PTAs has been
particularly pronounced in the last decade. The trend
towards a broader geographical scope of PTAs is even
more pronounced for those PTAs that are currently
under negotiation or have recently been signed (but
are not yet in force). Practically all of these are of the
cross-regional type.
PTAs have seen opposing trends towards further
rationalization on the one hand and a sprawling
web of new bilateral and overlapping deals on the
other.
Numerous
bilateral
agreements
have
been
consolidated into plurilateral agreements either via
accessions or negotiations between existing PTAs.
Examples include successive EU enlargements, the
consolidation of bilateral pacts between Eastern
European countries in the context of the Central
European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA) and the
conclusion of a PTA between Mercosur and the
Andean Community in the Latin American Integration
Association (LAIA) framework.
At the same time, a parallel trend is discernible towards
bilateral deals across regions. While many of these
bilateral arrangements are between developing
countries, developed countries have also played a part.
A consequence of this trend is an increased
fragmentation of trade relations, with countries
belonging to multiple, sometimes overlapping PTAs.
Free trade agreements are far more prevalent
than customs unions and a number of products
continue to be excluded from preferential access.
Free trade agreements account for more than threequarters of all PTAs in force. Although GATT
Article XXIV requires that import duties are to be
eliminated on substantially all trade among the
members of customs unions and free trade areas,
some products are often excluded. A recent study of
PTAs involving four major trading countries and their
partners shows that about 7 per cent of tariff lines in
the sample are excluded, either temporarily or
permanently. These products are mainly agricultural or
food items, and labour-intensive manufactured
products such as footwear and textiles.
The coverage of PTAs in terms of policy areas has
widened and deepened over time.
Notwithstanding the prevailing pattern of specific
product exclusions from tariff elimination, most recent
Executive summary
PTAs go beyond traditional tariff-cutting exercises and
may include such policy areas as services trade,
investment, intellectual property, technical barriers to
trade and dispute settlement. For instance, about onethird of PTAs in force today contain services
commitments compared to less than a tenth in 1990.
Stylized facts about trade flows related
to PTAs
The value of world trade between members of
preferential trade agreements has increased as
the number of PTAs has expanded.
Intra-PTA trade represented about 35 per cent of total
world merchandise trade in 2008, compared with 18
per cent in 1990.1 Preferential trade – that is, trade
actually receiving preferential tariff treatment –
represents a much smaller share of world trade.
However, it is still worth considering total trade among
PTA members because the latest generation of trade
agreements may be motivated by a broader set of
considerations than just tariff reductions, including the
development and maintenance of supply chains.
The share of manufactured goods in total intra-PTA
exports is the same as the share of manufactured
goods in world trade (65 per cent), and this share does
not vary much across PTAs. However, intra-PTA trade
in parts and components does vary significantly across
trade agreements, suggesting a link between some
PTAs and vertically integrated production structures.
Plurilateral trade agreements accounted for half of
global intra-PTA trade in 2008, while bilateral trade
agreements (including those where one party is a PTA)
accounted for the other half.
If many recent PTAs were designed to support
production networks, we might expect to see
greater geographic concentration of trade over
time, since many production networks are
regional in nature. Evidence of this exists only for
certain regions.
The share of intra-regional trade in Europe's total
exports remained roughly constant at around 73 per
cent from 1990 to 2009. Asia's intra-regional trade
share increased from 42 per cent to 52 per cent of
total exports during the same period. North America’s
intra-regional trade share rose from 41 per cent in
1990 to 56 per cent in 2000, but then fell back to
48 per cent in 2009, so there appears to be no global
pattern that applies to all industrialized regions.
Developing regions that predominantly export natural
resources have seen the share of intra-regional trade
in their total exports shares rise substantially over the
past 20 years or so, but they remain quite small.
The extent to which trade has become more
geographically concentrated differs depending on the
type of goods being traded. The share of intra-regional
trade in world exports of manufactured goods was
quite stable between 1990 and 2009, fluctuating
between 56 and 59 per cent, but the share for office
and telecom equipment jumped from 41 per cent to
58 per cent. Taken together, these results suggest
that supply chains may be an important component of
recent PTA activity in Asia and in the electronics
sector, but not so much in other regions or economic
sectors.
How preferential is trade?
Trade among PTA members is not all preferential
on account of the fact that a significant portion of
intra-PTA trade is MFN duty-free.
In a sample covering imports of the 20 largest
importers from all their trading partner countries –
accounting for 90 per cent of world merchandise trade
in 2008 – only 16 per cent qualified as preferential
trade, assuming full utilization of preferences. 2 In other
words, despite the explosion of PTAs in recent years,
84 per cent of world merchandise trade still takes
place on a non-discriminatory most-favoured nation
(MFN) basis. This is firstly because half of world trade
is already subject to zero MFN tariff rates. Secondly,
PTAs tend to exempt high MFN-tariff items from
preferential treatment and continue to trade these
products at MFN rates.
Existing preferential tariffs reduce the global tradeweighted average tariff by one percentage point, and
90 per cent of this reduction (i.e. 0.9 percentage
points) is due to reciprocal preference regimes. Only
2 per cent of global imports are eligible for preferential
tariffs where preference margins are 10 per cent or
more. For most large exporters, preferential tariffs
matter little for the bulk of their exports. This is not
always true for individual sectors especially in certain
smaller economies exporting a narrow set of
commodities (mainly sugar, rice, bananas, fish and
garments), where preference margins may be more
substantial. There is a possibility though that these
preferences will be eroded over time as the countries
to which they export enter into more PTAs.
Data from some customs administrations suggest
a high rate of preference utilization.
Information on the value of imports under different
preferential regimes from the EU and US reveal
preference utilization rates of 87 and 92 per cent
respectively. Preference utilization rates are uniformly
high for most exporting countries, preferential regimes
and types of products. Analysis shows that both
preference margins and import values have a positive
and statistically significant impact on preference
utilization. Surprisingly, however, many individual items
facing tariffs below 1 per cent still exhibit high
utilization rates. This might suggest either that the
7
world trade report 2011
cost of using preferential tariffs in certain cases is
negligible or that other benefits are linked to using
these preferences, perhaps related to privileged
customs clearance, qualification under specific
security measures or advantages in case of re-export
to other PTA partners.
Data from firm surveys offer a more detailed and
mixed picture of preference utilization rates.
Firm surveys carried out in 2007-08 by the Asian
Development Bank (ADB) and the Inter-American
Development Bank (IDB) in six East Asian countries
and four Latin American countries respectively reveal
that the use of PTA preferential tariffs is not uniformly
high. For instance, the ADB survey shows that only
around one-quarter of firms in the sample currently
used these preferences. However, this number doubled
when plans for using PTA preferences in the future
were factored in. The IDB survey shows that only
20 per cent of the firms in the sample did not make
any use of PTA preferences.
Complications and costs involved in complying with
rules of origin were cited as considerations influencing
preference utilization, especially where preference
margins were low. The surveys also cited other firmspecific factors that influenced preference utilization.
For instance, larger, more experienced firms, with
higher foreign equity and more information about PTA
provisions, were more likely to use preferential tariffs.
Firms in a number of countries suggested that a lack
of information on PTAs was the major explanation for
the non-use of these preferences.
See page 46
Section C: Causes and effects of
PTAs: is it all about preferences?
Motives for PTAs
Economic and political science theories provide
various explanations for why countries establish
preferential trade agreements.
Unilateral trade policy choices can have “beggar-thyneighbour” consequences, such as unfavourably
affecting the ratio of import to export prices (terms-oftrade effect) or a production relocation effect. Countries
might be stuck in a situation characterized by high
restrictions and inefficiently low levels of trade. A trade
agreement could neutralize these beggar-thy-neighbour
effects and achieve higher welfare. Economic theory
suggests, however, that a multilateral agreement rather
than a PTA is the best way to address the problem.
Gains in credibility suggest a second reason for
signing a PTA. A government may choose to “tie its
hands” through an international agreement in order to
prevent future policy reversals that would be
convenient in the short-run, but inefficient in the long
term. A PTA may provide a stronger commitment than
a multilateral agreement when a country is small in
world markets.
"Non-traditional” reasons for why countries form PTAs
include accessing a larger market, ensuring against
preference erosion, increasing predictability of future
trade policy, signalling stability to investors, and
achieving deeper policy commitments.
The creation of PTAs cannot be understood without
taking account of political circumstances. Political
science explanations of PTA formation focus on the
role of political integration, the role of domestic
political considerations, the form of governments and
institutions, diplomacy, and the role of power relations.
Changes in trade relationships may explain the
growth of PTAs over time. Together with certain
country characteristics, they may also explain the
timing of PTA formation and enlargement.
The potential loss of market share for non-members of
an existing PTA induces them to form new PTAs or join
existing ones. These domino effects of PTA formation
can be further strengthened with multilateral trade
opening.
Among the factors accounting for the pattern of PTA
formation and enlargement over time are the physical
distance between countries, economic size, similarity
in economic size, proximity of a potential entrant to an
existing PTA, the extent of existing agreements facing
a country pair, and the existing number of members in
a PTA.
8
Executive summary
The standard economics of PTAs
The standard theory on the effects of PTAs
suggests that preferential trade agreements
increase trade between member countries and
reduce trade with third-countries, leading to
negative welfare effects for non-members of
PTAs.
A PTA increases trade among members as exporters
benefit from the elimination of tariffs in partner
markets. Non-member countries suffer from a
reduction of exports to member countries and a
decline in the price of their exports in international
markets.
In the traditional Vinerian analysis, preferential trade
opening allows some domestic production to be
replaced by imports from more efficient firms located
in preference-receiving countries, leading to welfare
gains (trade creation). At the same time PTAs may
reduce imports from more efficient non-member
countries, implying a welfare loss (trade diversion). The
net welfare effect of PTAs depends on the relative
magnitude of these opposing effects.
Supply chain or vertical production arrangements
may change the welfare calculus.
The possibility of trading components used in the
production of final goods alters the calculation of trade
creation and trade diversion. Although the outcome is
still uncertain, welfare-reducing PTAs trading only in
final goods could become welfare-improving once
members trade in parts and components along a
supply chain. In this way, international production
networks can mitigate the trade diversion effects of
PTAs, although this is by no means guaranteed.
The trade effects of a preferential agreement
depend on the economic characteristics of PTA
members.
The “natural trading partners” hypothesis suggests
that trade agreements among countries which trade
intensively are more likely to be trade-creating.
Preferential trade agreements may also have dynamic
effects, for instance driven by economies of scale, and
effects on the location of production.
Several studies have tested the traditional theories on
trade creation and trade diversion. While this literature
is not conclusive, it suggests that trade diversion may
play a role in some agreements and in some sectors,
but it does not emerge as a key effect of preferential
agreements.
When governments have political economy
reasons for signing a PTA, the question arises
whether
trade-diverting
or
trade-creating
agreements are more politically viable and
whether a PTA reduces or increases the incentive
to set inefficiently high external tariffs.
In shaping their PTAs, governments may not be
influenced exclusively by the welfare implications of
agreements. If organized lobby groups carry sufficient
weight in the political preferences of governments,
trade-diverting PTAs could be politically viable in some
circumstances.
Moreover, conflicting political economy forces may act
upon external tariffs agreed in a PTA. On the one
hand, PTAs destroy protectionist benefits and lower
the demand for high external tariffs. On the other
hand, high external tariffs can be used in PTAs to
sustain cooperation on non-trade issues. The empirical
literature finds evidence of both effects.
Restrictive rules of origin (RoOs) in PTAs may
divert or suppress trade in intermediate goods.
Restrictive RoOs may make it profitable for firms in a
country to engage in “supply switching” – replacing an
efficient non-member supplier of an intermediate good
with a less efficient one, either from a partner country
(trade diversion) or a domestic firm (trade contraction
or suppression). Furthermore, by influencing the
sourcing of intermediate goods, RoOs are likely to
increase firms' costs and hence have an adverse effect
on final goods trade.
This discrimination, which leads to trade diversion by
protecting the exports of certain industries in PTA
member countries, can be resolved through the
“diagonal cumulation” of RoOs. Under this
arrangement, participating countries agree that in all
PTAs concluded among themselves, materials
originating in one country can be considered to be
materials originating in any of the other countries.
Going beyond the standard analysis
The concept of deep integration is widely used to
refer to any arrangement that goes beyond a
simple free trade area.
Trade agreements that mostly deal with border
measures are often defined as “shallow” agreements.
In contrast, preferential agreements that include rules
on other domestic policies are referred to as “deep”
agreements.
Two distinct dimensions of deep integration are the
“extensive” and the “intensive” margin. The extensive
margin refers to an increase in the policy areas
covered by an agreement, while the intensive margin
refers to the institutional depth of the agreement. The
extensive and intensive dimensions of deep
agreements may be related, as an extension of the
coverage of an agreement may require the creation of
common institutions for its proper functioning.
9
world trade report 2011
Deep integration and trade are intimately related.
Deep arrangements may be necessary to promote
trade in certain sectors and economic integration more
broadly. For instance, harmonization or mutual
recognition of certain regulations may be a prerequisite for trade in services, or competition policy
rules may be required to allow comparative advantage
to materialize.
Economic theory also suggests that the degree of
trade openness is a determinant of deep agreements.
In this respect, shallow and deep integration may be
seen as complementary where the first generates a
demand for governance that the second can provide.
An institutional challenge for the WTO is to find an
approach that facilitates deeper integration sought by
its members while maintaining compatibility with the
non-discrimination principle.
The rise in international production networks
illustrates the complementarity between trade
and governance which is at the core of successful
deep agreements.
In order for cross-border production networks to
operate smoothly, certain national policies need to be
harmonized or rendered mutually compatible to
facilitate business activities in several countries. This
generates a demand for deep forms of integration.
Developed countries were the first movers in the
attempt to provide some international rules to further
encourage international fragmentation of production.
Agreements such as the EU Single Market Programme
or the US-Canada free trade area can be explained (at
least in part) in terms of increased demand for deep
integration generated by the needs of international
production sharing arrangements.
The continuous expansion of production sharing
between developed and developing countries requires
deeper agreements to fill the governance gap between
countries. An agreement such as the North American
Free Trade Agreement, for example, includes
disciplines going beyond preferential tariffs that are
required to facilitate production sharing between the
United States and Mexico. In Europe the EuroMediterranean agreements fulfil the same objective.
The recent wave of preferential agreements may (at
least in part) be an institutional response to new
circumstances created by the growth in offshoring. In
this sense, PTAs are efficiency-enhancing rather than
beggar-thy-neighbour (trade-diverting) agreements.
10
Deep integration may involve several trade-offs
that need to be addressed.
A basic trade-off arises between the benefits of
common policies and the costs of harmonization when
policy preferences differ among member countries.
Deep integration lowers trade costs and provides
shared benefits, such as common rules and a stable
monetary system, that the market or national
governments fail to offer. However, no unifying analysis
is possible of the economic effects of deep integration,
as these effects depend on the specific form that
arrangements take.
Deep integration with advanced economies may create
advantages for developing countries from importing
best-practice institutions. However, costs may be
involved if the common rules are distant from national
preferences and the needs of developing countries.
Deep integration also has systemic effects. Deep
agreements may impose costs on non-member
countries. On the other hand, deep regional integration
could provide an appropriate intermediate level of
integration (e.g. common rules) between nation states
and the global level in different behind-the-border
areas.
See page 92
Executive summary
Section D: Anatomy of
preferential trade agreements
Preferential tariffs and PTAs
Preference margins are small and market access
is unlikely in many cases to be an important
reason for creating new PTAs.
The estimated average applied tariff across all
products and countries was 4 per cent in 2009, and
the scope for exchanging preferential market access is
therefore limited. Significant tariff barriers still exist in
some sectors, however, such as agriculture and labourintensive manufactured goods. However, PTAs do not
appear to be about the removal of tariff peaks either.
Most sensitive sectors remain sensitive (subject to
higher tariffs) in PTAs. Approximately 66 per cent of
tariff lines with MFN rates above 15 percentage points
have not been reduced in PTAs.
When the advantage conferred by providing preferential
access to an exporter is calculated with respect to the
average applied tariff faced by all exporters to the same
market rather than relative to the MFN rate, the share of
global trade for which preferential market access
matters is less than 13 per cent.
Patterns in the content of PTAs
PTAs cover many more policy areas than tariffs
and frequently entail legally enforceable
commitments.
In a sample of almost 100 PTAs, deep integration
elements were classified into WTO+ areas and WTO-X
areas. WTO+ refers to deeper integration in areas
covered by the WTO and WTO-X refers to policy areas
not covered in WTO agreements. The analysis confirms
that many PTAs go beyond the WTO and these deep
integration provisions are frequently enforceable legally.
As expected, WTO+ provisions universally include
industrial and agricultural tariffs. An increasingly large
number of PTAs now also include provisions on technical
barriers to trade, services, intellectual property and
trade-related investment measures. WTO-X provisions
commonly include competition policy, investment and
the movement of capital. About one-third of the PTAs in
the sample also include environmental laws, labour
market regulations and measures on visa and asylum.
Compared with PTAs between trading partners with
similar levels of income, those between developed and
developing countries contain a higher number of
WTO+ provisions on average. WTO-X provisions are
encountered most frequently in agreements between
developed countries, followed by those between
developed and developing countries, and finally those
between developing countries.
Overall, services commitments in PTAs have gone
well beyond commitments in the General
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) as well as
Doha Round offers in services.
Services obligations typically form part of
comprehensive PTAs covering “new generation” issues
such as investment, intellectual property, or
e-commerce. Out of 85 notifications under Article V of
the GATS, 3 a little more than a third rely on a GATStype listing of areas where specific commitments apply
(positive list), almost half rely on the more
comprehensive approach of indicating where specific
commitments do not apply (negative list) and the
remainder adopt a mixture of the two approaches.
Despite innovations in their structure, most services
PTAs share a broad commonality with the GATS in
terms of the basic set of disciplines, although some
PTAs have gone beyond GATS with respect to
disciplines on domestic regulation or transparency, for
example.
The investment chapters in PTAs contain many
provisions and guarantees that are important to
international production networks.
Since firm-specific assets such as human capital
(management or technical experts) and intellectual
property (patents, blueprints) give international firms a
competitive edge, protecting these assets against
expropriation will encourage more production sharing.
Allowing freer movement of corporate personnel is
another critical requirement. Investor confidence will
be further improved through access to a dispute
settlement mechanism.
From the sample of investment chapters in PTAs used
for this report, it appears that a large proportion of
agreements have adopted a negative list and hence a
more ambitious approach to investment opening. They
typically extend MFN and national treatment to foreign
investors, provide guarantees of investor protection
and grant private investors the right to dispute
settlement. In general, the investment provisions in
these PTAs are accommodating, although no attempt
has been made to test how much these provisions
actually affect flows of foreign direct investment. More
recent PTAs appear more open on the investment
front than earlier ones.
As tariff barriers have progressively been
reduced, non-tariff barriers have acquired
increasing weight. Over time, more and more
PTAs have included provisions regarding
technical barriers to trade (TBTs).
The inclusion of specific provisions in PTAs appears to
follow a hub and spoke structure, with a larger partner
representing the hub to whose standards the spokes
will conform. For example, while the agreements
11
world trade report 2011
signed by the EU typically include harmonization
provisions, North American agreements that embody
TBT provisions tend to prefer mutual recognition. In
addition, North American, East Asian and SouthCentral American TBT provisions in PTAs mainly focus
on introducing transparency requirements and
developing institutional bodies, while EU and African
agreements barely consider these issues.
The risk of a lock-in effect exists in regional
provisions on TBTs.
Harmonization to a regional standard may increase the
costs for further multilateral liberalization. If adopting a
certain standard involves the payment of some form of
fixed costs, the risk exists that regional provisions may
work as a stumbling block in multilateral cooperation.
Competition policy complements the reduction of
trade barriers.
The adoption of competition policy in PTAs is in many
ways a natural complement to the reduction of trade,
investment and services barriers. In evaluating
competition rules in PTAs, one needs to go beyond the
competition policy chapter of PTAs to include
competition-related provisions that appear in other
chapters of trade agreements. Competition disciplines
appear in the chapters on investment, services (in
telecommunications, maritime transport and financial
services), government procurement and intellectual
property.
Sector-specific competition provisions may have
stronger pro-competitive effects than the articles in
the competition policy chapter itself, assuming that the
trade agreement has one. Principles in PTAs relating
to non-discrimination, procedural fairness and
transparency can also have a strong bearing on
competition law and policy.
Many elements of competition rules in PTAs are
characterized by non-discrimination.
Competition disciplines usually operate through the
use of domestic regulations. While it is not impossible
for these regulations to be tailored to favour
enterprises originating from PTA partners, it may be
costly to do so. To the extent that enforcement of
competition law reduces the market power of domestic
incumbents, the prospects of foreign enterprises that
already operate in the market are improved, whether or
not they are from a PTA member.
Competition provisions in regional agreements may
carry other external benefits, such as economies of
scale from the creation of a regional competition
authority. Even if no centralized authority is
established, benefits can flow from information sharing
and cooperation among enforcement authorities.
Demonstration effects may also apply when a
12
competition authority in one PTA member takes action
against anti-competitive behaviour.
Production networks and deep PTAs
Empirical
analysis
confirms
the
positive
association between deep integration and
production networks.
Lack of data poses some difficulties in assessing the
international fragmentation of production, forcing
empirical studies to rely on proxy measures for
production networks. This analysis uses trade in parts
and components to proxy for global production sharing.
Results show that greater trade in parts and
components increases the depth of newly signed
agreements among PTA members. PTAs also increase
trade in parts and components by 35 per cent among
members. In addition, the greater the depth of an
agreement, the bigger the increase in trade in parts
and components among member countries. The
estimation results show that on average, signing deep
agreements increases trade in production networks
between member countries by almost 8 percentage
points.
The case of ASEAN: from regionalization to
regionalism.
ASEAN was established in 1967 largely to deal with
rising territorial tensions among some of its members
(the original signatories were Indonesia, Malaysia,
Philippines, Singapore and Thailand) and with possible
spillovers from the conflict in Indochina. In the quarter
of a century that spanned the creation of the
association and the decision formally to establish the
ASEAN free trade area (AFTA), there was a shift in
economic policy from traditional import substitution to
export promotion and openness to foreign direct
investment.
This led to a huge increase in total merchandise
exports of the five original members. In particular,
exports of parts and components became increasingly
important, rising from just about 2 per cent of total
exports in the year of the association's founding to
17 per cent by the time the free trade agreement was
signed. Equally telling was the increased prominence
of parts and components trade in intra-regional trade.
While the increased regionalization of trade in parts
and components trade in ASEAN would not have been
possible without the countries' openness to trade and
foreign investment, it may not have been sufficient for
production networks to continue to flourish. This may
explain AFTA's evolution beyond a free trade area.
Services and intellectual property agreements were
signed in 1995, an investment agreement and dispute
settlement mechanism in 1996, and a framework
agreement for mutual recognition arrangements in
Executive summary
1998. Recent studies document how AFTA succeeded
in reducing trade costs, not through preferential tariff
liberalization but through concerted trade facilitation
initiatives, and how this was motivated by participation
in international production networks.
Production networks may explain some PTAs in
Latin America too: the case of Costa Rica.
As a result of its policies of trade and investment
opening, Costa Rica has experienced a significant
change in its trade structure, with a substantial rise in
the share of manufacturing exports as well as trade in
services in total exports. Over the last decade, the
country has become more integrated with global
production networks in such sectors as electronics,
medical devices, automotive, aeronautic/aerospace,
and film/broadcasting devices.
economic diversification. Enhanced market access
without the capacity to produce goods and services to
benefit from those opportunities will fail to produce
higher economic growth. At a regional level these
supply-side constraints could be addressed in part by
a regional integration agenda that includes services,
investment, competition policy and other behind-theborder issues. In short, a deep integration agenda
could address supply-side constraints more effectively
than an agenda that focuses almost exclusively on
border measures.
See page 122
The link between production networks and PTAs
seems apparent in Costa Rica's agreements with the
United States (US-CAFTA-DR agreement) and with
China. While overall trade with the United States grew
by about 11 per cent annually from 1995, parts and
components trade grew at about twice that rate. More
than 25 per cent of Costa Rica's total goods exports in
2009 were directly related to production networks in
electronics, with China being the main trading partner.
Overall, trade in parts and components makes up
about half of Costa Rica's current trade with China.
Not all integration experiences conform to this
pattern: the case of Africa.
The roots of African integration lay in the effort to
correct the geographical fragmentation bequeathed by
colonialism. Fragmentation resulted in small markets,
land-locked economies, and limited development
options. In the 1980s, the Lagos Plan of Action
proposed the division of the continent into regional
integration areas that would eventually constitute a
united African economy.
For the most part, African integration has focused on
import tariffs. The inclusion of services and other
behind-the-border issues, such as investment,
competition policy and government procurement, has
proved contentious. A major limitation to African
integration progress has been its adherence to a
“linear” integration model. This process is marked by
the stepwise integration of goods, labour and capital
markets, and eventually monetary and fiscal
integration.
Deep integration could improve Africa's record on
regional cooperation.
Border measures are likely to represent a minor
constraint to regional trade in Africa compared with
structural economic shortcomings, such as a lack of
infrastructure, an institutional framework, skills, and
13
world trade report 2011
Section E: The multilateral
trading system and PTAs
directly refer to WTO rules on deep integration
measures, automatically supporting the multilateral
trading system.
Systemic effects of preferential tariff
liberalization
Several mechanisms supporting further trade opening
are found in PTAs. These include “non-party” MFN
clauses, a tendency to use template approaches that
replicate trade rules, and domino effects pointing in
the direction of the progressive extension of
preferential market access.
A number of different mechanisms have been
identified through which PTAs could foster or
hinder multilateral trade opening.
The prospect of preference erosion can be a force for
supporting further multilateral tariff reduction or for
resisting it. The presence of political-economy
motivations behind tariff reductions is another factor
that can either foster or slow down the diminution of
preferential tariffs through trade-opening on an MFN
basis.
Opposition to further multilateral tariff reductions
might also arise in the case of PTAs that are concluded
to foster mutual cooperation on non-trade issues, or
when PTAs increase the adjustment costs associated
with multilateral opening, or when the PTA is tradecreating from the perspective of excluded countries.
Evidence on the systemic effects of regionalism
on multilateral tariff reductions is inconclusive.
The literature that considers whether MFN and
preferential tariffs complement or compete with each
other finds opposite results for developing and
developed countries. Most of the contributions to this
literature, however, do not distinguish between MFN
tariffs that have been negotiated at the multilateral
level and unilateral tariff reductions.
Examination of the correlation between PTA formation
and multilateralism cannot produce conclusive results
because multilateral trade rounds are rare events,
where more or less ambitious trade opening scenarios
are negotiated. Multilateral trade negotiations are not
structured to contemplate either full or zero trade
opening. Anecdotal evidence can be found to support
the view that PTAs facilitate further multilateral trade
opening and the opposite view that they hinder it.
Deep PTA provisions and the multilateral
trading system
So far not much research has been conducted on
the systemic effects of deep-integration
provisions. The existing literature suggests that
deep integration is often non-discriminatory.
By their very nature, some deep integration provisions
are de facto extended to non-members because they
are embedded in broader regulatory frameworks that
apply to all trading partners. In such cases, multilateral
regulation may not be necessary. PTAs may also
14
Production chains can alter political-economy
forces in favour of the adoption of trade measures
that comply with the principle of nondiscrimination.
Final good producers sourcing their imports through
international value chains are likely to support the
harmonization of rules of origin across PTAs, for
instance through the adoption of rules of cumulation.
The international fragmentation of production may
also be a driver of deep integration provisions that are
consistent with the principles of the multilateral trading
system, such as international standards and
multilateral rules on trade remedies.
Some deep provisions in PTAs can, however,
contain discriminatory aspects, creating a tension
with the multilateral trading system.
The risk of trade diversion may extend beyond tariffs,
for example to the area of anti-dumping. Anti-dumping
provisions in PTAs may result in members being spared
from anti-dumping actions and an increased frequency
of anti-dumping actions against non-members.
Moreover, many PTAs exclude the imports of PTA
partners from global safeguard actions.
Lock-in effects of regulatory harmonization within
a given PTA may have negative systemic effects.
Competing PTAs with incompatible regulatory
structures and standards may lock in members to a
particular regime, undermining the principles of
transparency and predictability of regulatory regimes
and making movement towards multilateral trade
opening costly.
The non-discriminatory nature of deep provisions
might in principle create political-economy and
third-country resistance to further multilateral
opening.
If preferential liberalization is non-discriminatory in
nature, it might be opposed by political-economy
forces because higher market shares (and profits) in
the other member’s market might be more than offset
by the loss of domestic profits vis-à-vis firms from
partners and non-members.
Executive summary
Concerns over overlapping jurisdiction between
the WTO dispute settlement system and the
dispute settlement mechanisms of PTAs have
received considerable attention in the academic
literature.
The possibility that dispute settlement procedures in
more than one forum can give rise to conflicting
judgements has been discussed as a potential source
of concern. The issue has been raised only in a handful
of WTO disputes. A review of the disputes brought to
the WTO reveals that members continue to use the
WTO dispute settlement system to resolve
disagreements with their PTA partners.
Seeking coherence between PTAs and
the WTO
GATT/WTO provisions provide exemptions under
certain circumstances from the MFN principle for
PTAs.
Surveys of the application of these provisions suggest
a relatively tolerant attitude towards PTAs. The
provisions themselves are widely regarded as
incomplete and lacking in clarity. Recently, attention
has focused on improving transparency and the Doha
Round negotiations have resulted in the introduction
on a provisional basis of a new transparency
mechanism.
The fact that the Transparency Mechanism for
Regional Trade Agreements is the only result of the
Doha negotiations that has been allowed so far to go
forward independently of the full results of the Round
suggests that WTO members are aware of the need to
better understand what regional trade agreements are
about.
The quest for coherence between regionalism
and multilateralism is nothing new.
Until recently, ensuring coherence was broadly
understood as accepting that PTAs and the multilateral
system could complement each other while imposing
disciplines aimed at minimizing the negative effects
that PTAs could have. Approaches to improving
coherence focused on the weaknesses of multilateral
disciplines and how they could be fixed.
Recent developments in PTA activity may well change
the perspective on coherence. Beyond the fact that
PTA activity has accelerated noticeably since 1990,
what may challenge the current thinking is that the
new PTAs, or at least some of them, are qualitatively
different from the old ones.
Some of the new PTAs focus more on reducing
behind-the-border barriers than on extending
preferential tariffs. Given that preferential agreements
involving such measures do not typically induce trade
diversion, their systemic implications cannot be
analysed using the traditional stumbling blocks/
building blocks framework. Moreover, the political
economy of new PTAs is different from that of
preferential tariffs.
New international trade rules are being developed
outside the WTO, with attendant risks of exclusion
and additional trade costs arising from
overlapping and possibly competing regulatory
structures.
Whether and how these new challenges might be
addressed is an open question. The principle of
subsidiarity, which states that regulatory regimes
should be as decentralized as possible, could be used
to assess whether measures agreed at the bilateral or
regional level need to be incorporated in a multilateral
setting.
A number of different approaches have been
proposed for improving coherence between PTAs
and the multilateral trading system.
There may be a case for maintaining separate regimes
for regional and multilateral cooperation where
particular types of cooperation are more appropriately
managed at the regional rather than the multilateral
level. By the same token, there are issues that cannot
be addressed adequately at the regional level. In
between these two extremes, the coherence question
arises.
Proposals can be grouped under four headings:
accelerating multilateral trade opening; fixing the
deficiencies in the WTO legal framework; adopting a
softer approach as a complement to the existing legal
framework; multilateralizing regionalism (extending
existing preferential arrangements in a nondiscriminatory manner to additional parties). These
approaches are not mutually exclusive. They all aim at
making sure that PTAs contribute to trade cooperation
and opening in a non-discriminatory manner.
Lowering MFN tariffs would reduce discrimination and
thereby blunt the adverse effects of PTAs. However,
reducing all tariffs to zero does not seem to be
politically feasible in the present context and it would
not eliminate all potentially adverse effects of deeper
integration measures. Moreover, the scope for farreaching action in this domain is limited by the low
average level of existing preferential tariffs.
The Doha Round includes a mandate to negotiate with
a view to “clarifying and improving disciplines and
procedures under the existing WTO provisions
applying to regional trade agreements”. While
negotiations on the procedural issues have resulted in
the adoption on a provisional basis of the new
transparency
mechanism
for
regional
trade
15
world trade report 2011
agreements, negotiations on rules have not advanced.
These difficulties conform to a long-standing pattern
of limited progress.
The rationale for using a “soft law” approach would be
to allow WTO members to better understand their
respective priorities and interests, with a view
eventually to unblocking progress towards legal
interpretations of particular provisions that would
ensure coherence. However, the soft law approach is
not without risk as soft law and hard law could become
antagonistic to one another if the underlying conditions
for cooperation are absent.
As a result of global production sharing, new forces
favourable to the multilateralization of regionalism may
have emerged. The extent to which deep integration
measures in PTAs have the potential to generate the
same sort of costly spaghetti/noodle bowl as
preferential tariffs is still a matter for debate, but there
may be a role for the WTO to reduce these transaction
costs.
See page 164
Conclusions
An over-arching conclusion of this report is that
regional and multilateral approaches to trade
cooperation need not be incompatible, but neither can
they be seen simply as arrangements that serve the
same purpose or satisfy the same needs. Support for
an increasingly outward-looking and inclusive global
trading order has been strong in the period since the
end of the Second World War, and this growing trend
towards openness has manifested itself through
unilateral,
bilateral,
regional
and
multilateral
approaches.
The spread of deep PTAs and the weightier role of
non-tariff commitments have important implications
for how to evaluate the role of PTAs and how they
interact with the multilateral trading system. The sheer
number of PTAs and continuing momentum towards
establishing more of them suggest that they are here
to stay. They respond to a range of economic and
political needs. Governments will need to find a
coherent way of fashioning trade policy at the regional
and multilateral level. This means ensuring that PTAs
and the multilateral system complement each other
and that multilateral disciplines minimize any negative
effects from PTAs.
See page 196
16
Executive summary
Endnotes
1
These figures have been calculated excluding intra-EU trade.
2
If intra-EU trade is included, 30 per cent of world trade is
preferential.
3
This figure is current as of 1 March 2011, counting
notifications for agreements that are currently in force.
17
I. World trade in 2010
Global trade flows rebounded strongly in 2010
following their collapse in 2009. The rise in the
volume of goods exports in 2010 was the
largest on record, enabling world trade to
return to its pre-crisis level but not its longterm trend. Economic conditions continued to
improve in both developed and developing
economies, but the recovery of both trade and
output proceeded more slowly in developed
countries.
Contents
A. Introduction
20
B. The state of the world economy and trade in 2010
22
Appendix tables and charts
31
world trade report 2011
A. Introduction
World trade recorded its largest ever annual increase
in 2010 as merchandise exports surged 14.5 per cent,
buoyed by a 3.6 per cent recovery in global output as
measured by gross domestic product (GDP) (see
Figure 1). Both trade and output grew faster in
developing economies than in developed ones. Exports
in volume terms (i.e. in real terms, accounting for
changes in prices and exchange rates) were up 13 per
cent in developed economies while the increase for
developing economies was nearly 17 per cent. The
difference between trade of developed and developing
economies was even greater on the import side, where
developed economies' imports rose by 11 per cent
compared with 18 per cent in the rest of the world.
The factors that contributed to the unusually large
12 per cent drop in world trade in 2009 may have also
helped boost the size of the rebound in 2010. These
include the spread of global supply chains and the
product composition of trade compared with output.
Global supply chains cause goods to cross national
boundaries several times during the production process,
which raises measured world trade flows compared with
earlier decades. The quantification of this effect would
require data on trade in value added that are not
currently available. The goods that were most affected
by the downturn (consumer durables, industrial
machinery, etc.) have a larger share in world trade than
in world GDP, which increased the magnitude of the
trade slump relative to GDP in 2009, and which had a
similar positive effect during the recovery of 2010.
Higher prices for primary commodities and the
extraordinary growth of trade in developing Asia
helped boost the combined share of developing
economies and the Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS) in world exports to 45 per cent in 2010,
its highest ever.
China in particular made an outsized contribution to
the recovery of world trade in 2010, as the country's
exports increased by a massive 28 per cent in volume
terms and imports swelled by more than 22 per cent.
1. Putting the trade recovery into perspective
Although the growth of world exports in 2010 was the
highest on record in a data series going back to 1950, it
might have been even higher if trade had quickly reverted
to its pre-crisis trend. This did not happen. The rebound
was strong enough for world exports to recover their
peak level of 2008, but it was not strong enough to bring
about a return to the previous growth path (see Figure 2).
The 3.6 per cent growth rate of world GDP for 2010 is
also less robust than it might appear at first glance. It
was above its average rate of 3.1 per cent between
1990 and 2008, but it was far from a record. In fact,
world GDP growth equalled or exceeded 4 per cent
several times in recent years, including 1997, 2000,
2004 and 2006. Considering the depressed level of
world output in 2009, growth in this range or higher
would not have been surprising in 2010.
A number of factors combined to make trade and
output grow more slowly than they might otherwise
have done. First, curtailment of fiscal stimulus
Figure 1: Growth in volume of world merchandise trade and GDP, 2000-10 (Annual percentage change)
15
Average export growth
1990-2008
10
5
0
-5
Average GDP growth
1990-2008
-10
-15
2000
2001
2002
Merchandise exports
Source: WTO Secretariat.
20
2003
GDP
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
I – World trade in 2010
A. INTRODUCTION
Figure 2: Volume of world merchandise trade, 1990-2010 (Indices, 1990 = 100)
350
300
250
200
150
100
Export volume
2010
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
2000
1999
1998
1997
1996
1995
1994
1993
1992
1991
1990
50
Trend (1990-2008)
Source: WTO Secretariat.
measures in many countries dampened economic
activity in the second half of the year. European
governments in particular moved towards fiscal
consolidation in an attempt to reduce their budget
deficits through a combination of spending cuts and
revenue measures, with negative consequences for
short-term growth.
Secondly, although oil prices stabilized at around
US$ 78/barrel in 2010, they were still high by recent
historical standards (e.g. oil prices averaged
US$ 31/barrel between 2000 and 2005). Prices were
below the US$ 96/barrel average seen in 2008, but
they were also up 30 per cent from 2009, raising
energy costs for households and businesses.
Finally, persistent unemployment prevented domestic
consumption from rebounding more strongly in
developed countries and limited income growth and
import demand. The Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD) average
unemployment rate was 8.6 per cent in 2010 (up from
6.1 per cent in 2008), and unemployment remained
at or near 9 per cent in the United States throughout
the year.
The record expansion of trade and the revival of
economic activity in 2010 were certainly welcome
developments, but their importance should not be
overstated. Despite the rebound, the negative impact
of the financial crisis and global recession are likely to
persist for some time.
21
world trade report 2011
B. The state of the world economy and
trade in 2010
1. Economic growth
registering strong increases of 10.3 per cent and 9.7 per
cent, respectively. South and Central America also saw
vigorous growth of 5.8 per cent, driven by Brazil’s strong
7.5 per cent upturn. However, Africa had the fastest
average rate of GDP growth of any region over the last
five years (4.7 per cent between 2005 and 2010).
World GDP at market exchange rates expanded
3.6 per cent in 2010, one year after an unprecedented
contraction of 2.4 per cent that accompanied the
financial crisis in 2009. Output of developed economies
rose 2.6 per cent in 2010 after falling
3.7 per cent in 2009, while the rest of the world
(including developing economies and the CIS) grew
7.0 per cent, up from 2.1 per cent in 2009 (see Table 1).
Developed economies grew more slowly than
developing economies, but some performed better
than others. Concerns about the possibility of
sovereign defaults in Greece, Ireland, Portugal and
Spain brought renewed financial market instability and
fiscal austerity in the second half of 2010, which held
Europe’s growth rate down to 1.9 per cent, the slowest
of any region. The economies of Greece, Ireland and
Spain all contracted in 2010, as did Iceland’s, which
was hit by a banking crisis in 2008.
Growth was stronger in the first half of the year, but
weakened in the second half as the sovereign debt
crisis affecting smaller euro area economies restrained
economic growth, especially in Europe.
Although developing economies collectively avoided an
outright decline in 2009, many individual economies
saw their GDP contract, for example South Africa, Chile,
Singapore and Chinese Taipei. However, all of these
economies returned to positive growth in 2010, and the
only large developing country that remained mired in
recession was the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela.
The major exception to the below average GDP growth
in Europe was Germany, whose 3.6 per cent growth
rate outpaced all euro area economies and all
European Union members except for Sweden and
Poland. According to OECD National Accounts
Statistics, Germany’s net exports of goods contributed
1.4 per cent to its 3.6 per cent GDP growth, or 40 per
cent of the total increase. By comparison, domestic
GDP grew faster in developing Asia (8.8 per cent) than in
other developing regions last year, with China and India
Table 1: GDP and merchandise trade by region, 2007-10 (Annual percentage change)
GDP
Imports
2008
2009
2010
2008
2009
2010
2008
2009
2010
1.4
-2.4
3.6
2.2
-12.0
14.5
2.2
-12.8
13.5
North America
0.1
-2.8
3.0
2.1
-14.8
15.0
-2.4
-16.7
15.7
United States
0.0
-2.6
2.8
5.8
-14.0
15.4
-3.7
-16.4
14.8
5.1
-0.2
5.8
0.8
-7.9
6.2
13.2
-16.3
22.7
World
South and Central America a
Europe
European Union (27)
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)
0.5
-4.0
1.9
0.2
-14.1
10.8
-0.6
-14.2
9.4
0.5
-4.2
1.8
0.0
-14.5
11.4
-0.9
-14.2
9.2
5.5
-7.1
4.3
2.0
-5.2
10.1
16.4
-25.6
20.6
Africa
4.8
2.1
4.7
1.2
-4.2
6.5
14.6
-5.0
7.0
Middle East
5.3
0.8
3.8
3.5
-4.3
9.5
14.2
-7.8
7.5
Asia
2.8
-0.2
6.3
5.5
-11.2
23.1
4.7
-7.5
17.6
China
9.6
9.1
10.3
8.5
-10.5
28.4
3.8
2.9
22.1
Japan
-1.2
-6.3
3.9
2.2
-24.8
27.5
-1.0
-12.2
10.0
6.4
5.7
9.7
14.4
-6.8
19.9
17.3
-1.0
11.2
India
Newly industrialized economies
(4) b
1.9
-0.8
7.7
4.9
-5.7
21.3
3.5
-11.4
18.0
Memo: Developed economies
0.2
-3.7
2.6
0.8
-15.1
12.9
-1.2
-14.4
10.7
Memo: Developing and CIS
5.7
2.1
7.0
4.2
-7.8
16.7
8.5
-10.2
17.9
a Includes
b Hong
the Caribbean.
Kong, China; Republic of Korea; Singapore; and Chinese Taipei.
Source: WTO Secretariat.
22
Exports
I – World trade in 2010
GDP growth in the United States was more subdued, at
2.8 per cent in 2010, while Japan’s was up 3.9 per cent.
However, the Japanese recovery should be seen in the
context of the 6.3 per cent drop in output that the
country experienced in 2009, the most severe decline
among leading industrialized economies. Japan also
ceded the position of the world’s second-largest
economy to China, measured in dollar terms. In terms of
income per head, however, it may be noted that Japan’s
per capita GDP was US$ 44,800 in 2010, compared
with a figure of US$ 4,800 for China.
2. Merchandise trade in volume (i.e. real) terms
World merchandise exports in volume terms (i.e. excluding
the influence of prices and exchange rates) rose 14.5 per
cent in 2010, while world imports grew 13.5 per cent. In
principle, world exports and imports should increase at
roughly the same rate, with some discrepancies due to
differences in data recording across countries. World
trade as measured by exports grew four times as fast as
global GDP in 2010, whereas trade normally grows about
twice as fast as GDP (see Table 1).
The uneven recovery in output produced an equally
uneven recovery in trade. While world merchandise
exports rose 14.5 per cent in volume terms, those of
developed economies increased by 12.9 per cent, and
combined shipments from developing economies and
the CIS jumped 16.7 per cent. Imports of developed
economies grew more slowly than exports last year
(10.7 per cent compared with 12.9 per cent) while
developing economies plus the CIS saw the opposite
happen (17.9 per cent growth in imports compared
with 16.7 per cent for exports).
Only in Asia and North America did exports grow faster
than the world average (15.0 per cent and 23.1 per cent,
respectively), whereas slower than average growth was
recorded in Europe (10.8 per cent), the CIS (10.1 per
cent), the Middle East (9.5 per cent), Africa (6.4 per
cent) and South and Central America (6.2 per cent).
On the import side, faster than average growth was
observed in South and Central America (22.7 per
cent), the CIS (20.6 per cent), Asia (17.6 per cent) and
North America (15.7 per cent) while slower growth was
reported in Europe (9.4 per cent), the Middle East
(7.5 per cent) and Africa (7.1 per cent).
Asia's rapid real export growth in 2010 was led by
China and Japan, whose shipments to the rest of the
world each rose roughly 28 per cent. China’s trade
performance is more impressive when one considers
that the decline in the country’s exports in 2009 was
less than half that of Japan (11 per cent compared
with 25 per cent). Meanwhile, the United States and
the European Union saw their exports growing more
slowly at 15.4 per cent and 11.4 per cent, respectively.
Imports were up 22.1 per cent in real terms in China,
14.8 per cent in the United States, 10.0 per cent in
Japan, and 9.2 per cent in the European Union.
B.The state of the world economy
and trade in 2010
final consumption expenditure only contributed 0.7 per
cent to GDP, or 19 per cent of the total increase.
Regions that export significant quantities of natural
resources (Africa, the CIS, the Middle East and South
America) all experienced relatively low export volume
growth in 2010, but very strong increases in the dollar
value of their exports. For example, Africa’s exports
were up 6 per cent in volume terms, and 28 per cent in
dollar terms (see Appendix Table 1).
An explanation for this can be seen in rising primary
commodity prices, which resumed their upward
trajectory in 2010, after plunging in 2009. Table 2
illustrates commodity price developments in the last
few years. Despite recent volatility, the overall trend
towards higher prices is clear. Prices fell sharply in
2009 as the global recession took hold, but then shot
up again when growth resumed in 2010. The increases
were driven to a large extent by rising import demand
on the part of fast-growing developing economies
such as China and India. Between 2000 and 2010,
prices for metals rose faster than any other primary
commodity group, with average annual increases of
12 per cent, followed closely by energy with 11 per
cent growth per annum. Only agricultural raw material
prices stagnated, with increases of just 2 per cent per
year on average over the last ten years.
Table 2: Export prices of selected primary products, 2000-10 (Annual percentage change)
2008
2009
2010
2000-10
2005-10
28
-30
26
10
9
Metals
-8
-20
48
13
15
Beverages a
23
2
14
9
12
Food
23
-15
12
6
8
-1
-17
33
2
5
40
-37
26
11
8
All commodities
Agricultural raw materials
Energy
a Comprising
coffee, cocoa beans and tea.
Source: IMF International Financial Statistics.
23
world trade report 2011
In contrast to primary products, prices of manufactured
goods rose very little in 2010. Export and import price
indices may differ substantially across countries, but
as an example, US non-fuel import prices in 2010 were
nearly unchanged from 2009 (up 2.7 per cent in 2010
after falling 3 per cent in 2009), and prices of imports
from China (predominated by manufactures) declined
by 0.1 per cent. This means that nominal trade figures
for natural resource exporters would be strongly
deflated when calculating volume estimates, whereas
real trade growth for countries that mostly export
manufactured goods would be relatively close to their
nominal growth rates.
Higher commodity prices lifted foreign exchange
earnings in regions that export a lot of primary
products and helped boost imports, especially in South
and Central America, where the volume of imports
jumped 22.7 per cent in 2010, and in the CIS, where
imports were up 20.6 per cent. Africa’s import volume
growth was actually the lowest of any region last year,
at 7.0 per cent, despite the continent’s large share of
fuels and mining products in its total exports (64 per
cent in 2009 and 71 per cent in 2008, when
commodity prices were higher).
This relatively small increase may be partly explained
by the fact that African imports did not fall very far in
2009 (Africa had the smallest decline of any region at
-5.0 per cent), leaving less pent-up demand for imports
in the following year. Also, not all African countries are
important exporters of fuels and mining products,
which saw the biggest price rises. Net importers of
these products include Ethiopia, Kenya, Morocco and
Tanzania, among others. These countries did not
experience the same windfall in export earnings
enjoyed by natural resource exporters.
Although South Africa is a net exporter of mining
products, it is a net importer of fuels, which
represented just over 21 per cent of the country’s total
imports of goods in 2009 (the share is the same for
Kenya and Morocco, while Tanzania’s share is 23 per
cent).
3. Merchandise and commercial
services trade in value (i.e. dollar) terms
As a result of rising commodity prices and a depreciating
US currency (down 3.5 per cent on average against
major currencies in 2010 according to US Federal
Reserve nominal effective exchange rate statistics),
growth in the dollar value of world trade in 2010 was
greater than the increase in volume terms. World
merchandise exports were up 22 per cent, rising from
US$ 12.5 trillion to US$ 15.2 trillion in a single year, while
world exports of commercial services rose 8 per cent,
from US$ 3.4 trillion to US$ 3.7 trillion (see Table 3).1
The faster growth of merchandise trade compared
with services can be partly explained by the smaller
decline in services in 2009 (just 12 per cent compared
with 22 per cent for merchandise), which implies less
need for faster-than-average growth to catch up to
earlier trends. The average annual growth in the value
of merchandise trade and commercial services trade
between 2005 and 2010 was the same, at 8 per cent.
World exports of goods and commercial services in
current US dollars rebounded more quickly than world
GDP in 2010, and as a result the ratio of world trade to
GDP rose sharply after falling even more sharply in
2009 (see Figure 3). At 124 in 2010, it remained below
its 2008 peak of 132, but the 2010 value was still high
by historical standards.
Merchandise trade
Nominal merchandise exports of developed economies
jumped 16 per cent in 2010 to US$ 8.2 trillion, up from
US$ 7.0 trillion in 2009. However, because this rate of
increase was slower than the world average of 22 per
cent, the share of developed countries in world
merchandise exports fell to 55 per cent, its lowest
level ever.
This falling share cannot be explained mainly as a
result of higher prices for primary products exported
predominantly by developing countries. This is because
the latter prices were even higher in 2008 but the
Table 3: World exports of merchandise and commercial services, 2005-10
(Billion dollars and annual percentage change)
Value
Merchandise a
Commercial services
2008
2009
2010
2005-10
15,238
15
-22
22
8
3,665
13
-12
8
8
Transport
783
16
-23
14
7
Travel
936
10
-9
8
6
1,945
13
-8
6
9
Other commercial services
24
Annual percentage change
2010
Source: WTO Secretariat.
significant re-exports or imports for re-export.
a Includes
I – World trade in 2010
B.The state of the world economy
and trade in 2010
Figure 3: Ratio of world exports of goods and commercial services to GDP, 1980-2010
(Index, 2000 = 100)
140
130
120
110
100
90
80
70
60
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
2010
Source: IMF for world GDP, WTO Secretariat for world trade in goods and commercial services.
share of developed countries in world trade at that
time was also higher, at nearly 58 per cent.
The story is similar on the import side, where developed
economy imports increased 16 per cent to US$ 8.9
trillion, but their share in world imports dropped to 59 per
cent from 61 per cent in 2009 and 63 per cent in 2008.
of world imports), the United States (16 per cent),
China (12 per cent), Japan (6 per cent) and the
Republic of Korea (US$ 425 billion, 3.5 per cent).
Hong Kong’s total imports were actually larger than
Korea’s (US$ 442 billion), but retained imports were
smaller (US$ 116 billion) (see Appendix Table 4).
Commercial services
All WTO regions experienced double-digit increases in
the dollar value of both exports and imports in 2010,
thanks in part to rising prices for fuels and other
commodities (see Appendix Table 1).
The leading merchandise exporters in 2010 were
China (US$ 1.58 trillion, or 10 per cent of world
exports), the United States (US$ 1.28 trillion, 8 per
cent of world), Germany (US$ 1.27 trillion, 8 per cent
of world), Japan (US$ 770 billion, 5 per cent of world)
and the Netherlands (US$ 572 billion, 3.8 per cent of
world). The United States overtook Germany to
become the second-largest exporter, one year after
Germany ceded the top position to China (see
Appendix Table 3).
The top merchandise importers were the United States
(US$ 1.97 trillion, 13 per cent of world imports), China
(US$ 1.40 trillion, 9 per cent of world), Germany
(US$ 1.07 trillion, 7 per cent of world), Japan
(US$ 693 billion, 4.5 per cent of world) and France
(US$ 606 billion, 4 per cent of world).
World exports of commercial services increased 8 per
cent to US$ 3.67 trillion in 2010 after dropping 12 per
cent in 2009 (see Table 3).
Transportation was the fastest growing component of
commercial services exports in 2010, with an increase
of 14 per cent to US$ 782.8 billion. The faster growth
of transport services is not surprising since they are
closely linked to trade in goods, which saw record
growth last year. Travel grew in line with commercial
services overall, whereas other commercial services
(including financial services) advanced more slowly.
North America’s exports were worth US$ 599 billion in
2010, while the value of the region’s imports came to
US$ 471 billion. Exports and imports were both up
9 per cent year-on-year, but Mexico lagged on the export
side with 5 per cent growth (see Appendix Table 2).
If we ignore trade between the 27 European Union
members and treat the EU as a single entity, the
leading exporters were the European Union
(US$ 1.79 trillion, or 15 per cent of the total), China
(13 per cent), the United States (11 per cent), Japan
(6.5 per cent) and the Republic of Korea (4 per cent).
South and Central America’s exports rose 11 per cent
to US$ 111 billion, but imports grew more than twice
as fast (23 per cent) to reach US$ 135 billion. Both
exports and imports of Brazil grew faster than the
regional average (15 per cent and 35 per cent,
respectively), with particularly high growth rates
observed for imports of transport services (42 per
cent) and travel (51 per cent), partly due to the
strength of the real.
The top importers excluding trade within the EU were
the European Union (US$ 1.98 trillion or 16.5 per cent
Europe’s exports and imports were both larger than
any other region’s in 2010 (US$ 1.72 trillion and
25
world trade report 2011
US$ 1.5 trillion, respectively) but they were also the least
dynamic, with growth of just 2 per cent on the export side
and 1 per cent on the import side. The reason for
Europe’s poor performance can be found in the weakness
of travel services, which declined by 3 per cent on the
export side and 2 per cent on the import side.
In 2010, exports of CIS countries increased by 10 per
cent to US$ 78 billion. The region’s imports also rose
14 per cent to US$ 105 billion. Russian export growth
of 6 per cent was driven by transport services.
Meanwhile, Africa exported US$ 86 billion worth of
commercial services, 11 per cent more than in 2009.
The continent’s imports advanced 12 per cent to
US$ 141 billion. In South Africa, travel receipts
increased by 24 per cent due to the large number of
foreign visitors attending the FIFA World Cup.
The Middle East exported US$ 103 billion worth of
commercial services and imported US$ 185 billion in
2010. Exports and imports were both up 9 per cent
year-on-year.
Finally, Asia exported US$ 963 billion worth of
services in 2010 and imported a similar amount,
US$ 961 billion. Exports and imports were up 21 per
cent and 20 per cent, respectively. Transport was the
most dynamic sector, with a growth rate of 26 per cent
on both the export and import sides. Travel exports
also rose rapidly at 25 per cent. Also, other commercial
services increased by 17 per cent, which now
represents half of the region’s exports.
The United States exported US$ 515 billion in
commercial services in 2010, or 14 per cent of the global
total, making it the world’s largest exporter. The other
countries in the top five were Germany (US$ 230 billion,
or 6 per cent of world exports), the United Kingdom
(US$ 227 billion, also 6 per cent of world), China
(US$ 170 billion, 5 per cent of world) and France
(US$ 140 billion, 4 per cent of world) (see Appendix
Table 5).
The United States was also the leading importer, with
purchases of US$ 358 billion from foreign providers,
equal to 10 per cent of world imports. It was followed
by Germany (US$ 256 billion, 7 per cent of world),
China (US$ 192, 5.5 per cent of world), the United
Kingdom (US$ 156 billion, 4.5 per cent of world) and
Japan (US$ 155 billion, 4.5 per cent of world).
China replaced France as the fourth-largest exporter
of commercial services, while Germany overtook the
United Kingdom in second place. China also moved up
the rankings on the import side, taking over the third
position from the United Kingdom.
When trade within the EU is excluded, the European
Union becomes the leading global exporter, with
services exports to the rest of the world totalling
26
US$ 684 billion in 2010, or 25 per cent of global trade.
It is followed by the United States (with 18 per cent of
the reduced world total), China (with 6 per cent), Japan
(with 5 per cent) and Singapore (with 4 per cent).
The European Union is also the top importer when trade
within the EU is left out. Its imports from non-EU
countries in 2010 came to US$ 598 billion, or 22 per
cent of world trade. The remaining countries in the top
five were the United States (13 per cent of world), China
(7 per cent), Japan (6 per cent) and India (4 per cent).
4. Sectoral developments
Prices for traded manufactured goods tended to be
more stable than those of primary products, both
before and after the economic crisis, so movements in
nominal trade flows reflect changes in quantities
reasonably well. This is important because the product
composition of trade was a major determinant of the
extent to which the exports and imports of various
countries declined in 2009, and the same was true
during the recovery of 2010.
Figure 4 shows indices of estimated quarterly world
trade in manufactured goods broken down by product.
By the end of 2010, exports of manufactures had only
just returned to a level close to their pre-crisis
maximum, while particular categories such as
automotive products and iron and steel were still well
below their mid-2008 peaks.
World exports of office and telecom equipment
declined less than other products during the crisis, but
have grown faster since then. Exports of office and
telecom equipment rose nearly 73 per cent between
Q1-2009 and Q4-2010, and automotive products
increased by a similar amount (71 per cent).
However, automotive products declined much more
during the crisis (51 per cent compared with 30 per
cent for office and telecom), so that by the end of
2010 they were only 5 per cent above their level at the
beginning of 2007, whereas world trade in office and
telecom equipment was up 37 per cent. Manufactures
as a whole rose 46 per cent between Q1-2009 and
Q4-2010.
The share of office and telecom equipment in exports
of developing economies is greater than its share in
developed economies’ exports (15 per cent in 2008
for the former, 7 per cent for the latter) while
automotive products are responsible for a larger share
of developed economy exports (11 per cent, compared
with 4 per cent for developing economies), so it is
perhaps not surprising that developed country exports
have lagged behind those of developing countries
since the crisis.
World trade in textiles and clothing did not fluctuate as
much as other products in 2009 (down 14 per cent)
I – World trade in 2010
Due to insufficient data, we cannot say at this stage
whether world trade became more or less regional in
2010, but we can get an indication by looking at the
automotive sector, where quarterly trade data are
available by partner for all of the main exporting
countries and regions.
Table 4 shows preliminary estimates of automotive
product exports of North America, Europe and Asia
from 2008 to 2010, including intra-regional and extraregional trade flows. In Asia and North America,
Figure 4: World exports of manufactured goods by product, 2007-10 (Indices, 2007Q1 = 100)
B.The state of the world economy
and trade in 2010
and 2010 (up 11 per cent) but the category “other
machinery” matched the trend for total manufactures
almost perfectly. This is partly due to its relatively large
share in manufactures trade (about 13 per cent in
2009) but also to the fact that it is mostly made up of
investment goods (industrial machinery, powergenerating equipment, etc.), which are highly sensitive
to economic conditions and closely linked to
production. About 4 per cent of trade in manufactures
is composed of consumer durables other than
automobiles (mostly household appliances).
160
150
140
130
120
110
100
90
80
70
60
Office and telecom equipment
Textiles and clothig
Iron and steel
Manufactures
Automotive products
Other machinery
Q4-2010
Q3-2010
Q2-2010
Q1-2010
Q4-2009
Q3-2009
Q2-2009
Q1-2009
Q4-2008
Q3-2008
Q2-2008
Q1-2008
Q4-2007
Q3-2007
Q2-2007
Q1-2007
50
Source: WTO Secretariat estimates based on mirror data.
Table 4: Exports of automotive products by major exporting regions, 2008-10
(Billion dollars and percentage)
Value of
Value of
intraexports to
regional
world
exports
Value of
extraregional
exports
Share of
intra-regional
trade in exports
to world
Annual %
change in
exports to
world
Annual %
Annual %
change in
change in
intra-regional extra-regional
exports
exports
2010
2010
2010
2008 2009 2010
2009 2010
2009 2010
2009
2010
205.3
156.6
48.7
72.2 75.6 76.3
-32
43
-28
-40
39
132.4
94.2
38.1
66.4 70.7 71.2
-33
45
-29
73.0
62.4
10.6
83.1 84.4 85.5
-29
41
-28
46
-42
42
43
-34
31
North America
Automotive products
Vehicles
Parts and components
45
Europe
Automotive products
538.8
385.9
153.0
75.2 77.1 71.6
-31
18
-29
10
-36
46
Vehicles
351.1
247.3
103.7
73.5 76.5 70.5
-32
16
-29
7
-39
46
Parts and components
187.8
138.5
49.2
78.6 78.3 73.8
-29
22
-29
15
-28
47
276.5
89.8
186.7
24.5 31.8 32.5
-34
45
-14
48
-40
43
Vehicles
170.7
43.9
126.8
17.6 24.0 25.7
-41
45
-19
55
-45
42
Parts and components
105.8
45.9
59.9
39.5 44.2 43.4
-19
44
-10
42
-26
46
Asia
Automotive products
Source: WTO Secretariat estimates based on monthly data for available reporters in Global Trade Information Services’ Global Trade Atlas
database.
27
world trade report 2011
exports of automotive products became increasingly
intra-regional between 2008 and 2010, with North
America’s intra-regional trade share rising from
72 per cent to 76 per cent and Asia’s increasing from
24 per cent to 32 per cent.
On the other hand, Europe’s exports became more
intra-regional in 2009 but sharply more extra-regional
in 2010. Reasons for this include weak demand within
Europe on account of the continent’s relatively slow
rate of GDP growth, and booming exports from
Germany to China.
The value of Germany’s total exports of automotive
products was up 25 per cent from US$ 159.7 billion in
2009 to US$ 199.6 billion in 2010. However, exports
to China roughly doubled during the same period, from
US$ 8.7 billion to US$ 17.6 billion. Also, while
Germany’s exports to the rest of the world were down
34 per cent in 2009, exports to China were up 12 per
cent. As a result, China has become the third-largest
market for German cars after the United States and
the United Kingdom.
Exports of vehicles and auto parts developed along
similar lines in North America and also in Europe, but
they diverged slightly in Asia in 2010, as the region’s
exports of vehicles became more intra-regional, while
trade in parts and components became more extraregional.
5. Trade balances and exchange
rates
Trade imbalances of leading economies widened in
2010, as exports and imports bounced back from their
depressed levels of 2009. However, for most countries
the gap between exports and imports was smaller
after the crisis than before (see Appendix Figure 1).
28
The monthly trade deficit of the United States widened
from a low of US$ 32 billion in February 2009 to
around US$ 62 billion per month on average in the
second half of 2010, and the deficit for the year
increased 26 per cent compared with 2009. However,
the 2010 deficit of roughly US$ 690 billion was
22 per cent less than the corresponding deficit of US$
882 billion in 2008.
China’s merchandise trade surplus for 2010 totalled
US$ 183 billion, roughly 7 per cent less than the
US$ 196 billion it recorded in 2009, and 39 per cent
less than the nearly US$ 300 billion surplus of 2008.
The European Union had a trade deficit with the rest of
the world of US$ 190 billion in 2010, which was up
26 per cent from 2009 but down 49 per cent from the
US$ 375 billion it recorded in 2008.
Japan was an exception to the trend towards smaller
trade deficits/surpluses after the financial crisis. In
2008 the country recorded a US$ 19 billion surplus of
exports over imports, but this nearly quadrupled to
US$ 77 billion in 2010.
In terms of exchange rates, by February 2011 the yuan
had appreciated against the US dollar in nominal terms
by around 3.8 per cent from its previous level. However,
real appreciation against the dollar is happening at a
faster rate due to higher inflation in China. China’s real
(i.e. inflation adjusted) effective exchange rate against
a broad basket of currencies rose 1.3 per cent in 2010
according to indices supplied by J.P. Morgan. By
comparison, the US dollar registered a 5 per cent real
effective depreciation against trading partners’
currencies during the same period.
I – World trade in 2010
B.The state of the world economy
and trade in 2010
UK £
Japan yen
Euro
Brazil real
China yuan
January 11
January 10
January 09
January 08
January 07
January 06
January 05
January 04
January 03
January 02
40
January 00
60
January 11
60
January 10
80
January 09
80
January 08
100
January 07
100
January 06
120
January 05
120
January 04
140
January 03
140
January 02
160
January 01
160
January 00
180
January 01
Figure 5: Nominal dollar exchange rates, January 2000 - February 2011
(Indices of US dollars per unit of national currency, 2000 = 100)
Korea won
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
The yen appreciated by nearly 7 per cent in nominal
terms against the dollar in 2010, but its real effective
rate was only up by less than 1 per cent on account of
a falling price level (i.e. deflation) in Japan. This
suggests that the higher value of the yen did not hurt
the competitiveness of Japanese goods on world
markets.
On the other hand, the strong nominal appreciations of
the Brazilian real (12 per cent) and the Korean won
(10 per cent) against the dollar were matched by large
real effective rises (15 per cent and 9 per cent,
respectively) that would have raised the cost of goods
from these countries relative to other countries’
exports (see Figure 5).
29
world trade report 2011
Endnotes
1
30
World exports of goods measured on a balance of payments
basis like services were also up 22 per cent in 2010.
I – World trade in 2010
Appendix tables and charts
Appendix Table 1: World merchandise trade by region and selected economies, 2010
(Billion dollars and percentage)
Exports
Value
2010
World
North America
United States
Imports
Annual percentage change
2005-10
2008
2009
Value
2010
2010
Annual percentage change
2005-10 2008
2009
2010
14,855
8
15
-23
22
15,050
7
16
-23
21
1,964
6
11
-21
23
2,681
3
8
-25
23
1,278
7
12
-18
21
1,968
3
7
-26
23
Canada a
387
1
9
-31
22
402
4
7
-21
22
Mexico
298
7
7
-21
30
311
6
10
-24
29
575
10
21
-24
25
576
14
30
-26
30
202
11
23
-23
32
191
20
44
-27
43
South and Central America b
Brazil
Other South and Central America b
Europe
European Union (27)
Germany
373
9
20
-25
22
385
12
25
-25
24
5,626
5
12
-22
12
5,841
5
13
-25
13
5,147
5
11
-22
12
5,337
5
12
-25
12
1,269
5
9
-23
13
1,067
7
12
-22
15
France
521
2
10
-21
7
606
4
13
-22
8
Netherlands
572
7
16
-22
15
517
7
18
-24
17
United Kingdom
405
1
5
-23
15
558
2
2
-24
15
Italy
448
4
9
-25
10
484
5
10
-26
17
Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS)
588
11
35
-36
30
414
14
32
-33
24
400
10
33
-36
32
248
15
31
-34
30
500
10
29
-30
28
463
13
28
-15
14
82
10
16
-24
33
94
9
14
-27
29
Africa less South Africa
418
10
31
-31
28
369
14
33
-12
11
exporters c
277
9
34
-38
31
138
14
39
-9
4
Non oil exporters
141
12
24
-14
21
231
13
29
-14
15
Russian Federation a
Africa
South Africa
Oil
Middle East
916
11
34
-31
30
572
11
28
-15
13
4,685
11
15
-18
31
4,503
11
21
-20
32
China
1,578
16
17
-16
31
1,395
16
18
-11
39
Japan
770
5
9
-26
33
693
6
23
-28
25
216
17
30
-15
31
323
18
40
-20
25
1,111
9
10
-17
30
1,103
9
17
-24
33
Asia
India
Newly industrialized economies (4) d
Memorandum items:
MERCOSURe
282
11
24
-22
30
267
19
41
-28
43
ASEAN f
1,052
10
14
-18
29
950
10
21
-23
31
EU (27) extra-trade
1,787
6
13
-21
17
1,977
6
17
-27
18
164
15
32
-24
28
174
15
30
-5
13
Least-developed countries (LDCs)
a Imports
are valued f.o.b.
the Caribbean. For composition of groups see the Technical Notes of WTO, International Trade Statistics, 2010.
c Algeria, Angola, Cameroon, Chad, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Libya, Nigeria, Sudan.
d Hong Kong, China; Republic of Korea; Singapore; and Chinese Taipei.
e Common Market of the Southern Cone: Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay.
fAssociation of Southeast Asian Nations: Brunei Darussalam; Cambodia; Indonesia; Lao People’s Democratic Republic; Malaysia; Myanmar;
Philippines; Singapore; Thailand; Viet Nam.
b Includes
Source: WTO Secretariat.
31
world trade report 2011
Appendix Table 2: World exports of commercial services by region and selected country, 2010
(Billion dollars and percentage)
Exports
Value
2010
World
North America
United States
South and Central
America a
Brazil
Europe
European Union (27)
Imports
Annual percentage change
2005-10
2008
2009
13
-12
8
7
9
-8
8
10
-7
10
15
15
27
1,724
6
1,553
6
3,665
8
599
515
111
30
2010
Value
2010
Annual percentage change
2005-10 2008
3,505
8
14
9
471
6
8
358
6
-8
11
135
-9
15
60
12
-14
2
1,504
11
-15
2
1,394
2009
2010
-11
9
9
-9
9
9
-8
7
14
21
-9
23
22
28
-1
35
6
12
-13
1
5
12
-13
1
Germany
230
7
15
-12
2
256
4
11
-12
1
United Kingdom
227
2
0
-19
0
156
0
-1
-19
-1
France
140
3
12
-14
-1
126
3
9
-10
0
Netherlands
111
4
13
-9
0
109
5
14
-3
1
Spain
121
5
12
-14
-1
85
5
9
-17
-1
Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS)
Russian Federation
Ukraine
78
14
27
-17
10
105
12
26
-19
14
44
12
30
-19
6
70
13
30
-20
18
16
12
27
-23
20
11
10
43
-30
0
86
9
14
-9
11
141
14
30
-12
12
Egypt
24
10
25
-14
12
13
6
25
-22
-1
South Africa
14
5
-8
-6
21
18
9
2
-13
25
Morocco
12
10
12
-7
1
6
14
24
-6
15
Middle East
103
…
…
-3
9
185
…
…
-8
9
Africa
24
7
15
-10
11
17
5
13
-14
3
963
12
16
-11
21
961
11
16
-10
20
China b
170
18
20
-12
32
192
18
22
0
22
Israel
Asia
Japan
138
6
15
-14
9
155
5
13
-12
6
India
110
…
20
-13
…
117
…
25
-9
…
Singapore
112
15
17
-6
20
96
12
17
-9
21
Korea, Republic of
82
11
25
-19
13
93
10
14
-17
17
Hong Kong, China
108
11
9
-6
25
51
9
11
-5
15
48
9
12
-8
17
50
11
21
-15
22
684
7
12
-14
5
598
7
16
-13
6
Australia
Memorandum item
EU (27) extra-trade
a Includes
the Caribbean. For composition of groups see Chapter IV Metadata of WTO International Trade Statistics, 2010.
estimate.
b Preliminary
Note: While provisional full-year data were available in early March for 50 economies accounting for more than two thirds of world
commercial services trade, estimates for most other countries are based on data for the first three quarters.
Source: WTO Secretariat.
32
I – World trade in 2010
Appendix Table 3: Merchandise trade: leading exporters and importers, 2010
(Billion dollars and percentage)
Rank
Exporters
Value
Annual
Share percentage
change
Rank
Importers
Value
Annual
Share percentage
change
1
China
1,578
10.4
31
1
United States
1,968
12.8
23
2
United States
1,278
8.4
21
2
China
1,395
9.1
39
3
Germany
1,269
8.3
13
3
Germany
1,067
6.9
15
4
Japan
770
5.1
33
4
Japan
693
4.5
25
5
Netherlands
572
3.8
15
5
France
606
3.9
8
6
France
521
3.4
7
6
United Kingdom
558
3.6
15
7
Korea, Republic of
466
3.1
28
7
Netherlands
517
3.4
17
8
Italy
448
2.9
10
8
Italy
484
3.1
17
9
Belgium
411
2.7
11
9
Hong Kong, China
442
2.9
25
– retained imports a
116
0.8
31
10
United Kingdom
405
2.7
15
10
Korea, Republic of
425
2.8
32
11
Hong Kong, China
401
2.6
22
11
Canada b
402
2.6
22
18
0.1
7
– re-exports a
383
2.5
23
– domestic
exports a
12
Russian Federation
400
2.6
32
12
Belgium
390
2.5
11
13
Canada
387
2.5
22
13
India
323
2.1
25
14
Singapore
352
2.3
30
14
Spain
312
2.0
6
– domestic exports
183
1.2
32
15
Singapore
311
2.0
26
– retained imports c
142
0.9
24
15
– re-exports
169
1.1
28
Mexico
298
2.0
30
16
Taipei, Chinese
275
1.8
35
16
Mexico
311
2.0
29
17
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia a
254
1.7
32
17
Taipei, Chinese
251
1.6
44
Federation b
248
1.6
30
202
1.3
22
Brazil
191
1.2
43
Turkey
185
1.2
32
22
Thailand
182
1.2
36
26
23
Switzerland
176
1.1
13
13
24
Poland
174
1.1
16
1.3
28
25
United Arab Emirates a
170
1.1
13
158
1.0
21
26
Malaysia
165
1.1
33
Indonesia
158
1.0
32
27
Austria
159
1.0
11
18
Spain
245
1.6
8
18
Russian
19
United Arab Emirates a
235
1.5
27
19
Australia
20
India
216
1.4
31
20
21
Australia
212
1.4
38
21
22
Brazil
202
1.3
32
23
Malaysia
199
1.3
24
Switzerland
195
1.3
25
Thailand
195
26
Sweden
27
28
Poland
156
1.0
14
28
Sweden
148
1.0
23
29
Austria
152
1.0
11
29
Indonesia
132
0.9
46
30
Czech Republic
133
0.9
18
30
12,541
82.3
-
Total of above d
World d
15,238
100.0
22
126
0.8
20
Total of above d
Czech Republic
12,712
82.7
-
World d
15,376
100.0
21
a Secretariat
estimates.
are valued f.o.b.
c Singapore’s retained imports are defined as imports less re-exports.
d Includes significant re-exports or imports for re-export.
b Imports
Source: WTO Secretariat.
33
world trade report 2011
Appendix Table 4: Merchandise trade: leading exporters and importers (excluding intra-EU (27) trade), 2010
(Billion dollars and percentage)
Rank
Exporters
Value
Annual
Share percentage
change
Importers
Value
Annual
Share percentage
change
1
Extra-EU (27) exports
1,787
15.0
17
1
Extra-EU (27) imports
1,977
16.5
18
2
China
1,578
13.3
31
2
United States
1,968
16.4
23
3
United States
1,278
10.8
21
3
China
1,395
11.6
39
4
Japan
770
6.5
33
4
Japan
693
5.8
25
5
Korea, Republic of
466
3.9
28
5
Hong Kong, China
442
3.7
25
– retained imports a
116
1.0
31
6
Korea, Republic of
425
3.5
32
6
Hong Kong, China
401
– domestic exports a
3.4
22
18
0.2
7
– re-exports a
383
3.2
23
7
Russian Federation
400
3.4
32
7
Canada b
402
3.3
22
8
Canada
387
3.3
22
8
India
323
2.7
25
9
Singapore
311
2.6
26
– retained imports c
142
1.2
24
9
Singapore
352
3.0
30
– domestic exports
183
1.5
32
– re-exports
169
1.4
28
10
Mexico
298
2.5
30
10
Mexico
311
2.6
29
11
Taipei, Chinese
275
2.3
35
11
Taipei, Chinese
251
2.1
44
248
2.1
30
202
1.7
22
43
Arabia a
Federation b
12
Kingdom of Saudi
254
2.1
32
12
Russian
13
United Arab Emirates a
235
2.0
27
13
Australia
14
India
216
1.8
31
14
Brazil
191
1.6
15
Australia
212
1.8
38
15
Turkey
185
1.5
32
16
Brazil
202
1.7
32
16
Thailand
182
1.5
36
17
Malaysia
199
1.7
26
17
Switzerland
176
1.5
13
18
Switzerland
195
1.6
13
18
United Arab Emirates a
170
1.4
13
19
Thailand
195
1.6
28
19
Malaysia
165
1.4
33
20
Indonesia
158
1.3
32
20
Indonesia
132
1.1
46
Arabia a
21
Norway
132
1.1
9
21
Kingdom of Saudi
102
0.8
7
22
Turkey
114
1.0
12
22
South Africa
94
0.8
29
23
Iran, Islamic Rep. of a
101
0.8
28
23
Viet Nam
85
0.7
21
24
South Africa
82
0.7
33
24
Norway
77
0.6
11
25
Nigeria a
79
0.7
49
25
Iran, Islamic Rep. of a
63
0.5
24
26
Viet Nam
72
0.6
26
26
Israel a
61
0.5
24
27
Chile
70
0.6
30
27
Ukraine
61
0.5
34
28
Argentina
69
0.6
23
28
Philippines a
58
0.5
27
29
Kuwait a
66
0.6
27
29
Chile
58
0.5
37
30
Bolivarian Rep. of
Venezuela
66
0.6
14
30
Argentina
56
0.5
46
10,709
90.2
-
Total of above d
10,865
90.4
-
World d
12,016
100.0
24
Total of above d
Worldd
(excl. intra-EU
11,878
100.0
26
(27))
a Secretariat
estimates.
are valued f.o.b.
c Singapore’s retained imports are defined as imports less re-exports.
d Includes significant re-exports or imports for re-export.
b Imports
Source: WTO Secretariat.
34
Rank
(27))
(excl. intra-EU
I – World trade in 2010
Appendix Table 5: Leading exporters and importers in world trade in commercial services, 2010
(Billion dollars and percentage)
Rank
Exporters
Value
Share
Annual
percentage
change
Rank
Importers
Value
Share
Annual
percentage
change
1
United States
515
14.1
8
1
United States
358
10.2
7
2
Germany
230
6.3
2
2
Germany
256
7.3
1
3
United Kingdom
227
6.2
0
3
China a
192
5.5
22
4
China a
170
4.6
32
4
United Kingdom
156
4.5
-1
6
5
France
140
3.8
-1
5
Japan
155
4.4
6
Japan
138
3.8
9
6
France
126
3.6
0
7
Spain
121
3.3
-1
7
India
117
3.3
…
8
Singapore
112
3.0
20
8
Netherlands
109
3.1
1
9
Netherlands
111
3.0
0
9
Italy
108
3.1
1
10
India
110
3.0
…
10
Ireland
106
3.0
2
11
Hong Kong, China
108
2.9
25
11
Singapore
96
2.7
21
12
Italy
97
2.6
3
12
Korea, Republic of
93
2.7
17
13
Ireland
95
2.6
3
13
Canada
89
2.6
15
14
Korea, Republic of
82
2.2
13
14
Spain
86
2.4
-1
15
Belgium
81
2.2
2
15
Belgium
76
2.2
4
16
Switzerland
76
2.1
6
16
Russian Federation
70
2.0
18
17
Luxembourg
68
1.9
13
17
Brazil
60
1.7
35
18
Canada
66
1.8
15
18
Hong Kong, China
51
1.5
15
19
Sweden
64
1.7
9
19
Australia
50
1.4
22
20
Denmark
58
1.6
7
20
Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia b
49
1.4
…
-1
21
Austria
53
1.5
-1
21
Denmark
49
1.4
22
Australia
48
1.3
17
22
Sweden
48
1.4
6
23
Russian Federation
44
1.2
6
23
Thailand
45
1.3
21
24
Taipei, Chinese
41
1.1
29
24
United Arab Emirates b
42
1.2
…
25
Norway
40
1.1
5
25
Norway
41
1.2
12
26
Greece
37
1.0
-1
26
Switzerland
38
1.1
-1
27
Thailand
34
0.9
15
27
Luxembourg
38
1.1
8
28
28
Turkey
33
0.9
0
28
Taipei, Chinese
37
1.1
29
Malaysia
33
0.9
13
29
Austria
36
1.0
-2
30
Poland
32
0.9
11
30
Indonesia
33
0.9
18
31
Brazil
30
0.8
15
31
Malaysia
32
0.9
18
32
Macao, China
28
0.8
51
32
Poland
27
0.8
16
33
Finland
25
0.7
-10
33
Czech Republic
24
0.7
28
34
Israel
24
0.7
11
34
Mexico
23
0.7
8
35
Egypt
24
0.6
12
35
Finland
23
0.7
-11
36
Portugal
23
0.6
2
36
Nigeria b
20
0.6
…
37
Czech Republic
22
0.6
10
37
Greece
20
0.6
2
19
0.5
…
18
0.5
…
38
Hungary
18
0.5
1
38
Iran, Islamic Rep.
39
Lebanon b
18
0.5
…
39
Angola b
40
Indonesia
40
Turkey
of b
17
0.5
25
18
0.5
17
Total of above
3,290
89.8
-
Total of above
3,035
86.7
-
World
3,665
100.0
8
World
3,505
100.0
9
a Preliminary
b Secretariat
estimate.
estimate.
Note: Figures for a number of countries and territories have been estimated by the Secretariat. Annual percentage changes and rankings
are affected by continuity breaks in the series for a large number of economies, and by limitations in cross-country comparability. See the
Metadata.
Source: WTO Secretariat.
35
world trade report 2011
Appendix Table 6: Leading exporters and importers of commercial services excluding intra-EU (27)
trade, 2010 (Billion dollars and percentage)
Rank
Exporters
Value
Annual
Share percentage
change
Rank
Importers
Value
Share
Annual
percentage
change
1
EU (27) Extra-EU (27)
684
24.5
5
1
EU (27) Extra-EU (27)
598
22.1
6
2
United States
515
18.4
8
2
United States
358
13.2
7
3
China a
170
6.1
32
3
China a
192
7.1
22
4
Japan
138
4.9
9
4
Japan
155
5.7
6
5
Singapore
112
4.0
20
5
India
117
4.3
…
6
India
110
3.9
…
6
Singapore
96
3.5
21
7
Hong Kong, China
108
3.9
25
7
Korea, Republic of
93
3.4
17
8
Korea, Republic of
82
2.9
13
8
Canada
89
3.3
15
9
Switzerland
76
2.7
6
9
Russian Federation
70
2.6
18
10
Canada
66
2.4
15
10
Brazil
60
2.2
35
11
Australia
48
1.7
17
11
Hong Kong, China
51
1.9
15
22
12
Russian Federation
44
1.6
6
12
Australia
50
1.8
13
Taipei, Chinese
41
1.5
29
13
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia b
49
1.8
…
14
Norway
40
1.4
5
14
Thailand
45
1.7
21
15
Thailand
34
1.2
15
15
United Arab Emirates b
42
1.5
…
16
Turkey
33
1.2
0
16
Norway
41
1.5
12
17
Malaysia
33
1.2
13
17
Switzerland
38
1.4
-1
18
Brazil
30
1.1
15
18
Taipei, Chinese
37
1.4
28
19
Macao, China
28
1.0
51
19
Indonesia
33
1.2
18
20
Israel
24
0.9
11
20
Malaysia
32
1.2
18
21
Egypt
24
0.9
12
21
Mexico
23
0.9
8
22
Lebanon b
18
0.6
…
22
Nigeria b
20
0.7
…
23
Indonesia
17
0.6
25
23
Iran, Islamic Rep. of b
19
0.7
…
24
Mexico
16
0.6
5
24
Angola b
18
0.7
…
25
Ukraine
16
0.6
20
25
Turkey
18
0.7
17
26
South Africa
14
0.5
21
26
South Africa
18
0.7
25
27
Argentina
13
0.5
18
27
Israel
17
0.6
3
28
Philippines
12
0.4
21
28
Lebanon b
15
0.6
…
29
Morocco
12
0.4
1
29
Argentina
14
0.5
17
30
Kuwait b
11
0.4
…
30
Egypt
13
0.5
-1
31
Croatia
11
0.4
-7
31
Kuwait b
12
0.5
…
32
United Arab Emirates b
10
0.4
…
32
Algeria b
12
0.4
…
33
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia b
10
0.4
…
33
Ukraine
11
0.4
0
34
Chile
10
0.3
15
34
Chile
11
0.4
17
35
Cuba b
9
0.3
…
35
Philippines
11
0.4
25
36
New Zealand
9
0.3
14
36
Kazakhstan
10
0.4
4
37
Iran, Islamic Rep. of b
8
0.3
…
37
Bolivarian Rep. of
Venezuela
10
0.4
10
38
Viet Nam
8
0.3
32
38
New Zealand
9
0.3
15
39
Panama
6
0.2
8
39
Viet Nam
8
0.3
24
40
Tunisia
40
Colombia
5
0.2
-1
Total of above
2,655
95.0
-
World
2,795
100.0
11
a Preliminary
b Secretariat
8
0.3
17
Total of above
2,525
93.3
-
World
2,705
100.0
13
estimate.
estimate.
Note: Figures for a number of countries and territories have been estimated by the Secretariat. Annual percentage changes and rankings are
affected by continuity breaks in the series for a large number of economies, and by limitations in cross-country comparability. See the Metadata.
36
Source: WTO Secretariat.
I – World trade in 2010
Appendix Figure 1: Monthly merchandise exports and imports of selected economies,
January 2006 - January 2011 (Billion dollars)
United States
Japan
250.0
100.0
200.0
80.0
150.0
60.0
100.0
40.0
50.0
20.0
0.0
0.0
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2006
2007
European Union (27) extra-trade
2008
2009
2010
2009
2010
2009
2010
France
250.0
80.0
200.0
60.0
150.0
40.0
100.0
20.0
50.0
0.0
0.0
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2006
2007
Germany
2008
United Kingdom
150.0
70.0
60.0
120.0
50.0
90.0
40.0
30.0
60.0
20.0
30.0
10.0
0.0
0.0
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
Exports
2006
2007
2008
Imports
Source: IMF International Financial Statisitics, Global Trade Information Services GTA database, national statistics.
37
world trade report 2011
Appendix Figure 1: Monthly merchandise exports and imports of selected economies,
January 2006 - January 2011 (Billion dollars) (continued)
China
Republic of Korea
160.0
50.0
140.0
40.0
120.0
100.0
30.0
80.0
20.0
60.0
40.0
10.0
20.0
0.0
0.0
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2006
2007
Brazil
2008
2009
2010
2009
2010
2009
2010
India
25.0
35.0
30.0
20.0
25.0
15.0
20.0
15.0
10.0
10.0
5.0
5.0
0.0
0.0
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2006
2007
Russian Federation
2008
South Africa
50.0
12.0
10.0
40.0
8.0
30.0
6.0
20.0
4.0
10.0
2.0
0.0
0.0
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
Exports
2006
2007
2008
Imports
Source: IMF International Financial Statisitics, Global Trade Information Services GTA database, national statistics.
38
I – World trade in 2010
Appendix Figure 1: Monthly merchandise exports and imports of selected economies,
January 2006 - January 2011 (Billion dollars) (continued)
Chinese Taipei
Singapore
30.0
40.0
25.0
30.0
20.0
20.0
15.0
10.0
10.0
5.0
0.0
0.0
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2006
2007
Malaysia
2008
2009
2010
2009
2010
2009
2010
Thailand
25.0
20.0
20.0
16.0
15.0
12.0
10.0
8.0
5.0
4.0
0.0
0.0
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2006
2007
Turkey
2008
Mexico
25.0
40.0
20.0
30.0
15.0
20.0
10.0
10.0
5.0
0.0
0.0
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
Exports
2006
2007
2008
Imports
Source: IMF International Financial Statisitics, Global Trade Information Services GTA database, national statistics.
39
II. The WTO and
preferential trade
agreements:
From co-existence
to coherence
The World Trade Report 2011 describes the
historical development of PTAs and the current
landscape of agreements. It examines why
PTAs are established, their economic effects,
and the contents of the agreements
themselves. Finally it considers the interaction
between PTAs and the multilateral trading
system.
Contents
A. Introduction 42
B. Historical background and current trends 46
C. Causes and effects of PTAs: Is it all about preferences? 92
D. Anatomy of preferential trade agreements 122
E.The multilateral trading system and PTAs
164
196
F. Conclusions
world trade report 2011
A. Introduction
The rapid increase in preferential trade
agreements (PTAs) has been a prominent
feature of international trade policy in recent
times. PTAs constitute an exception to the
general most-favoured nation (MFN) provision
of the WTO, whereby all WTO members
impose on each other the same nondiscriminatory tariff. With the exception of
Mongolia, all WTO members are party to at
least one PTA. Interest in negotiating PTAs
appears to have been sustained despite the
global economic crisis. Indeed, the economic
crisis itself may be spurring governments to
negotiate new PTAs as much to preserve
existing openness in the face of political
pressure to reduce access as to generate new
openness. The explosion of PTAs has triggered
a parallel eruption of research on the subject.
Nevertheless, this report provides fresh
perspectives and insights into this important
area of trade policy.
42
II – The WTO and Preferential Trade Agreements
1. Perspectives and insights in the World Trade Report 2011
44
2. Structure of the report
45
A. INTRODUCTION
Contents
43
world trade report 2011
Although the term “regional trade agreement” has
become widely used, this report uses the more generic
term PTA, since a large number of agreements are not
limited to countries within a single region. The report
only covers reciprocal preferential agreements –
regional, bilateral or plurilateral. Non-reciprocal
agreements are certainly deserving of study, but
almost 90 per cent of the global trade-weighted
preference margin (i.e. the difference between the
lowest applicable preferential tariff and the MFN rate
applied to other trading partners) is related to
preferential tariffs under reciprocal agreements (see
Section B). PTAs may be free trade agreements, or
customs unions with common external tariffs.
1. Perspectives and insights in the World Trade Report 2011
(a) International production networks
Some explanations for why countries enter into PTAs
have not received enough attention and deserve to be
examined more closely. The international fragmentation
of production, already present in the early 1960s, has
expanded significantly. Data suggest that in the last two
decades offshoring in both intermediate goods and
services has grown at a faster pace than trade in final
goods. In particular, growth in East Asia and the economic
transformation of Eastern Europe appear to have
significantly intensified these phenomena (Jones et al.,
2005). This report links the increasing number of PTAs
with the growing importance of international production
networks and delves closely into this relationship.
(b) Preferential trade flows and tariffs
The explosion of PTAs is not being matched by an
expansion in trade flows that receive preferential
treatment. This report provides what is probably the most
systematic estimation of the magnitude of preferential
trade and the result proves to be an eye-opener. Only
16 per cent of global merchandise trade receives
preferential treatment if trade within the European Union
is excluded. Perhaps this result should not be surprising in
light of the huge reduction in tariffs that has occurred
since the end of the Second World War (half of global
merchandise trade has applied MFN tariff rates of zero).
Onerous rules of origin procedures sometimes associated
with free trade agreements have contributed to these low
figures by making the costs of compliance requirements
higher than the perceived worth of the underlying
preference margins.
Benefiting from a newly created database on preferential
tariffs, this report establishes that preferential margins
are small when they are adjusted to account for the
preferential access enjoyed by other exporters. The
proliferation of PTAs means that the difference between
the MFN rate and the PTA rate overstates the competitive
advantage of a PTA member, since increasingly its
44
competitors will also enjoy preferential access to the
market. The report estimates that in 2007, preference
margins appropriately adjusted to take account of the
presence of other preferential suppliers were no greater
than 2 per cent in absolute value for the bulk (more than
87 per cent) of all merchandise trade. The implication of
these results is that one has to look beyond tariffs to
explain why countries enter into PTAs.
(c) Beyond trade creation and trade diversion
While nearly all trade agreements contain provisions
on preferential tariffs, most PTAs now cover a wide
range of issues beyond tariffs, including services,1
investment, intellectual property protection, and
competition policy. These policy areas involve domestic
regulations (or behind-the-border measures). In some
of these new areas, the agreements are “deeper”,
either in the sense that they commit members to a
greater degree of market integration than the WTO
(e.g. the removal of all barriers to service providers of
PTA partners), or that some policy prerogative is
delegated from a national to a supra-national level
(e.g. the creation of regional standards).
Deep integration is likely to occur for several different
reasons. First, trade openness increases policy interdependency (spillovers) that makes unilateral decisionmaking inefficient compared with decisions taken
collectively. A second reason is that deep integration
agreements may be necessary to promote trade in
certain sectors and economic integration more broadly.
This second explanation applies to international
production networks which require a governance
structure beyond low tariffs. If these agreements
result primarily in changes to domestic regulations,
one may need to think in terms of a framework distinct
from trade creation and trade diversion because
changes to domestic regulations are difficult to tailor
so as to favour only certain trade partners.
(d) A viable WTO agenda on PTAs
The significance of PTAs from the perspective of the
multilateral trading system is inadequately captured by
the old idiom of stumbling blocks and building blocks.
The underlying question behind this approach was
whether preferential tariff opening would eventually
lead to multilateral opening. This analysis does not,
however, mean that PTAs are an altogether benign
phenomenon that can be ignored by the multilateral
trading system. More subtle forms of discrimination
may be embedded in PTAs, and PTAs can raise
transaction costs.
A number of possible ways for the WTO to interact with
PTAs are discussed in the report – some of which have
been tried more than others in the past. These options
include i) fixing deficiencies in the WTO legal framework
(i.e. a “hard law” approach); ii) adopting a more nuanced
and non-litigious approach to considering PTAs in the
II – The WTO and Preferential Trade Agreements
2. Structure of the report
The report is divided into four main parts.
Historical background and current trends
This section provides both a historical analysis of PTAs
and a description of the current landscape. It
documents the large increase in PTA activity in recent
years, breaking this down by region, level of economic
development, and type of integration agreement. It
provides a precise estimate of how much trade in PTAs
receives preferential treatment.
Causes and effects of PTAs
This section surveys the causes and consequences of
PTAs, with a focus on both economic and political
explanations. An important distinction is made between
shallow integration, which focuses solely or mostly on
border measures, and deep integration in which
cooperation extends to “behind-the-border” measures.
Deep integration may be necessary to stimulate more
trade. At the same time, the decision to sign deep
agreements may be the result of trade openness itself
and the structure of trade, such as the presence of
international production networks. To flourish, these
networks may require a degree of international
governance that only deep integration can supply.
Whatever the motivations for deeper integration, standard
theory based on the notions of trade creation and trade
diversion is inadequate for capturing the full picture. To
the extent that deep integration in PTAs involves changes
to domestic regulations rather than already low tariffs,
trade diversion may not pose as serious a risk. The
section argues that traditional theories do not fully
explain the emerging pattern of PTAs and that the
relationship between trade agreements and production
networks, among other explanations, should be
considered when analysing PTAs.
Anatomy of PTAs
This section validates the hypothesis that more and
more PTAs go beyond tariffs by examining the contents
of the agreements. It establishes a key empirical result
of the report, namely that preferential tariff margins,
adjusted to take account of the proliferation of PTAs,
are small. The section confirms the broadening sectoral
coverage of PTAs and examines how far they contain
legally enforceable commitments in services,
investment, technical barriers to trade and competition
policy, which are all likely to be crucial for production
networks. The commitments in these policy areas are
also deeper – whether measured relative to multilateral
commitments or in terms of the degree of market
integration aimed for.
Using trade in parts and components as a proxy for
the degree of production networking among countries,
empirical evidence is presented which demonstrates
the strong link between these networks and PTAs.
Deep PTAs increase the volume of trade in parts and
components among members. Finally, the section
examines several examples of preferential trade
agreements in East Asia, Latin America and Africa to
consider how well they fit the hypothesis of
international production networks.
A. INTRODUCTION
context of transparency and information exchange in
order better to understand mutual multilaterally based
interests in relation to PTAs (a “soft law” approach);
iii) accelerating a multilateral MFN-driven agenda on
trade opening; and iv) multilateralizing (aligning and
consolidating) PTA-related initiatives over time into the
WTO framework. This last approach could involve
revisiting WTO approaches to decision-making so as to
contemplate
non-discriminatory
WTO-sanctioned
agreements among groups of members (“critical mass”)
that would support a multilateralization process. These
approaches are not necessarily mutually exclusive.
Moreover, they all aim to reinforce compatibility and
coherence between PTAs and the multilateral trading
system.
The multilateral trading system and PTAs
This section identifies areas of synergies and potential
conflicts between preferential trade agreements and
the multilateral trading system and examines ways in
which the two “trade systems” can be made more
coherent. Preferential tariffs, although less important
than in the past, can erode the motivation for
multilateral trade opening. “Deep” PTA provisions often
have non-discriminatory effects and international
production networks can alter political economy forces
that lead to the multilateralization of regional initiatives.
The possibility of competing dispute settlement
systems creates hazards of its own. Finally, the section
reviews how the GATT/WTO has historically dealt with
the subject of preferential trade agreements. Taking
this history into account, the section concludes with a
reflection on what the WTO's future agenda on PTAs
could look like.
Endnotes
1
Some agreements only cover services and therefore contain
no tariff commitments.
45
world trade report 2011
B. Historical background
and current trends
Preferential trade agreements (PTAs) have
been around for centuries – long before the
creation of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT) in 1947. This section
provides a broad overview of the evolution of
these agreements. It begins with a historical
account of the process towards greater
openness and economic integration that
started with the trade networks of the midnineteenth century. It identifies the multiple
setbacks and reversals along the way, and
finally portrays the different “waves” of
agreements that have accompanied the
multilateral trading system since its creation.
It highlights that there has been a creative
tension between regional and multilateral
approaches which, although often
complicated, has generally advanced trade
openness and economic integration.
46
II – The WTO and Preferential Trade Agreements
B.historical background
and current trends
Contents
1. The formation of PTAs: a historical perspective
48
2. The evolution of PTAs: stylized facts
54
3. Trade flows related to PTAs
63
4. How preferential is trade? 72
5. Conclusions
85
Some key facts and findings
• Almost 300 preferential trade agreements (notified and not notified)
were in force in 2010.
• 13 is the average number of PTAs that a WTO member is party to.
• Only 16 per cent of global merchandise trade receives preferential
treatment.
• Less than 2 per cent of world trade is eligible for preference margins
above 10 percentage points.
47
world trade report 2011
A variety of statistical information is presented to
characterize patterns in PTA formation over time and
to describe the PTA landscape that we face today.
These patterns include the rapid expansion and
intensification of PTA activity, particularly over the past
20 years. This expansion is characterized by increasing
developing country participation, as well as the
spanning of regional boundaries and the proliferation
of bilateral deals. At the same time, evidence is
provided that the explosion of PTAs has not been
matched by an expansion of preferential trade flows.
While one half of world merchandise trade takes place
among PTA partners (including trade within the EU),
only a fraction of this is preferential (e.g. on the basis of
lower tariffs for the trading partners) and, in addition,
preference margins (i.e. the difference between the
lowest applicable preferential tariff and the nondiscriminatory most-favoured nation rate applied to
other trading partners) are small. Specific factors
affecting preference utilization are also examined. By
pointing out countries’ continued interest in concluding
PTAs on the one hand and the reduced scope for
preferential market access on the other, this section
sets the stage for subsequent parts of this report that
will examine alternative rationales for the formation of
PTAs and the related issue of “deep” integration.
Since the EU’s member states have ceded responsibility
for trade policy to the federal level, it often makes more
sense to treat the bloc as a single entity and to exclude
trade within the EU from share calculations. Hence,
unless otherwise stated, this convention will be followed
through much of the discussion in Section B. However,
the relevant tables will continue to show figures
including and excluding intra-EU trade.
1. The formation of PTAs: a historical perspective
There is nothing new about PTAs – nor about the debate
on whether they have a positive or negative effect on
economic relations. Throughout modern history, countries
have secured and strengthened their trade relations
through various arrangements – from colonial
preferences to bilateral commercial treaties to broader
regional agreements. These arrangements have also
overlapped and interacted, creating a global trade
landscape defined less by clear-cut choices between
regionalism and multilateralism than by the complex
interplay, even competition, among multiple trade
regimes. Despite the system's complex and sometimes
messy evolution, several long-term trends are discernible.
48
First, international trade cooperation has generally
become wider and more inclusive – with more countries
entering into binding agreements, and with more rules
being consolidated in the increasingly “global”
architecture of the World Trade Organization (WTO).
Secondly, trade agreements have generally become
“deeper”, as well as “wider”, by reaching into new policy
areas such as services trade, foreign investment,
intellectual property and government procurement – a
reflection of the deepening integration of the world
economy, and the growing “globalization” of policies that
were once considered domestic. Thirdly, and most
significantly, world trade has become progressively
more open and less discriminatory over recent decades
– with the paradoxical result that preferential bilateral
and regional agreements continue to proliferate, even
as the salience of preferences is diminishing, suggesting
that countries have motives other than simply market
access for entering into such arrangements.
While the historical trend has been towards more
openness and deeper rules in international trade
agreements – and away from protectionist blocs –
progress has not been in a straight line, and there have
been major set-backs and reversals along the way.
Although it is difficult to generalize, the pressure to
slip backwards into more inward-looking and defensive
trade arrangements has been strongest during periods
of economic contraction, financial instability and
geopolitical insecurity. For instance, the economic
depression of the early 1870s effectively brought to
an end the rapid expansion of Europe's network of
bilateral trade treaties, just as the “Great Depression”
of the early 1930s helped fuel the spread of defensive
and hostile trade blocs in the inter-war period.
Conversely, the push for a more open and inclusive
trading order has been strongest during periods of
economic expansion and international peace – and in
the aftermath of the system's breakdown or collapse.
The most striking example is the creation of the
“multilateral” GATT in the post-war period in response
to the restrictive and discriminatory trade blocs of the
1930s which had exacerbated the economic slump and
contributed to the outbreak of the Second World War.
The recent explosion of bilateral and regional
agreements has once again moved the debate about
the causes and effects of PTAs – both positive and
negative – to the fore. Some argue that it signals a
weakening
of
international
commitment
to
multilateralism, and foreshadows a return to more
fragmented world trade. Others suggest that it is part
of the pattern seen since the Second World War where
bilateral and regional agreements provide an avenue
for “faster” and “deeper” rule-making than the broader
WTO – spurring subsequent progress in the multilateral
system, and offering a coherent, rather than conflicting,
approach to managing more integrated world trade.
(a) From empires to international agreements
To view the history of the world trading system as a
stark choice between regionalism and multilateralism –
or between preferential and non-preferential
agreements – is too simplistic. For most of modern
history, trade agreements were more or less limited in
geographic scope – usually taking the form of colonial
II – The WTO and Preferential Trade Agreements
Similarly, the distinction between preferential and nonpreferential trade arrangements is more a matter of
degree than of kind. Strictly speaking, all trade
agreements – bilateral, regional, multilateral – are
preferential in the sense that their benefits and
obligations apply to members only, and non-members are
excluded; this is true even of the modern WTO, where
more than 30 countries, including Russia, remain outside
the system. What really defined the various historical
phases of the international trading system was whether
countries' underlying policy objective was to expand and
open up their trade relations or to restrict and limit them.
Empires were one of the earliest means of securing trade
interests. Powerful states – from the Romans to the
Ottomans, to the British – used influence and force to
create colonial empires or “spheres of influence” that
gave their traders and manufacturers secure access to
foreign markets, often on an exclusive basis. Although
bilateral commercial treaties have also existed for
centuries, 2 the widespread idea that international
agreements could secure trade interests is relatively
modern, dating mainly from the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries (Trebilcock and Howse, 1995).
Early commercial treaties were concerned less with
opening up new markets and liberalizing trade than with
ensuring that a country's traders enjoyed protection from
arbitrary arrest and seizure in foreign countries – hence
the focus on securing for their merchants (and their
property) the same treatment under the laws of another
state that were enjoyed by domestic merchants, a
precursor of the WTO's “national treatment” principle.
Since most European countries also routinely restricted
the extent to which foreign ships could carry goods to
and from their ports, especially in their increasingly
important trade with overseas colonies,3 early bilateral
trade treaties did not attempt to dismantle these
domestic protections, but merely sought to ensure that a
foreign merchant marine was treated no less favourably
than other foreign shipping – leading to the inclusion of a
“most favoured nation” (MFN) clause in some early
treaties (Brown, 2003).
(b) The nineteenth century: surging trade
and expanding agreements
The nineteenth century saw a major shift in the nature
and scope of bilateral trade treaties in the direction of
more openness and liberalization – prompted by a huge
expansion in international trade and by Great Britain's
rapid rise as the world's pre-eminent economic power
and a staunch open-trade advocate. British industrialists,
especially in rising centres such as London, Manchester
and Glasgow, began to feel that they no longer needed
protection from foreign competitors, and argued that the
country's restrictive trade policies only served to
encourage other countries to exclude British exports
from their markets.
British industrialists also believed that Britain's
competitiveness could be strengthened by reducing
domestic labour costs – which, in their view, were
adversely impacted by Britain's high agricultural import
barriers, the so-called Corn Laws (Brown, 2003).
Underpinning this policy and political shift was growing
support for the open trade ideas that had been advanced
by the theories of Adam Smith and David Ricardo.4
B.historical background
and current trends
spheres of influence, associated with empires, or
bilateral commercial treaties, mainly among European
powers. Only with the creation of the GATT in 1947 did
the idea of a wider, multilateral agreement move to the
forefront of international trade relations; and even then
the scope of the initial GATT system was modest,
involving just 23 countries in a plurilateral agreement,
and only gradually evolving to the near “universal”
membership of the modern WTO.1
In addition to significant unilateral tariff reductions during
this period, Britain passed the Reciprocity of Duties Act in
1823 – which greatly eased restrictions on the British
carry trade (i.e. materials from the colonies that Britain
could not produce), a key feature of the earlier Navigation
Acts, and allowed for the reciprocal reduction of import
duties in bilateral treaties negotiated with like-minded
countries. An even more important step was the signing
of the Cobden-Chavalier Treaty between Britain and
France in 1860, which for the first time involved significant
reciprocal tariff reductions between the two countries
and included a strong MFN clause (i.e. the principle of not
discriminating between one’s trading partners) .
Aimed at improving political relations between Britain
and France through strengthened economic ties, the
Cobden-Chavalier Treaty also sparked a wave of bilateral
negotiations among Europe's other economic powers –
an early manifestation of the process of competitive
trade liberalization, or “domino effect”, seen today. These
negotiations were driven by the need to gain equivalent
access to the French and British markets and by the
promise of non-discriminatory treatment. Whether the
Cobden-Chavalier Treaty and its successors ushered in
the “great phase of European free trade” (Bairock, 1989)
– or merely reflected continental Europe's growing
acceptance of the logic of unilateral trade liberalization –
is a matter of ongoing historical debate (Accominotti and
Flandreau, 2008).
What is clear is that the treaty helped spark an expanding
network of bilateral MFN trade treaties in Europe. By one
estimate, tariff levels were cut by half in the wake of
these agreements and, because they lasted for a period
of ten years, a greater measure of certainty was
introduced into trade relations (Shafaeddin, 1998). Since
this new network of treaties was both reciprocal and
inclusive (via the MFN clause), it was also essentially
interlocking – creating an early form of “plurilateral”
preferential trade agreement (i.e. unconditional MFN
treatment among all treaty-signers) and foreshadowing
the basic structure of the multilateral system that took
shape a century later (Brown, 2003).
49
world trade report 2011
By the late nineteenth century, however, the momentum
towards a more open, less preferential trading system
was beginning to slow. The worldwide depression from
1873 to 1877 – possibly as severe as the Great
Depression 60 years later – increased pressure for more
domestic protection and weakened the drive for access
to foreign markets (Shafaeddin, 1998). The unification of
Germany and Italy in the early 1870s also placed
pressure on Europe's non-discriminatory system of trade
relations, as both countries sought to consolidate their
newly-achieved national unity by raising external tariff
barriers (Trebilcock and Howse, 1995).
Another problem was that the United States refused to
become part of Europe's network of non-discriminatory
treaties, instead negotiating its own reciprocal and
preferential bilateral agreements. As United States'
exports expanded, especially in grain and
manufactured goods, European trade partners grew
less willing to provide unconditional MFN treatment to
American “free riders” without reciprocal treatment in
the expanding US market (Brown, 2003).
An even greater threat to trade openness and nondiscrimination was the race among the leading economic
powers, including the United States, at the end of the
nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century to
establish or expand their overseas colonies and spheres
of influence. The motivation was not just to carve out
exclusive markets for their exports but to secure national
self-sufficiency in raw materials. Even in Britain, the
prevailing open trade policy was being challenged by
growing numbers urging that preferential trade, such as
lower tariffs, be granted to Britain's overseas colonies.
A series of isolated trade wars also broke out during this
period, causing further strain within the trading system.5
Although trade flows continued to expand during this
period, the momentum towards building a network of
trade rules and institutions had clearly been lost by the
outbreak of the First World War in 1914 (Brown, 2003).
(c) First World War and the Great
Depression: resurgent regionalism
The First World War shattered the more open and
integrated world trading system that had been built up
over the previous century. Despite various attempts in the
1920s to restore what had been achieved and to advance
international economic cooperation – most notably at the
League of Nation's World Economic Conference in 1927
– the recovery of the international trade and payments
system was slow and tentative. This slow recovery was a
reflection of fragile economic growth, chronic exchange
rate instability and the reluctance of the United States to
take up the mantle of economic leadership gradually
surrendered by an economically weakened and
overstretched Britain (Brown, 2003).
50
Worse, any tentative progress achieved in the 1920s was
soon rolled back by the Great Depression of the early
1930s and its disastrous aftermath. There is broad
agreement among historians that the recession of 1929
was transformed into the Great Depression mainly
because of a series of monetary and fiscal policy
blunders. These financial mistakes were exacerbated by
the spread of “beggar-thy-neighbour"6 trade strategies,
as countries tried to insulate themselves from shrinking
demand and growing unemployment by raising import
barriers and carving out preferential export markets,
resulting in the collapse of international trade and the
rise of trade frictions (Irwin et al., 2008).
Some of these trade blocs were defensive. In 1930, the
Netherlands, Denmark, Norway and Sweden tried to
shield themselves from the worst of the growing
economic crisis with the creation of the DutchScandinavian Economic Pact,7 while two years later
Britain and its colonies agreed to a system of “Imperial
Preferences” which gave preferential tariff treatment to
one another's trade – signalling the end of Britain's
commitment to non-preferential open trade which had
existed for over 100 years. Other blocs were more
hostile. After 1936, Germany moved to create its own
restrictive trade bloc as part of its drive for economic
self-sufficiency and resource security – by concluding a
network of bilateral agreements with Southern and
Eastern European countries. This had the effect of
orienting these countries' trade towards Germany and
away from the rest of the world (Braun, 1990). At the
same time, Japan was building its Greater East Asian coprosperity sphere – explicitly aimed at creating a selfsufficient “block of Asian nations led by the Japanese
and free of Western Powers” (William, 2000).
One bright spot was the decision of the United States to
embark on a cautious policy of trade liberalization three
years after implementing its 1930 Hawley-Smoot Tariff
Act, which had raised US tariffs on imported goods to
record levels. The move towards liberalization signalled
for the first time its future leadership of the global trading
system. In 1934, Congress enacted the Reciprocal Trade
Agreement Act, which gave the new Roosevelt
administration authority to negotiate bilateral tariff
reduction agreements (based on an unconditional MFN
clause) in concert with other countries. With this authority,
originally granted for three years and subsequently
renewed, the government concluded more than 20 trade
agreements in the 1930s, initially with Latin American
countries, but later with Britain and Canada (Irwin et al.,
2008). These bilateral agreements probably only had a
marginal effect on world trade during this chaotic period,
but more importantly they signalled a new liberal direction
in US trade policy, and laid the foundations for much of
the GATT system after the Second World War.
(d) Most-favoured nation and the birth of the GATT
The foundations of the modern multilateral trading
system were laid in the years immediately after the
Second World War. This was a period favourable for
II – The WTO and Preferential Trade Agreements
The Bretton Woods Conference in 1944 envisaged the
creation of three new international economic
institutions that would form the pillars of a new world
economic order: the International Monetary Fund
(IMF), which would maintain exchange rate stability,
the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development, or the World Bank, which would provide
reconstruction capital for war-torn countries, and the
International Trade Organization (ITO), which would
oversee the administration of an open and nonpreferential multilateral trading order. Although the
IMF and World Bank came into being, the ITO was
“stillborn”, mainly because of concerns in the US
Congress about a loss of sovereignty to the proposed
trade body (Trebilcock and Howse, 1995). Countries
returned to the provisional GATT agreement that had
already been negotiated among 23 “contracting
parties” in 1947, and which was to provide the
foundation for an expanding multilateral trade system
until it was subsumed by the WTO in 1995.
Although there was a shared vision about the post-war
trading system – especially the need to lower tariffs
and to discipline any forms of discrimination – Britain
and the United States clashed over how the new
architecture could be reconciled with existing regional
arrangements. A major source of friction – which
surfaced repeatedly during wartime and post-war
economic negotiations – was Britain's desire to
preserve its system of “Imperial Preferences”. The US
Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, was critical of the
adverse effects of Imperial Preferences on United
States' exports to Britain and Canada, two of America's
most important markets. The State Department tried
to dismantle them, first during negotiations over the
terms of the so-called “Lend Lease” programme in
1941, and later in successive meetings between 1943
and 1948 to discuss post-war trade architecture.
Britain was just as determined to hold the line on Imperial
Preferences. Although some policy makers wanted a
return to Britain's traditional open trade leadership after
the war, the majority, including renowned economist
J.M. Keynes, were more cautious, and wanted to maintain
both Imperial Preferences (seen as an essential
underpinning of the Empire) and the freedom to use
import controls (seen as key to government economic
planning and to Keynesian “demand management”)
(Irwin et al., 2008). Complicating matters was the fact
that the United States' position on preferential trade was
not entirely unambiguous. One reason they ultimately
agreed to accept an exemption for preferential regional
trade blocs in the new GATT, embodied in Article XXIV
(they initially wanted an exemption from nondiscrimination for customs unions only, not free trade
agreements), was its support for nascent plans for
European integration.
B.historical background
and current trends
large advances to be made in international trade
liberalization and cooperation. The United States had
emerged from the war as the unquestioned economic
superpower, and it had strong commercial and foreign
policy reasons for pushing the international system in
the direction of multilateralism. Moreover, the wartime
victors, especially Britain and the United States, largely
agreed on the root causes of the political and economic
chaos of the inter-war period, and wanted to construct
an international economic system that would prevent a
return to the financial instability and trade bloc rivalry
that had led to the outbreak of war (Brown, 2003). 8
British and American officials also differed initially
over the negotiating mechanism for achieving more
open trade. Whereas the British proposed sweeping,
across-the-board horizontal tariff reductions on a
uniform and non-selective basis, the Americans
pressed for – and eventually won agreement on – a
less ambitious approach which more closely resembled
their pre-war Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act (RTAA)
negotiations. The outcome was a “multilateral-bilateral”
hybrid in which tariffs would be cut in bilateral
negotiations, and then multilateralized through the
MFN principle, in line with the pre-war RTAA approach
(Irwin et al., 2008).
Even the basic principles of the resulting GATT
reflected earlier bilateral models and approaches.
Much of its language was borrowed directly from the
RTAA arrangements, which in turn had taken their
core principles of reciprocity, non-discrimination and
national treatment from nineteenth-century Europe's
network of bilateral agreements. A major change was
that the new GATT subsumed this bilateral architecture
in a single multilateral convention, both reflecting and
reinforcing the commitment among members to wider
trade cooperation than had existed at any time in the
past. The biggest change represented by the new
GATT was that multilateralism (and MFN) for the first
time became the foundation or default, not the
alternative, for international trade relations.
(e) The modern era: three new “waves” of regionalism
Creation of the GATT did not diminish the attraction of
bilateral or regional approaches to international trade
relations. On the contrary, the push for new regional
agreements, especially in Europe, re-emerged less than
five years after the GATT was launched, ushering in a
long period of creative tension between regionalism and
multilateralism, and paving the way for dramatic advances
in both approaches. If the mid-nineteenth century marked
the first major phase of regionalism, the last 60 years
have witnessed three additional phases or “waves”. Each
has been driven, at least in part, by a perceived need
among groups of countries to go “further and faster”
than the broader GATT system in order to manage
“deeper” trade integration (Carpenter, 2009).
Although the widening and deepening of the European
Union has been at the centre of each successive wave
of regionalism, North America and now Asia have also
51
world trade report 2011
joined the race. At the same time, each wave has tended
to coincide with – or be immediately followed by –
significant advances in GATT negotiations, leading
some to argue that there is a process of competitive
liberalization, or “domino effect”, not just among the
various regional agreements, but more fundamentally
between regionalism and multilateralism.
The first wave of regionalism occurred in the late
1950s and 1960s. At its centre, was Europe's push for
continental integration – starting with the sectoral
European Coal and Steel Community in 1951, leading
to the broader European Economic Community (EEC)
in 1957, and building outwards to current or past
colonial possessions through a complex network of
preferential, but non-reciprocal trade arrangements
(Winters, 1993). This evolving European Community
helped spark the creation of the rival European Free
Trade Association (EFTA) in 1957 among countries
that had chosen to stay outside the Community. The
EEC was also taken as a model by groups of
developing countries in Africa, the Caribbean, Central
and South America which rushed to form their own
regional and subregional unions during this period.
However, most of these arrangements – including
even the most promising, the East African Community
and the Central American common market – had
collapsed or drifted into abeyance by the end of the
1970s (de Melo and Panagariya, 1993). 9
At the same time, Europe's integration triggered
pressure for progress at the multilateral level, as other
countries sought to mitigate the effects of European
preferential trade by lowering MFN tariffs across the
board. The launch of the Dillon Round of trade
negotiations in 1960 was prompted in part because the
adoption of the EEC's common external tariff required
the renegotiation of certain members' bound tariff rates
(i.e. the upper limit for members' tariff rates) – a process
which encouraged these members to seek reciprocal
tariff reductions from trade partners in a broader
multilateral context. Likewise, the more ambitious
Kennedy Round between 1964 and 1967 coincided
with negotiations to expand the EEC to include Britain,
Ireland, Denmark, Greece and Norway – and was
motivated in part by US concerns about being excluded
from an ever-broader and more unified European market
(Anderson and Blackhurst, 1993). Thus, GATT tariff
cutting and membership enlargement moved in tandem
with the widening and deepening of Europe's integration
project, as well as with other regional initiatives
The second wave of regionalism began roughly in the
mid-1980s and extended well into the 1990s. Once
again Europe's drive to expand and deepen its
economic integration was a central impetus. The mid1980s saw Europe embark on its “single market”
programme, aimed at dismantling the remaining
physical, technical and tax barriers within the
community by 1992 – a transformation marked by the
organization changing its name from the EEC to the
52
European Community (EC) with the passage of the
Maastricht Treaty in 1993. The EC was also pushing to
create a new cluster of bilateral PTAs with Central and
Eastern European countries10 following the break-up
of the Soviet Union and the dissolution of the Council
for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) (Lester
and Mercurio, 2009). These latter agreements were
focused on reducing tariffs, creating uniform rules of
origin (RoOs), and developing EC-consistent regulatory
approaches to services, standards, and transition rules
in sectors such as agriculture. Their overarching aim
was to pave the way for the admission of ten new
countries (eight Central and Eastern European
countries and two Mediterranean countries) into the
EU in 2004, and two additional ones (Bulgaria and
Romania) in 2007.
In the mid-1990s, the EU also concluded a number of
bilateral agreements with countries in the Middle East
– (with Israel, Jordan, Lebanon and the Palestinian
Authority) and North Africa (with Algeria, Egypt,
Morocco and Tunisia) with the intention of forming an
open trade area similar to the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) (Fiorentino et al., 2007).
Europe was not alone in this approach. This time, the
momentum behind regionalism also came from the
United States, partly because of its ongoing concerns
about the EC's expansion, and partly because of its
frustration with delays in launching and then advancing
the Uruguay Round negotiations (Fiorentino et al.,
2007). Having eschewed regionalism in favour of
multilateralism for almost 40 years, the United States
suddenly shifted strategies, embarking on an ambitious
programme of bilateral negotiations that included, first,
a free trade agreement with Israel in 1985, and then,
more dramatically, the Canada-US Free Trade
Agreement in 1988, later trilateralized to include Mexico
in NAFTA in the early 1990s (Anderson and Blackhurst,
1993). Much of the “new” trade policy agenda that the
United States had been seeking in the multilateral
arena – such as investment, services trade, intellectual
property rights, and government procurement – was
incorporated first in these bilateral and regional talks,
and then taken up in the Uruguay Round negotiations.
As with the previous wave of regionalism, this newest
one had a demonstration effect, as groups of
developing countries moved to establish and
strengthen their own regional groupings. In Latin
America, old integration arrangements, such as the
Central American Common Market and the Andean
Community, were revived in an effort to build a broader
and more ambitious Latin American Common Market,
effectively mirroring North America's and Europe's
own pan-continental projects. Even more ambitious
was the MERCOSUR (Southern Common Market)
project. Envisaged as a full customs union among
Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay, MERCOSUR
was perhaps the most prominent example of a new
generation of “developing-developing country” PTAs. It
II – The WTO and Preferential Trade Agreements
In Africa too, initiatives were launched to revitalize
existing regional groupings and to form new ones –
such as the Common Market for Eastern and Southern
Africa (COMESA), the East African Community (EAC),
the Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS) and the Southern African Development
Community (SADC) – with the objective of accelerating
industrialization, diversifying economies, developing
regional infrastructure, encouraging the adoption of
common negotiating positions, and promoting peace
and security on the continent. In particular, COMESA
was seen as a step towards the realization of an
African
Economic
Community,
while
SADC
represented an effort to reintegrate South Africa into
the post-apartheid regional economy (Hwang, 2007).
In Asia, regionalism gathered pace as well. The
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
embarked on plans for an ASEAN Free Trade Area
(AFTA), in order to strengthen the resilience of ASEAN
member countries to economic crises and to enhance
cooperation in non-traditional trade areas, such as
science and technology, agriculture, financial services
and tourism (an extended discussion of the role of
international production networks appears in
Section D.3). The South Asian Association for
Regional Cooperation was also created at this time –
in part to try to reduce political tensions between India
and Pakistan (Dash, 1996) – later transformed into the
South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA).
Most ambitious of all, the Asia Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC) was launched in 1989 with the
goal of “pursuing free and open trade and investment”
among its founding 12 members on a non-preferential
(i.e. “open regional”) basis (Pomfret, 2006).11 Around
the same time, Australia and New Zealand deepened
their free trade area into the Closer Economic
Relations (CER). Proponents typically argued that
these agreements represented new forms of
regionalism – justified on the grounds that members
could go “further and faster” in areas of deeper
integration than was feasible in the wider and slower
GATT system. Another common rationale was
concerns about the slow pace of the Uruguay Round
and the rise of other rival regional trade blocs.
Indeed, as with the previous wave, progress at the
multilateral level coincided with – and, some argue,
benefited from – this second wave of regionalism.
After several failed attempts, the Uruguay Round was
launched in 1986, including for the first time a
negotiating mandate on services, intellectual property
and, to a more limited extent, investment. Despite
concerns about the GATT being eclipsed by regional
deals – or because of them – the Uruguay Round was
successfully concluded in 1994, crowned with the
creation of the WTO, effectively taking some of the
energy out of this second wave of regionalism.
Over the past decade, another wave of regionalism has
been gathering force, driven as before by key trade
powers, such as the EU and the United States, but for
the first time also including many Asian countries that
had previously been the strongest supporters of
multilateralism and non-discrimination. Their conversion
to regionalism can be traced in part to the international
community's inadequate reaction to the collapse of
Asian trade following the Asian financial crisis in 1997,
the high-profile collapse of the WTO's Seattle Ministerial
Conference in 1999, and the diminishing significance of
pan-Pacific initiatives, especially the APEC Forum
(Aggarwal and Koo, 2005). Even more importantly, the
proliferation of regional agreements in Asia also
appears to reflect and reinforce an underlying process
of deep economic integration. This was caused by
countries being woven ever more tightly together by the
trade and investment flows associated with regional and
subregional production networks.
B.historical background
and current trends
reflected a desire partly to strengthen political
relations between Argentina and Brazil, partly to
counterbalance other emerging continental integration
agreements, and partly to create a stronger and more
unified trade policy voice for the partner countries in
the multilateral system (Mansfield et al., 2000).
Key Asian countries that have launched (and
concluded) bilateral negotiations include Japan, the
Republic of Korea, Singapore, China and India (Katada
and Solis, 2008). Even AFTA concluded bilateral
agreements with major Asian economies, such as
Japan and China (Lester and Mercurio, 2009). During
the same period, the United States launched bilateral
negotiations and concluded agreements with a range
of countries, including Jordan, Bahrain, Chile, Morocco,
Singapore, Australia, Oman, Peru, Panama, Colombia
and the Republic of Korea (Pomfret, 2006).
This most recent “wave” of regionalism covers a much
wider network of participants – including bilateral,
plurilateral and cross-regional initiatives – and
encompasses countries at different levels of economic
development – including “developed-developed”,
“developing-developing”, and “developed-developing”
alliances. And although these new agreements, like
previous PTAs, also involve preferential tariff
reductions, they focus even more on WTO-plus type
issues, such as services, capital flows, standards,
intellectual property, regulatory systems (many of
which are non-discriminatory) and commitments on
labour and environment issues.
As these agreements grow more comprehensive and
complex – as rule-making moves beyond the reduction
of border barriers into the challenges of “deeper”
policy integration – they have begun to blur the
meaning of discrimination. For example, the nondiscriminatory harmonization of regulatory standards
in these new regional agreements can have a
“preferential” effect when it effectively creates a
regional regulatory “bloc” that benefits insiders more
53
world trade report 2011
than outsiders. Conversely, the liberalization of certain
services regulations in a “discriminatory” regional
agreement can have a non-preferential effect when
regulatory changes necessarily benefit all foreign
suppliers, not just the partners to the agreement.
Some trade experts take a pessimistic view of the
latest explosion of PTAs, arguing that there is a link
between the surge of bilateral and regional deals and
the slow pace of the Doha Round (Bhagwati, 2008).
Others are more optimistic, suggesting the
proliferation of bilateral and regional deals will
eventually, as in the past, have a domino effect, and
force the pace of the Doha negotiations. Still others
argue that there is no correlation or causal link
between the pace of multilateralism and regionalism,
pointing to the fact that regional initiatives did not
“take off” when the Uruguay Round stalled between
1990 and 1994, and only accelerated after the
Round's conclusion in 1994 (Freund, 2000). In fact,
there is evidence that recent regional and multilateral
initiatives have actually advanced in tandem. This
adds weight to the view that they can, and do,
represent complementary aspects of an increasingly
complex and sophisticated global trade architecture –
one in which bilateral, regional and multilateral
agreements coexist and cohere in a kind of “multispeed” or “variable geometry” system.
2. The evolution of PTAs: stylized
facts
In order to identify relevant patterns in the evolution of
the PTA landscape, this section sets out to classify
PTAs according to a range of criteria. The main
purpose of these classifications will be to characterize
trends in the creation of PTAs and changes in their
nature over time. By looking at several PTA
characteristics together, it may also be possible to
consider the extent to which certain PTA attributes
may be linked with one another. Possible ways to
categorize PTAs include classification by:
• level of development (participation of developed or
developing countries only or of both developed and
developing countries);
• geographical coverage (intra- or cross-regional
PTAs) within/across regions, e.g. Asia (East, West,
Oceania), the Americas (North, South, Central,
Caribbean), Europe, Middle East, Africa and the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS);
• type (bilateral, plurilateral PTAs or PTAs between
regional blocs);
• degree of market integration (e.g. FTA, customs
union) and issue coverage (e.g. goods, services,
regulatory issues).
Characterizing PTAs in this way allows us to highlight a
range of stylized facts.12 The WTO's database on PTAs
54
is the primary source of information for this analysis.13 It
consists of all PTAs notified to the WTO and the GATT
(notifications under GATT Article XXIV, Enabling Clause
and General Agreement on Trade in Services Article V),
both those that are currently in force and those that are
inactive. The database also contains information on
PTAs that have not yet been notified to the WTO, but for
which an early announcement has been made.
WTO statistics on active PTAs, based on notification
obligations, tend to overestimate the total number of PTAs
for two reasons. First, for a PTA that includes both goods
and services, the database contains two notifications –
one for goods and another for services.14 Second, the
database counts accessions to existing PTAs as new
notifications. Hence, the number of “physical” agreements
equals the total number of notified active PTAs minus
Economic Integration Agreements (EIA) in services and
accessions to existing PTAs. Another weakness in the
current WTO database stems from the non-notification of
more than 100 active PTAs among developing countries.
Hence, for the purpose of this analysis, the database is
supplemented by information available from other publicly
available sources.15
(a) Level of development
PTA participation has accelerated over time and
become more widespread. From the 1950s onwards,
the number of active PTAs increased more or less
continuously to almost 70 in 1990. Thereafter, PTA
activity accelerated noticeably, with the number of
PTAs more than doubling over the next five years and
more than quadrupling until 2010 to reach close to
300 PTAs presently in force (see Figure B.1). The rise
in the absolute number of PTAs shown in Figure B.1,
and its acceleration from the early 1990s onwards, is
not really surprising in light of the fact that an
increasing number of countries have turned towards
outward-oriented policies and experienced strong
economic growth. This multiplied the demand for trade
agreements compared with previous time periods that
were dominated by inward-looking development
strategies and low economic performance.
Bergstrand et al. (2010) show that countries with
higher gross domestic products (GDPs) are more likely
to conclude trade agreements and that increased PTA
activity reinforces the demand for further trade
agreements by outsiders. However, the surge in PTA
activity is not merely driven by the “extensive margin”,
i.e. by a growing number of countries taking an interest
in reciprocal trade opening. A similar picture emerges
when the evolution in the number of PTAs per country
is considered, i.e. the increase in PTA activity at the
“intensive margin” (see Figure B.1a).
Only about two-thirds of the agreements currently in
force have been notified to the WTO. The overall picture
of highly dynamic PTA activity in recent times does not
change when only notified agreements are taken into
II – The WTO and Preferential Trade Agreements
300
Number of PTAs
250
200
B.historical background
and current trends
Figure B.1: Cumulative number of PTAs in force, 1950-2010, notified and non-notified PTAs,
by country group
150
100
50
0
1950
1955
1960
1965
1970
developing-developing
1975
1980
1985
developed-developing
1990
1995
2000
2005
2010
developed-developed
Source: WTO Secretariat.
Figure B.1a: Average number of PTAs in force per country, 1950-2010, notified and non-notified PTAs,
by country group
1.4
1.2
Number of PTAs
1
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0
1950
1955
1960
1965
1970
developed-developed
1975
1980
1985
developed-developing
1990
1995
2000
2005
2010
developing-developing
Note: In this figure the total number of PTAs is divided by the present number of countries in the respective groups.
Source: WTO Secretariat.
account. The intensification of PTA activity since the
early 1990s becomes particularly apparent when the
average number of PTA participants per WTO member
is considered. This number has risen from an average of
about two PTA trading partners in 1990 to over 12 at
the present date (see Figure B.1b).16 The various factors
that might prompt countries to create PTAs and
questions of timing are discussed in more detail in
Section C, while examples of the specific reasons
leading to the conclusion of PTAs have been given in
the historical discussion in Section B.1.
Developing countries have contributed in no small part
to the recent hike in PTA activity. Their participation in
PTAs evolved from continuous growth in the number of
preferential arrangements with developed countries to
an accelerating pattern of agreements between
developing countries (South-South agreements) (see
Figures B.1 and B.1a). From the late 1970s, when
agreements between developed and developing
countries (North-South agreements) represented
almost 60 per cent of all PTAs in force and SouthSouth PTAs barely 20 per cent, these two shares have
55
world trade report 2011
Figure B.1b: Average number of PTA participants per WTO member, 1958-2010, notified PTAs
14
12
Number of PTAs
10
8
6
4
2
0
1958
1962
1966
1970
1974
1978
1982
1986
1990
1994
1998
2002
2006
2010
Note: These figures include both GATT/WTO member and non-member trading partners in the context of PTAs per current WTO
members (153).
Source: WTO Secretariat.
evolved in opposite directions, with South-South now
representing two-thirds of all PTAs in force and NorthSouth about one-quarter.
From the 1960s onwards, the share of PTAs between
developed countries (North-North agreements) hovered
more or less around 30 per cent before its continuous
decline from the mid-1980s to barely 10 per cent today.
However, Figure B.1a shows that on average a
developed country still participates in more PTAs with
other developed countries than with developing
countries. This gap has been closing since the 1990s,
but there was a statistical correction in 2004 owing to
the enlargement by ten new members of the EU.17
These numbers are not only a reflection of the increasing
participation of developing countries in world trade. They
also underscore the shift of interest of developing
countries from preferential tariffs provided on a unilateral
basis by developed countries, for instance in the context
of the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), towards
South-South trade supported by preferential trading
relationships. The emergence of South-South integration
may also reflect its usefulness as a policy tool for
industrialization by facilitating the inclusion of leastdeveloped countries (LDCs) into regional production
networks and hence into the export process. SouthSouth integration also provides a means of strengthening
developing countries’ bargaining power in multilateral
trade negotiations (Wignaraja et al., 2010a) and of
addressing region-specific issues, such as transit,
migration and water (World Bank, 2005).
A different (and probably misleading) picture emerges
if only PTAs notified to the WTO are considered.
Acharya et al. (2011) find the opposite trend, where
56
PTAs concluded among developing countries rose in
the 1990s, only to seem to slow over the last ten years,
while PTAs between developed and developing
countries have shown a marked increase over the last
decade. The reason for this is that about 100 active
PTAs among developing countries, most of which are
fairly recent, have not been notified to the WTO.
The numbers in Figure B.1 are based on the year when
a PTA entered into force, yet these agreements were
negotiated and signed some time beforehand. Delays in
entry into force occur because ratification or approval
by Parliament is required and can sometimes take
longer than initially planned. This implies that full access
to partner markets is postponed and economic
conditions may change and affect the anticipated
benefits at the time of signature. On average, once a
PTA is signed, it enters into force in the following year,
with no major differences in delays between agreements
involving only developed, or only developing, countries.
Although an agreement may enter into force for all
partners at the same time, not all participating
countries open their markets to the same extent and
according to the same time schedule. Such transition
times may allow countries and industries to undertake
the necessary adjustment measures. Having transition
periods of varying length is common in developeddeveloping country PTAs, but also among developing
countries if levels of development differ substantially.
For example, within AFTA, Brunei Darussalam,
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and
Thailand (ASEAN-6) have brought down more than
99 per cent of the products in the Common Effective
Preferential Tariff Scheme Inclusion List to the 0-5 per
cent tariff range. However, Cambodia, Lao People’s
II – The WTO and Preferential Trade Agreements
Western Hemisphere for cross-regional agreements
and below, for instance, the CIS average for intraregional agreements.19
One reason for this is that countries in Asia have only
recently become more active in signing PTAs. Over the
last ten years, countries in East and West Asia as well
as Oceania have participated in almost half the PTAs
concluded over that period (more than, for instance,
European and CIS countries, which participated in
about one-third of agreements), while their
participation in PTA activities in the 1990s barely
reached 5 per cent (only six out of 106 agreements).
The high overall activity in the 1990s was largely due
to the dissolution of the former Soviet Union and the
establishment of new trading relationships in Europe
and within the CIS, which at that time accounted for
almost 50 per cent of new PTAs.
Viet Nam was given until 2006 to bring down the
respective tariffs of products in the Inclusion List to no
more than 5 per cent duties, Laos and Myanmar until
2008 and Cambodia until 2010.18 Unfortunately, data
on country-specific transition periods until full
implementation of commitments are not systematically
collected in the PTA databases mentioned above. Dent
(2006) notes, however, that such transition periods on
average have become shorter over time, from around
ten years in the mid-1980s to less than four years a
decade later.
There is considerable diversity in the total and average
numbers of agreements within and across regions (see
Table B.1). Europe is leading in terms of absolute
numbers of PTAs for both agreements within its own
region and with other regions. By contrast, African
countries, despite their relatively large numbers of
agreements within Africa and with other regions, do
not even count one PTA per country either within
Africa or across regions. In particular, their crossregional country average is significantly lower than
almost all other regions. For cross-regional
agreements, the numbers in both absolute and average
terms are particularly high for North, South and
Central America. Among Asian countries, despite their
increasing economic importance and regional
production structures, the average number of PTA
memberships is still well below the averages in the
B.historical background
and current trends
Democratic Republic, Myanmar and Viet Nam have so
far moved about 80 per cent of their products into
their respective Common Effective Preferential Tariff
Scheme Inclusion Lists, of which about 66 per cent
have tariffs within the 0-5 per cent tariff band.
All WTO members (with the exception of Mongolia)
belong to at least one PTA. Map B.1 shows the level of
participation in PTAs for countries/territories around
the globe. The EU participates in the largest number of
agreements (30), followed by Chile (26), Mexico (21),
EFTA members (between 20 and 22), Singapore (19),
Egypt (18) and Turkey (17). Other emerging economies,
such as Brazil (13), India (12) and China (10) are not
too far behind. Asian countries, however, show
increasing PTA activity, with Singapore and India
concluding a majority of their agreements, 17 out of
19 and 10 out of 12 agreements, respectively since
2000. The contrast is even starker for latecomers,
such as China and Japan, all of whose agreements
have entered into force since 2000.
Table B.1: Total and average number of PTAs in force, 2010, notified and non-notified PTAs, by region,
regional type and country group
Africa
(58)
Intra-regional
DevelopedDeveloping
DevelopingDeveloping
South
America
(12)
Central
Caribbean
America (24)
(7)
West Middle
Asia East (8)
(13)
Oceania
(30)
East Asia (19)
North
America (5)
Total
24
29
36
13
7
0
7
7
5
17
1
Avg/
country
0.4
2.4
0.9
1.1
1.0
0.0
0.9
0.5
0.2
0.9
0.2
Total
31
4
42
52
34
19
14
30
10
34
37
0.5
0.3
1.1
4.3
4.9
0.8
1.8
2.3
0.3
1.8
7.4
0
0
21
0
0
0
0
0
2
1
2
Avg/
country
0.0
0.0
0.5
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.1
0.1
0.4
Total
12
2
41
11
3
3
1
15
11
22
18
Avg/
country
0.2
0.2
1.0
0.9
0.4
0.1
0.1
1.2
0.4
1.2
3.6
Total
43
31
16
54
38
16
20
22
2
28
18
Avg/
country
0.7
2.6
0.4
4.5
5.4
0.7
2.5
1.7
0.1
1.5
3.6
Cross-regional Avg/
country
DevelopedDeveloped
CIS Europe
(12)
(40)
Total
Note: The number of countries considered per region is given in brackets.
Source: WTO Secretariat.
57
WOrld Trade repOrT 2011
MapB.1: membership in PtAs in force, 2010, notifi ed and non-notifi ed PtAs, by country
0
1 to 4
5 to 9
10 to 19
20 or more
Source:WTOSecretariat.
IncreasedPTAactivity,however,isnotjustfoundinthe
Asianregion.Furtherafield,theUnitedStateshasalso
becomemoreactive,concluding9ofits11agreements
since 2000. In this regard, the numbers of recently
signedPTAs(butnotyetinforce)andofthosecurrently
undernegotiationarequitetellingaswell. 20Despiteits
dominant position among existing PTAs, the EU
continues to widen its range of partners, with another
17 agreements signed or currently under negotiation.
Traditionally active countries, such as Singapore, the
United States and Chile, continue to negotiate new
PTAs(nine,eightandsixrespectivelyundernegotiation
or signed). In addition, a range of “newcomers” to the
PTA scene are currently engaged in a substantial
number of negotiations. This is especially true for the
Gulf Cooperation Council countries (15 agreements,
withtheUnitedArabEmiratesalsocurrentlynegotiating
an agreement with the United States), but also for
Canada, China, India and the Republic of Korea (nine
each),Australia(eight)andThailand(six).
(b) Geographicalcoverage
PTAactivityhastranscendedregionalboundaries.The
term “regional trade agreements” (RTAs) and
“preferentialtradeagreements”(PTAs)areoftenused
interchangeably in the literature, and the rise of
“regionalism” is often referred to in order to describe
the spread in PTA activity discussed in the previous
subsection. However, one half of PTAs currently in
force are not strictly “regional”, in that they include
countriesfromothergeographicalareas,accordingto
the regional definitions commonly employed in the
WTOcontext(seeFigureB.2).Thisdevelopmentisin
Figure B.2: Cumulative number of intra- and cross-regional PtAs in force, 1950-2010, notifi ed and
non-notifi ed PtAs
300
Number of PTAs
250
200
150
100
50
0
1950
1955
1960
1965
1970
1975
1980
Cross-regional
Source:WTOSecretariat.
58
1985
1990
Intra-regional
1995
2000
2005
2010
II – The WTO and Preferential Trade Agreements
reflect the fact that several prospects of agreements
within a region have already been exhausted
(Fiorentino et al., 2007).
Table B.2 shows the number of agreements within a
region and across regions for each regional group and
partner group. Table B.3 indicates how the numbers for
Table B.2: “Network” of PTAs in force, 2010, notified and non-notified PTAs, by region
Africa
CIS
Europe
South
America
Central
America
Caribbean
West
Asia
Middle
East
Oceania
East
Asia
North
America
24
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
CIS
0
29
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
Europe
16
4
36
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
Africa
South America
3
0
6
13
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
Central America
1
0
2
19
7
-
-
-
-
-
-
Caribbean
2
0
3
16
11
0
-
-
-
-
-
West Asia
4
1
3
4
1
1
7
-
-
-
-
Middle East
13
1
12
3
1
1
4
7
-
-
-
Oceania
1
0
1
3
0
1
0
0
5
-
-
East Asia
3
0
5
8
6
1
9
3
7
17
-
North America
4
0
6
16
9
4
2
7
2
5
1
B.historical background
and current trends
marked contrast to just over ten years ago, when
activity within a region was dominant. The trend
towards a broader geographical scope of PTAs is even
more pronounced for those PTAs that are currently
under negotiation or have recently been signed (but
are not yet in force), practically all of which are crossregional. The advent of cross-regional PTAs may
Source: WTO Secretariat.
Table B.3: Intra- and cross-regional PTAs in force, 2010, notified and non-notified PTAs, by region and
time period
1950-59
1960-69
1970-79
1980-89
1990-99
2000-10
Africa
CIS
Europe
South
America
Central
America
Caribbean
West
Asia
Middle
East
Oceania
East North
Asia America
Intraregional
2
0
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Crossregional
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Intraregional
1
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
Crossregional
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Intraregional
1
0
5
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
Crossregional
2
0
3
3
1
2
2
2
1
2
2
Intraregional
5
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
2
0
0
Crossregional
1
0
1
11
9
4
1
2
0
1
6
Intraregional
12
25
10
9
0
0
2
2
1
2
1
Crossregional
11
1
12
10
8
3
1
14
0
0
8
Intraregional
3
4
17
3
5
0
5
5
1
15
0
Crossregional
17
3
26
28
16
10
10
12
9
31
21
Source: WTO Secretariat.
59
world trade report 2011
each region have developed over time. While Europe has
a strong focus on intra-regional agreements, it has also
followed the recent trend towards more cross-regional
integration, notably with Africa and the Middle East. By
contrast, CIS countries have so far confined their PTA
activities to other countries in the CIS region. Similarly,
African countries feature a considerable number of
agreements with other African countries, but have
engaged in only a few PTAs with countries in the
Americas and Asia. Over time, however, it is interesting to
note that while African countries in the 1990s were
active in regard to PTAs within Africa, the reverse is true
in the last decade. The African countries belonging to the
Africa, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) grouping have
signed a series of Economic Partnership Agreements
(EPAs) with the EU. The EPAs are a key element of the
Cotonou Agreement, which is the latest agreement in the
history of ACP-EU development cooperation. Perhaps
not surprisingly, many cross-regional agreements are
located in the Western Hemisphere, involving North,
Central and South America as well as the Caribbean in
various constellations. Also, the Western Hemisphere's
cross-regional activity has received a major boost over
the past ten years.
The situation is somewhat different in Asia, where
despite some activity within Asia and across regions, the
picture is more geographically dispersed and both types
of activities took off only after 2000. For instance, in
East Asia the number of PTAs with countries in West
Asia and Oceania are quite similar to the number of
agreements with Caribbean, South and Central American
partners. As will be discussed further in Section C, these
differences in the timing and orientation of PTAs are
driven by a multitude of possible explanations. It is
noteworthy that, for the moment, few PTAs involve
countries from more than two geographical regions, such
as the recent PTA between the United States, Central
American countries (within the Central American Free
Trade Agreement) and the Dominican Republic in the
Caribbean or the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic
Partnership Agreement which encompasses countries
from East Asia, Oceania and South America, as well as
countries from other regions currently negotiating to join.
(c) Types of PTAs
PTAs have seen opposing trends towards further
rationalization on the one hand and a sprawling web of
new bilateral and overlapping deals on the other. PTAs
can be negotiated between two countries (bilateral),
among several countries (plurilateral) or among one or
several PTAs that have already been formed. Currently,
two trends can be observed. On the one hand, there are
growing instances of multiple bilateral agreements being
consolidated into a plurilateral agreement or of an existing
regional bloc negotiating on behalf of its members.
Figure B.3 shows that, apart from the 1970s, accessions
to existing PTAs and new deals among PTAs have been
particularly prominent in recent years. Examples are, of
course, successive EU enlargements, but also the
consolidation of bilateral pacts between Eastern
European countries in the context of the Central
European Free Trade Area (CEFTA) or the conclusion of
a PTA between MERCOSUR and the Andean
Community in the Latin American Integration Agreement
framework. 21 Acharya et al. (2011) document this move
towards further consolidation by contrasting the
cumulative number of active PTAs, which dropped in
2005 and 2007 following EU enlargement, with the
spike in the number of notified PTAs that became
Figure B.3: Cumulative number of bilateral PTAs and types of plurilateral PTAs in force, 1950-2010,
notified and non-notified PTAs
300
Number of PTAs
250
200
150
100
50
0
1950
1955
1960
1965
1970
1975
PTA-PTA/country
1980
1985
Plurilateral
1990
1995
2000
2005
2010
Bilateral
Note: “Bilateral” PTAs consist of two parties only, “plurilateral agreements” of three or more. The category “PTA-PTA/country” denotes PTAs,
where an existing PTA has engaged in an agreement with another country, including through accession, or with another existing PTA.
Source: WTO Secretariat.
60
II – The WTO and Preferential Trade Agreements
On the other hand, there is a parallel trend beyond
integration within a region towards a multitude of
bilateral deals across the globe. Table B.4 reveals that
cross-regional PTAs are to a large extent of a bilateral
nature, while plurilateral deals are much more common
within a region. In fact, Figures B.2 and B.3 illustrate
that the doubling of cross-regional PTAs over the past
decade has coincided with a similarly strong increase
in the number of bilateral deals. As shown in Table B.4,
many of these bilateral deals have been between
developing countries, but large developed countries,
such as the United States, have also been active in
concluding bilateral PTAs with a range of countries,
such as Australia, Bahrain, Morocco and Singapore.
Similarly, in East Asia, it has been both small and
medium-sized countries, such as Singapore and
Thailand, and larger ones, such as Japan (and more
recently China), that have played a central role in this
move towards increasing bilateralism (Aggarwal and
Koo, 2005). One possible conclusion is that the recent
proliferation of bilateral PTAs denotes a shift from the
traditional concept of regional integration among
neighbouring countries to partnerships driven by
strategic (political and economic) considerations that
are not necessarily related to regional dynamics. 23 It
may also reflect the technical complexity of negotiating
with a group of countries on a broad range of issues,
such as factor mobility, investment, intellectual
property rights and government procurement.
Finally, as noted above, the disproportionate increase
in the number of bilateral PTAs may also reflect the
fact that opportunities for region-wide plurilateral
PTAs are fewer given the past waves of regionalism
(Fiorentino et al., 2007). An important side effect of
these developments is the increased fragmentation of
trade relations related to countries' membership in
multiple, sometimes overlapping PTAs. De la Rocha
(2003) documents, for instance, that most countries in
Eastern and Southern Africa belong to at least two
regional groups and that, in addition, many of them are
involved in overlapping bilateral trade and investment
agreements. For example, the author cites various
members of SADC that entertain up to ten separate
bilateral agreements with other SADC countries.
(d) Degree of market integration
The degree of market integration mostly stays at the FTA
level and a number of products continue to be excluded
from preferential access. Nevertheless, the coverage of
PTAs in terms of issue areas has widened and deepened
over time. The historical overview in Section B.1 noted
the original intent of the drafters of the GATT to make an
exception from non-discrimination for customs unions
(CUs) rather than for FTAs that ultimately were covered
as well by GATT Article XXIV. Over time, the number of
CUs has certainly proven to be minor compared with the
proliferation of FTAs. Figure B.4 shows that currently
FTAs (not counting partial scope agreements and mere
services agreements) account for three-quarters of all
PTAs in force.24 Among other things, countries may find
it less desirable to form CUs as these require the
establishment of a common external tariff and
harmonization of external trade policies, and hence imply
a much higher degree of policy coordination and a loss of
autonomy over national commercial policies (Fiorentino
et al., 2007).
B.historical background
and current trends
inactive in those years. From Table B.4 it is clear that
further PTA formation by existing PTAs has mainly
involved developed countries only so far, or both
developed and developing countries, but has been less
common among just developing countries, especially in
relative terms compared with bilateral agreements. 22
Although, under GATT Article XXIV:8, duties are to be
eliminated on substantially all the trade between
participants in both FTAs and CUs, it is common that
“sensitive” products are excluded from concessions. 25
In a study covering 15 bilateral agreements between
four major economies – Canada, the European Union,
Japan and the United States – and their major trading
partners, Damuri (2009) shows that about 7 per cent
of tariff lines in the sample, comprising around 11,000
products, are classified as “products excluded”, either
temporarily or permanently. 26 These products are
concentrated in less than 15 per cent of the tariff lines
covered in the negotiations and mainly fall in the
agriculture and food sectors. 27
Damuri also highlights several factors related to the
pattern of product exclusions, confirming the
underlying political economy motivation of maintaining
heightened protection for certain industries. As
Table B.4: Number of bilateral PTAs and types of plurilateral PTAs in force, 2010, notified and nonnotified PTAs, by country group and regional type
Developed-Developed
Bilateral
Plurilateral
Plurilateral; at least one
party is a PTA
6
9
8
Developed-Developing
29
6
41
Developing-Developing
135
36
18
Intra-regional
81
39
26
Cross-regional
89
12
41
Source: WTO Secretariat.
61
world trade report 2011
Figure B.4: Type of PTAs in force, 2010, notified and non-notified PTAs
PSA & EIA 0.4%
CU 5.7%
CU & EIA 2.3%
EIA 0.4%
PSA 18.0%
FTA 44.1%
FTA & EIA 29.1%
Note: As explained in the introduction, the term “preferential trade agreement” (PTA) is used in this report to denote reciprocal preferential
agreements in general. For the purposes of this figure, we follow the classification in Acharya et al. (2011): A “free trade agreement” (FTA)
Note: As explained in the introduction, the term "preferential trade agreement"
denotes an agreement between two or more parties in which tariffs and other trade barriers are eliminated on most or all trade and each
(PTA) is used in this Report to denote reciprocal preferential agreements in general.
party maintains its own tariff structure vis-à-vis third parties. A “customs union” (CU) is an agreement between two or more parties in which
the purposes
of this
the in
classification
Acharya
et aal.common
(2011):commercial policy towards
tariffs and other trade For
barriers
are eliminated
on figure,
most orwe
all follow
trade and,
addition, the in
parties
adopt
A "free
agreement"
(FTA) denotes
agreement
two agreement"(PSA)
or more parties is employed to describe
third parties which includes
thetrade
establishment
of a common
externalan
tariff.
The termbetween
“partial scope
an agreement betweenintwo
or more
parties
in which
the barriers
parties offer
each other concessions
on trade
a selected
number of products or sectors.
which
tariffs
and other
trade
are eliminated
on most or all
and each
Economic integration agreements
(EIA) its
refer
to agreements
on trade
in services
through which
two or more
parties
party maintains
own
tariff structure
vis-à-vis
third parties.
A "customs
union"
(CU)offer preferential market
access to each other. is an agreement between two or more parties in which tariffs and other trade barriers
are eliminated on most or all trade and, in addition, the parties adopt a common
Source: WTO Secretariat.
commercial policy towards third parties which includes the establishment of a common
external tariff. The term "partial scope agreement"(PSA) is employed to describe
an agreement
between
two ortariff
more rate
parties inPTA
which(i.e.
the parties
eachvalues
other are high), inclusion is
expected, he finds that
the higher
the MFN
when offer
import
concessions
a selected
number
of products
or sectors.
of reporting countries,
the lessonlikely
it is to
include
a
more
likely. Economic integration
agreements the
(EIA)higher
refer to the
agreements
on trade in services through which two
product in a PTA. Moreover,
revealed
or more(RCA)
parties of
offer
preferential
market access
to each
other.PTAs go beyond the traditional tariffMost
recent
comparative advantage
partner
countries,
Source:
WTO
Secretariat
cutting exercises and cover, for example, services,
which measures their capacity to export to reporting
countries’ markets, the less likely a product is included
in a PTA. By the same token, when products are
already heavily traded between countries negotiating a
investment, intellectual property, technical barriers to
trade and dispute settlement. For instance, about onethird of PTAs in force today contain services
Figure B.5: Cumulative number of PTAs, 1950-2010, notified and non-notified PTAs, by scope
of coverage
300
Number of PTAs
250
200
150
100
50
0
1950
1955
1960
1965
1970
Goods
Source: WTO Secretariat.
62
1975
1980
1985
Goods and services
1990
Services
1995
2000
2005
2010
II – The WTO and Preferential Trade Agreements
Almost all services PTAs notified so far involve
economies in Asia-Pacific, Europe and the Americas.
Only a few countries in Africa and the Middle East are
parties to such agreements (i.e. Morocco, Jordan, Oman,
Bahrain, and all via PTAs with the United States) although
many of them are currently involved in negotiating trade
agreements that may cover services. While large
economies, such as Brazil, China, the EU, India, Japan
and the United States, have been involved in services
PTAs, they have not yet signed such agreements among
themselves.29 These facts are borne out by the figures
contained in Table B.5, which indicate that a majority of
PTAs between developed and developing countries
contain commitments on services, unlike PTAs between
developed countries or between developing countries.
A larger share of bilateral agreements compared with
plurilateral ones contain commitments on services. This
is perhaps a reflection of more complex issues being
dealt with on a one-to-one basis, and of the fact that the
profusion of bilateral agreements, together with the
increased importance of services trade, are relatively
recent phenomena. The coverage of services is
particularly conspicuous for cross-regional PTAs (see
Table B.5). An increasing number of bilateral PTAs across
the globe, covering more than traditional tariff reductions
and services in particular, may be indicative of the more
strategic motivations of recent PTA formation, notably in
the context of international production networks (to be
further discussed in Section D).
New provisions on the enforcement of domestic labour
and environmental laws have also been incorporated in
certain PTAs. NAFTA has placed environmental
protection on a pedestal by concluding that in the event
of an inconsistency with its provisions, trade obligations
specified under different environmental and conservation
agreements would prevail. The East Africa Community, to
take another example, seeks to promote the sustainable
utilization of natural resources, demonstrating a nonlegally binding approach to dealing with these issues.
In more recent PTAs, there are commitments to cooperate
across an even wider set of policy areas, such as poverty
alleviation, rural development and tourism (Whalley,
2008). Significantly, most of the “new” policy areas or
regulatory frameworks found in PTAs are not addressed
multilaterally (an issue that will be discussed in more detail
in Section D). This move into newer areas not covered by
current WTO rules is reflected in the language used to
describe these PTAs. For example, the recent JapanSingapore agreement is termed a “New Age Economic
Partnership” agreement, while the China-ASEAN
agreement is referred to as a “Framework Agreement on
Comprehensive Economic Cooperation” (Whalley, 2008).
B.historical background
and current trends
commitments, and this development has accelerated
in recent times (see Figure B.5). 28 The top 25
exporters and importers of services (on the basis of
2008 balance of payment statistics) are involved in at
least one services PTA. The WTO members that have
engaged in most services PTAs include Chile, Mexico,
the United States, Singapore and Japan.
3. Trade flows related to PTAs
The reduction of tariff rates over time – through
multilateral, preferential and unilateral processes – has
reduced the scope for securing meaningful trade
preferences. That this has coincided with a substantial
increase in the number of active preferential trade
agreements suggests that countries may have reasons
for entering into these agreements beyond securing
access to vital export markets. The following section
looks at the magnitude, direction and evolution of global
trade flows in order to shed some light on this issue, and
more generally to determine the impact of the expansion
in PTAs in recent years. Statistics on PTA-related trade
flows can reveal a number of important facts, including: i)
the total value of world merchandise trade taking place
among PTA members; and ii) the degree to which trade
has become more or less geographically concentrated as
regional trade agreements have proliferated.
Section B.3(a) addresses the first of these questions
by summarizing all available data on trade flows
between parties to trade agreements, and by providing
a breakdown of these flows by type of agreement and
Table B.5: Number of goods and services PTAs in force, 2010, notified and non-notified PTAs,
by country group, level of participation and regional type
Goods
Goods and services
Services
13
9
1
Developed-Developing
36
40
0
Developing-Developing
145
41
1
Bilateral
104
64
0
Developed-Developed
Plurilateral
38
11
2
Plurilateral; at least 1 party is
a PTA
52
15
0
Intra-regional
110
33
2
Cross-regional
84
57
0
Source: WTO Secretariat.
63
world trade report 2011
product group. Focusing on total merchandise trade
between PTA members significantly overstates the
amount of world trade that is conducted on a
preferential basis, since trade agreements generally
do not apply to all goods, and existing trade
preferences may not be fully utilized. However, figures
on total intra-PTA trade do have certain advantages.
To begin with, they give a more complete picture of the
trading relationships between PTA members, which is
particularly important when assessing the notion that
countries may be less motivated by the desire to obtain
preferential market access through PTAs than they
were in the past. Also, the total value of intra-PTA
trade can be seen as an upper bound estimate of the
amount of trade conducted on a preferential basis.
Section B.4 provides a detailed estimate of the amount
of international trade receiving preferential tariff
treatment, which we shall see is quite small.
The second question – whether trade has become
more or less geographically concentrated – is tackled
in Section B.3(b), using WTO statistics on trade
between geographical regions. One compelling
explanation for the explosion in the number of trade
agreements since 1990 is that these agreements may
provide an institutional framework for the creation and
maintenance of international supply chains, many of
which are regional in nature. If this is the case, data on
the magnitude and direction of trade flows within and
between geographic regions could provide an
indication of whether trade agreements are related to
the development of global supply chains.
The data in Section B.3 mostly pertain to merchandise
trade rather than to trade in services, due to a lack of
sufficiently detailed information on bilateral trade flows
for the latter. Such data that are available suggest that
intra-PTA trade in services is relatively small compared
with trade in goods, and extremely small compared
with total trade in goods and services. Some examples
of services trade among large PTA partners are given
towards the end of Section B.3(a), but otherwise the
data in this part of the report deal exclusively with
merchandise trade.
(a) What is the value of world trade
between PTA members?
In this subsection, we estimate total world trade
between PTA members in 1990 and 2008, as well as
the share of trade within PTAs (intra-PTA trade) in world
trade. Intra-PTA trade flows are calculated as the sum
of bilateral merchandise trade between PTA members
for all available reporters in the UN Comtrade database,
while total world trade is approximated by the sum of all
reporters in Comtrade. We find that the dollar value of
trade between members of preferential trade
agreements has indeed grown faster than the world
average since 1990, and as a result the share of intraPTA trade in world trade has increased from 18 per cent
in 1990 to 35 per cent in 2008 (see Figure B.6). 30 64
Figure B.6: Share of intra-PTA trade in world
merchandise exports, 1990-2008 (Percentage)
60
50.8
50
40
34.5
30
28.0
17.8
20
10
0
Intra-PTA share
in world including EC/EU
1990
Intra-PTA share
in world excluding EC/EU
2008
Note: World is estimated as the sum of all available reporters in
Comtrade.
Source: UN Comtrade database.
The value of world trade between PTA members, as
measured by exports, increased from US$ 537 billion in
1990 to US$ 4.0 trillion in 2008 (see Tables B.6 and
B.7). The contribution of different types of trade
agreements to trade between PTA members has also
changed as the landscape of preferential agreements
has evolved. In 1990, trade between parties to
plurilateral agreements made up around 10 per cent of
intra-PTA trade in 1990, but this share rose to 50 per
cent by 2008. One of the main reasons for the increased
importance of plurilateral agreements was the
establishment in 1994 of NAFTA, which replaced the
bilateral Canada-US Free Trade Agreement and whose
three members (Canada, Mexico and the United States)
comprise the second-largest regional trade bloc by
value of exports after the European Union.
Values and shares for imports are also shown in
Tables B.6 and B.7, and these figures are very similar to
their counterparts on the export side.
In addition to total merchandise trade values, Table B.7
also shows trade between PTA members in
manufactures, as well as in a category called “parts
and components”. Trade in parts and components is
often used as an indicator or measure of international
production networks (the role of these networks in the
establishment of PTAs is discussed further in
Sections C and D). Manufactures are defined here as
the sum of sections 5, 6, 7 and 8 minus division 68
and group 891 in the third revision of the Standard
International Trade Classification (SITC Rev.3), in
accordance with the definition used in the WTO’s
International Trade Statistics publication (World Trade
Organization (WTO), 2010). There is no broadly
II – The WTO and Preferential Trade Agreements
Manufactures represented 65 per cent of merchandise
trade among PTA members in 2008 and around
64 per cent of intra-trade between parties to
plurilateral trade agreements. The share of
manufactures in total merchandise trade of all
reporting countries in Comtrade (a proxy for the world)
was only slightly higher at 65 per cent. The shares of
parts and components in total merchandise remain
between 17 and 18 per cent regardless of the type of
trade agreement. Overall, it appears that product
shares do not change much depending on whether
agreements are plurilateral, bilateral between two
countries, or bilateral involving a PTA.
Although there is little difference in product shares
based on the membership composition of trade
agreements, we do see significant variation in product
shares and intra-PTA trade shares when we look at
individual agreements. Appendix Table 1 (see the
Statistical appendix) shows exports and imports of
selected plurilateral PTAs in 2008 broken down by the
two product groups used in Table B.7 (i.e. manufactures,
parts and components) as well as by origin and
destination: trade within the PTA (intra-PTA trade) and
trade outside the PTA (extra-PTA trade). Some products
make up a much larger (or smaller) percentage of intraPTA trade than extra-PTA trade. Intra-PTA trade may
represent a relatively large or small part of overall trade
in particular classes of goods.
B.historical background
and current trends
accepted definition of parts and components that we
can appeal to, but for the purposes of this report we
have defined it as the SITC Rev.3 equivalent of codes
42 and 53 in the Broad Economic Categories (BEC)
classification, supplemented with unfinished textile
products in division 65 of the SITC classification.
As an example of how to read the table, we shall examine
the case of the ANDEAN Community (comprising the
Plurinational State of Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and
Peru). We can observe that intra-PTA trade plays a small
role in total ANDEAN trade on both the export and
import sides. Only 8 per cent of ANDEAN members'
merchandise imports and 7 per cent of their exports
either originate in or are destined for other ANDEAN
countries. Equivalently, we could say that extra-PTA
shares are 92 per cent for imports and 93 per cent for
exports, which amounts to the same thing. We can
Table B.6: World merchandise trade between PTAs, 1990 (Billion dollars and percentage)
Values
Share in total world
preferential trade
Share in total world
merchandise trade
(Billion dollars)
(Percentage)
(Percentage)
Exports
Imports
Exports
Imports
Exports
Imports
484
489
50
51
14
14
429
429
44
45
12
12
55
60
6
6
2
2
482
472
50
49
14
13
Canada – United States
178
169
18
18
5
5
EC (12) – EFTA countries
143
145
15
15
4
4
Including intra-European Union (12)
Total world plurilateral trade
of which:
EC (12) intra-trade
Rest of world
Total world bilateral trade
of which:
161
158
17
16
5
4
Total world preferential trade
Rest of world
966
960
100
100
28
27
Total world merchandise trade
3,449
3,550
-
-
100
100
55
60
10
11
2
2
482
472
90
89
16
15
Canada – United States
178
169
33
32
6
5
EC (12) – EFTA countries
143
145
27
27
5
5
Excluding intra-European Union (12)
Total world plurilateral trade
Total world bilateral trade
of which:
Rest of world
Total world preferential trade
161
158
30
30
5
5
537
532
100
100
18
17
3,020
3,121
-
-
100
100
excluding EC (12)
Total world merchandise trade
excluding EC (12)
Source: UN Comtrade database.
65
world trade report 2011
Table B.7: World merchandise trade between PTAs, 2008 (Billion dollars and percentage)
Value
Share in all
commodities
Share in total
PTA trade
Share in PTAs
excl. EU (27)
Share in all
reporting
countries a
Share in all
reporters excl.
EU (27) a
(Billion dollars)
(Percentage)
(Percentage)
(Percentage)
(Percentage)
(Percentage)
Export
Import
Export
Import
Export
Import
Export
All commodities
5,892
5,780
100
100
75
74
-
Manufactures
4,138
3,968
70
69
76
75
988
1,002
17
17
73
All commodities
2,017
2,125
100
100
-
Manufactures
1,286
1,306
64
61
368
394
18
19
All commodities
2,005
2,083
100
100
Manufactures
1,334
1,348
67
65
359
371
18
All commodities
1,565
1,616
Manufactures
1,057
Import
Export
Import
Export
Import
-
38
36
-
-
-
-
40
38
-
-
73
-
-
37
38
-
-
-
50
51
-
-
17
17
-
-
49
49
-
-
17
17
-
-
51
51
-
-
18
19
25
26
50
49
13
13
17
17
24
25
51
51
13
13
18
17
18
27
27
49
49
14
14
18
18
100
100
20
21
39
38
10
10
13
13
1,075
67
67
19
20
40
41
10
10
14
14
279
293
18
18
21
21
38
38
11
11
14
14
All commodities
439
467
100
100
6
6
11
11
3
3
4
4
Manufactures
277
273
63
58
5
5
11
10
3
3
4
4
80
78
18
17
6
6
11
10
3
3
4
4
7,897
7,863
100
100
100
100
-
-
51
49
-
-
Plurilateral agreements incl.
EU (27)
Parts and components
Plurilaterals excl. EU (27)
Parts and components
Bilateral agreements
Parts and components
Bilaterals with one
PTA
partner a
Parts and components
Other bilaterals
Parts and components
Total trade between PTAs incl.
EU (27)
All commodities
Manufactures
5,471
5,316
69
68
100
100
-
-
52
51
-
-
Parts and components
1,347
1,373
17
17
100
100
-
-
51
52
-
-
All commodities
4,022
4,208
100
100
-
-
100
100
-
-
34
34
Manufactures
2,620
2,655
65
63
-
-
100
100
-
-
34
34
727
765
18
18
-
-
100
100
-
-
36
37
All commodities
15,549
15,935
100
100
-
-
-
-
100
100
-
-
Manufactures
10,446
10,402
67
65
-
-
-
-
100
100
-
-
2,656
2,650
17
17
-
-
-
-
100
100
-
-
11,674
12,280
100
100
-
-
-
-
-
-
100
100
Total trade between PTAs excl.
EU (27)
Parts and components
Total of all reporting
countries incl. EU (27) a
Parts and components
All reporters excl. EU (27) a
All commodities
Manufactures
7,595
7,740
65
63
-
-
-
-
-
-
100
100
Parts and components
2,035
2,042
17
17
-
-
-
-
-
-
100
100
a Sum of all available reporters in the UN Comtrade database, equal to roughly 97% of world trade. WTO’s estimates for total world
exports and imports in 2008 from International Trade Statistics 2010 are $16.1 trillion and $16.5 trillion respectively, including intra-EU
trade. Total exports and imports in 2008 excluding intra-EU trade are equal to 12.1 trillion and 12.5 trillion, respectively.
Source: UN Comtrade database.
66
II – The WTO and Preferential Trade Agreements
The European Union is notable for having the highest
intra-PTA share and the lowest extra-PTA share of any
regional trade agreement. The share of intra-EU trade
in total merchandise exports in 2008 was equal to
67 per cent, compared 65 per cent for manufactures
and 63 per cent for parts and components. By
comparison, the equivalent shares for NAFTA were
49 per cent for total merchandise, 48 per cent for
manufactures, and 46 per cent for parts and
components. The EU also has the second highest
share of manufactures in both its intra-exports (74 per
cent, behind the Asia Pacific Trade Agreement (APTA)
with 82 per cent) and extra-exports (81 per cent, again
behind APTA with 90 per cent).
The ASEAN free trade area recorded one of the higher
shares of intra-PTA trade in total exports of parts and
components with 28 per cent. ASEAN was tied with
APTA for the highest share of parts and components
in total merchandise exports, again with a share of
28 per cent.
Appendix tables 2 to 6 in the Statistical Appendix
provide more information on intra-trade within selected
PTAs, including intra-PTA shares in total exports and
imports for member countries broken down by product.
In some cases, not all members of the PTA are shown
in the table, but unless otherwise indicated the total
always refers to the sum of all available reporters in
Comtrade. Years are chosen to maximize country
coverage and if possible to show some of the period
before agreements came into force. Intra-PTA trade
shares for different products and countries have
clearly changed over time. For example, within ASEAN,
Thailand's exports of agricultural products are
increasingly destined for ASEAN trading partners, as
the share of intra-trade with these partners in the
country's total agricultural products exports rose from
9 per cent in 1992 to 14 per cent in 2000 and
eventually to 19 per cent in 2008. Thailand has also
seen its intra-PTA share of automotive products
exports rise sharply, roughly doubling from 15 per cent
in 2000 to 30 per cent in 2009.
Appendix tables 2 to 6 also show rising intra-PTA
trade shares for NAFTA countries between 1990 and
2000, followed by declining shares from 2000 to
2009. Surprisingly, the decline in intra-PTA trade
applies to all three member countries and to most
products on both the export and import sides, with the
exception of Mexican fuels and mining products
exports, which increased from 78 per cent to 82 per
cent. Despite its declining intra-PTA trade shares, the
overall share of intra-PTA trade in total NAFTA exports
remains relatively high compared with other PTAs (48
per cent for exports, 33 per cent for imports).
The intra-PTA trade share of MERCOSUR for total
merchandise has also declined recently, and currently
stands below its 1995 level on both the export and
import sides. All member countries have seen their
share of exports to MERCOSUR partners in total
exports decline over time, while Argentina, Paraguay
and Uruguay have increased their intra-PTA trade
shares on the import side.
B.historical background
and current trends
also see that the intra-PTA share in exports of
manufactures is higher than that for total merchandise
at 20 per cent, which means that 20 per cent of
ANDEAN countries' exports of manufactures go to
other ANDEAN countries. One interesting feature of
ANDEAN's trade is that the share of manufactures in
total exports is much larger for intra-PTA exports (52 per
cent) than for extra-PTA exports (16 per cent).
As a final example, despite the low intra-PTA trade
shares for total merchandise exports of Africa, intraPTA trade within COMESA as a percentage of total
exports is quite high in certain categories of goods,
including automotive products (41 per cent in 2009),
parts and components (39 per cent) and manufactures
(28 per cent).
The fact that a given trade agreement has a high or a
low share of intra-PTA trade in its total exports may
have little significance if its overall weight in world PTA
trade is small. Figure B.7 shows shares of selected
PTAs in world intra-PTA exports, both including and
excluding trade within the EU. The EU makes up nearly
half (49 per cent) of world intra-PTA exports, when
trade between its member countries is considered,
followed by NAFTA (13 per cent), ASEAN (3 per cent),
APTA (3 per cent), the CIS (2 per cent) and
MERCOSUR (1 per cent). The EU also leads all other
countries and PTAs in the total value of its trade with
bilateral partners, which collectively makes up 12 per
cent of world intra-PTA trade (6 per cent for EFTA
countries alone). By comparison, China's bilateral trade
with ASEAN countries only accounts for 3 per cent of
world intra-PTA trade, while US bilateral agreements
make up just 2 per cent of the world total.
The overwhelming weight of the European Union in
world exports between PTA members provides another
argument for excluding trade within the EU, since its
inclusion may only serve to severely underestimate the
importance of other preferential agreements in world
trade. Without intra-EU trade entering into the
calculation of shares, NAFTA becomes the largest
trade agreement by value, representing 25 per cent of
world intra-PTA trade. However, EU bilateral trade
agreements collectively add up to 24 per cent of the
total, including 12 per cent with EFTA countries. Other
PTAs all see their shares roughly double after
excluding trade within the EU.
Data on intra-PTA trade in services are limited due to
the small number of countries reporting bilateral
services trade statistics to international organizations,
as well as the differing levels of partner detail across
reporting countries. To get a rough idea of the
magnitude of global intra-PTA trade in services, it may
67
world trade report 2011
Figure B.7: Shares of selected PTAs in total
world exports between PTA members, 2008
(Percentage)
Other bilaterals 3%
US bilaterals 2%
Other bi-plurilaterals 2%
Including EU (27)
EU bilaterals 6%
EFTA-EU 6%
ASEAN-Japan 3%
ASEAN-China 3%
Other
plurilaterals 4%
MERCOSUR 1%
CIS 2%
APTA 3%
ASEAN 3%
NAFTA 13%
EU (27) 49%
Excluding EU (27)
Other bilaterals 7%
NAFTA 25%
US bilaterals 4%
Other bi-plurilaterals 4%
EU bilaterals 12%
ASEAN 6%
EFTA-EU 12%
APTA 6%
EFTA bilaterals 1%
ASEAN-Japan 5%
ASEAN-China 5%
CIS 3%
Other plurilaterals 8%
MERCOSUR 1%
Source: UN Comtrade database.
suffice to look at the largest services traders for
which partner data are available, namely the European
Union and the United States.
According to data from the Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD), EU exports
of services to PTA partners came to US$ 192 billion
in 2008, equal to 25 per cent of total extra-EU
exports of services and 7 per cent of extra-EU exports
of goods and services. However, the above figure
includes exports to partners in PTAs that cover goods
alone as well those that cover goods and services. If
only agreements that deal with services explicitly are
considered, exports to PTA partners totalled just US$
18.5 billion, equal to 2.4 per cent of exports of
services outside the EU and less than 1 per cent of
goods and services exports.
68
On the import side, EU trade with PTA partners
outside the EU amounted to US$ 167 billion including
agreements covering goods alone (equal to 26 per
cent of total EU services imports and 6 per cent of
goods and services imports). This figure drops to
US$ 20 billion when only agreements that deal with
services are considered (equal to 3 per cent of
services imports and less than 1 per cent of goods
and services imports). Meanwhile, the United States'
exports and imports of services to and from PTA
partners amounted to roughly US$ 80 billion and
US$ 45 billion, respectively, in 2008. These
accounted for 15 per cent of total US services exports
and 12 per cent of services imports. Shares in goods
and services were 4 per cent for exports and 2 per
cent for imports.
Exports and imports of the EU and the United States
are also small compared with these countries' exports
and imports of merchandise to PTA partners. The
EU's US$ 192 billion in exports of services to PTA
partners was only 20 per cent as large as exports of
merchandise outside the EU, while the US$ 167
billion of imports was only equal to 17 per cent of
merchandise imports. These shares fall to 2 per cent
on both the export and import sides when agreements
dealing with services are considered exclusively. As
for the United States, its exports of services to PTA
partners were only 7 per cent as large as its
merchandise exports to PTA partners, while its
imports were only 4 per cent as large.
The preceding tables and charts were intended to
quantify the amount of world trade that occurs
between parties to preferential trade agreements and
to give an indication of its composition. However, as
was noted earlier, the amount of trade between PTA
members is much larger than the amount of trade that
is on a preferential basis. As explained in Section B.4,
around half of world merchandise imports (52 per
cent of 20 major economies considered), are MFN
duty free and therefore ineligible for preferential
treatment. A further 19 per cent of imports are subject
to low MFN tariffs of 5 per cent or less, bringing the
total share of world trade subject to low or zero MFN
tariffs to 71 per cent. This leaves limited scope for
large tariff reductions to be granted in PTAs – a
subject that will be examined in Section B.4, which
provides more detailed estimates of the breakdown of
preferential trade.
(b) Has trade become more geographically
concentrated?
In examining trade between regions, existing WTO
datasets on merchandise trade were used, particularly
the Network of Merchandise Trade that appears in the
WTO's International Trade Statistics publication (World
Trade Organization (WTO), 2010). These data cover
trade by product for the world as well as within and
between geographical regions in current US dollar
II – The WTO and Preferential Trade Agreements
Map B.2 shows total merchandise exports of WTO
regions from 1990 to 2009, as well as their respective
shares of trade within the region (intra-regional trade)
and outside the region (extra-regional trade), based
on the network data described above and summarized
in Appendix table 7. Asia, North America and Europe
are shown according to one scale, while the CIS,
South and Central America, Africa and the Middle
East have a separate scale.
Although it is not clear from the map due to the
exclusion of intra-EU trade, the region with the largest
share of intra-regional trade in its total exports is
Europe.
Europe's
exports
increased
from
US$ 1.7 trillion in 1990 to US$ 6.5 trillion in 2008
before falling to US$ 5.0 trillion in 2010, but the share
of intra-regional trade in the region's total exports has
remained roughly constant at around 73 per cent
throughout the entire period. However, when the
European Union is considered as a single entity and
trade within the EU is excluded, Europe's intra-regional
trade share falls to third place behind Asia and North
America. Intra-regional trade shares before 2000,
which come to around 35 per cent, only exclude trade
within the EU's 15 member states at that point. Shares
in subsequent years exclude trade among all 27
current EU members and are measured at just under
30 per cent.
Whether it makes sense to exclude trade within the
EU in this way depends on the questions being asked
of the data. The European Union is the latest
incarnation of one of the earliest post-war preferential
trade agreements, the European Coal and Steel
Community. This agreement developed into the
European Economic Community (EEC), the European
Community (EC) and eventually the European Union
based on the principle of supra-nationalism, in which
national sovereignty is pooled between countries in
certain policy areas, notably trade. This decades-long
process of integration has served as a model for many
other trade agreements, and consequently trade
within the EU arguably should be considered in any
historical account of regionalism. However, since the
creation of the “single market” in 1997 and the
introduction of a common currency in 2002, the
European Union has clearly become something more
than just a customs union, let alone a preferential
trade agreement. As a result, it is sometimes
preferable to treat the EU as a single entity by
excluding intra-EU trade from regional and world
B.historical background
and current trends
terms. Network data are available back to 2000,
according to the WTO's current regional and product
classifications, and back to 1990, according to the
WTO's old country and product groupings. These have
been harmonized to the greatest extent possible in
the tables and charts to follow. For data before 1990
and for individual countries, the UN Comtrade
database has been used.
Map B.2: Intra-regional and extra-regional merchandise exports of WTO regions, 1990-2009
(Billion dollars and percentage)
1,957
452
690
71%
966
1,602
706
1,225
81%
52%
65%
85%
29%
35%
548
56%
146
73%
44%
59%
27%
1990 2000 2009
Europe (excl. EU-intra)
48%
41%
1990 2000 2009
North America
384
120
138
94%
58
80%
74%
74%
26%
26%
1990 2000 2009
South and Central America
19%
268
100%
91%
1990 2000 2009
Commonwealth of
Independent States
48%
15%
1,658
1990 2000 2009
Middle East
459
198
86%
3,575
51%
106
94%
149
88%
52%
739
91%
12%
1990 2000 2009
Africa
58%
49%
42%
1990 2000
Asia
Intra
2009
Extra
Note: Graphs for regions are not shown to scale. Colours and boundaries do not imply any judgement on the part of WTO as to the legal
status of any frontier or territory.
Source: Network of world merchandise trade tables from WTO International Trade Statistics 2010, supplemented with older network
tables and Secretariat estimates prior to 2000.
69
world trade report 2011
totals. Wherever possible, statistics that both include
and exclude trade within the EU have been presented.
Even though the share of intra-regional trade in
Europe's exports has been steady for nearly two
decades, it is conceivable that total merchandise
trade figures could obscure important changes at the
product level − for example, when falling intraregional trade shares for one product cancel rising
shares for other products. However, this is not the
case for Europe (with some minor exceptions).
European intra-regional trade shares are steady back
to 1990 not just for agriculture and fuels and mining
products but also for a wide range of manufactured
goods, including automotive products, office and
telecom equipment, clothing and chemicals. The intraregional share for iron and steel did rise from 75 per
cent in 1990 to 80 per cent in 2000, but this fell back
to 77 per cent in 2008 and then to 73 per cent in
2009 following the financial crisis. The lack of change
in intra-EU trade since 1990 is perhaps not surprising,
since much of the work of reducing trade barriers
between member countries was completed decades
ago.
After Europe, the region with the next largest share of
intra-regional trade in its total exports is Asia. Its
intra-regional trade share has risen over time, from 42
per cent in 1990 to 52 per cent in 2009. However,
most of this increase occurred at the beginning of this
period, and the shares for Asia have remained close to
50 per cent since the mid-1990s. Unlike Europe, the
steady share of intra-regional trade in total exports
does indeed mask significant shifts at the product
level.
Asia's intra-regional share of agricultural products
exports dropped from 65 per cent in 1990 to 57 per
cent in 2009, but since agriculture only represents
around 6 per cent of Asia's exports in value terms, the
impact of this change on the share for total
merchandise trade was barely discernible. More
significantly, its intra-regional share of office and
telecom exports jumped from 30 per cent in 1990 to
55 per cent in 2009. This rise was countered by
falling intra-regional shares for iron and steel (down
from 80 per cent in 1995 to 64 per cent in 2009),
textiles (down from 65 per cent in 1995 to 46 per
cent in 2009), and clothing (down from 29 per cent in
1995 to 22 per cent in 2009.) The share of intraregional trade in Asian automotive products exports
has fluctuated over time with no obvious trend. These
contrary movements left the intra-regional share in
exports of manufactures nearly unchanged between
1995 and 2007 at around 47 per cent.
Developments for Japan and China merit special
attention given their weight in Asian and world trade.
Between 1995 and 2008, China's exports to Japan
grew more slowly than China's overall exports to the
world, and this trend was especially pronounced in
70
office and telecom equipment. On the other hand,
growth in Japan's shipments to China has been much
stronger than Japanese exports to the world.
Furthermore, the share of Japan's exports going to
developing Asia (including China) increased from
31 per cent in 1999 to 54 per cent in 2009. At the
same time, the share of developed economies in
China's exports increased from 29 per cent to 36 per
cent between 2000 and 2009. These changes
suggest the development of regional production
networks involving Japan and China, which may
consist of parts and components being shipped from
Japan to China, and later from China to other
countries after some elaboration.
The share of intra-regional trade in North America's
total merchandise exports jumped from 41 per cent in
1990 to 56 per cent in 2000 before falling back to
48 per cent in 2009. The lower share in 2009 was not
merely a product of the trade collapse that followed
the global financial crisis, since the share was almost
the same as in 2008 (49 per cent) when global trade
peaked. Several important sectors displayed falling
shares of intra-regional trade between 2000 and
2009, including automotive products (down from 89
per cent in 2000 to 72 per cent in 2008 and 76 per
cent in 2009). The falling intra-regional shares were
not limited to manufactures, as intra-regional trade of
agricultural products and fuels and mining products
also declined. Office and telecom equipment was the
only sector to record an increase, from 27.5 per cent
in 1990 to 50.1 per cent in 2009.
The remaining regions (i.e. the CIS, Africa, the Middle
East and South America) all have much smaller intraregional trade shares in their total merchandise
exports, mostly due to the fact that they export large
quantities of natural resources, mostly to developed
economy markets in Europe, North America and Asia.
Intra-regional trade shares for the CIS, Africa, the
Middle East and South America in 2009 were 19 per
cent, 12 per cent, 15 per cent and 26 per cent,
respectively. Although these shares are quite small
compared with other regions, most are up sharply
since 1990. For example, African countries' exports to
other African destinations represented just 6 per cent
of the continent's total merchandise exports in 1990,
but this share nearly doubled to 12 per cent by 2009.
Whether this increase had anything to do with
preferential trade agreements is unclear, but the fact
that it occurred in the face of rising oil prices is
noteworthy. Africa's intra-regional trade share
excluding fuels and mining recorded an even larger
increase, from 9 per cent in 1990 to 22 per cent in
1999. Intra-regional trade in manufactures also more
than doubled its share in total exports during the
same period, rising from 13 per cent to 28 per cent.
Despite similarities to other resource-exporting
regions, South and Central America's case is different
due to the fact that the region's exports are more
II – The WTO and Preferential Trade Agreements
The share of intra-regional trade in world trade can be
estimated by taking the sum of intra-regional trade
values for all regions and dividing by world
merchandise exports. This was equal to 54 per cent of
world merchandise exports in 2009, or US$ 6.6
trillion. This share has changed very little since 1990,
when it stood at 53 per cent of world exports, or US$
1.8 trillion.
Figure B.8 illustrates intra-regional trade shares in
total world exports for selected manufactured goods
between 1990 and 2009. The share of intra-regional
trade in world manufactures exports is quite stable
over time, fluctuating between 56 and 59 per cent.
Office and telecom equipment recorded the largest
increase, as its intra-regional share increased from
41 per cent in 1990 to 58 per cent in 2009. The intraregional component of world automotive products
exports also increased from 65 per cent to nearly
70 per cent in 2000 before falling to 63 per cent in
2008.
Figure B.9 shows shares in world merchandise
imports based on available reporters in the UN
Comtrade database at five-year intervals beginning in
1965 (the CIS region is excluded due to insufficient
data). The share of intra-regional trade in East Asia's
total imports rose inexorably between 1965 and
2005, from 35 per cent to 60 per cent. During the
same period the European Union (15) saw an increase
in its intra-trade share, which advanced from 53 per
cent in 1965 to 65 per cent in 1990 before falling
back to 56 per cent in 2005. Europe (which excludes
intra-EU trade) recorded an increase in its intraregional trade share from 26 per cent in 1965 to 40
per cent in 2005. North America's intra-regional trade
share in total imports started out at 39 per cent in
1965, then rose slightly to 42 per cent in 1970 before
sliding to a low point of 33 per cent in 1980. Beginning
in 1990, the share of intra-regional imports in total
imports increased to nearly 40 per cent in 2000
before dropping to 35 per cent in 2005. South and
Central America saw its intra-trade share jump from
16 per cent in 1975 to 29 per cent in 2005.
B.historical background
and current trends
diverse. For example, fuels and mining products made
up nearly 70 per cent of Middle East exports in 2009,
whereas the share of these products in South and
Central America's exports was just 30 per cent. The
share of intra-regional trade in South and Central
America's total merchandise exports increased from
14 per cent to 26 per cent between 1990 and 2009,
but aggregation obscures some of the more dramatic
changes taking place at the product level. The
regional component of South and Central America's
exports of manufactured goods increased sharply
from 17 per cent in 1990 to 44 per cent in 2009. This
rise is partly attributable to an even larger increase for
automotive products, from 25 per cent in 1990 to 73
per cent in 2009. The share of intra-regional trade in
iron and steel exports also more than doubled, from
15 per cent to 31 per cent.
In summary, the share of intra-regional trade in total
exports of North America has declined in the last ten
years, while Asia has recorded a small increase. During
the same period, Europe's intra-regional trade share
including intra-EU trade was flat. Resource-exporting
regions have tended to increase their (undeniably
small) intra-regional trade shares in recent years
despite rising prices and strong demand growth for
fuels and mining products, especially in Asia. However,
the share of intra-regional trade in world trade in 2009
was effectively the same as in 1990.
Figure B.8: Intra-regional trade shares in world by manufacturing sector, 1990-2009
75
70
Per cent
65
60
55
50
45
40
1990
1995
2000
2005
2008
2009
Textiles
Iron and steel
Automotive products
Manufactures
Clothing
Office and telecom equipment
Source: WTO International Trade Statistics 2010, Secretariat estimates.
71
world trade report 2011
Figure B.9: Shares of intra-regional trade in total imports by region, 1965-2005
70
60
Per cent
50
40
30
20
10
0
1965
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
European Union (15)
East Asia
South and Central America
North America
Europe
Middle East
Africa
West Asia
2005
Source: UN Comtrade.
4. How preferential is trade?
Trade between PTA members is growing as the
number of agreements increase. About one half of
world trade now takes place among PTA members. 31
However, examining total trade flows between PTA
partners overstates the amount of trade that takes
place on a preferential basis. This is partly because
tariff schedules of many PTA members increasingly
contain duty-free MFN rates on which no further tariff
reduction can be given. Hence, while the number of
PTAs has been increasing, the importance of
preferential trade has not kept pace. This development
reflects a substantial reduction in MFN tariffs during
the past two decades, either through multilateral trade
negotiations or unilateral reductions.
Even when preference margins are positive,
preferential rates available in the context of PTAs may
not always be utilized (i.e. products may continue to
be traded under applicable MFN rates). Actual
utilization of preferential rates depends on a range of
factors. These relate both to the benefits of using
preferences (notably the size of the preference
margin) and the costs (e.g. rules of origin and other
administrative requirements to be fulfilled). 32 As the
latter are likely to constitute some sort of fixed cost,
transaction size may also play a role. This implies that
firm-specific characteristics, such as size, experience,
ownership and access to information, may also play a
role.
This subsection uses three different data sources to
estimate the amount of trade that receives PTA
concessions in various ways. Each source also
72
contains information that allows for an analysis of
some of the factors that can explain utilization of
preferential rates. To begin with, matched tariff line
and trade data for 20 countries covering large parts
of world merchandise imports are examined. From
this, the amount of trade already receiving MFN zero
tariff rates can be determined, with the remaining
trade constituting the upper bound for the size of
preferential trade assuming full utilization of tariff
preferences. The amount of trade eligible for different
ranges of preference margins as well as the overall
average trade-weighted preferential margin can also
be calculated. The size of the preferential margin is an
important determinant for the utilization of available
preferential rates.
Next, customs data from the EU and US on the value
of imports under different preferential regimes are
considered. On the basis of this information, actual
aggregate preference utilization rates can be
computed. Using these rates at the product-exporter
level, the significance of the size of preference
margins and trade flows in explaining preference
utilization can be formally tested. Finally, data from
firm surveys on the utilization of preferences by
individual companies can be obtained for selected
regions. While these data do not contain disaggregate
information on the size of preference margins and
actual trade flows, it sheds light on the different cost
factors affecting firms' decisions to make use of
available preferences. The data can also be sorted in
order to identify firm attributes, such as firm size or
experience, that are associated with higher utilization
of preferential rates.
II – The WTO and Preferential Trade Agreements
The analysis conducted in this subsection uses data
on imports by the 20 largest importers from all partner
countries. 34 The sample covers around 90 per cent of
world trade in 2008. The bilateral import flows are
matched with tariff data of the same year. 35 Highly
disaggregated tariff-line import and tariff data are
used wherever possible, rather than the data at subheading (HS-6) level underlying many previous
studies. 36 The main source for import data at the
tariff-line level is the TradeMap dataset of the
International Trade Centre (ITC). Tariff schedules or
commitments are taken from the World Integrated
Trade Solution (WITS). 37
The principal output of the analysis is the share of
trade that is preferential (by different ranges of
preference margins), 38 the share of trade that is nonpreferential (and applicable MFN duties using the
same ranges) as well as the share of trade at MFN
zero tariff rates, for which no further preferences can
be granted. From this, the overall trade-weighted
preferential margin can also be determined. 39 In order
to give a complete picture regarding the extent to
which trade is preferential, the dataset considers both
reciprocal and non-reciprocal preferences. However,
in light of the focus of this report, the discussion
concentrates on trade between PTA partners. In any
event, the analysis shows that most preferential trade
occurs under reciprocal regimes.
In the following subsections, the extent of preferential
trade and preferential margins are shown by importer,
exporter, tariff regime, country group and product
group. Finally, some observations are offered on
recent developments in PTAs and their implications
for preferential trade and average preference margins.
The results of this analysis show that the share of
preferential trade is surprisingly small. Only 16 per
cent of world trade is potentially preferential (30 per
cent if trade within the EU is included), and less than
2 per cent of world trade (4 per cent including trade
within the EU) is eligible for preference margins above
10 percentage points. This is in large part due to the
fact that for most traded items MFN rates are already
low or zero, which limits the scope for granting
preferences. 40 Assuming static trade flows and full
utilization of preferences, all preferences together
reduce the global41 trade-weighted average tariff by
one percentage point (from 3 to 2 per cent), 42 and
90 per cent of this reduction, i.e. 0.9 percentage
points, is due to reciprocal preference regimes.
(i) Preferential trade by importer
On aggregate, 50 per cent of imports by the 20
countries examined here (excluding intra-EU trade)
originate in countries with which some sort of
preferential agreement exists (see Appendix table 8).
Only a third of that (16 per cent of all trade) is
potentially preferential, which can easily be seen from
Figure B.10. 43 There are two reasons for this
difference: first, over one half of world trade is already
subject to zero MFN rates, implying that no
preferences can be granted. For example, 63 per cent
of Singapore's imports originate in PTA partners, but
practically all of its imports enter under MFN zero
duties.44 Second, preference regimes often feature
product exemptions, such that trade in these products
still occurs at MFN rates.
B.historical background
and current trends
(a) Matched tariff line and trade data 33
For some countries, the share of preferential imports is
high. In Figure B.10, it is shown that 64 per cent of
intra-EU trade, 48 per cent of Mexico’s imports and 54
per cent of Switzerland’s imports are preferential, i.e.
face a positive preference margin, but these margins
are mostly fairly small. Only a small share of imports –
less than 2 per cent across all 20 countries (excluding
intra-EU trade; the share amounts to 4 per cent if trade
within the EU is included) – is eligible for preferences
where preference margins are 10 per cent or more. The
main exception is Mexico (15.8 per cent of imports).
Brazil also grants high preference margins to a
relatively large share of imports (7 per cent), and 9.4
per cent of trade within the EU enjoys a preference
margin of over 10 per cent. Not surprisingly, MFN
duties for non-preferential imports are usually low. The
share of MFN zero imports is in the range of 40-50 per
cent in most countries. Notable exceptions include
India and Russia with small shares of MFN zero imports,
and Singapore and Hong Kong, which generally apply
no duties. On aggregate, only 3.8 per cent of global
non-preferential imports have MFN duties above 10
per cent (2.8 per cent if trade within the EU is included).
In Appendix table 9, a counterfactual value of MFN
duties is calculated that would need to be paid in the
absence of preferential arrangements, assuming the
value of trade remains unchanged. 45 This figure can
be contrasted to actual duties, assuming that available
preferences are fully used. The differences between
these two numbers constitute “duties saved” through
preferences.
Overall, preferential rates reduce global tariffs by
approximately one-third (almost two-thirds including
trade within the EU), assuming trade flows were the
same in the absence of preferences. For some
countries, this ratio is considerably higher. For
example, in Mexico duties paid with preferential tariffs
constitute only about 16 per cent of the statutory
MFN duties. Among other things, this is due to the
large share of Mexico’s imports under NAFTA and its
extensive product coverage. From this information, it
is also possible to calculate the trade-weighted
average preference margin, which overall is rather low,
just 1 per cent on aggregate (excluding trade within
the EU; with EU intra-trade it is about 2 per cent) and
less than 1 per cent for most countries individually. 46
The average margin is fairly high for trade within the
EU (4.9 per cent), especially in comparison to the
73
world trade report 2011
Figure B.10: Preferential trade by importer, 2008, shares by preference margin and MFN rates
(Percentage)
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Total with intra-EU
Total without intra-EU
EU-intra
EU-extra
United States
China
Japan
Korea, Rep. of
Canada
Hong Kong, China
Mexico
Singapore
Taipei, Chinese
India
Russian Federation
Australia
Turkey
Switzerland
Brazil
United Arab Emirates
Malaysia
Thailand
Indonesia
PM above 10%
PM 5.1% to 10.0%
PM 0.1% to 5.0%
No preference,
MFN above 5%
No preference,
MFN 0.1% to 5.0%
MFN zero
Note: In some cases, trade and/or tariff data refer to the year 2006, 2007 or 2009, depending on data availability.
Source: ITC TradeMap, WITS (TRAINS), UN Comtrade, US ITC, TARIC.
margin granted by the EU to third countries (0.9 per
cent), as well as for Mexico (9.3 per cent).
(ii) Preferential trade by exporter
Figure B.11 (together with Appendix table 10)
provides the preferential margins received by the 30
largest exporters in the 20 importing countries
included in the dataset.47 In aggregate, about one half
of exports go to partners with whom the exporter has
some type of preferential arrangement. However, this
does not always mean that preferential tariffs are
received for a large proportion of exports, or that the
preferential margin is substantial.
74
For instance, 95 per cent of exports from Chile, one of
the most active negotiators of PTAs in recent years,
are destined for countries giving at least some
preferences to Chilean goods. However, only 27 per
cent of Chile’s exports are eligible for preferential
tariffs, with just 3 per cent of its exports benefiting
from a margin above 10 per cent. Sixty-four per cent
of Chile’s exports face zero MFN rates and only 7 per
cent are subject to positive MFN duties. By contrast,
Mexico, with 98 per cent of its exports going to PTA
partners, enjoys preferences on over 60 per cent of
its exports; even so, less than 6 per cent of its exports
obtain a preference margin of more than 10 per cent.
The proportion of exports going to destinations where
preferences are granted is considerably lower for the
three largest developed country exporters, namely
39 per cent for the US, 21 per cent for the EU and
only 5 per cent for Japan. Again, the share of exports
receiving substantial preference margins is low. While
for the US, at least about 20 per cent of its exports
enjoy a preference margin above 5 per cent, only
3.7 per cent of exports benefit from a preference
margin of more than 10 per cent (see Figure B.11).
Among the 30 largest exporters, the country with the
highest share of exports (21 per cent) enjoying a
preference margin of more than 10 per cent is Turkey,
and its overall trade-weighted preferential margin is
the highest within this group (5 per cent). At the same
time, while between 40 and 70 per cent of exports are
duty-free under MFN rates for all major exporters, this
is the case for only 18 per cent of Turkey's exports.48
Overall, it appears that for most large exporters,
preferential tariffs matter little for the bulk of their
exports. This is not always true for individual sectors,
some of which enjoy substantial preference margins,
but only account for a small share of exports. As a
result, the average preference margin is fairly low.
A number of mostly smaller countries exporting a
narrow set of commodities (mainly sugar, rice,
II – The WTO and Preferential Trade Agreements
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Total
China
EU-extra
United States
Japan
B.historical background
and current trends
Figure B.11: Preferential trade by exporter (30 largest exporters), 2008, shares by preference margins
and MFN rates (Percentage)
Canada
Korea, Rep. of
Russian Federation
Taipei, Chinese
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
Mexico
Malaysia
Switzerland
Australia
Singapore
Thailand
India
Brazil
Norway
Indonesia
United Arab Emirates
Turkey
Iran, Islamic Rep.
Nigeria
South Africa
Venezuela,
Bolivarian Rep. of
Kuwait
Philippines
Algeria
Chile
Qatar
PM above 10%
PM 5.1% to 10.0%
PM 0.1% to 5.0%
No preference,
MFN above 5%
No preference,
MFN 0.1% to 5.0%
MFN zero
Note: In some cases, trade and/or tariff data refer to the year 2006, 2007 or 2009, depending on data availability.
Source: ITC TradeMap, WITS (TRAINS), UN Comtrade, US ITC, TARIC.
bananas, fish and garments) to preference-granting
markets, in particular the EU and to a lesser extent
the United States, enjoy more substantial preference
margins. For most countries, reciprocal preferences, if
measured, for instance, by the share of duties saved
through reciprocal schemes in all preferences
received, are now far more important than nonreciprocal regimes. This is especially true since, for
example, the EU has signed EPAs with most of the
ACP countries that used to benefit from unilateral
preferences given by the EU.
Figure B.12 shows the 25 countries with the highest
trade-weighted preferential margin.49 Mauritius is
leading the list with a trade-weighted average
preference margin of 24 per cent faced by its exports.
This can be explained by the composition of Mauritian
exports which, to an important extent, consist of
garments, fish and sugar, i.e. items subject to high
MFN duties in its main export market, the EU. While
other countries, such as Guyana (preferential exports
of sugar and rice to the EU and garments to the United
States), may depend on preferential tariffs in these
sectors as well, they also export minerals and other
raw materials that do not face high MFN tariffs, and,
therefore, feature smaller average preference margins.
Overall, around 40 exporters have a trade-weighted
preferential margin of 5 per cent or more and almost
all of them are ACP and/or LDC countries. 50
(iii) Preferential trade by type of regime
As noted above, it is possible, subject to certain
assumptions, to allocate trade to different preferential
regimes, in particular in order to distinguish between
non-reciprocal and reciprocal preference schemes in
the dataset, given the focus of this report. 51 From
75
world trade report 2011
Figure B.12: Preferential trade by exporter (25 exporters with highest trade-weighted preferential
margin), 2008, preference margins (Percentage)
30
25
20
15
10
5
Guatemala
Mozambique
Bangladesh
Samoa
St. Pierre
and Miquelon
Greenland
Nicaragua
Maldives
Madagascar
Nepal
Honduras
Lesotho
Barbados
Afghanistan
El Salvador
Cape Verde
Malawi
St. Lucia
Haiti
Guyana
Belize
Seychelles
Fiji
Swaziland
Mauritius
0
Note: In some cases, the data refer to the year 2006, 2007 or 2009, depending on data availability. For many of the countries shown here,
the trade-weighted preference margin depends heavily on the ad valorem equivalent for key export items to the EU (e.g. raw sugar and
bananas). Countries shown in green have less than 70 per cent of their exports going to the covered 20 importers. In the case of Barbados
and Belize, very large exports are reported to Nigeria, which seems to be an error in the Comtrade data. A high share of Malawi’s exports
has an unknown ad valorem equivalent. The affected product is tobacco, exported to the EU.
Source: ITC TradeMap, WITS (TRAINS), UN Comtrade, US ITC, TARIC.
Table B.8, it is clear that some regimes are more
preferential than others. Intra-EU trade clearly is
preferential, with almost 64 per cent of trade enjoying
preferential tariffs and the remainder being traded at
MFN zero rates. By contrast, the preferential share for
intra-ASEAN trade is just about 20 per cent. Although
tariffs in ASEAN member countries, when measured
on a simple average basis, are higher than in the EU,
goods traded among ASEAN countries tend to be
products, where MNF tariffs are already zero (73 per
cent of trade flows within ASEAN). 52
Measured in terms of the trade-weighted average
preference margin, the “most preferential” regime is
the one governing trade between Brazil and the rest of
MERCOSUR with a margin of over 16 per cent. Eightyfive per cent of imports from MERCOSUR partners are
given a preferential tariff by Brazil, and for 63 per cent
of trade the preference margin is above 10 per cent.
The trade-weighted preferential margin is also high for
trade between Brazil and Mexico (14 per cent) and
EPAs (8 per cent) as well as for trade between Turkey
and the EU, intra-EU trade and trade within NAFTA,
with margins of around 5 per cent.
The last column in Table B.8 shows the share of duties
remaining with full use of preferences, compared with
MFN duties that would otherwise apply. This can be seen
as an indicator of the product coverage of the preferential
agreement with regard to traded items, with a lower rate
indicating a larger coverage.53 Coverage is very high for
most regimes shown here, except for Japan-Singapore,
Japan-Mexico and India-Singapore, which are fairly
recent PTAs and may not be fully implemented. This is in
76
stark contrast to non-reciprocal regimes, which often
have a very low coverage. For example, both the EU and
US Generalized System of Preferences schemes waive
duties for less than 20 per cent of the amount otherwise
due. Another way to look at this is to consider the share
of non-preferential trade within a preferential regime. For
example, almost no trade among NAFTA countries, and
only 1.3 per cent of trade between the EU and
Switzerland, is non-preferential.54 On the other hand,
22 per cent of trade between Japan and Mexico is still
subject to positive MFN duties, which can be seen as
evidence of significant product exclusions at the current
stage of implementation.
Taking into account the complete list of regimes
included in the database and distinguishing between
reciprocal and non-reciprocal schemes, it turns out
that about 80 per cent of preferential trade takes
place under reciprocal preference regimes, i.e. PTAs
as defined in this report. Even more strikingly, almost
90 per cent of the global trade-weighted preference
margin is related to preferences under PTAs. 55 NAFTA
alone contributes 43 per cent to global tariff savings
from preferences, which corresponds to about one half
of all duties saved in reciprocal agreements (not
including trade within the EU). In large part, this is due
to Mexico’s comparatively high statutory MFN rates.
Trade within the EU, with a preferential margin similar
to that of trade within NAFTA, but with a much higher
trade value, “saves” EU members duties of US$ 185
billion, which is twice as much as all duties saved by
other preferential agreements taken together.
II – The WTO and Preferential Trade Agreements
Share of trade by preferential margin (PM) and MFN rate (in per cent of total trade)
MFN
zero
Non-preferential trade
Preferential trade
Regime
n/a
PM MFN
PM
PM
PM PM
MFN MFN MFN MFN
0.1% 0.1% Total above 10.1% 5.1% 2.6% Total above 10.1% 5.1% 2.6% Total
to
to
20% to 20% to 10% to 5%
20% to 20% to 10% to 5%
2.5%
2.5%
MFN
Total
trade
(billion
dollars)
Tradeweighted
pref.
margin
(percentage
points)
Duties
“saved”
(billion
dollars)
Pref.
duties
over MFN
duties
(per cent)
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
44.8
1.1
3.8
11.7
15.6
12.7
53.9
1.3
4,874.4
0.0
0.0
100.0
EU-intra
63.7
3.9
5.5
16.7
19.6
18.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
34.4
1.8
3,807.4
4.9
185.4
0.0
Reciprocal
regimes
43.7
1.8
4.0
12.5
9.3
16.1
7.6
0.3
0.7
2.5
2.9
1.2
47.0
1.7
2,802.8
3.0
83.9
23.5
NAFTA
60.9
2.7
3.6
21.5
8.3
24.9
0.1
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
38.2
0.8
912.3
4.5
40.7
0.3
EUSwitzerland
56.9
1.1
2.8
8.7
12.7
31.6
1.3
0.3
0.2
0.5
0.2
0.1
41.0
0.8
261.4
2.2
5.7
16.4
intraASEAN*
20.1
2.0
2.0
2.6
4.7
8.7
3.6
0.3
0.0
0.0
1.7
1.6
72.9
3.4
140.8
1.7
2.3
27.4
EU-Turkey
78.4
0.6
14.6
23.7
26.4
13.1
0.9
0.2
0.3
0.3
0.0
0.1
20.0
0.7
140.7
5.1
7.2
4.4
EU-Mexico
51.2
3.5
10.0
30.1
3.5
4.1
0.9
0.2
0.4
0.3
0.0
0.0
43.2
4.7
58.0
6.1
3.6
3.8
SingaporeUSA
7.2
0.2
0.2
0.6
4.8
1.4
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
92.7
0.0
34.1
0.3
0.1
4.7
AustraliaUSA
45.7
0.0
0.1
3.6
29.5
12.5
2.4
0.1
0.0
0.0
0.4
1.9
51.6
0.3
32.9
1.9
0.6
6.8
EU-EPA*
42.5
11.3
7.2
11.7
10.8
1.5
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
56.2
1.3
27.8
7.5
2.1
0.0
JapanSingapore
3.1
0.0
0.0
0.1
2.4
0.6
1.9
1.5
0.1
0.1
0.3
0.0
94.0
1.0
25.2
0.1
0.0
76.8
JapanMexico
22.4
7.9
1.5
5.1
5.4
2.5
21.7
0.7
0.5
18.9
1.6
0.0
50.7
5.2
19.6
3.9
0.8
47.8
AustraliaSingapore
6.4
0.0
0.0
0.2
6.1
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
93.6
0.0
16.6
0.4
0.1
0.0
BrazilMERCOSUR*
85.4
25.4
37.1
21.1
1.0
0.8
0.1
0.0
0.1
0.0
0.0
0.0
13.9
0.7
15.1
16.4
2.5
0.1
IndiaSingapore
20.0
0.0
0.0
8.7
6.6
4.6
16.2
0.1
0.0
15.0
1.0
0.0
59.6
4.3
13.9
1.0
0.1
68.4
Brazil-Mexico
83.2
23.7
13.8
18.0
12.6
15.1
2.3
0.6
1.4
0.2
0.1
0.0
14.2
0.3
7.9
14.2
1.1
19.2
Nonreciprocal
regimes
17.6
0.1
0.9
1.4
6.3
8.9
26.3
1.0
4.4
4.3
7.2
9.5
55.6
0.5
2,067.3
0.6
11.8
77.2
EU-GSP
13.3
0.0
0.1
0.7
7.3
5.2
23.0
0.6
5.1
3.8
7.8
5.7
63.4
0.3
1,011.9
0.4
4.2
82.7
US-GSP
8.3
0.0
0.2
1.8
3.9
2.4
62.4
0.9
4.7
4.5
2.4
49.9
28.8
0.4
257.9
0.3
0.9
82.2
US-AGOA
90.1
0.3
1.2
0.4
1.0
87.2
0.1
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
9.9
0.0
83.6
0.5
0.4
1.2
EU-GSPPLUS
29.7
3.0
8.3
10.0
5.7
2.7
9.7
9.0
0.0
0.0
0.4
0.2
60.1
0.4
38.0
2.9
1.1
53.8
EU-GSPLDC
33.0
0.9
27.4
3.1
1.0
0.7
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
66.0
0.9
32.8
4.1
1.4
0.0
US-Andean
72.0
1.2
4.2
4.9
1.9
59.9
0.6
0.0
0.3
0.2
0.1
0.0
27.0
0.4
29.0
1.5
0.4
4.6
US-CBTPA
40.9
0.6
3.5
12.1
0.7
24.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
58.9
0.2
11.2
1.6
0.2
0.0
US-LDC
34.1
0.0
0.0
1.8
0.4
31.9
61.9
7.1
44.4
9.7
0.7
0.0
3.9
0.1
10.2
0.2
0.0
98.5
US-CBERA
4.5
0.0
0.1
3.5
0.6
0.3
90.7
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
90.7
4.8
0.0
4.4
0.3
0.01
27.0
B.historical background
and current trends
Table B.8: Preferential trade by agreement/type of regime, 2008, selected regimes
Note: In some cases, trade and/or tariff data refer to the year 2006, 2007 or 2009, depending on data availability. EU-intra trade is shown
separately from other reciprocal regimes. The aggregate figure for reciprocal trade is therefore without EU intra-trade. Only a selection of
regimes is shown here. For one thing, this is due to gaps in the dataset, for instance missing data on preferential rates applied by Thailand
for FTA partners outside ASEAN. Such regimes are therefore not shown. Some regimes are incomplete (marked by an asterisk ‘*’),
because only one of two partners is covered by the dataset as an importer, which makes indicators for such regimes difficult to interpret.
Intra-ASEAN figures only includes imports from the four ASEAN members that are covered by the data (Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore
and Thailand). EU-EPA only covers EU imports from EPA partners, not their imports from the EU. Brazil-MERCOSUR only covers imports
from Brazil.
Sources: ITC TradeMap, WITS (TRAINS), UN Comtrade, US ITC, TARIC.
77
world trade report 2011
(iv) Preferential trade by country group
exports seven times more to the United States than
Cambodia, but pays less than half of the duties levied
on the latter (US$ 194 million vs. US$ 429 million).
Total duties for Swiss imports are low, as Switzerland
supplies the United States with a wide range of items,
such as pharmaceuticals, medical technology and
machinery, that face low or even zero MFN rates,
unlike Cambodia that exports mainly textiles, only a
fraction of which qualify for preferential tariffs.
Table B.9 shows preferential trade by country groups
(excluding intra-EU trade). 56 Imports by developed
countries from LDCs enjoy relatively high preferences,
with 15 per cent of such imports having a preference
margin of 10 per cent or more. The trade-weighted
preferential margin of 2.7 per cent for these imports is
well above the global average. This does not mean that
LDCs generally face lower duties. As is well known,
some LDCs pay higher duties on average compared
with developed-country trading partners, as LDCs
often export products subject to tariff peaks
(i.e. relatively high tariffs) and exempt from preferential
treatment, such as garments. For example, Cambodia
would pay a 15 per cent duty on its total merchandise
exports without preferential tariffs, but still pays 11 per
cent, assuming full utilization of preferences. By
contrast, the EU and United States pay on average a 3
per cent duty on their exports after preferences are
taken into account.
(v) Preferential trade by product group
Table B.10 shows that tariffs and preference margins
on traded items (excluding intra-EU trade) are
considerably higher for agricultural products than for
non-agricultural products. 57 Owing to the relatively low
share of agriculture in international trade, large tariff
reductions on certain agricultural products have little
impact on the overall share of preferential trade, global
average tariffs and the average trade-weighted
preference margin. Relatively high tariffs and
preference margins also exist for certain nonagricultural goods, such as fish, textiles and transport
equipment. For trade in parts and components, which
plays a role in regional production networks (see
Section D), MFN tariffs and the share of preferential
trade in overall trade are not very different from overall
averages.
Such differences in tariff treatment, owing to the
different product composition of developed- and
developing-country exports and limitations in LDC
preferential tariffs, have repeatedly been highlighted
for specific markets in trade policy discussions. For
example, Switzerland, which does not have a
preferential tariff regime with the United States,
Table B.9: Preferential trade by country group, 2008
Country
group
TOTAL
Share of
Share of trade by preferential margin (PM) and MFN rate (in per cent of total trade)
imports
from
Non-preferential imports
MFN zero
Preferential imports
countries
receiving
PM
PM
PM
PM
MFN MFN MFN MFN
preferPM
MFN
10.1% 5.1% 2.6% 0.1% 10.1% 5.1% 2.6% 0.1% with
no ences (in Total above
Total above
Total
to to to to to to to to pref. pref.
per cent of
20%
20%
20% 10%
5% 2.5%
20% 10%
5% 2.5%
total trade)
n/a
Tradeweighted
Total
pref.
trade
margin
(billion
(percentdollars)
age
points)
50.0
16.3
0.5
1.3
3.9
4.0
6.5
30.2
0.8
3.0
7.5
10.2
8.7
52.3
25.3
27.0
1.2
9,744.5
1.0
NorthNorth
42.0
21.3
0.3
0.6
6.2
3.8
10.4
26.5
0.5
0.6
4.9
6.9
13.7
51.7
20.1
31.6
0.4
2,265.5
0.8
NorthSouth
74.3
18.9
0.5
1.5
2.4
6.3
8.1
24.9
0.7
3.6
4.3
6.2
10.2
55.6
40.8
14.8
0.5
3,399.5
0.9
North-LDC
99.6
51.8
1.1
13.7
2.7
1.8
32.5
8.0
0.9
5.8
1.3
0.1
0.0
39.6
39.6
0.0
0.6
82.1
2.7
SouthNorth
21.2
12.0
1.0
1.9
6.7
1.7
0.7
45.8
1.6
5.9
18.6
15.3
4.4
39.0
8.2
30.8
3.1
1,628.9
1.8
SouthSouth
43.1
10.2
0.5
1.0
2.0
2.8
3.9
30.9
0.8
2.7
7.4
16.7
3.3
57.1
20.1
37.0
1.8
2,169.0
0.7
South-LDC
46.3
5.0
0.3
0.8
1.1
2.4
0.5
13.3
0.6
0.3
1.1
10.0
1.2
81.1
33.3
47.8
0.6
64.3
0.4
Importer
– Exporter
Exporter
North
33.3
17.5
0.6
1.2
6.4
2.9
6.4
34.6
0.9
2.8
10.6
10.4
9.8
46.4
15.1
31.3
1.5
3,894.4
1.2
South
62.2
15.5
0.5
1.3
2.3
4.9
6.5
27.3
0.7
3.2
5.5
10.3
7.5
56.2
32.7
23.5
1.0
5,568.5
0.8
LDC
76.2
31.3
0.7
8.0
2.0
2.1
18.5
10.3
0.8
3.4
1.2
4.4
0.5
57.9
36.8
21.0
0.6
146.4
1.7
ACP
78.7
32.6
1.1
1.3
2.7
3.2
24.3
8.3
0.2
0.3
1.4
5.4
1.1
58.4
41.5
16.8
0.7
352.0
1.1
Note: In some cases, trade and/or tariff data refer to the year 2006, 2007 or 2009, depending on data availability.
Sources: ITC TradeMap, WITS (TRAINS), UN Comtrade, US ITC, TARIC.
78
II – The WTO and Preferential Trade Agreements
Share of trade by preferential margin (PM) and MFN rate (in per cent of total trade)
Non-preferential trade
Preferential trade
Product group
TOTAL
MFN zero
PM
PM
PM
PM
MFN MFN MFN MFN
PM
MFN
10.1% 5.1% 2.6% 0.1% 10.1% 5.1% 2.6% 0.1% with
Total above
Total above
Total
to to to to to to to to pref.
20%
20%
20% 10% 5% 2.5%
20% 10% 5% 2.5%
n/a
Total
trade
(billion
dollars)
Tradeweighted
pref.
margin
(%
points)
no
pref.
16.3
0.5
1.3
3.9
4.0
6.5
30.2
0.8
3.0
7.5
10.2
8.7
52.3 25.3 27.0
1.2
9,744.5
1.0
Ag.
24.1
2.9
4.5
6.2
5.3
5.2
36.4
8.3
5.0
7.5
10.4
5.1
35.1 20.2 14.8
4.5
519.0
4.0
Non-Ag. – All
15.9
0.4
1.2
3.8
3.9
6.6
29.8
0.4
2.9
7.5
10.2
8.9
53.3 25.6 27.7
1.1
9,225.5
0.8
Non-Ag. – Textiles (ch. 61-64)
30.7
1.8
16.1
3.7
3.5
5.6
59.7
4.1
2.6
0.2
1.1
329.6
3.2
Non-Ag. – Fuel (ch. 27)
12.9
0.0
0.0
0.3
1.6
11.0
23.4
0.0
0.0
8.9
13.9 63.4 39.2 24.3
0.2
2,230.0
0.1
Non-Ag. – Fish
36.7
3.1
7.1
10.8
8.6
7.2
33.5
0.3
5.9
8.7
13.1
5.6
29.5 18.6 10.9
0.2
72.8
3.1
Non-Ag. – Other
15.9
0.4
0.7
4.9
4.7
5.2
30.4
0.3
2.3
9.2
10.9
7.7
52.3 22.3 30.0
1.3
6,593.0
0.9
01' – Animal products
28.6
3.6
6.6
6.8
4.4
7.3
41.9
10.4
6.7
6.4
12.8
5.6
27.3 14.6
12.7
2.2
123.4
4.9
02' – Vegetable products
23.1
2.7
3.6
5.9
5.0
5.9
32.4
7.9
2.2
5.0
14.0
3.3
41.1
25.0 16.1
3.4
208.1
4.4
03' – Fats and oils
30.5
1.0
1.6
11.9
13.9
2.0
47.8
4.8
1.6
29.1
8.9
3.3
19.7 13.2
6.5
2.0
43.3
2.4
04' – Prep. food, bev., tob.
27.7
3.5
6.4
7.0
5.9
5.0
33.9
5.3
8.4
6.6
6.3
7.4
33.5 19.7 13.8
4.8
191.1
3.6
05' – Mineral products
12.1
0.0
0.0
0.3
1.5
10.3 21.8
0.0
0.0
0.6
8.2
12.9 65.8 39.6 26.3
0.3
2,446.0
0.1
06' – Chemical products
15.2
0.0
0.9
5.9
4.2
4.4
33.6
0.1
1.4
13.7 10.5
7.9
50.6 20.1 30.5
0.6
754.8
0.7
07' – Plastics and rubber
33.6
0.1
2.0
15.7
11.3
4.5
47.3
0.3
4.2
22.8 16.2
3.8
15.9
7.6
8.2
3.2
336.7
2.0
08' – Leather
22.7
0.4
0.3
2.7
12.0
7.3
53.1
0.7
11.5
17.9
21.1
1.9
24.2
4.7
19.5
0.0
63.1
0.9
09' – Wood and articles of wood
20.9
0.0
1.0
5.6
11.2
3.1
20.4
0.0
1.3
7.4
11.3
0.5
58.3 35.9 22.5
0.3
71.8
1.1
10' – Paper
8.9
0.2
1.8
5.1
1.3
0.5
12.6
0.1
1.9
4.4
5.7
0.6
77.6
41.5
36.1
0.9
129.1
0.8
11' – Textiles
31.1
1.6
14.6
5.4
2.6
6.9
54.9
3.4
28.2 16.6
5.8
0.8
12.5
2.3
10.2
1.5
382.3
3.1
12' – Footwear
21.7
0.6
0.9
5.7
13.3
1.1
62.1
3.9
14.8 35.7
7.4
0.3
12.4
1.4
11.0
3.8
70.6
1.3
13' – Stone, cement
25.5
0.2
2.3
7.0
9.3
6.7
50.9
1.0
7.7
21.2
15.7
5.4
22.8
11.1
11.6
0.8
74.3
1.4
7.3
0.0
0.3
1.2
1.7
4.0
21.8
0.1
0.6
9.9
8.0
3.2
70.9 34.6 36.2
0.0
257.1
0.3
15' – Base metals
18.4
0.1
0.6
5.8
7.7
4.2
32.1
0.9
2.1
8.1
16.1
4.9
48.6 26.8 21.9
0.9
744.5
0.9
16' – Machinery
10.8
0.0
0.5
2.1
3.8
4.4
24.1
0.0
2.4
6.0
8.0
7.7
63.8 25.7 38.1
1.3
2,547.9
0.5
17' – Transport equipment
32.0
3.6
0.8
11.4
3.7
12.5
47.1
1.3
2.0
11.9
11.1
10.8
3.1
724.1
2.7
18' – Optical and other
apparatus
9.8
0.0
0.3
1.6
3.0
4.9
36.8
0.0
1.8
8.3
19.2
15.2 36.6
1.5
340.5
0.3
19' – Arms and ammunition
12.9
0.0
0.5
2.9
5.5
4.0
45.6
0.5
0.7
8.6
21.7
14.0 38.4
7.6
30.8
3.1
6.6
0.6
20' – Miscellaneous articles
11.3
0.0
0.9
2.9
6.1
1.3
26.1
0.5
3.4
4.5
16.4
1.3
62.4
27.1 35.3
0.2
213.1
0.6
21' – Art and antiques
0.4
0.0
0.0
0.1
0.0
0.3
1.2
0.0
0.0
0.4
0.7
0.0
98.4 19.5 78.9
0.0
16.1
0.0
BEC-42-53
18.3
0.1
0.5
5.3
5.0
7.4
34.0
0.3
2.5
8.4
10.5 12.4 45.9 16.1 29.8
1.7
1,158.0
0.8
SITC-Textiles
31.1
0.3
2.6
12.6
6.6
9.0
47.6
0.3
5.8
BEC-42-53 & Textiles
19.1
0.1
0.6
5.7
5.1
7.5
34.9
0.3
2.7
By Ag. vs Non-Ag.
34.3 18.6
0.7
8.5
0.8
7.6
B.historical background
and current trends
Table B.10: Preferential trade by product group, 2008
By HS Section
14' – Precious stones, jewellery
20.8 17.8
7.5
51.8
7.0
Parts and components
26.4 13.3
9.5
10.7
1.8
20.5
2.8
17.7
0.9
83.4
1.9
11.7
44.3 15.3 29.0
1.7
1,238.7
0.9
Note: In some cases, trade and/or tariff data refer to the year 2006, 2007 or 2009, depending on data availability.
Sources: ITC TradeMap, WITS (TRAINS), UN Comtrade, US ITC, TARIC.
79
world trade report 2011
(vi)
divided by eligible imports.60 For both the EU and the
United States, the PURs are surprisingly high at an
aggregate 87 and 92 per cent respectively, weighted by
preferential import values (see Figures B.13 and B.14).61
Utilization rates are high, not only in aggregate, but also
for most exporting countries, preferential regimes and
types of products. Both developed and developing
country exporters have high utilization rates in both
markets, with the former featuring slightly higher rates.
Recent trends
While the share of preferential trade with high margins
is relatively small, it seems to have increased over
recent years. A number of PTAs have been signed
since 2008 that are not covered in the dataset. In
terms of bilateral trade flows, the “largest” PTAs that
have recently been signed are the agreements
between China-Chinese Taipei, EU-Republic of Korea,
US-Republic of Korea, Australia-New Zealand-ASEAN
and ASEAN-Japan. These agreements are at different
stages in the process towards full implementation.
Detailed tariff schedules would be needed to see how
these agreements would affect the overall share of
preferential trade flows. In the absence of such data, a
rough estimation can still be made.
From Figure B.13, it can be seen that United States'
imports from Singapore and Morocco show somewhat
lower utilization rates. At the sectoral level, this is
mainly driven by US imports of chemicals, in the case
of Singapore, and garments and footwear from
Morocco. For chemicals, a relatively low utilization may
be due to a combination of low preference margins
and the exigencies of rules of origin, while the latter
may play the main role in the garments and footwear
sectors. For the EU, utilization rates are relatively low
for imports from Algeria and Jordan, which can
principally be explained by imports from these
countries being concentrated in oil products (Algeria)
and plastics and chemicals (Jordan), where preference
margins are low (see Figure B.14).
Assuming constant trade flows, PTAs concluded after
2008 would increase the share of world trade among
preference-granting countries from 50 to around 54
per cent (excluding trade within the EU). If bilateral
tariffs were fully eliminated within these PTAs, the
share of world trade covered by a positive preferential
margin would increase from 16 to 18 per cent. Hence,
while non-discriminatory liberalization in recent years
has not kept pace with the proliferation of PTAs,
further unilateral MFN tariff liberalization and notably
the conclusion of the Doha Round would counter the
recent upward trend of preferential trade.
From Table B.11 it can be seen that preference utilization
rates do not vary much across product groups. Not
surprisingly, utilization is generally a bit higher for
agricultural items (99 per cent in the United States),
since tariffs are higher for these products. If utilization
rates are examined for different ranges of preference
margins, it appears that products with small preferential
margins and small trade flows have lower utilization rates.
Since using preferences can be costly (depending on the
rules of origin and other requirements relating to proof of
origin), traders would incur these costs only if benefits in
terms of preference margins were sufficiently high.
(b) Customs data from the EU and US 58
Data on the actual import values under different
preferential regimes are available from the European
Commission and the US International Trade
Commission. 59 The preference utilization rate (PUR) is
calculated as imports under a preferential regime
Figure B.13: Preference utilization rate (PUR) of US preferential regimes (sorted by eligible exports),
2008 (Percentage)
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
PUR by import value
PUR by import duty
Sources: ITC TradeMap, WITS (TRAINS), US ITC, TARIC.
80
PUR – simple average
Micronesia
Morocco
CBI
Bahrain
Jordan
Singapore
LDC
Israel
Australia
Chile
CBTPA
CAFTA
Andean
GSP
AGOA
Mexico
Canada
US Total
0
II – The WTO and Preferential Trade Agreements
100
90
80
70
60
B.historical background
and current trends
Figure B.14: Preference utilization rate (PUR) of EU preferential regimes (sorted by eligible exports),
2008 (Percentage)
50
40
30
20
10
Andorra
Palestinian Territories
San Marino
Jordan
Faroe Islands
Lebanese Rep.
Macedonia
EEA
OCT
Chile
Algeria
Iceland
Croatia
Egypt
Balkan
Mexico
PUR – simple average
Syrian Arab Rep.
PUR by import duty
Israel
Morocco
Tunisia
South Africa
GSP-PLUS
EPA
PUR by import value
GSP-LDC
Turkey
Norway
GSP
Switzerland
EU total
0
Sources: ITC TradeMap, WITS (TRAINS), US ITC, TARIC.
As it is reasonable to expect that preference utilization
includes a fixed cost element, the rate of use should
increase with higher trade values. These relationships
are tested more formally by Keck and Lendle (2011).
Using customs data from the EU and the United
States, the authors estimate a simple empirical model
of preference utilization at the product-country level
using the preferential margin and import value as the
main explanatory variables. 62 As expected, they find
that the preference margin has a positive and
significant impact (at the 1 per cent significance level)
on preference utilization, and similar results are
obtained for import values. 63
Such factors seem to have less of an effect on
utilization rates in the United States compared with
the EU. In the United States, 55 per cent of all productcountry observations for which the duties saved are
below US$ 10 are still imported under a preferential
regime. The respective figure for the EU is only 13 per
cent. However, many individual items imported to the
EU and the United States facing tariffs well below 1
per cent still exhibit high utilization rates. For example,
the PUR for EU imports of Swiss luxury watches
ranges between 94 and 98 per cent, despite an ad
valorem equivalent of only 0.02 to 0.08 per cent. This
seems to imply that either the cost of using
preferences in certain cases is negligible or that other
benefits linked to using preferences exist, perhaps
related to privileged customs clearance, qualification
under specific security measures or advantages in
case of re-export to other PTA partners. This would
require further research.
(c) Data from firm surveys
In 2007-08, an Asian Development Bank (ADB) team
randomly surveyed 841 export-oriented manufacturing
enterprises, across a variety of industries, 64 in six East
Asian economies65 to gather firms’ views on the
utilization of PTAs (Kawai and Wignaraja, 2011). At the
same time, the Inter-American Development Bank
(IADB), in a project coordinated with that of the ADB,
commissioned a survey of 345 firms in four Latin
American countries (Harris and Suominen, 2009). 66 In
the context of PTAs, Latin America and East Asia
represent two important regions of the world. While
the former has a long history of preferential
agreements, the latter has witnessed a rapid spread of
PTAs over the last decade, with the number of
agreements in effect having increased from less than
half a dozen to about 50 between 2000 and 2010
(Kawai and Wignaraja, 2011). 67
It is important to highlight the fact that these firm
surveys estimate utilization of PTA preferences based
on the incidence of firms – i.e. the share of sample
firms in a given country that say they use FTA
preferences. Data on shares of export value enjoying
preferences are not available from these firms' surveys.
Given the above, these data cannot be compared with
preference utilization rates based on customs data.
Furthermore, it is worth noting that in these surveys,
firms were selected from a sample that comprised
exporters from key industries in each economy, using
a simple random sampling method (Kawai and
Wignaraja, 2011). This could affect the aggregation of
data across the different economies.
81
world trade report 2011
Table B.11: Preference utilization rate (PUR) by product group, 2008 (Percentage) 68
EU
US
PUR by
import
value
PUR by
import
duty
PUR
– simple
average
PUR by
import
value
PUR by
import
duty
PUR
– simple
average
Ag.
93
96
69
99
99
91
Non-Ag.
87
90
44
91
93
68
Ag./Non-Ag.
HS Section
01' – Animal products
85
93
81
100
99
91
02' – Vegetable products
93
97
71
99
100
91
03' – Fats and oils
96
96
61
98
98
89
04' – Prep. food, bev., tob.
91
96
70
98
99
93
05' – Mineral products
80
79
48
89
91
67
06' – Chemical products
85
91
55
92
92
76
07' – Plastics and rubber
93
94
52
97
98
69
08' – Leather
91
91
52
94
94
70
09' – Wood and articles of wood
91
93
59
97
98
83
67
11' – Textiles
85
88
54
87
87
12' – Footwear
90
92
55
93
89
70
13' – Stone, cement
92
93
53
96
96
79
14' – Precious stones, jewellery
85
85
35
93
92
79
15' – Base metals
95
96
46
95
94
75
16' – Machinery
83
84
29
90
91
57
17' – Transport equipment
91
93
37
97
98
60
18' – Optical and other apparatus
82
79
20
76
80
57
19' – Arms and ammunition
88
89
59
94
93
79
20' – Miscellaneous articles
86
87
41
95
96
77
Note: All products of HS Sections 10 and 21 have zero MFN duties in both EU and US and are therefore not shown.
Sources: ITC TradeMap, WITS (TRAINS), US ITC, TARIC.
Results from the ADB surveys reveal that “preference
utilization” by exporting firms in some PTAs are not
high per se. For the sample of 841 firms in East Asia,
the study by Kawai and Wignaraja (2011) shows that
around 28 per cent currently use PTA preferences.
However, this number nearly doubles to 53 per cent
when plans for using PTA preferences in the future are
factored in (see Table B.12).
Table B.12 shows that Chinese, Japanese and Thai
firms are the highest users of PTA preferences, while
plans for heightened preference use in the future are
present in all six countries. The high level of PTA use
among firms in China can be attributed to the
determined build-up of new and expanding production
networks that required channelling resources across
the region. In Japan, a relatively high PTA use rate may
be attributed to its giant manufacturing firms that are
anchors for regional production networks, as well as to
the many networks of private sector industry
associations and public trade support institutions that
provide services to help businesses adapt to PTA
guidelines. Thailand’s relatively high use of PTAs is
likely to be the result of the country’s emergence as a
82
regional production hub (e.g. for automotives), high
rates of export-oriented foreign direct investment
(FDI) and the government’s reliance on PTAs as a
trade policy tool.
In Latin America, the IADB survey of 345 firms
suggests that only 18 per cent are not using any PTA,
and that on average firms are using more than one
(Harris and Suominen, 2009). These figures vary as
one breaks down the sample by country, firm size, or
industry. The least likely firms to be making use of
PTAs were large textile firms in Panama (no use of
PTAs), whereas large food and agriculture firms in
Chile were most likely to be taking advantage of PTA
tariff preferences (using 3.5 PTAs on average).
Furthermore, of the firms not using any agreement, the
overwhelming majority of them were Panamanian (57
of 61 firms were not using tariff preferences), which is
easily explained by the fact that Panama does not have
PTAs in force with any of their primary trading partners.
A total of 98 per cent of firms surveyed in Chile,
Mexico and Colombia were using preferences (Harris
and Suominen, 2009).
II – The WTO and Preferential Trade Agreements
Use PTAs
Use or
plan to
use PTAs
%
%
All firms
28.4
53.0
Japan
29.0
47.4
China
45.1
77.9
Korea, Rep. of
20.8
54.2
Singapore
17.3
28.0
Thailand
24.9
45.7
Philippines
20.0
40.7
Source: Kawai and Wignaraja (2011).
These firm surveys identify a number of factors that
influence the preference utilization patterns described
above. The following is a brief review.
(i) Margins of preference
The 2007-08 ADB survey of exporting firms in East
Asia shows that 36 per cent of reporting firms in the
Republic of Korea and 14 per cent in China cited
“having had no substantial tariff preference or having
had no actual benefits from such” as the major reason
for not utilizing the PTA preferential tariffs. The
relatively low rate of preference utilization in PTAs for
the Philippines and Singapore can be attributed to the
countries' overwhelming export concentration in
electronics, which is characterised by low MFN tariff
rates (Kawai and Wignaraja, 2011). 69
(ii) Rules of origin
Rules of origin (RoOs) are formulated in the context of
PTA agreements to prevent “trade deflection" 70 , in an
effort to support a process of preferential trade
liberalization. This is particularly important in the
context of global production networks, which, through
trade in intermediate goods, involve two or more
countries in the production of a single final good. In
reality, however, RoOs may result in far less trade
liberalization than is implied by the preferences
granted. This is because RoOs, when restrictive and
complex, may raise transaction costs for firms to a
degree that makes utilization of FTA preferences
uneconomical (Manchin and Pelkmans-Balaoing,
2007; Tumbarello, 2007). It becomes especially likely
given the low margins of preference described above.
Furthermore, as the number of concluded agreements
increases, different RoOs in multiple, overlapping
PTAs can pose an additional burden on firms. This
phenomenon is referred to as the “spaghetti bowl” of
trade deals (see Box B.1 for a brief overview).
For a sample of 221 firms, Wignaraja et al. (2010b)
show that around 15 per cent reported that RoOs in
Thailand's PTAs were an obstacle to using PTA
preferences. In addition, another 22 per cent reported
that RoOs might be an obstacle in the future. In the
survey of 345 Latin American firms, 36 per cent
reported that compliance with RoOs was not easy.
This varied across countries, with nearly half of
Mexican firms reporting difficulty with compliance,
whereas only 27 per cent of Colombian firms
encountered difficulties. However, when asked
directly if the RoOs of an agreement had caused them
to not use the available preferences, only about 10
per cent answered in the affirmative (Harris and
Suominen, 2009).
B.historical background
and current trends
Table B.12: Firms’ utilization of PTA preferences
(Percentage of respondents)
Furthermore, studies based on firm-survey data found
that relative to small and medium-sized enterprises
(SMEs) and “giant” firms, large firms have more
negative perceptions about RoOs (Kawai and
Wignaraja, 2009; Wignaraja et al., 2010b). This may
be explained by the following. First, as firms become
larger initially, they begin exporting to multiple
markets and hence meeting RoOs requirements
becomes costly. Subsequently, however, as they
become even larger, they acquire wider and deeper
market penetration and hence greater wealth, which
allows them to prove origin of goods more easily.
Survey results from East Asia also show that firms
prefer greater flexibility and being able to choose
between RoOs for the same product for two reasons.
First, if they cannot meet one requirement, having
another RoO increases their likelihood of using PTA
preferences. Second, some RoOs may be better
aligned than others with the technology, production
processes and business strategies of particular
industries (Kawai and Wignaraja, 2011). Of the 841
sample firms, 48 per cent of respondents preferred to
be given the option of choosing between a domestic
value content (VC) rule and a change in tariff
classification (CTC) rule. Another 28 per cent chose
the CTC rule only and 24 per cent chose the VC rule
only (Kawai and Wignaraja, 2011). The CTC rule may
be preferred to the VC rule because calculating the
latter is time-intensive, and hence costly, and often
requires the disclosure of confidential information on
costs, components and procurement sources.
Based on a survey of 841 firms in six East Asian
economies, Kawai and Wignaraja show that only 20
per cent of respondents reported that multiple RoOs
significantly added to business costs. Singaporean
firms had the most negative perceptions (38 per cent)
while Chinese firms had the least negative (6.3 per
cent). National PTA strategies, industrial structures,
and the quality of institutional support may underlie
differences in perceptions of RoOs across Asian
countries. As the number of PTAs in the region
increases, however, there may be a greater risk of an
Asian “noodle bowl” effect in the future. For instance,
Hirastuko et al. (2009) report that in Japan, while 28
per cent of the surveyed firms indicated that the
83
world trade report 2011
Box B.1: Rules of origin in PTAs: transaction costs and the spaghetti-bowl phenomenon
Rules of origin (RoOs) are likely to increase the transaction cost of trade because firms will have to alter their
production methods (for example, source more inputs from PTA partners) from what may have been the
least-cost choice and due to the administrative and bureaucratic costs associated with administering RoOs
regimes. These latter costs relate to the fact that for a good to be granted originating status, the exporting
firm needs to provide detailed documentary evidence in order to obtain the relevant certification. RoOs
prescribe a detailed way in which a good needs to be transformed in the partner country in order to be
exported to another PTA partner at the preferential rate. However, there is no single approach for defining
“substantial transformation” (Estevadeordal, 2000).
The level of transformation is usually specified in terms of a minimum percentage of the final product value
that has been added in the originating country,71 changes in tariff headings for a product under the
Harmonized Commodity Description System in the originating country 72, or through specific technical
requirements relating to specific production process operations that a product must undergo in the
originating country 73 . The different methods described above have been used in different ways, with different
degrees of precision under different PTAs74 . For example, there is the Latin American Integration Agreement
where a general rule, based on a change in tariff classification at the heading level or a regional value added
of at least 50 per cent of the f.o.b. export value, is used for all items. In contrast, NAFTA incorporates a
general rule combined with specific rules at the six-digit Harmonized System level, combining the three
methods described above in a variety of ways (Estevadeordal, 2000). Importantly, the design of RoOs chosen
determines the extent to which they increase the transaction cost of trade.
Furthermore, in the current sea of PTAs, there is often little consistency in the underlying RoOs across
different products and different agreements. These two separate, but related, dimensions are an additional
cost to firms. First, if the specification of the rule for a particular product differs across agreements signed
by a country, firms must be able to understand the different rules, and then adapt their production networks
to comply with each different rule. Second, even where the specification of the RoO for a given product is
harmonized across agreements, each agreement covers a different set of partner countries. Hence, the
materials that count as “originating” under one agreement may not be “originating” under another. For
example, a Moroccan firm wanting to export a given product will have different RoO requirements and
different administrative procedures depending on whether it is exporting the good to the United States,
Europe or countries in the Arab region. This lack of compatibility between different RoOs in multiple,
overlapping PTAs, referred to as the “spaghetti bowl” effect (Bhagwati, 1995), is likely to further increase the
transaction costs of trade for firms.
84
existence of multiple RoOs leads to increased costs,
this number rises to 61 per cent when the future is
factored in. In Latin America, 30 to 45 per cent of the
surveyed firms rated the “spaghetti bowl” costs from
medium to very high.
preferences in East Asia, about 30 per cent felt that
the existence of multiple RoOs leads to increased
costs to exporting, while another 33 per cent thought
that it would do so in the future (Hirastuko et al.,
2009).
Recognizing the above, around 41 per cent of firms in
the ADB survey see the benefits from harmonized
RoOs75 in reducing “spaghetti bowl” costs and hence
increasing preference utilization (Kawai and
Wignaraja, 2011). In the IDB survey, this process of
harmonized RoOs was recognized as having the
highest potential for cost savings. Nearly a quarter of
firms rated this as generating “high” or “very high”
savings (ranging from 13 per cent of firms in Chile to
46 per cent in Panama) (Harris and Suominen, 2009).
Thailand is at the centre of production networks in the
automobiles and electronics sectors, with five major
PTAs in effect. In a 2007 ADB survey of 118 MNCs
and domestic firms, 22 per cent report that multiple
RoOs in Thailand’s FTAs were an obstacle to using
FTA preferences while another 23 per cent said
multiple RoOs might be an obstacle in the future.
Furthermore, it is worth noting that auto firms, with
large amounts of components and parts trade,
perceived multiple RoOs to be more of a problem
(Wignaraja et al., 2010b).
What is more, the “spaghetti bowl” costs of PTAs may
make it harder for firms to organize international
production networks. Consider, for example, Japanese
multinational companies (MNCs), which are a major
driver of production networks in the East Asian region.
In a firm survey carried out by the Japan External
Trade Organization (JETRO) in 2006, of the 97
Japanese MNCs using (or planning to use) PTA
In sum, it is both the design (the “transformation
criterion” used and flexibility for firms to choose
between different criteria) and the coherence
(multiple RoOs in multiple overlapping PTAs) of RoOs
that affect transaction costs and hence the utilization
of preferences in PTAs. Furthermore, production
networks that rely on international trade in
II – The WTO and Preferential Trade Agreements
(iii) Other firm-specific factors
Firm size
A classic firm size effect is visible in the underlying
pattern of PTA preference use from the ADB and IDB
firm surveys in East Asia and Latin America
respectively. Relative to SMEs, large firms were more
likely to use FTA preferences (Cheong and Cho, 2009;
Hirastuko et al., 2009; Harris and Suominen, 2009;
Wignaraja et al., 2010b). For example, Kawai and
Wignaraja (2011) report that the size of Japanese
firms that use PTA preferences have an average of
30,104 workers, while the average firm size is 3,542 in
China; 1,098 in Singapore; 591 in Thailand and 395 in
the Philippines. In contrast, the average number of
employees for non-users is markedly smaller at 7,020
in Japan, 2,226 in China; 291 in Thailand; 269 in the
Philippines and 142 in Singapore.
The higher utilization rates among large firms can be
attributed to the following. First, using PTAs is likely to
entail large fixed costs – learning about PTA provisions,
adjusting business plans to complex tariff schedules,
obtaining certificates of origin, etc. – and larger firms
are better able than small firms to muster the financial
and human resources to address these issues (Kawai
and Wignaraja, 2011). Second, large firms are likely to
realize larger gains from tariff preferences because
they export more, often being a part of MNC-based
production networks (Cheong and Cho, 2009).
Firm experience
Firm surveys carried out by the ADB and IADB in East
Asia and Latin America respectively show a positive
relationship between experience and the likelihood of
a firm using a PTA. For example, Wignaraja et al.
(2010a) show that in the Philippines, the probability of
firms in the sample that are less than ten years old
using the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (AFTA) is
about 10 per cent or less, while the probability for
firms in operation for more than 25 years is more than
25 per cent. This may be because more experienced
firms develop core capabilities, extensive supply
networks and administrative capacity over time to
better compete in the world market and take advantage
of PTAs.
Foreign ownership
Firm survey results from East Asia show that users of
PTA preferences in Japan and Thailand both have
significantly higher foreign equity than non-users. On
average, users in Japan have 9.8 times more foreign
equity than non-users, while users in Thailand have 1.5
times more foreign equity than non-users (Kawai and
Wignaraja, 2011). It is likely that access to the
marketing know-how of their parent companies —
including dealing with multiple tariff schedules and
RoOs — makes foreign affiliates better placed to use
PTAs than domestic firms.
B.historical background
and current trends
intermediate inputs for the production of a single final
good are likely to be particularly affected by stringent
and complicated RoOs in PTAs. The ADB firm survey
in East Asia reveals that 31 per cent of respondent
firms in the Philippines cite RoOs as the biggest
impediment for not utilizing PTA preferences (Kawai
and Wignaraja, 2011), while the IDB survey in Latin
America shows that 29 per cent identify RoO issues
as being “restrictive”.76 These numbers suggest that
while compliance with origin is a significant issue, the
rules of origin are far from being a universal
impediment.
Lack of information
PTA texts are complex legal documents which require
legal expertise to improve understanding of the
business implications of agreements. Hence, having
detailed knowledge of how PTA provisions affect
businesses is likely to have a significant effect on the
use of PTA preferences. The ADB survey of firms in
East Asia shows that PTA users in Japan, which has a
relatively high preference utilization rate, have the
highest knowledge levels (64 per cent). In contrast, in
the Philippines, which has a relatively low preference
utilization rate, only 7 per cent of users claim thorough
knowledge (Kawai and Wignaraja, 2011). In fact,
Wignaraja et al. (2010a) report that firms in the
Philippines that are “aware” of FTA provisions have a
predicted AFTA use rate of 40 per cent, compared
with a mere 11 per cent for those that are less “aware”.
Furthermore, the ADB firm survey reveals that 70 per
cent of responding firms in the Philippines, 45 per cent
in China and 34 per cent in the Republic of Korea cited
“lack of information about the conditions of the
existing PTAs or about how to utilize them” as the
biggest impediment for not utilizing PTA preferences
(Kawai and Wignaraja, 2011).
5. Conclusions
PTAs existed long before the advent of the multilateral
trading system. Already in 1860 the Cobden-Chevalier
Treaty introduced a stronger trade relationship
between France and Britain, helping to trigger a
network of reciprocal and inclusive trade treaties –
perhaps an early prototype of the GATT/WTO. This
demonstrates that no simple divide exists between
“regionalism” and “multilateralism”. Not surprisingly,
therefore, the establishment of the GATT and its
successor, the WTO, has not diminished the
attractiveness of bilateral and regional approaches.
The three waves of “regionalism” in the era after the
Second World War were all driven, at least in part, by
the desire to go “further and faster” than was occurring
at the multilateral level.
On the basis of WTO data, this section has highlighted
a number of stylized facts about the evolution of PTA
85
world trade report 2011
activity. The recent proliferation of PTAs to a significant
degree comprises agreements between developing
countries, cross-regional PTAs and bilateral
arrangements. Growth has taken place both on the
“intensive” and “extensive” margin, i.e. it involves both
traditionally active PTA participants, such as the EU,
Chile and Mexico, and “newcomers”, such as Japan,
other countries from Asia and the Middle East. Many
of these agreements go beyond traditional market
access commitments and cover a range of “behindthe-border” areas, such as intellectual property rights,
product standards, competition and investment
policies. Several reasons for these developments can
be put forward and will be further explored in this
report, but the emergence of international production
networks is certainly one compelling explanation.
The need to look for alternative motivations for
countries' unabated interest in PTAs has been
demonstrated by statistics on the surprisingly low
share of preferential trade in global trade, as well as
the low preference margins involved. While trade
between PTA members is growing as the number of
agreements increases, the analysis presented in this
section shows that given the considerable number of
zero duty MFN rates in many countries and widespread
product exclusions, only 16 per cent of world trade is
eligible for preferential tariffs and less than 2 per cent
is eligible to receive preferences with margins above
10 percentage points (30 per cent and 4 percentage
points respectively if trade within the EU is included).
In other words, despite the explosion of PTAs in recent
years, 84 per cent of world merchandise trade still takes
place on an MFN basis (70 per cent if intra-EU trade is
included). The global trade-weighted preference margin
amounts to no more than 1 per cent (2 per cent
86
including trade within the EU). Even these low numbers
must be seen as an upper limit, since preference
utilization usually entails costs related to rules of origin
and other administrative requirements that may frustrate
the actual use of available preferences.
Simple empirical estimations using customs data from
the EU and United States confirm higher utilization
rates for higher preferential margins and trade values.
This points to the influence of fixed costs on the use of
preferences. However, preference utilization in the EU
and the United States overall is fairly high, which seems
to suggest that costs involved are rather modest and/or
that demonstrating origin may be associated with other
benefits. At the same time, firm surveys from East Asia
reveal that the use of PTA preferences is not uniformly
high. This suggests that costs relating to the design and
coherence of origin rules, a lack of information, and
other impediments affecting preference utilization are
not universal. Rather, they are likely to vary by country,
sector and firm.
In light of the limited scope for meaningful trade
preferences, the ever-increasing number of PTAs
points to other objectives beyond traditional market
opening as drivers of PTA formation. It is a matter for
debate as to how far the recent surge in PTAs is
related to the slow pace of the Doha Round of trade
negotiations and the complexities involved in reaching
agreement in a multilateral setting. Some PTAs
obviously go further than the WTO, both in the depth
and breadth of their coverage. Subsequent parts of
this report seek to shed further light on what motivates
countries to pursue “deep integration” through PTAs,
the policy areas covered, and the way these strategies
operate in practice.
II – The WTO and Preferential Trade Agreements
1
2
3
Multilateralism in international relations is typically defined
as multiple countries working in concert on specific or
general issues. The first modern instances of
multilateralism occurred in early nineteenth-century
Europe, with the creation of the Concert of Europe after the
Napoleonic Wars, and then again in the period between the
First and Second World Wars, with the creation of the
ill-fated League of Nations. However, the most successful
modern examples of multilateralism are generally
considered to be the United Nations system, the Bretton
Woods institutions, and the GATT/WTO, all of which trace
their origins to efforts to reconstruct the international
system after the devastation of the Second World War and
the perceived failures of the League of Nations.
An early example was the 1703 Methuen Treaty between
England and Portugal which, among other things, stipulated
that Portuguese wines imported to England would be
subject to a third less duty than wines imported from
France, and that English woollen cloth imported to Portugal
would enter duty free.
Fairly typical were England’s Navigation Laws of 1712
– which were designed explicitly to restrict the use of
foreign shipping between England and its colonies, as well
as to secure colonial markets for English manufacturing,
and to grant monopolies to colonial commodity suppliers
(Dickerson, 1951).
4
The fact that the American Revolution was sparked in part
by colonial resentment of the restrictive Navigation Laws
was another factor which led to the system’s demise – and
the growing support for free trade – in the early nineteenth
century.
5
For example, the Franco-Italian conflict (1886-95); the
Franco-Swiss conflict (1892-95); the Russian-German
conflict (1893-94); the Spanish-German conflict (1894-99);
the Romania-Austro-Hungarian conflict (1886-93).
6
“Beggar-thy-neighbour” is an expression in economics
describing policies that seek benefits for one country at the
expense of others.
7
Belgium, Luxembourg, and Finland had also joined the Pact
by 1933.
8
A key figure behind this shift in US trade policy towards
greater liberalization and cooperation in trade was
Cordell Hull, the US Secretary of State for much of
Roosevelt’s presidency, who tirelessly asserted his belief
that “wars were often largely caused by economic rivalry
conducted unfairly” and that if the world “could get a freer
flowing of trade – freer in the sense of fewer
discriminations and obstructions – (then) one country would
not be deadly jealous of another and the living standards of
all countries might rise” (Irwin et al., 2008).
9
In part, these regional agreements failed because they
were based on a regional form of import substitution that
inevitably led to conflict over trade diversion – each
member wanted a regional market for its own inefficient
industries, but was unwilling to buy the expensive or
poor-quality import substitutes of their partners – while not
having the political determination of the EEC which began
life with the overarching objective of consolidating peace in
the region (Pomfret, 2006).
B.historical background
and current trends
Endnotes
10 Bulgaria, the Czech and Slovak Republics, Estonia,
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Slovenia.
11 The founding members of APEC were Australia, Brunei
Darussalam, Canada, Indonesia, Japan, the Republic of
Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Singapore,
Thailand, and the United States.
12 In economics, a stylized fact is a simplified presentation of
an empirical common finding.
13 The database is publicly accessible. For documentation of
the database, see the WTO’s Regional Trade Agreements
Information System (RTA-IS), available at http://rtais.wto.
org/UI/PublicMaintainRTAHome.aspx.
14 In the summary tables of the database, the total number of
“physical” agreements are provided.
15 For example, the website “bilaterals.org” (accessed on
17 January 2011) claims to provide information on
“everything that’s not happening in the WTO”. The Tuck
School of Business at Dartmouth University also has a
searchable global database on PTAs available at http://
www.dartmouth.edu/~tradedb/trade_database.html,
accessed on 14 January 2011. PTA databases with a
distinct regional focus include the ones by the InterAmerican Development Bank available at http://www.iadb.
org/dataintal/Default.aspx, accessed on 17 January 2011,
and the Asian Development Bank available at http://aric.
adb.org/ftatrends.php for PTA trends, and http://aric.adb.
org/indicator.php for trade data by countries and groupings,
accessed on 17 January 2011. Authors of empirical studies
usually assemble their own up-to-date dataset on PTAs
from a variety of such sources. See for instance, Hufbauer
and Schott (2009), as updated by Baldwin and Jaimovich
(2010).
16 See also Freund and Ornelas (2010) who find the same
pattern, albeit with an extended version of the WTO
database of notified PTAs and, therefore, report slightly
different figures for the average number of PTA partners
over time.
17 For a breakdown of PTAs by country group (developed,
developing) and region see Table B.1 in subsection B.2 (b)
below.
87
world trade report 2011
18 See ASEAN website at http://www.aseansec.org/19585.
htm, accessed on 19 November 2010.
19 Of course the content of PTAs also matters with most CIS
agreements involving only goods, whereas a range of Asian
agreements cover both goods and services. The issue of
deeper integration, notably in relation to the recent trends
towards international production networks, is discussed
further below in Section D.
20 While there is a large degree of certainty about the number
of PTAs in force especially if they are notified to the WTO,
figures on agreements under negotiation or signed
agreements depend largely on whether the parties to these
PTAs make such information available publicly. Information
gathered on the latter is therefore less complete.
21 Also, the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership
(TPP) Agreement will consolidate a significant share of
world trade.
22 The declaration to integrate COMESA, EAC and SADC at
the Tripartite Summit on 22 October 2008 in Kampala,
Uganda, with the ultimate goal to form an African common
market by 2028 might foreshadow a reversal of this trend.
See, for instance, SADC Today Volume 11 No. 3 of
December 2008 at http://www.sardc.net/editorial/
sadctoday/view.asp?vol=720&pubno=v11n3, accessed on
3 March 2011.
29 Agreements between important services exporters – apart
from European integration agreements -include, for
example, NAFTA, US-Australia, Japan-Switzerland,
Singapore-US, China-Singapore, or China-Hong Kong,
China.
30 The shares in this subsection differ somewhat from those
in Table B.8, but the data are not strictly comparable.
Shares in this section only include reciprocal regimes,
whereas both reciprocal and non-reciprocal regimes are
considered in Table B.8. Also, Table B.8 is based on
reported data from 20 countries, whereas shares in this
section are based on all available reporters in Comtrade.
However, shares in both sections are of roughly similar
magnitude.
31 See Section B.3. This figure covers only reciprocal
agreements and excludes trade under non-reciprocal
preference schemes. If non-reciprocal preferences are
included as well, the share of trade (including intra-EU
trade) between countries that have some kind of
preferential relationship amounts to almost two-thirds of
world trade (see Appendix Table 1).
23 For an overview of strategic explanations of why countries
decide to integrate through trade agreements, including
across regions, see Ravenhill (2008: 2010). For further
examples, see also Box 1 in Section C providing PTA case
studies based on information collected in the context of
WTO Trade Policy Reviews.
32 For an estimate of the average cost margin related to the
fulfilment of rules of origin requirements see, for example,
Francois and Manchin (2007).
24 Freund and Ornelas (2010) show that the gap between CUs
and FTAs may be much less severe if, for example, the
average number of trading partners per WTO member is
calculated. They find that FTA participants currently have
about nine partners on average, compared to six for CU
members. The relatively high average for the latter is driven
by the fact that the EU, as one of the largest PTAs, is a
customs union.
34 The sample of 20 counts the EU and its 27 members as
one. Throughout the discussion, figures are given both with
and without intra-EU trade.
25 Product exclusions are more common in PTAs notified
under the Enabling Clause, where a similar provision does
not apply. For analytical purposes, PTAs covering only a
selected number of products or sectors have been labelled
“partial scope agreements” in Figure B.4.
26 The list of “products excluded” is constructed by classifying
products that do not receive preferential tariff treatment in
the first year of the PTA’s implementation.
27 For instance, of all agriculture and food products
represented in 20,915 tariff lines recorded in the sample,
around 27 per cent are excluded from the provision of tariff
concessions. In comparison, only around 1 per cent of
manufacturing products (mostly labour-intensive products
such as footwear and textiles) are excluded in the
respective PTAs. This sectoral pattern may be attributable
to the fact that agricultural products are sensitive products
in these countries, intricately linked to the domestic
political economy process (Grossman and Helpman, 1995).
88
28 Reviewing commitments undertaken by 36 WTO members
under mode 1 (cross-border supply) and mode 3
(commercial presence), Roy et al. (2007) suggest that PTA
commitments tend to go significantly beyond those in the
GATS.
33 For a more extensive discussion of these data see
Carpenter and Lendle (2010).
35 For some countries, trade and/or tariff data are taken from
the year 2006, 2007 or 2009, depending on data
availability.
36 If only some tariffs within an HS sub-heading are zero, the
calculation of averages at the HS-6 level would
underestimate the share of MFN zero imports. This, in turn,
implies that the share of preferential imports would be
overestimated. For instance, using tariff-line data, the share
of MFN zero imports is 57 per cent for the EU and 43 per
cent for the US (see Appendix table 8 in the Statistical
appendix). If HS-6 average tariffs are used instead, these
shares drop to 46 per cent for the EU and 37 per cent for
the US.
37 WITS is a software developed by the World Bank, in
collaboration with various international organizations
including UNCTAD, ITC, WTO and the United Nations
Statistical Division. WITS provides access to major
international trade, tariffs and non-tariff data compilations.
See http://wits.worldbank.org/wits.
38 It is not shown whether the preferential rate is a zero rate or
only a reduced rate. However, zero preferential rates are far
more common than reduced rates.
II – The WTO and Preferential Trade Agreements
40 In many countries, high MFN tariffs exist for items that are
not heavily traded – often precisely because of these high
tariffs or other trade barriers.
41 "Global” here implies that the average is calculated on the
basis of the 20 importing countries examined here in
relation to all of their trading partners.
42 With EU intra-trade, the global trade-weighted average
tariff is reduced by two percentage points (from about 3.5
to 1.5 per cent).
43 The corresponding numbers with EU intra-trade are 64 per
cent of world trade that is with countries receiving
preferences and about half of this (30 per cent of all trade)
that is preferential.
44 Singapore applies a zero MFN duty for all products except
for a handful of alcoholic beverages, which then usually
enter duty-free under Singapore’s PTAs. See Appendix
Table 1 for Singapore and more country-specific data.
45 Of course, this assumption is unrealistic, as trade flows
would change in the absence of preferences. However,
proceeding in this way allows for the calculation of a
counterfactual estimate of “duties saved” due to
preferential agreements.
46 The trade-weighted preferential margin gives the average
margin over all exports or imports, and not the average
margin over preferential trade. However, the latter can be
easily calculated by dividing saved duties over preferential
trade. On a global level (without intra-EU), the tradeweighted preference margin is 1.0 per cent, but the average
margin for preferential trade (which is 16 per cent of all
trade) is 6.0 per cent.
47 The data are based on imports from trading partners (mirror
data). Since the dataset only includes imports from 20 countries, not all exports from the 30 listed countries
are included. Overall, approximately 89 per cent of exports
are covered. Coverage of individual countries can be seen
in Appendix table 8 (see the Statistical appendix). All
indicators are calculated using the available data and are
not adjusted for the degree of coverage of the data. It
should also be recalled that here the focus is only on the
preferential margin faced by individual exporters without
taking into account the market access conditions for
competing products from third countries. This is done in
Section D (see Box D.1), where “competition-adjusted”
preference margins are calculated as the percentage-point
difference between the weighted average tariff rate applied
to the rest of the world and the preferential rate applied to
the beneficiary country, with weights being the trade
shares in the preference granting market.
B.historical background
and current trends
39 The preferential margin (abbreviated “PM” in the tables) is
the difference between the lowest applicable preferential
tariff and the MFN rate. The trade-weighted preferential
margin can simply be calculated as duty reduction divided
by total trade, with “duty reduction” being the difference
between MFN duties applicable if no preferences existed
and duties applicable with full use of preferences.
Preferential trade flows may be slightly overestimated, as
the analysis assumes that preferences are fully utilized,
which is not always the case. On the other hand,
preferential trade under quota regimes, including
preferential quota regimes, is not covered by the data,
which leads to an underestimation of preferential trade
flows. There are a number of other reasons why estimates
shown here may not always be exact. Although the margin
of error is likely to be very small for aggregated figures,
more detailed results must be interpreted with care, as they
may depend strongly, for example, on the estimated ad
valorem equivalent for individual products.
48 Most of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela’s exports are
non-preferential and face low MFN tariffs. These are mainly
crude oil exports to the US, which are subject to a very low
specific tariff (AVE < 1%).
49 In Figure B.12, non-reciprocal regimes matter only for
Bangladesh, Cape Verde, Haiti, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi,
the Maldives, Samoa and Senegal, taking as a criterion that at
least 40 per cent of duties saved are related to non-reciprocal
preferences received. Over time, these preferences may be
eroded as the countries to which they export enter into more
PTAs. See the discussion in Section D.1 which examines the
effect of entry of more preferential competitors on an
exporter’s margin of preference.
50 Again, it should be noted that the data cover only exports to
the 20 largest importers. Some countries enjoy additional
preferences in smaller markets in their region that are not
covered in the dataset; hence the average margin for these
countries could be higher.
51 The trade between each country pair and in each direction
is labelled as belonging to a specific regime. In the case of
overlapping preferences, the most generous preference
scheme is considered for labelling purposes. However, all
existing preferences are included in the dataset and it is
assumed that the best applicable tariff rate is used for
each product.
52 It should be recalled that the dataset only covers imports
from four major ASEAN members (Indonesia, Malaysia,
Singapore and Thailand).
53 This is why this indicator is 100 for MFN and zero for EU
intra-trade. It should also be recalled that in PTAs
preferential rates are commonly zero rather than simply
reduced rates.
54 Even with a very low share of non-preferential trade, a
preferential regime could still have many exemptions on
items that are not heavily traded (e.g. because of high
tariffs). One example is the EU-Switzerland FTA, which
excludes many agricultural products.
55 In other words, reciprocal regimes account for 0.9
percentage points of the 1 per cent global trade-weighted
preference margin, while non-reciprocal regimes only
contribute 0.1 percentage points. The individual numbers
for the 20 importing countries contained in the dataset are
provided in Appendix table 11 (see the Statistical
appendix). In general, with the exception of Japan,
reciprocal preferences granted are much more important. In
the Appendix, besides the share of duties saved due to
reciprocal regimes (88 per cent), the share of reciprocal
preferential trade in preferential trade is also provided,
which is somewhat lower, but still high at 77 per cent.
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world trade report 2011
56 For the purpose of this calculation, the following countries
and territories are considered developed countries
(“North”): Andorra, Australia, Canada, the EU and its
members, Faroe Islands, Gibraltar, Iceland, Japan, New
Zealand, Norway, Switzerland (with Liechtenstein) and the
United States. The remaining countries are considered
developing countries (“South”) or LDCs. The category
“South” comprises only non-LDC developing countries;
LDCs are shown separately. ACPs and LDCs overlap. LDCs
do not appear as importers because none of the 20
importers included in this dataset is an LDC. Cape Verde,
although graduated, has been included in the list of LDCs
because it continues to receive LDC preferences.
57 The picture is similar within the EU. Agricultural products
have trade-weighted margins of well above 10 per cent.
Other sectors with high margins are textiles and footwear (9 per cent) and transport equipment (8 per cent). There is
a fairly high share of trade for which duties are not
available, mainly due to specific tariffs. This means that the
trade-weighted margin is likely to be underestimated.
Imports under quota regimes are reflected in the data.
58 For a more extensive discussion see Keck and Lendle
(2011).
59 For the EU, disaggregated import data by preference
eligibility and import regime is taken from Eurostat. The
import data is then matched with MFN and preferential
tariffs from the TARIC database (as of mid-2008). Similarly
disaggregated import data for the US is provided by the
USITC, which is then matched with the US tariff schedule
for 2008 and complemented from other sources, notably
MacMap.
60 An import is considered eligible for a particular preference
if the product from the exporting country can receive a
preference according to the tariff schedule. See, for
example, also Dean and Wainio (2006). Country- and
product-specific exemptions are taken into account.
which implies around 40 per cent uncensored observations
overall. Moreover, in the absence of transaction level data,
the authors obtain as a (rough) proxy a zero/one indicator
for preference utilization by using aggregated preferential
as well as aggregated MFN flows at the product-country
level. This transformation of the data brings the number of
observations to over 175,000 for the EU and 53,000 for
the US. However, it needs to be kept in mind that these
observations are based on an aggregate of an unknown
number of individual transactions. Product-specific as well
as regime-specific effects are controlled for.
63 Results change little when outliers are removed, i.e. observations with either very large preferential margins
(> 50 per cent) or very small import flows (< $ or €10,000)
or both. A range of papers exist that obtain similar results
finding that preference utilization rates are generally rather
high and vary positively with export size and preferential
margins. See for instance, Hakobyan (2011), Dean and
Wainio (2006), Manchin (2005), Candau and Sebastien
(2005) and Brenton and Ikezuki (2004). However, most of
the existing papers focus on a specific preference regime.
The main disadvantage of defining utilization rates for
specific regimes is that it can give the misleading
impression that its overall utilization is low, even though it
may be used a lot more if an alternative scheme did not
exist. By contrast, Keck and Lendle (2011) take into
account the whole array of preferential regimes by the EU
and US.
64 The multi-country survey’s participating firms were from the
electronics sector (33 per cent), followed by the automotive
(21 per cent) and textile and garments (17 per cent)
sectors. The remaining firms were exporters of chemicals
and pharmaceuticals, metals and machinery, and processed
foods.
65 Japan, China, the Republic of Korea, the Philippines,
Singapore and Thailand
66 Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Panama
61 Preference utilization rates (PUR) can be aggregated over
exporters and products in different ways in order to
determine average utilization rates. First, average utilization
rates “by import value” are weighted by the value of
preferential imports divided by the value of eligible imports.
Secondly, average utilization rates “by import duty” are
weighted by the duties saved for preferential imports
divided by the duties that could be saved for all eligible
imports. Finally, simple average utilization rates are
calculated as the average of all observed utilization rates at
the product-exporter level. The latter measure is somewhat
problematic, since simple averages should only be
determined across individual transactions in order to obtain
the actual share of import transactions using preferences,
and not across product-exporter combinations. Thus, the
simple average here is typically upward biased, since
preferences are not used in many small transactions.
62 When PUR in the EU and US (calculated as described in
footnote 47 above) is used as the dependent variable,
values range from 0 to 100 per cent. The dataset used
contains around 126,000 observations for the EU and
around 38,000 for the US. Forty-two per cent of the
observations for the EU show zero utilization and 18 per
cent full utilization. The exact reverse is true for the US,
90
67 See also Table B.3.
68 All products of HS Sections 10 and 21 have zero MFN
duties in both EU and US and are therefore not shown.
69 But it could also reflect a self-selection bias, if a high
proportion of the sample firms in these countries belonged
to the electronics sector.
70 Refers to the rerouting of goods, whereby in PTAs which
are not customs unions – members maintain their own
external tariffs – imports of any particular product would
enter the country with the lowest import duty on the item in
question and be re-exported to other countries in the PTA.
71 Defined, relative to unit cost or price.
72 For example, in the US-Canada FTA, the production of
aged cheese from fresh milk does not confer origin
(Krishna and Krueger, 1995).
II – The WTO and Preferential Trade Agreements
74 In the case of trade in services, PTA provisions have mainly
sought to establish the origin of service providers because
the need for physical proximity between service producers
and consumers implies a strong link between the service
and its supplier. For example, PTAs often require that
enterprises eligible for concessions are incorporated under
the laws of one of the partner countries, and that eligible
individuals be citizens or residents of one of the countries.
Alternatively, enterprises may be required to have
“substantive business activities” within the region and
individuals are expected to have their “centre of economic
interest” there (Fink and Jansen, 2009).
B.historical background
and current trends
73 For example, in the case of American imports of apparel
under NAFTA, preferential treatment is given only if each
step of the transformation from raw material to finished
garment has been undertaken within the FTA (Krishna and
Krueger, 1995).
75 This is referred to in the literature as “diagonal cumulation”
(Estevadeordal and Suominen, 2004; Gasiorek et al., 2009)
– see Section C.
76 A larger percentage of firms in Chile and Mexico that have
FTAs with large developed countries (the US and the EU,
among others) report RoOs to be “restrictive”, relative to
Colombia and Panama.
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C. Causes and effects
of PTAs: Is it all about
preferences?
A vast literature in economics and political
science focuses on the causes and effects of
preferential trade agreements – and in
particular on the way that border measures,
such as tariffs, impact trade flows among
countries both inside and outside such
agreements. Often referred to as the “standard
analysis of preferential trade agreements”,
this literature is discussed in detail in
Sections C.1 and C.2. However, many recent
regional agreements have moved beyond
border measures to include deeper forms of
rules and institutions that can only be partly
understood by the standard analysis of
preferential trade. An examination of the
economic motives – and the key issues – that
lie behind these deeper integration
agreements is discussed in Section C.3.
92
II – The WTO and Preferential Trade Agreements
1. Motives for PTAs
94
2. The standard economics of PTAs
100
3. Going beyond the standard analysis
109
4. Conclusions
114
Technical Appendix: Systemic effects of PTAs
118
C. Causes and effects
of PTA s: Is it all about
preferences?
Contents
Some key facts and findings
• PTAs now cover a wider number of issues – beyond tariffs – and
involve more structured institutional arrangements.
• Global production networks increase the demand for deep
agreements since they provide governance on a range of regulatory
issues that are essential to the success of the networks.
• Deep integration agreements can complement rather than substitute
for the process of global integration.
• Economic theory needs to go beyond the standard trade-creation
and trade-diversion analysis of PTAs, which is about the impact of
preferential tariffs.
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1. Motives for PTAs
Economists and political scientists have identified
several rationales for preferential trade agreements –
a brief overview of which is provided below.
(a) Neutralizing beggar-thy-neighbour trade
policies
Economists have long recognized that trade policy can
have “beggar-thy-neighbour” effects. That is,
protectionist trade measures can be unilaterally
attractive but multilaterally destructive. Specifically,
the beggar-thy-neighbour problem is based on the
idea that trade policy decisions of one country affect
the welfare of another country through an international
externality (i.e. a cross-border effect). The economic
literature has highlighted two main effects associated
with trade policy: the terms-of-trade effect and the
production relocation effect. These are discussed in
more detail below. Independently of how one country's
trade policy affects its trading partners, a trade
agreement is a means of neutralizing negative crossborder effects.
The main logic of the terms of trade (or traditional)
approach is that countries that have market power
(i.e. that can influence their terms of trade) cannot
resist the temptation to act non-cooperatively. As
noted by Johnson (1953), each country sets trade
policy in an attempt to improve its terms of trade
(i.e. lower the costs of its imports relative to exports)
and increase national income.1 However, the resulting
non-cooperative (Nash) equilibrium is inefficient, as
each country's terms-of-trade-enhancing unilateral
actions are cancelled out. More restrictive trade
policies by all countries have little net effect on the
terms of trade, but lead to a contraction of trade
volumes which reduces aggregate welfare – a situation
referred to as a terms-of-trade-driven Prisoners’
Dilemma (Bagwell and Staiger, 1999).
The terms-of-trade effect may not be the only relevant
externality associated with trade policy. Trade policy
may also try to expand domestic production in a sector
to the detriment of foreign production by changing
relative prices. This is referred to as the “production
relocation effect” (Venables, 1987). Like a terms-oftrade-driven Prisoners’ Dilemma 2, if all governments
choose trade policies aimed at attracting more
production, no government actually succeeds. In
equilibrium, production does not relocate across
countries, but trade falls in response to the rise in
restrictive trade measures. To put it differently,
countries are stuck in a production relocation
Prisoners’ Dilemma.
These non-cooperative situations can be avoided
through a trade agreement among countries which
encourages them to cooperate rather than to act
94
unilaterally. 3 An important question is whether such an
agreement should be at the regional or at the
multilateral level. Studies by Bagwell and Staiger
(2003) and by Ossa (2010) show that a multilateral
trade agreement based on simple rules that allow
countries to coordinate tariff reductions and
reciprocate market access is the first-best option to
neutralize negative (terms-of-trade or production
relocation) externalities.
If a multilateral trade agreement such as the GATT/
WTO is in place, there is no rationale for signing a
preferential trade agreement (PTA) 4 – and WTO
members would have little incentive to form PTAs to
solve these types of coordination problems. 5 However,
in the absence of multilateral trade cooperation,
countries may seek a preferential agreement to limit
cross-border effects associated with trade policy.
(b) Gaining credibility
Aside from avoiding the temptation to adopt “beggarthy-neighbour” trade policies, preferential agreements
may also serve as instruments to stop governments
from implementing “beggar-thyself” policies. By this it
is meant that a government may choose to “tie its
hands” and commit itself to trade openness through an
international agreement in order to prevent future
policy reversal that might be convenient in the short
run, but inefficient in the long term. In other words, the
government understands that an agreement can help
it to make more credible policy commitments than it
would otherwise be able to make.
Specifically, a government might sign a PTA to solve
some form of time-inconsistency problem. 6,7 The
different mechanisms through which a timeinconsistent trade policy may lead to inefficiencies
have been highlighted in a number of studies (Staiger
and Tabellini, 1987; Matsuyama, 1990; Amin, 2003). In
these models, the government wants to use
discretionary trade policy to increase social welfare
(for example, in response to an unexpected event, to
allow temporary protection to an infant industry, etc.).
However, the use of trade policy can alter the normal
behaviour of participants in an economy since agents
can anticipate the policy change, and react to it in
ways that will reduce the policy's impact on them. This
implies that the government will not be able to use
discretionary trade policy as originally intended,
resulting in a socially inefficient trade policy.
Similar credibility problems emerge when a
government is exposed to political pressures from
domestic interest groups lobbying for protection
(Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare, 1998). The presence of
import restrictions will reward import-competing
producers and will divert investments from other
economic activities. The cost of this distortion may be
large in the long run, but in the short run domestic
lobbying by the import-competing sector will prompt
II – The WTO and Preferential Trade Agreements
the policy-maker to set high restrictions. In these
circumstances, Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (1998)
identify two reasons why a government may want to
commit to a PTA: first, to minimize the costly long-term
distortions involved with protecting a politically
organized sector, where the country has no
comparative advantage and it is unlikely to gain it in
the future; and, secondly, to avoid a costly delay in the
adjustment process of the declining sector relying on
government protection.
An important question is whether a PTA may provide
more credibility than a multilateral treaty – in other
words, would a WTO member choose to sign a PTA to
improve further the credibility of its policy vis-à-vis the
private sector. One possibility is that a country may be
too small in world markets for other countries to care
about its GATT/WTO violations, whereas a country
that has preferential access to that country has a
particular stake in making sure that this preferential
access is maintained. This provides a possible reason
why a small country seeking to tie its hands through a
trade agreement – and thereby increase its credibility
with its own private sector – might naturally look to a
PTA in addition to GATT/WTO commitments.
(c) Other economic motives
There are several other economic reasons why
countries opt to form PTAs, some that mirror the
motives discussed above and others that are sometimes
referred to as “non-traditional” motives (Fernandez and
Portes, 1998). These are briefly reviewed below. They
include, but are not limited to, increasing market size,
increasing policy predictability, signalling openness to
investors and achieving deeper commitments.
Increasing market size can be a reason for establishing
PTAs since it enables firms from signatory states to
exploit economies of scale and to gain a relative
advantage over excluded competing firms. In addition,
preferential access to a larger market may increase a
country's attractiveness as a destination for foreign
direct investment (FDI). Both reasons are particularly
valid for small economies, which may help to explain
why these countries agree to make concessions on
other more controversial issues, such as intellectual
property rights or environmental standards, when
negotiating PTAs with large economies.
A country with a reputation for protectionism might
find it particularly valuable to signal its willingness to
shift towards a more liberal and business-friendly
policy. In this case, the precise provisions of a PTA are
less relevant than demonstrating to investors that the
current government is open to business. Alternatively,
a country might want to enter into a PTA to signal that
its economy, or a particular sector, is competitive.
C. Causes and effects
of PTA s: Is it all about
preferences?
These theoretical results contain a clear normative
implication: governments should undertake binding
trade policy commitments concerning their future
behaviour. A trade agreement, in addition to facilitating
policy cooperation as emphasized above, may have
precisely this commitment role, as it reduces or
eliminates the signatory governments' discretionary
power in setting tariffs, and raises the costs of
resorting to unilateral trade protectionism. This
provides a welfare-improving way to enforce domestic
commitments to a policy of trade openness. 8
Related to the time-inconsistency issues addressed
above, a trade agreement may also be signed to
reduce uncertainty on future trade policy, thus sending
an important signal to investors. Since future
administrations might have policy preferences that
differ from those of the current administration, a
government may sign a PTA in an attempt to lock-in its
policies (for example, a pro-open trade policy) and to
diminish the likelihood that they might be reversed. In
this way, the government addresses not so much the
issue of policy credibility as the issue of policy
predictability (Fernandez and Portes, 1998).
Economic analysis often overlooks the simple fact that
trade policy is decided in a political environment, and
governments may face incentives that differ from
simple welfare considerations. However, some recent
economic literature has emphasized the role played by
special interest groups in trade policy determination. 9
Simply put, interest groups lobby to influence
government decisions and, in turn, governments trade
off the welfare effects of their trade policy choices
(e.g. signing or not signing a PTA) with the political
support of special interests. In this political context,
the choice to sign a preferential agreement may be
driven by the interests of an organized lobby rather
than by social welfare considerations (Grossman and
Helpman, 1995).10
A final argument for signing a PTA relates to the need
to achieve a deeper form of integration which goes
beyond traditional trade (i.e. border) measures such as
tariffs (Lawrence, 1996). This deeper integration may
require institutions and levels of policy coordination
that can be more easily achieved at the regional than
at the multilateral level.11 This issue will be more
extensively discussed in Section C.3.
(d) Political motives
The creation of PTAs cannot be fully understood
without considering the political context within which
they are formed. Political science has provided
additional explanations for why states might engage in
PTAs, focusing in particular on the role of political
integration, domestic politics, forms of governments,
institutions, diplomacy or the influence of power and
ideas. Some of the most important “political”
arguments for PTAs are discussed briefly below.
Preferential trade agreements have long been seen as
playing a key role in regional political integration.
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Perhaps the best modern example was the formation
of the European Community (EC) in the 1950s which,
at the time, was the most important PTA in the world
and attracted considerable attention from political
scientists. Initially, “functionalist” scholars, inspired by
the logic of integration, emphasized the importance of
bureaucratic actors as key drivers of integration, as
well as the process by which national elites transferred
loyalties to a supranational level (Mitrany, 1943; Haas,
1958; Sandholtz and Zysman, 1989).
It was postulated that a policy spill-over effect would
incrementally drive integration from “low politics”
(trade integration) to “high politics” (political
integration). This “functionalist” school of thought was
later challenged by political scientists who marshalled
empirical evidence that cast doubt on the extent of
spill-overs and helped explain the stagnation in the
European integration process. Proponents of an “intergovernmentalist” theory argued that national
preferences were more relevant in shaping the pace
and content of political and economic integration, and
questioned whether there had been a significant
transfer of control from member states to Community
institutions (Hoffmann, 1966; Moravcsik, 1998).
To help explain the increasing number of trade
agreements elsewhere in the world, political theorists
first attempted to apply the European integration
models. However, the limits soon became obvious.
Trade integration outside Europe proceeded according
to different patterns and concomitant political
integration was lacking. Additional strategic
explanations emerged. These included a desire to
increase influence in international negotiations by
pooling resources (e.g. the Caribbean Community), see
Andriamananjara and Schiff (2001), or the goal of
resisting the threat of communism in South-East Asia,
by strengthening cooperation among like-minded
governments (e.g. the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations) for an overview, see Ravenhill (2008). Another
strategic motive for forming regional trade agreements
was to counteract the growth of other regional
arrangements. For example, Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation was widely seen as an attempt by the US
to send a pre-emptive trade policy signal to the
European Community about the cost of building a
“Fortress Europe”.
Existing research has shown that democracies are
more likely to form PTAs among themselves (Mansfield
et al., 2002). One explanation is that democratic
governments use trade agreements as a signalling
device vis-à-vis domestic constituents that they are
implementing sensible policies. Related research looks
at how governments calculate the political costs and
benefits of PTAs, and how voters hold their political
leaders accountable. The work by Mansfield et al.
(2007) suggests that a country's decision to enter into
PTAs is related to the number of internal veto players
(i.e. lawmakers or parliamentarians). In addition,
96
Mansfield and Milner (2010) show that the number of
veto players in a country affects the transaction costs
of an agreement. As the number of veto players
increases, ratification becomes less likely.
While veto players diminish the likelihood of entering
PTAs, the regime type (democracy) affects the ratification
rate positively. Mansfield and Milner (2010) argue that
PTAs can serve as a strategic tool vis-à-vis voters. In
other words, PTAs can act as a credible signal that
governments can use to pursue trade objectives
preferred by a majority of voters rather than by special
interests. According to this view, the spread of democracy
since the 1980s, especially across the countries of Latin
America, Asia, and Central and Eastern Europe, may help
explain the proliferation of PTAs.
The decision to negotiate and sign PTAs may also be
affected by the extent to which countries use trade
policy to reinforce wealth and empower relations. If
governments distrust one another, they may form
bilateral treaties in order to limit or to control the
growth of other powers (e.g. to serve as counterbalances). Gowa and Mansfield (1993) and Gowa
(1994) argue that trade integration stimulates trade
flows between two countries, leads to a more efficient
allocation of resources and thus frees up resources for
military use. The increasing wealth and power of
member countries should be of concern to excluded
countries. An agreement between two countries may
thus force other pairs of countries to follow suit, with
the aim of retaining their current relative position
(Gowa and Mansfield, 1993).
In a similar vein, the design of PTAs is also indicative
of power relations. Stronger states can more easily
dictate the terms of agreements in a bilateral or
regional context. Other diplomatic and foreign policy
considerations may influence the decision to form
PTAs. For instance, some states use PTAs to reward
allies and to reinforce key alliances. In this view, PTAs
are an active part of foreign policy making (White,
2005; Rosen, 2004; Higgott, 2004; Capling, 2008).
PTAs might also serve as “diffusion mechanisms” –
either directly, in the form of coercion, or more
indirectly, in the form of learning. For example, a
growing body of work treats the EU as a “conflicted
power” (Meunier and Nicolaidis, 2006), which uses its
market power (i.e. access to the EU's single market) to
coerce weaker powers, including former colonies, into
accepting new types of trade arrangements (Farrell,
2005) (for example, European Partnership Agreements
with the African, Caribbean and Pacific group of
states). Others consider that the European Community
provided an example for economic integration among
countries in Latin America and Africa in the 1960s
(Pomfret, 2001), demonstrating how the perceived
success of trade arrangements “teach” others to adopt
similar policies (Krueger, 1997).
II – The WTO and Preferential Trade Agreements
(e) What explains the growth of PTAs?
Changes in the underlying dynamic of trade
relationships across the globe may prompt countries to
sign PTAs. Baldwin (1995) provided a model of the
enlargement of Europe's economic integration which
rested on a “domino theory” of regionalism – i.e. where
the potential loss of market share induces nonmembers to join existing PTAs, creating a process of
action and reaction or contagion. Exporters in nonmember countries push their governments to join
existing PTAs or create new ones to counteract the
potential damage caused by preferential trade
liberalization (Baldwin and Jaimovich, 2010). There is a
set of studies which find broad empirical support for
Baldwin's domino theory – formation of PTAs creates
an incentive for outsiders to become members of an
existing PTA or to form new PTAs (Egger and Larch,
2008; Baldwin and Jaimovich, 2010; Chen and Joshi,
2010). According to Egger and Larch (2008), these
results are particularly useful to “predict” the process
of regional integration in Europe.
The political science literature also focuses on the
causal mechanisms behind the domino effect, in
particular how decision-makers and interest groups
react to discrimination. Pahre (2008) applies the idea
of a competitive spread of trade agreements to the
nineteenth century. Mattli (1999) makes this argument
with respect to the enlargement of the European
Union, while Gruber (2000) does so in the context of
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).
In a similar vein, Dür (2010) explains the PTAs signed
by the EU and the US in the 1990s and 2000s in
terms of competition for market access in emerging
economies. This empirical literature does not deny the
importance of factors other than potential trade
diversion in explaining the growth of PTAs. For
example, Manger (2009) argues that investment
discrimination as a result of the creation of NAFTA
contributed to Japan’s decision to conclude a trade
agreement with Mexico.
The concluding part of this section emphasizes the
importance of “deep” integration – arrangements that
go beyond extending preferential tariff concessions to
include areas such as investment – in PTA formation.
Furthermore, Section D assesses the relative
importance of tariff liberalization and “deep”
integration in explaining the recent spread of PTAs.
In the literature, the influence of existing PTAs on
subsequent PTA formations is often referred to as
“endogenous
regionalism”.
Such
“endogenous
regionalism”, however, may also be influenced by trade
liberalization at the multilateral level. For instance,
Freund (2000) argues that as multilateral tariff levels
fall, the formation of PTAs, and hence the domino
effect, is strengthened. This may be explained by the
effect of tariff reduction on competition, profits, and
tariff revenue.
Lowering tariffs enhances competition, which leads to
greater output. At high world tariff levels, this efficiency
effect is large and multilateral tariff reduction, which
has a greater effect on competition than preferential
reduction, is better. However, lowering tariffs also
means smaller profits and less tariff revenue. At low
overall tariff levels, the efficiency effect is smaller, but
preferential reduction is less costly – profits and tariff
revenue fall by less. Preferential agreements effectively
allow members to divert part of the profit loss that
results from lower tariffs to the third country where
output contracts. Hence, the welfare gain from joining a
PTA is greater than the gain from a move to open trade
when tariffs are low; the reverse is true when tariffs are
high.12 Empirical evidence confirms the above
prediction. For example, Fugazza and Robert-Nicoud
(2010) show that reductions in the US multilateral tariff
of a given product in the Tokyo and Uruguay Rounds are
systematically associated with lower preferential tariffs
for that product, and with that product being included in
more PTAs formed after the conclusion of the Uruguay
Round.
C. Causes and effects
of PTA s: Is it all about
preferences?
Finally, there may be a direct or indirect relationship
between the formation of PTAs and the multilateral
system, either reflecting a lack of progress at the
multilateral level or a strategy to improve states’
leverage in the WTO. Gridlock or stagnation in
multilateral negotiations, for example, may create
incentives for states to pursue preferential trade
liberalization, and encourage exporters to lobby their
governments for PTAs (for example, see case studies
in Capling and Low (2010), where policy communities
note both the “remoteness” and “slowness” of the
WTO). Alternatively, states may sign PTAs in order to
increase their bargaining power during multilateral
trade talks (Mansfield and Reinhardt, 2003). The
drawn-out negotiations in the Uruguay Round, and in
the current Doha Development Round, may explain the
current proliferation of PTAs.
Finally, there is an emerging literature which provides
a systematic explanation of the timing of PTA
formations and enlargements since the late 1950s
using econometric duration analysis. This helps explain
the pattern of PTA formation described in Section B.
For instance, Bergstrand et al. (2010)13 identify three
systematic relationships between the “timing” of PTA
events and different economic characteristics.
Specifically, natural trading partners (countries closer
to each other in terms of physical distance), pairs of
countries with larger gross domestic products (GDPs),
and pairs of countries whose economic size is similar,
have a higher probability of forming a PTA – or
enlarging an existing PTA – sooner than countries that
do not share these three characteristics.14 Liu (2010)
draws similar conclusions.
Bergstrand et al. (2010) also outline conditions under
which PTAs create the greatest incentives for non-
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members to join existing agreements or to form new
ones. First, the closer a potential entrant is to a PTA
that another country is already a member of, the more
likely that the two countries will form a PTA sooner,
consequently enlarging the PTA. Second, the higher
the “intensity of regionalism” a country pair faces, the
more likely it is that the two countries form or enlarge
an existing PTA sooner. Third, there is a “humpshaped” relationship between the number of members
of the nearest PTA and the likelihood of it enlarging
sooner. At first, the probability that two countries
enlarge an existing PTA sooner increases with the
number of members of the nearest PTA – reflecting
demand for membership by potential entrants. Beyond
a certain threshold level of membership size, however,
this probability declines as the utility loss from an
expansion for the potentially “worst-off” existing
member15 prevents infinite enlargement.16 This is
important since the speed of regionalism has appeared
to be “much slower” than the apparent growth in
demand for membership by non-members suggests,
given the domino theory of regionalism.17
Overall, Bergstrand et al. (2010) show that the
relationships suggested by the six economic
characteristics described above are sufficient to
explain 62 per cent of the variation across 10,585
pairs of countries and 57 years of the timing of 1,560
PTA events. Furthermore, the model is able to predict
the actual year of the PTA formation or enlargement
by a country-pair correctly in nearly 50 per cent of the
1,560 PTA events. Liu (2010) also emphasizes the
importance of certain political variables in explaining
the timing of PTA formation. For example, the author
shows that countries with similar polity scores,18 lack
of political hostility and a shared colonial history are
more likely to form PTAs.
Based on answers provided by WTO members in the
Trade Policy Reviews undertaken by the WTO Secretariat,
Box C.1 contains a short discussion of the motives
mentioned by WTO members for why they sign PTAs.
The above sections have covered in depth the
determinants of the formation of preferential trade
agreements. However, little mention has been made of
those agreements that have been negotiated among
countries but have never been implemented. For example,
in the early 1990s discussions were begun to establish a
Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). This envisioned
a hemispheric-wide free trade area in the continent.
However, the initiative has largely fallen by the wayside.
One way to look at the motives of preferential trade
liberalization is that they provide a demand-side
explanation of the creation and enlargement of PTA but
assumes that there is an unlimited supply of membership.
It is important though to also consider what constraints
are operating on the supply-side of preferential
liberalization. In the case of enlarging an already existing
PTA, for example, the supply of new members would be
determined at the margin by the potentially worst-off
member (Bergstrand et al, 2010). Hence, there might be
situations in which the determinants of the demand and
the supply of preferential liberalization membership are
so dissimilar that an agreement will very unlikely be
reached. This issue merits further research.
Box C.1: PTA case studies
The WTO periodically examines the national trade policies of its members through Trade Policy Reviews
(TPRs). The member being reviewed submits a Government Report that is published alongside the report
prepared by the Secretariat. These official statements present the government’s perspective on major
developments in the country’s trade policy, including the negotiation and conclusion of PTAs. Although there
is no defined structure to the Government Reports, they occasionally provide insight into the motives behind
preferential agreements.
There are certain limitations to this analytical approach. Given that each member decides what to include in
the Government Reports, some explicitly address the motivation behind pursuing PTAs, while others avoid
mentioning it altogether. Furthermore, several governments tend to repeat paragraphs from previous TPRs to
explain their trade policy without describing motives that are specific to new PTA initiatives. Therefore, this
survey of Government Reports is mostly anecdotal and far from exhaustive.
A survey of Government Reports shows that PTAs are predominantly about securing preferential market
access and attracting investment, as these are the most commonly quoted motives. However, an array of
additional motives is also mentioned, in particular the goal of addressing policy issues that go deeper or
beyond WTO rules (see Section D for contents of PTAs). It also appears that PTAs are sometimes used as a
means of promoting deeper commitments in new areas, with the aim of eventually incorporating them at the
multilateral level.
For example, the United States stated in its Government Report that PTAs “challenge the multilateral system
to keep pace with the interests and needs of members, and contribute to the WTO system by introducing
innovation and strengthened disciplines”, and that “these agreements can become models for future
multilateral liberalization in new areas, such as agriculture, services, investment, and environmental and
labour standards” (World Trade Organization (WTO), 2008).
98
II – The WTO and Preferential Trade Agreements
Similarly, the Government Report of Mexico acknowledged that PTAs “establish important precedents in
some areas that could be included in future multilateral negotiations”, and that Mexico would “continue to
negotiate regional trade agreements insofar as they go beyond multilateral liberalization” (World Trade
Organization (WTO), 1997).
Political motivations that go beyond trade policy are also expressed in the official statements. Several
Government Reports explicitly declare that PTAs aim to promote democracy and political stability. Peace and
security is also said to be advanced through trade cooperation in PTAs.
Commenting on its PTA with the EC, Chile also asserts that the agreement “covers not only trade issues, but
political and cooperation areas as well. In the political area, the agreement seeks to promote, disseminate
and defend democratic values” (World Trade Organization (WTO), 2003).
The linkage between political stability and peace is more evident in the EC’s agreements with neighbouring
partners: “The Euro-Med agreements concluded with eight Mediterranean countries continue to be the basis
for intensifying bilateral and regional co-operation in support of an area of peace, stability and shared
prosperity” (World Trade Organization (WTO), 2004).
C. Causes and effects
of PTA s: Is it all about
preferences?
In the TPR on the European Communities (EC), the EC places particular emphasis on the political cooperation
dimension of its respective agreements. For example, in its region-to-region negotiations with the Andean
Community and Central American countries, the EC “aim[ed] to reinforce the political and economic stability
of each region” (World Trade Organization (WTO), 2009b).
Similarly, the US Government Report argues that the Dominican Republic-Central American Free Trade
Agreement (DR-CAFTA) “supports regional stability, democracy and economic development” contributing to
the “transformation of a region that was consumed by internal strife and border disputes just a decade ago”
(World Trade Organization (WTO), 2006).
In several Government Reports, the slow pace at which multinational negotiations are currently advancing
has been used as a justification for seeking PTAs.
The Government Report of Chile admits that “the pace of multilateral discussions is not rapid enough ... a
relatively small economy like Chile has very limited capacity to exert any influence in the resolution of these
problems. Bilateral initiatives are therefore useful as a supplementary way of achieving substantial outcomes
more expeditiously than would be possible at the multilateral level” (World Trade Organization (WTO), 2009a).
The contagion or domino-theory, whereby the conclusion of a PTA acts as a catalyst to trigger other PTAs,
also appears to be a central motive. There is evidence that countries are conscious of the effects PTAs have
on third countries and the multilateral system. Some countries, such as Mexico, have pursued PTAs with the
explicit goal of encouraging other trading partners to negotiate similar agreements. Other countries, such as
Pakistan and Japan, have reacted to the proliferation of PTAs by concluding that they have no choice but to
create their own network of PTAs (despite being initially opposed to preferential liberalization).
After concluding its first major PTA, Mexico stated in its Government Report that NAFTA “is very important
for Mexico, not only owing to the participation of its biggest trading partner ... but also because it generated
an incentive and interest among other trading partners for negotiating similar agreements” (World Trade
Organization (WTO), 1997). This has been a successful strategy, considering that Mexico went on to
conclude PTAs with the EC, the European Free Trade Association and Japan within a decade.
Fearing being left out of the preferential liberalization taking place outside the multilateral negotiations,
countries such as Pakistan are “cognizant of the proliferation of regional and bilateral Preferential Trading
Arrangements” and have reasoned that “many such arrangements place Pakistani exporters at a disadvantage
vis-à-vis their competitors. In order to counter these negative effects, Pakistan has been actively involved in
seeking such arrangements on bilateral or regional level” (World Trade Organization (WTO), 2007).
In its 2000 report, Japan remained “seriously concerned that some RTAs have raised trade barriers to trade
with non-member countries, and that they have effectively weakened the free, non-discriminatory, and open
multilateral system formed under the WTO”. It clarified it did not “belong to any preferential regional
agreements” but that as a result of the proliferation of PTAs “the possibility and the desirability of free trade
agreements [were] being examined by various sectors” (World Trade Organization (WTO), 2000). Two years
later, in its next TPR, Japan noted that it had begun to pursue PTAs (World Trade Organization (WTO), 2002).
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2. The standard economics of PTAs
(a) An overview of the economic effects of PTAs
The basic economic effects of preferential agreements
can be illustrated in a simple model (Baldwin, 2009).
Consider a world composed of three identical countries
called Home, Partner and Rest of the World (RoW).
Each country imports two goods from the other two
nations, and exports one good to both destinations.
The trade patterns of this model economy are depicted
in Figure C.1 below. Further assume that in an initial
situation, all countries impose on each other the same
(non-discriminatory) tariff, referred to as the MostFavoured Nation (MFN) tariff. In this scenario, the
domestic price is higher than the border price faced by
the two suppliers and imports are lower compared to
open trade. Importantly, however, the two suppliers
share equally the reduction in exports due to the
imposition of an MFN tariff.
Figure C.1: The PTA diagram’s trade pattern
Good 1
Good 2
Home
Good 1
Partner
Good 2
Good 3
Good 3
RoW
What are the effects of a preferential trade agreement?
To help answer this question, consider the case where
Home and Partner form a free trade area (or a customs
union), so that Partner producers get duty-free access
in the Home market, and Home producers get duty free
access in the Partner market (a complete graphical
analysis is contained in Technical Appendix C.1).
Focusing first on the market for good 1, the good that
is imported by the Home economy, the following price
and volume effects take place. The domestic price
falls relative to the situation where there is a single
MFN tariff as the supply of the good in the Home
economy is increased, but now there are two distinct
border prices. The border price faced by Partner is
higher, as exporters no longer face a tariff in the Home
market, while the border price faced by exporters in
RoW is lower, as they still face a tariff but the domestic
price in the Home economy is lower. As a result,
exports from Partner expand, while exports from RoW
contract.
100
As the PTA is reciprocal, the effects discussed above
on the market for good 1 materialize symmetrically for
good 2. The only difference, intuitively, is that in this
market the Home economy is an exporter, while
Partner is the importer. Therefore, in this market,
Home gains from a higher border price and greater
exports to Partner, while RoW loses from the drop in
border price and the reduction in its exports in
sector 2. Finally, the formation of a preferential
arrangement has no effect on the market for good 3,
where RoW is the importer, as that country is assumed
to maintain the same MFN tariff.19
A PTA has two types of effects on the export side. First,
exporters in member countries gain from improved
market access as the tariff is removed. Secondly, these
exporters also benefit from the fact that tariff
discrimination reduces imports from RoW. The latter
effect is sometimes referred to as the “preference rent”,
as it would not exist if tariff liberalization were carried
out in a non-discriminatory fashion. 20
On the import side, the preferential agreement has
ambiguous effects on member countries. Consider the
market for good 1, where the Home economy is the
importer (the effects on Partner for good 2 are
analogous). The formation of the PTA has offsetting
volume and price effects. 21 The increased imports
allow the Home economy to benefit from the
replacement of high-cost domestic production with
more efficient imports. The terms of trade (i.e. the
price of exports relative to imports) of Home improve
relative to RoW and falls relative to Partner. Overall,
whether the members of a PTA gain or lose depends
on the level of the initial MFN tariff and on the
elasticities of demand and supply (i.e. to what extent
the demand and supply of a product is sensitive to
changes in its price).
A final consideration relates to the welfare effect of a
PTA on non-members. As discussed above, RoW
suffers a reduction of its exports to the PTA member
countries. In addition, the non-member is hurt by a
negative terms-of-trade effect, as the price of its
exports declines while the prices of its imports are
unaltered. In other words, a preferential agreement
can be interpreted as a negative externality that PTA
members impose on non-members.
(b) Trade creation and trade diversion
The formal analysis of the economic impact of PTAs
began with the work of Jacob Viner in the 1950s
(Viner, 1950). He asked whether a PTA would make
member countries better off, and concluded that this
was not necessarily so. While his approach disregarded
some of the effects discussed above, it had an
important and enduring effect on the academic and
policy debate surrounding preferential agreements. 22
A review of the Vinerian theory is, therefore, useful to
understand much of the debate on PTAs.
II – The WTO and Preferential Trade Agreements
Building on Viner's insight into the uncertain implications
of PTAs' effect on welfare, Kemp and Wan (1976)
found the conditions that would make a customs union
– a PTA with a common external policy – necessarily
welfare-improving. They concluded that a customs
union will be welfare-enhancing if external tariffs are
adjusted so as to leave world prices unchanged. In
other words, if tariffs are such that external trade is
not affected, any additional trade between members
must be trade-creating and outsiders are not hurt. In
this case, the PTA is Pareto improving. 23 This general
principle has been extended to other forms of PTAs:
free trade areas (Panagariya and Krishna, 2002) and
partial liberalization (Neary, 2011). Furthermore, Kemp
and Wan also found that it is possible to guarantee
that all members of a PTA are better off if countries
can compensate losing members through lump-sum
transfers. Even if in reality the external tariffs are not
fully adjusted and lump-sum transfers are not always
present, the Kemp-Wan logic is important from a policy
perspective because it proves that PTAs are not
necessarily bad for world welfare. 24
C. Causes and effects
of PTA s: Is it all about
preferences?
In this theory, preferential liberalization has two main
effects – trade creation and trade diversion – and the
net balance between the two determines whether a
PTA increases welfare for its members. As tariffs on
trade between partners fall, some domestic production
is replaced by imports from more efficient producers
from partners – thus resulting in trade creation and
welfare gains. But since the PTA also discriminates
against non-members, imports from partners replace
imports from more efficient outside producers and the
member countries end up paying more for the same
good. This second effect which harms members'
welfare is known as trade diversion. The interaction
between trade creation and trade diversion has
dominated much of the subsequent literature on PTAs
and regionalism. Box C.2 provides a simple graphical
analysis to illustrate trade creation and trade diversion
effects.
Box C.2: Trade creation and trade diversion effects
Consider a world composed of three countries: Home, Partner 1 and Partner 2, trading a homogeneous
good. Assume Home is a small country that takes international prices as given, while Partner 1 and Partner
2 are large economies, meaning that Home could satisfy its entire national demand for the good by importing
from either of them. If Home has no PTA in place and applies the same MFN tariff to both Partner 1 and
Partner 2, it will get all its imports from the most efficient country.
Figure C.2 below shows the supply and demand curves for Home. The free-trade prices of the good from
Partner 1 and Partner 2 are represented by P B and P C , respectively. Note that Partner 1 is the more efficient
producer, as it is capable of supplying the product at a lower price than Partner 2. When Home applies the
same tariff to both countries, the domestic prices increase equally for both and are denoted by P BT and P CT.
Under these conditions, Home would import solely from Partner 1, at the price of P BT, a quantity of the good
given by the segment D1 – S1.
Consider first the case in which Home signs a PTA with Partner 1. In such a situation, imports from Partner 1
are no longer subject to tariffs and the domestic price of the good falls to P B . At this price, Home will import
from Partner 1 the quantity D2 – S 2. To measure the net effect of the PTA on national welfare, one must
analyse how consumers, producers and the government are affected.
Figure C.2: Home PTA with Partner 1: trade creation
P
S
PCT
PBT
PC
a
c
d
b
PB
D
S2
S1
D1
D2
Q
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world trade report 2011
Since, in this case, Home concluded a PTA with the most efficient producer, the agreement results in pure
trade creation. The gains of trade creation are measured by the shaded triangles “b”, which represents gains
in production efficiency, and “d”, which represents gains in consumption efficiency. Consumers in Home
benefit from the PTA because the domestic price of the good falls and consumption rises. Thereby, consumer
surplus increases by areas a + b + c + d. Producer surplus is reduced by the area “a”. As the price of the
product on the domestic market decreases through competition from Partner 1, some domestic producers
will be forced to reduce output or close down altogether. Government also loses all of the tariff revenue that
had been collected on imports of the product depicted as area “c” in Figure C.2. Thus, the overall net effect
of the PTA for national welfare is positive with a gain of b + d.
Now, consider the case in which that Home signs a PTA with Partner 2 instead. In this case, the price of
imports from Partner 2 falls to P C , which is below the import price from Partner 1. At this lower price, Home
imports from Partner 2 rather than Partner 1. Figure C.3 below shows that, by giving preferential access to
the least efficient producer, the PTA results in trade diversion.
Figure C.3: Home PTA with Partner 2: trade diversion
P
S
PCT
PBT
a
b
c
d
PC
e
PB
D
S2
S1
D1
D2
Q
Before signing a PTA with Partner 2, Home would apply the same MFN tariff to all foreign producers and it
would import from the most efficient country, Partner 1, the quantity D1 – S1 at the price P BT. When Home
concludes the PTA, the price of goods imported from Partner 2 falls to P C while imports from Partner 1
remain at P BT. As a result, Home will import only from Partner 2 the quantity D2 – S2 at the price P C . Once
again, to measure the net effect of this PTA on national welfare, one must analyse how consumers, producers
and the government are affected.
After signing a PTA with Partner 2, as in the first case, consumers in Home are better off and consumer
surplus gains compound to the area a + b + c + d. Note that while there is still some trade creation, the
efficiency gains in production and consumption – triangles b and d – are smaller than in the previous
scenario. Also, domestic producers suffer a reduction in producer surplus equal to area “a” and government
loses tariff revenue equal to “c”. The main difference between the two cases is in the shaded area “e” which
represents trade diversion. This shaded area is the amount of trade the PTA diverts away from the more
efficient producer, Partner 1, by giving preferential access to Partner 2. In other words, Home suffers this
efficiency loss and pays a higher price for imports by not adopting open trade towards all countries.
To calculate national welfare, one must balance the efficiency gains against the efficiency loss. In Figure C.3,
it is clear that the area “e” is larger than b + d; thus the PTA with Partner 2 has a negative net effect on
national welfare in Home. However, this is not always the case. It is possible that a PTA is trade-diverting, but
not welfare-reducing, if the gains from trade creation are larger than the loss from trade diversion – e.g. if
e < (b + d).
102
II – The WTO and Preferential Trade Agreements
(i) The effects of PTAs in services
Up to this point, the analysis has focused on the
welfare effects of preferential liberalization in goods
trade. However, given the increasing importance of
services in PTAs, it is useful to analyse the welfare
implications of services liberalization. Does the former
analysis also help us to understand the effects of
PTAs in services?
The effects of PTAs in services are illustrated in
Box C.3. This analysis is based on the work of Matoo
and Fink (2002). Focusing on the first category of
services protection, the authors study the trade and
welfare effects of discriminatory services trade
liberalization.
Box C.3: The effects of PTAs in services
Consider a three-country model similar to the one in Box C.2, but assume now that the Home economy can
impose (discriminatory) frictional barriers. This situation can be represented by assuming the quality of the
service composed by a universal standard (U) which is equal across countries and a country-specific
standard (V i ). If a foreign-service supplier wants to provide a service in the Home country, it has to face the
cost of meeting the specific standard in the domestic country (Ci ) so the variable cost increases by Ci V i . It
may also be the case that the Home country does not accept the universal standard component provided by
the foreign supplier. Under these circumstances, if the foreign supplier wants to sell in the domestic country,
it has to face an additional cost of Ci (V i+U), because it needs to adapt to both the universal and the countryspecific standard.
C. Causes and effects
of PTA s: Is it all about
preferences?
The crucial difference between trade in goods
liberalization and trade in services liberalization is that
PTAs in services do not involve tariff reductions but
changes to domestic regulations, and the removal of
restrictions on the movement of foreign investment.
Although protection in services sectors may assume
several forms, they can be grouped into three
categories: (i) variable cost increasing measures
(“frictional barriers”); (ii) fixed cost increasing
measures; and (iii) quantitative restrictions on the
number of foreign service providers. While regulatory
measures are often non-discriminatory in nature, there
are examples where this is not the case and countries
employ measures that de facto liberalize preferentially.
Given this framework, the analysis of discriminatory regulation in services trade follows the same logic as
trade in goods. Assume that the Home economy is small and that there are two foreign countries (Partner 1
and Partner 2, respectively indicated by subscripts B and C ) potentially exporting services. As in the previous
section, assume that Partner 1 is the more efficient producer. Suppose that the autarchy price for the service
is P* and that, before recognition, foreign firms have to meet the universal standard in the Home country.
Initially the variable cost by foreign firms in the domestic market is Ci (V i + U) + Chome (V home+U). When this
cost is higher than P* (for both Partner 1 and 2), no trade occurs. But if Home recognizes the universal
component of quality by Partner 2 as equivalent to the domestic one, Partner 2 faces a reduction in its
variable cost, now C c (Vc) + Chome (V home + U). If this cost is lower than P*, we observe trade in services from
Partner 2 to the Home country (see Figure C.4). In this case, discriminatory recognition (liberalization) is
necessarily trade creating.
Assume now that initially, when trade restrictions apply to both foreign countries, CB (V B + U) + Chome (V home
+ U) < P*< C c (Vc + U) + Chome (V home + U) only Partner 1 sells its services in the Home economy (see
Figure C.4). If the Home country recognizes the universal standard u provided by Partner 2 as equal to the
domestic one, it may be the case that the only exporting country is Partner 2 and imports are higher than
before. This is true when C c (Vc) + Chome (V home + U) < CB (V B + U) + Chome (V home + U) < P*.
The welfare effect of the discriminatory liberalization on the Home economy can be seen in Figure C.4: there
is a gain in consumer surplus (a + b + c + d) partially offset by loss in producer surplus (a). An important
point here is to understand the role of the area c + e. In the traditional trade in goods case, the area c + e is
a welfare loss for Home since it represents the fall in government tariff revenue. However, in this context, the
area c + e represents the additional cost that Partner 1 had to face when it supplied the Home economy
(CB U times the pre-recognition value of imports). If this cost did not have any effect on the Home country (for
instance, in the form of a regulatory rent), the area c + e does not enter into the calculation of the total Home
country’s welfare. On the other hand, if a share (s) of the cost sustained by Partner 1 constituted a form of
regulatory rent, the net welfare effect of services liberalization in the Home economy is b + c + d - s(c + e).
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world trade report 2011
Figure C.4: Effects of PTAs in services
P
S
CC(VC+U)+Chome(Vhome+U)
P*
CB(VB+U)+Chome(Vhome+U)
CCVC+Chome(Vhome+U)
a
b
c
d
e
CBVB+Chome(Vhome+U)
D
S2
(c) Natural partners, accumulation and
location effects of PTAs
The effects of PTAs studied in the economic literature
go well beyond the ones discussed in this section.
Below, we briefly summarize three areas of research
that provide additional insights into the welfare
implications of preferential agreements.
It is possible that the trade effects of a preferential
agreement depend on the economic characteristics of
PTA members themselves. In particular, if trade
agreements are more likely to be signed between
countries that trade intensively with each other, PTAs
should generally be expected to be trade creating.
This idea is often referred to as the “natural trading
partners” hypothesis.
Krugman (1991) shows that the costs of preferential
trade agreements formed between “natural” trading
partners are likely to be lower than for arrangements
between countries that do not trade heavily with one
another. He models a world where countries are
spread over many continents and where variations in
inter-continental transport costs determine whether
the formation of regional trading blocs are globally
welfare-improving. If inter-continental transport costs
are high enough to ensure that the bulk of trade takes
place regionally in the absence of PTAs, the formation
of “natural” trading blocs within a region is welfareimproving as the gains from trade creation are likely to
outweigh trade diversion. 25 The validity of the “natural
trading partners” hypothesis is discussed in the
empirical evidence subsection below.
104
The effects of PTAs are not necessarily limited to
traditional trade effects (i.e. the allocation of resources
in participating economies). Specifically, preferential
agreements may influence welfare of member countries
through accumulation (i.e. economies of scale) and
location effects (Baldwin and Venables, 1995).
S1
D1
D2
Q
The trade creation, trade diversion debate focuses on
the static effects of PTAs. However, it is reasonable to
expect that preferential agreements will have dynamic
implications (i.e. that change over time). The
accumulation effect considers how a PTA affects
growth. It does this through changes in the return on
investment in member countries determined by
changes in physical capital and human capital
(management and technical expertise) or by changes
in technology available to firms. In a sense, the
redistribution of capital flows after the conclusion of a
PTA can be seen as investment creation and diversion.
If capital is internationally mobile, it is possible that
there will be an increase in capital inflows within the
PTA at the expense of non-members. In addition, there
is a wide body of literature that studies the effects of
trade on long-run growth (World Trade Organization
WTO, 2008). This area of research generally does not
consider the effects of preferential trade agreements
as opposed to non-discriminatory trade opening.
However, some of the mechanisms through which
trade affects growth (international knowledge
spillovers, enhanced competition, etc.) apply to PTAs
as well as to multilateral trade liberalization. 26
The location effect looks at how the integration of a
country into a PTA may alter the distribution of
economic activity within the PTA and thereby lead to
inequality among member countries. When trade
barriers are reduced, firms can alter their location
decisions. This decision depends on the balance
between production costs and the trade costs that
must be incurred to supply different markets. On the
one hand, locations where economic activity is more
concentrated can be efficient in the presence of
external economies of scale that increase firms'
productivity. On the other hand, proximity to consumers
reduces trade costs, particularly when trade policy
restrictions are in place. Baldwin and Venables (1995)
find that as trade costs decline, having close access to
II – The WTO and Preferential Trade Agreements
consumers becomes less important. Thus, during a
process of trade liberalization, firms would be drawn to
“central” areas within the PTA. This agglomeration
effect may exacerbate regional inequalities between
members of an agreement.
(d) Effects of PTAs: the evidence
A first branch of the empirical literature analyses
specific
agreements
and,
using
different
methodologies, reaches mixed conclusions in terms of
the net welfare effects of PTAs. For example, a first
set of studies focus on the Canada-United States free
trade agreement (CUSFTA). Clausing (2001) finds
evidence that the agreement increased US imports
from Canada, but did not divert US imports away from
other US trading partners. Similarly, the CUSFTA study
by Trefler (2004) confirms the finding that trade
creation outweighs the trade diversion effect. In
contrast, a study of NAFTA concludes that the
agreement is overall trade diverting (Romalis, 2007). 28
Romalis uses changes in EU trade over the period to
capture the counterfactual (i.e. what would have
happened in the absence of the agreement), but finds
that the welfare costs of NAFTA are small.
Chang and Winters (2002) evaluate the welfare impact
of the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) from a
different perspective, looking at the effect the customs
union (between Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and
Uruguay) has had on export prices to Brazil. They find
that Argentina's export prices increased while those of
excluded countries have declined, suggesting the
agreement is trade-diverting and that it has hurt nonmembers. Finally, Egger (2004) finds that joining a
regional trading bloc does not exert any significant
short-term impact on trade volumes, but that there is a
considerable trade creation effect in the long-run.
Hypothetically, removing the European Economic Area
(EEA) would account for a 4 per cent reduction of
trade within the EEA. A similar estimate for NAFTA
yields a reduction in 15 per cent of volume trade.
Another branch of the empirical literature uses gravity
models to infer the trade effects of an agreement. The
key question is to what extent PTA partners trade
more than would be predicted by standard bilateral
trade determinants (e.g. income, geographical
proximity, etc.). Magee (2008), for example, uses panel
data for 133 countries in the 1980-1998 period and
includes several fixed effects to capture the
counterfactual: what would happen to trade if there
were no PTAs. He finds that the average impact of
Finally, focusing on East Asia, Lee and Shin (2006)
find that PTAs in the region are likely to create more
trade among members without diverting trade from
non-members. Baier and Bergstrand (2007) estimate
the impact of PTAs on trade flows, taking account of
the “endogeneity" 29 problem – i.e. the possibility that
countries join PTAs for unobservable reasons that may
be correlated with the level of trade. They conclude
that when taking into account the endogeneity of a
PTA, the positive impact of the agreement on bilateral
flows becomes statistically more robust and five times
larger than in estimates that disregard the endogenity
problem. 30 Thus, it appears that countries generally
opt for welfare improving PTAs when there are gains
from liberalizing bilateral trade.
C. Causes and effects
of PTA s: Is it all about
preferences?
Several studies examine the impact of PTAs and test
the traditional theories on trade creation and trade
diversion. While this literature is not conclusive, it
suggests that trade diversion may play a role in some
agreements and in some sectors, but it does not
emerge as a key effect of preferential agreements
(Freund and Ornelas, 2010). 27
PTAs on trade flows is small – only 3 per cent – and
that, on average, trade creation exceeds trade
diversion. In contrast, an earlier gravity-model study
covering 130 countries from 1962 to 1996 found that
PTAs have generated a significant increase in trade
between members, often at the expense of the rest of
the world, suggesting evidence of trade diversion
(Carrere, 2006).
Acharya et al. (2011) analyse trade creation effects
both within the PTA and outside of the PTA for a number
of preferential trade agreements. They find strong
evidence of intra-PTA trade creation, showing that PTAs
increase the value of trade between member countries
(for 17 out of the 22 PTAs considered). On the other
hand, they do not find evidence of trade diversion
effects. Differently from other studies in this area,
Acharya et al. (2011) also consider the possible trade
creation effect outside of the PTA. Most of the analysed
PTAs increase exports from member countries to nonmember countries. In particular, they find very strong
and positive effects regarding MERCOSUR and the
ASEAN Free Trade Area, with an increase of exports
outside of the PTA by 109 per cent and 136 per cent
respectively. Trade diversion effects outside of the PTA
have been found in a number of cases, including the
Caribbean Community (CARICOM), the Central
European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA), the Common
Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and
the Closer Economic Relations FTA between Australia
and New Zealand.
A third approach in the empirical literature has been to
test the “natural trading partner” hypothesis (Krugman,
1991). Also using a gravity model and concentrating
on the Americas, Frankel et al. (1995) seek to identify
trade diversion by testing whether regional trade is
greater than could be explained by natural
determinants of trade, such as proximity and market
size. They find that multiple PTAs with partial
liberalization among neighbours within a continent
would raise welfare, and that this situation is preferable
to a single continental free trade area. Thus, in their
view, the formation of trading blocs, such as NAFTA
and MERCOSUR, among “natural trading partners” is
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world trade report 2011
preferable to the failed FTAA (Free Trade Area of the
Americas). An opposing view is held by Bhagwati and
Panagariya (1996), who argue that the volume of trade
and transport cost criteria, tested by Frankel et al., are
not sufficient to ensure that a PTA will raise welfare.
Addressing the points brought up by Bhagwati and
Panagariya, Krishna (2003) uses detailed US trade
data to estimate the welfare effects of hypothetical
bilateral PTAs. He finds that neither geographical
proximity nor trade volumes are significantly correlated
with welfare gains, concluding that these are not good
indicators for the formation of PTAs, as the literature
supporting the “natural trading partner” hypothesis
suggests. Baier and Bergstrand (2004) study which
pair of countries would gain most from forming a PTA
and whether these country-pairs are more likely to
sign a preferential agreement. They develop a general
equilibrium model with a sample of 53 countries, using
data from 1996. Testing for several variables that
predict 85 per cent of the bilateral PTAs in their
sample, 31 their results support the natural trading
partner hypothesis. 32
(e) The political economy of PTAs and
external tariffs
Section C.1 makes the point that the views of special
interest groups may weigh heavily on governments and
that a policy maker may sign a PTA to accommodate
the interests of powerful lobby groups. In this political
context, can inefficient PTAs be signed (or efficient
ones be rejected)? More precisely, under what
conditions will a trade-distorting PTA be endorsed by a
government? Two influential studies addressing these
questions reached a similar conclusion in that tradediverting PTAs are more likely to be politically viable. 33
106
market falls by a small margin, and exporters in Partner
2 gain from the high domestic price in the partner's
market. Hence, domestic import-competing producers
are hurt slightly and would weakly oppose an
agreement, while exporters in the partner country
benefit largely and strongly support the agreement.
Consider next the case of a trade-creating PTA (e.g.
the one between Home and Partner 1, in Figure C.2).
The domestic price falls substantially as a result of the
agreement, the domestic import-competing sector
suffers larger losses while foreign exporters receive
little benefit. In this scenario, domestic political
opposition to the PTA is strong, while foreign support
is marginal. 34
The work by Grossman and Helpman (1995) is based
on the assumption that markets are perfectly
competitive (i.e. no supplier has sufficient market
share to affect prices). A question, therefore, arises
whether results would be different under imperfectly
competitive markets. In an oligopolistic setting, where
a small number of producers dominate the market,
Krishna (1998) shows that it is still true that tradediverting PTAs are politically viable, while tradecreating ones are not. Intuitively, trade diversion
increases the oligopolistic incomes (rents) of
producers in the partners' economies and, therefore,
creates political support for the agreement.
Specifically, Krishna (1998) posits that a political
requirement for a PTA is that aggregate profits
increase in the partners' economies. If trade is diverted
away from third countries, it is more likely that firms
from within the agreement gain market share in the
partner's economy (to the disadvantage of thirdmarket competitors) and increase their profits. 35
The work by Grossman and Helpman (1995) provides
the basic structure for the so-called “new political
economy” literature in trade. The key idea, which is
embodied in all models discussed in this section, is
that the interaction of governments in the international
arena is a two-level game (Putnam, 1988). In the first
stage, the policy preferences of a government are
shaped by national welfare considerations and by the
politically organized groups that represent different
industrial sectors. In the second stage, governments
negotiate a PTA under the constraints imposed by the
domestic political environment. The outcome of this
game is the politically viable preferential agreement.
In brief, these earlier works conclude that the
conditions needed for the political viability of a PTA
may contradict those that ensure its social desirability.
These studies, however, do not consider that external
tariffs (i.e. the tariff that PTA members impose on nonmembers) may respond to the formation of a
preferential agreement. For instance, Richardson
(1993) first made the point that countries may have
reason to lower their external tariffs after entering a
PTA. Importantly, removing this assumption may
radically change the implications of these models.
Intuitively, considering the graph in Figure C.2, if Home
lowers the external tariff to Partner 1 after signing a
PTA with the less efficient Partner 2, it is entirely
possible that the PTA will still be trade-creating. 36
A PTA naturally requires the assent of both
governments involved. The question is, therefore,
under what domestic conditions is such commonality
of purposes more likely? As lobby groups tend to
represent producers' interests, one needs to
understand how a preferential agreement affects
producers. Consider first a trade-diverting PTA
(e.g. the one between Home and Partner 2 described
in Figure C.3). In this case, the price in the Home
Ornelas (2005a: 2005b) revisits the GrossmanHelpman and Krishna theory, which deals with the
situation where the external tariff is allowed to change
after a PTA has entered into force. Specifically, these
papers allow tariffs on third countries to be set
“endogenously”, that is, in a way that allows special
interest groups to influence policy both before and
after an agreement is signed. Ornelas shows that
independently of the structure of markets (i.e. perfectly
II – The WTO and Preferential Trade Agreements
competitive or not), welfare-decreasing preferential
agreements are unlikely to be politically viable.
However, Ornelas shows it is still possible that special
interest pressures may persuade governments not to
sign some preferential agreements that would improve
social welfare.
Limão (2007) provides an economic model that allows
an analysis of the importance of non-trade issues in
PTAs, and their effect on incentives to lower external
tariffs. Specifically, he argues that, if preferential
agreements include non-trade issues rather than just
tariff reductions, governments may be more reluctant
to reduce external tariffs. The reason is that a PTA
may be valuable to a country precisely because tariff
reductions encourage cooperation on other non-trade
issues. However, in this case, a government may have
little appetite to reduce tariffs on third-country
imports, because a reduction in the external tariffs
would lower the preference margin to partners and
thus weaken the agreement.38
The above reasoning has the following implications.
First, a PTA weakens the impact of political economy
forces on external tariffs in equilibrium. As the demand
for external protection falls under a PTA while its cost
is unaltered, the external tariff is predicted to fall.
Secondly, if preferential agreements destroy
protectionist rents, political support of organized
sectors cannot be a strong rationale for a PTA.
Politically viable agreements must, therefore, be those
that improve aggregate social welfare.
Ultimately, the effect of PTAs on external tariffs is an
empirical question. However, the literature appears to
be discordant. In a first set of studies, Estevadeordal et
al. (2008) and Calvo-Pardo et al. (2009) find that
preferential agreements in Latin America and ASEAN
countries had the effect of reducing external tariffs.
Specifically, they find that external tariffs decline
faster in those sectors where preferences have been
granted and that, contrary to prevailing opinion, there
is little evidence that preferences lead to higher
external tariffs. In a second set of studies, Limão
(2007) and Karacaovali (2008) show that the opposite
pattern emerges from an analysis of PTAs signed by
the United States and the European Union.
To some extent, these recent works on the new
political economy of preferential agreements should
be seen as complementary. Grossman and Helpman
(1995) and Krishna (1998) focus on the decision to
sign or not a PTA, but they do not examine the effect
that a PTA has on external tariffs, which is instead the
focus of Ornelas (2005a: 2005b). If special interests
could both lobby to influence the trade regime decision
as well as the tariff formation, Ornelas' findings would
be qualified. In this scenario, trade-diverting
preferential agreements can be politically viable.
However, this negative outcome is not as likely as one
might think, as the political rent destruction caused by
a PTA reduces governments' incentives to endorse
welfare-reducing agreements (Freund and Ornelas,
2010).
While these contrasting empirical findings suggest
that more analysis is needed in this area, they may be
less controversial at a closer look. Specifically, the
difference in the sample of countries analysed may
explain part of the differences. PTAs signed between
developed and developing countries, such as those
signed by the European Union and the United States
with developing countries, may be more likely to
include provisions that go beyond the lowering of
tariffs than agreements between two developing
countries. As this is generally the case (see Section B),
it is not surprising, in light of the theory, to find that the
PTAs between developed and developing countries
tend to increase external tariffs, while agreements
between two developing countries are likely to reduce
them.
C. Causes and effects
of PTA s: Is it all about
preferences?
The starting point for an accurate characterization of
these findings is to consider the political determinants
of external tariffs. The political demand for external
protection is lower under a preferential agreement.
After a PTA is formed, the domestic import-competing
sector loses market share to the partners' producers.
In this new environment, any increase in the domestic
price that may result from an increase in the external
tariff benefits domestic producers less than it would if
a PTA was not in place. The reason is that the external
protection granted by the tariff “leaks” to PTA partners
and only partly benefits domestic producers. 37 Put
differently, the incentive of import-competing sectors
to demand protection is stronger in the absence of a
PTA, as their share of the domestic market is larger.
This is true both for perfectly competitive producers as
well as for oligopolistic firms. Moreover, the cost of
lobbying is not changed under a PTA, as this still
reflects the cost of the external tariff to society at
large.
and several other areas. As the next subsection
discusses more extensively, there are a number of
reasons that justify these developments. The question
addressed here is not on the economic rationale for
such arrangements, but rather whether one should
expect external tariffs to fall when preferential
agreements encompass more than the lowering of
tariffs.
The new political economy literature has also raised a
related but distinct question. A number of PTAs go
well beyond tariff arrangements and include “nontrade” issues, such as labour or environmental
standards, provisions on intellectual property rights
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world trade report 2011
(f) Rules of origin and trade diversion
(i) Rules of origin: a source of trade
diversion
In PTAs which are not customs unions, members
maintain their own external tariffs. Consequently, in the
absence of any rules, imports of particular products
would enter the country in the PTA with the lowest
import duty on the item in question and be re-exported
to other countries in the PTA. Hence, rules which
confirm the true “origin” of the goods are required to
prevent such re-routing of goods – or “trade deflection”.
For example, suppose the preferential tariff on the
exports of country A to country B is zero. Hence, when
country A exports the good to country B, the latter
needs to ensure that the good really does originate in
country A, and is not simply being re-routed via
country A by some third country which does not have
the same degree of preferences in country B. Empirical
evidence supports this hypothesis relating to the role of
rules of origin (RoOs)39 in preventing trade deflection.
For instance, Estevadeordal (2000) finds that the higher
the absolute spread between Mexican and US tariffs to
third parties, the higher the restrictiveness built into the
RoOs of NAFTA. In reality, however, RoOs may be used
to protect certain favoured industries, thereby leading
to trade diversion or trade suppression (Krishna and
Krueger, 1995).
Consider the following scenario. Assume a production
sharing network between countries B and C, whereby
country B exports a final good to country A using
intermediate goods from country C. Furthermore,
assume that country A is a high-cost (relative to
country C) producer of intermediate goods used in the
production of this final good which is exported by
country B to country A. Initially, country A signs a PTA
with country B and another PTA with country C. Hence,
a good produced in B would have preferential access
to A, as would a good originating in C. Under the
negotiated PTA, country A could impose stringent
RoOs on country B with the result that the final product
that country B exports to country A may not qualify as
originating there – perhaps because the proportion of
intermediate goods from C is too high. Hence, the firm
in country B can either continue to import the
intermediate good from country C and not gain
preferential access to country A or shift its purchase
of the intermediate good from C to A, in order to
satisfy the RoOs and obtain preferential access on
their exports to country A.
108
In other words, restrictive RoOs may make it profitable
for firms in country B to engage in “supply switching”
by using a more expensive intermediate good either
from country A or a domestic firm, i.e. restrictive RoOs
in final goods divert or supress trade in intermediate
goods. Supply-switching strengthens the trade link
between countries A and B (hub-spoke), at the
expense of trade between countries B and C (spoke-
spoke), i.e. country A benefits by using RoOs to protect
exports of certain industries (Gasiorek et al., 2009).
Furthermore, by influencing the sourcing of
intermediate goods trade, RoOs are likely to increase
firms' costs and hence have an adverse effect on final
goods trade. This increase in cost strengthens the
“spaghetti bowl” effect of PTAs analysed in Section B.
Hence, supply-switching – or the non-utilization of
preferences, as a result of RoOs – reduces the trade
liberalizing impact of PTAs. Analysing import data for a
sample of more than 150 countries during the period
from 1981 to 2001, Estevadeordal and Suominen
(2008) find that restrictive product-specific RoOs
encourage the trading of intermediate goods within
the PTA (thereby leading to trade diversion) and
undermine aggregate trade flows among PTA partners.
In a survey of 345 firms in four Latin American countries
carried out by the Inter-American Development Bank
(IADB) in 2007-08, fewer than 10 per cent reported
having changed their supply chain in order to adapt to
rules of origin (Harris and Suominen, 2009). This
suggests that most firms continue to import from the
same source as before, even if this means foregoing
preferential access to their PTA partner country market.
Among the multi-national corporations (MNCs) in the
sample, however, about 75 per cent (ranging from 50
per cent in Panama to nearly 90 per cent in Colombia)
described RoOs as an important factor in determining
where to invest in production facilities. However, when
asked whether investment in a subsidiary was made
explicitly to meet RoO requirements in one or more of
the country's PTAs, the figure falls to less than 30 per
cent40 (Harris and Suominen, 2009). This firm-level
evidence suggests that for MNCs, which rely heavily on
flows of intermediate goods trade via production
networks, RoOs significantly affect investment
decisions. In particular, firms may switch their source of
intermediate goods from a more efficient supplier in a
non-member country to a less efficient supplier in a
member country (where they establish production
facilities), thereby resulting in trade diversion.
(ii) Reducing such trade diversion: the way
forward
The hypothetical scenario described above showed
that the final good originating in B has preferential
access to A, as does the intermediate good originating
in C. However, the final good from B, produced using
intermediate goods from C, which does meet rules
granting originating status for B’s exporters to C,
would not be eligible for preferential access. Such a
system of bilateral hub-spoke agreements with
constraining rules of origin is thus likely to enhance
hub-spoke trade at the expense of spoke-spoke trade.
Gasiorek et al. (2009) have argued that this
discrimination, which protects the exports of certain
industries in country A and hence leads to trade
diversion, can be resolved if country B signs a PTA
II – The WTO and Preferential Trade Agreements
with country C and is thereafter allowed to add its own
intermediate inputs (value added) with the intermediate
inputs from country C in determining originating status
on the exports of the final product sold to country A.
This is the principle of “diagonal cumulation” of rules of
origin. Under this arrangement, all participating
countries agree bilaterally that in all PTAs concluded
among themselves materials originating in one country
can be considered to be materials originating in all the
other countries. This makes it easier to import
intermediate goods and still satisfy the RoOs.
proportion of country C’s value added together with its
own value added in determining originating status.
Diagonal cumulation applies to trade between three or
more trading partners normally linked by PTAs with
identical RoOs. It builds on the concept of “bilateral
cumulation” – materials originating in one country can
be considered as materials originating in the other
partner country – which is a feature of all PTAs. In
addition, there is the concept of “total cumulation”,
which again applies to trade between three or more
countries, but involves greater flexibility than “diagonal
cumulation”. This is because it allows intermediate
processing to be split in any way among all the parties
to the PTA, provided that when added together, the
cumulative processing is sufficient to meet the origin
rule. In the context of our hypothetical scenario, suppose
for instance that the intermediate good from country C
does not qualify as originating in that country. With total
cumulation, the producer in country B can cumulate the
As shown in Section B and Section D, over the past
three decades trade agreements have gone beyond
border measures, such as tariffs, and have integrated
a number of domestic policies and regulations,
including intellectual property rights, product
standards, competition and investment policies. These
developments are not inconsequential; once tariffs are
removed, differing regulatory policies among nations
become more salient, creating complex challenges of
accommodation and coordination. Moreover, trade
openness – along with the new forms of trade that
technological development makes possible – creates
new pressures to reconcile divergent national
practices, and generates new forms of cross-border
policy effects (spillovers). These developments
produce demands for governance and the rule of law
that transcend national borders.
Although total cumulation is rare, diagonal cumulation
has been used by some PTAs. The EU is a good
example in this regard. Box C.4 provides an overview
of the EU experience in relaxing RoOs in PTAs.
3. Going beyond the standard
analysis
C. Causes and effects
of PTA s: Is it all about
preferences?
Box C.4: Lessons from the EU experience in relaxing rules of origin (RoOs)
For the EU, the issue of multiple RoOs became increasingly significant in the 1990s, as agreements were
concluded with a number of countries from Central and Eastern Europe and from the South Mediterranean. It
became apparent that the EU’s “spaghetti bowl” of criss-crossing agreements was restricting firms’ ability to
source intermediate goods from the cheapest source, i.e. there was trade diversion (Gasiorek et al., 2009).
To address this problem, the Pan-European (PANEURO) Cumulation System (PECS) was launched in 1997.
It established identical protocols for product-specific and regime-wide RoOs across the EU’s existing and
future PTAs. This included arrangements with the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) countries, dating
from 1972 and 1973, as well as those forged in the 1990s and later – i.e. PTAs with several Eastern
European countries, the Euro-Mediterranean Agreements, the Stabilization and Association Agreements
with Croatia and FYR Macedonia, as well as extra-regional PTAs with South Africa, Mexico and Chile
(Estevadeordal and Suominen, 2004). Hence, “diagonal cumulation” was a key principle introduced in panEuropean rules. It enabled producers to use components originating in any of the participating countries
without losing the preferential status of final product.
Empirical evidence reveals that the harmonization of RoOs, via diagonal cumulation in the PECS, has
impacted trade flows since 1997. For instance, analysing the textile industry, Augier et al. (2004) find that
trade between non-cumulating countries could be lower by up to 50 to 70 per cent. Similarly, using data on
trade flows between 38 countries for three baskets – trade in all goods, trade in intermediate goods, and
trade in manufactured goods – Augier et al. (2005) show that trade between countries that became part of
the pan-European system of diagonal cumulation was higher relative to trade with other countries by about
43 per cent between 1995 and 1999. In addition, they show that the introduction of the PECS in 1997
increased trade between the spokes by 7 and 22 per cent. However, their methodology is based on using
dummy variables in a gravity model to capture the role of cumulation. Hence, it is possible that these variables
are capturing other factors.
At the same time, analysing data on trade flows between 38 countries, Gasiorek et al. (2009) find that the
trade between newly cumulating countries (following the introduction of the PECS in 1997) rises by more
than trade between these countries and third countries for some selected industries. 41
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world trade report 2011
The following subsection looks at the new forms of
trade agreements that are emerging, using the concept
of “deep” integration (Lawrence, 1996), and asks two
main questions. First, what are the motives behind
these agreements? Secondly, what determines the
structure of deeper arrangements? Answers to these
questions are essential to understanding the economic
costs and benefits of deeper integration.
(a) The concept of deep integration
Trade agreements that deal mostly with border
measures are often defined as “shallow” agreements.
On the domestic side, these agreements accord nondiscriminatory national treatment to foreign goods and
firms (i.e. the same treatment that is accorded to
domestic firms), but stop short of intervening in
domestic economic policies beyond this requirement.
In contrast, trade agreements that include rules on
domestic policies that fall “inside the border” are
referred to as “deep” agreements (Lawrence, 1996).
There is no agreed definition of the scope of such
deep agreements, and indeed the concept is widely
used to refer to any arrangement that goes beyond
simply extending preferential tariff concessions.
However, there are at least two distinct dimensions –
the “extensive” and “intensive” margins – to any deeper
integration agreement.
The first dimension refers to increasing the coverage of
an agreement beyond the lowering of tariffs (e.g. the
harmonization of national regulations in financial
services). Most discussions of deep integration focus on
this dimension. The second dimension, the intensive
margin of deep integration, refers to the institutional
depth of the agreement, such as the extent to which
certain policy prerogatives are delegated to a
supranational level of government (e.g. the formation of
a customs or monetary union). These two dimensions
are often related. That is to say, extending the coverage
of an agreement may also require creating common
institutions and new, more sophisticated ways of sharing
sovereignty in order to administer it. The table below
provides a schematic (but not exhaustive) picture of the
diverse forms of integration.42
Like shallow integration arrangements, deeper
agreements can be among advanced economies
(North-North), advanced and developing economies
(North-South), or just developing economies (SouthSouth). Similarly, membership in deep integration
arrangements can be wide or narrow, ranging from
regional agreements involving several neighbouring
countries to bilateral agreements between two distant
partners.43
(b) Why is deep integration gaining
momentum?
Deep economic integration and trade are intimately
related (see Table C.1). Deep arrangements may be
necessary to promote trade in certain sectors or across
economies more broadly. For instance, harmonization of
certain regulations may be a prerequisite for trade in
services or common competition policy rules may be
required to allow comparative advantage to materialize
(see Section D.2(b)). Conversely, trade liberalization –
and the evolving structure of trade (for example, the
growth of production networks) – can make the need
for deeper policy integration more pressing. In short,
shallow and deep integration can be complementary
processes, as the first generates a demand for
Table C.1: Shallow versus deep integration
Integration level
SHALLOW INTEGRATION
Type of PTA
Features
Example
Free trade agreement (FTA)
Members liberalize internal
trade but retain their
independent external tariffs
US-Israel FTA
FTA+
An FTA that in addition
harmonizes some beyond the border standards
(e.g. environmental standards)
NAFTA
Customs Union (CU)
Members liberalize trade within
the union and adopt common
external tariffs against the rest
of the world
SACU
Common Market
Establishment of the free
movement of all factors of
production within the PTA,
including labour and capital
EU
Monetary Union
Establishment of a common
currency and completely
integrated monetary and
exchange rate policy
Euro Area
Fiscal Union
Establishment of a common
fiscal policy
US
DEEP INTEGRATION
110
Note: The depth of integration of PTAs might overlap across types of agreements in certain circumstances.
II – The WTO and Preferential Trade Agreements
governance that the latter can provide. This relationship
is underscored in the economic literature.
In sum, the relationship between deep integration and
trade works both ways – in the sense that one may be
the cause and/or consequence of the other. The
relationship is also dynamic – in the sense that it is
likely to develop over time. The remainder of this
section focuses on international production networks
which exemplify the complementarity between trade
and governance that lies at the root of the current
proliferation of deep agreements.
(i) International production networks and
deep integration
Twenty-first century trade, as defined by Baldwin
(2010), is a much more complex phenomenon than
trade prior to the early 1980s.44 This complexity is the
result of the increased role of international production
networks in the global economy, which are
characterized by the unbundling of stages of
production across borders. Increasingly, multinational
firms are not only distributing manufacturing stages to
decrease costs and exploit comparative advantages;
they are also unbundling and outsourcing services
work, primarily office tasks, making global production
networks even more sophisticated and complex.
These new forms of international trade require
reconsideration and reconceptualization of preferential
trade. Most of the PTA models above assume that
countries trade final goods and that producers are
protection seekers for these goods. However, there
might be some economic sectors, increasingly
dependent on imported intermediate inputs, that seek
lower levels of protection to reduce their production
costs (Yi, 2003). Some empirical evidence suggests
that when countries have a significant number of firms
involved in production networks there is more pressure
for unilateral trade liberalization.45
For similar reasons, countries that form part of supply
chains involving multiple nations might be more
inclined to sign PTAs with their trading partners than
to unilaterally liberalize. As various stages of
production may take place in a number of different
countries, the effects of trade barriers, such as tariffs
or other non-tariff barriers, on the cost of a particular
Theoretical conclusions regarding the welfare effects
of preferential trade liberalization also change with the
presence of production networks. In fact, international
production sharing can mitigate the trade-diversion
effects of PTAs.46 The possibility of dividing up the
production of final goods into various stages or
components alters the calculation of trade creation
and trade diversion and, although the outcome is still
uncertain, it leaves room for welfare-reducing PTAs,
that trade only in final goods, to become welfareimproving PTAs, once members engage in trade of
parts and components. 47
International production networks are not a new
phenomenon, but their relevance is increasing in
particular regions of the world (see Box C.5), and their
pattern and composition has changed over time.
Initially, countries engaging in production sharing were
mainly rich countries.48 From the mid-1980s, however,
production networks between developed and
developing countries started to increase (see
Section B.3).
C. Causes and effects
of PTA s: Is it all about
preferences?
A number of authors argue that markets need nonmarket institutions (political, legal and social) if they are
to function properly (Casella, 1996; Casella and
Feinstein, 2002; Padoa-Schioppa, 2001; Rodrik, 2000).
These non-market institutions are essentially public
goods that the market itself fails to provide. Others
make the point that trade openness increases policy
externalities, rendering unilateral decision-making
inefficient compared with cooperative decision-making
(Broner and Ventura, 2006; Epifani and Ganica, 2006;
Brou and Ruta, 2010; Antràs and Staiger, 2008).
stage of production is proportional to the number of
times the product crosses other national boundaries.
In addition, countries may sign PTAs in order to secure
or “lock in” trading relationships, thus reinforcing their
position as the main provider of intermediate inputs.
Is there any link between the recent growth of
production networks and the demand for deeper
agreements? The theoretical and empirical literature
on FDI and offshoring highlights that despite the
benefits of exploiting factor price differences and new
technological developments, there are additional costs
of international fragmentation of production – from the
managerial and logistic costs associated with
monitoring and coordinating international production
to learning about the laws and regulations that are
required to do business in another country. These
costs might be particularly high for developing nations
which are part of North-South production networks,
and that may lack the kind of sophisticated business
laws and the product and labour regulations which rich
countries use to consolidate their trade in intermediate
goods (Baldwin, 2010).
In this context, the expansion of production networks –
and in particular of North-South production-sharing
– should be related to the proliferation of deep
agreements aimed at filling a governance gap between
countries. Agreements that include provisions related
to the institutional framework, competition policy, the
product and labour-market regulations, infrastructure
development, and other areas could make productionsharing activities more secure and less vulnerable to
disruptions or restrictions (Yeats, 2001).
This pattern can be observed in agreements such as
NAFTA which not only increase market access, through
tariff reductions, but also include disciplines that reduce
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world trade report 2011
Box C.5: Determinants of the regionalization of production networks
Standard elements of comparative advantage, such as variations in labour supply conditions, wages, or
relative factor endowments, help explain not only the proliferation of North-South production networks but
also the regionalization of such networks. Studies by Athukorala and Menon (2010) of East Asia, for example,
show that even though wages in China; Hong Kong, China; the Republic of Korea; and Chinese Taipei have
been rapidly approaching developed-country levels in recent years, wages in countries such as Malaysia, the
Philippines, Thailand and Viet Nam remain lower than – or comparable to – wages in Mexico and countries
on Europe’s periphery.
The role of distance is also important in explaining the regionalization of production networks. Several
economists have pointed out that despite technological advancements, distance still matters and certain
countries still suffer from geographic remoteness (Venables, 2001). 49 In addition, there is evidence that
geographical distance remains a key factor in determining international transport costs, especially shipping
costs, and delivery time (Evans and Harrigan, 2005). Arguably, these types of costs are particularly relevant
for production networks, where a good can cross borders several times in the various stages of production.
New geography models of economic agglomeration at the international level are also useful in explaining the
regionalization of production sharing. Access to intermediate goods creates agglomeration of production, as firms
gain from being close to customer and supplier firms.50 As more and more firms move to a certain region, they
create a demand for suppliers of intermediate goods and services, reinforcing the offshoring attractiveness of that
region for other firms in the industry and related fields. In addition, because production networks are formed
around centres of economic activity, the distance between these production centres and the periphery matters.51
Schatz and Venables (2000) show that major outward investors carry out much of their investment, which
relies heavily on intermediate goods trade, close to home (the United States investing in Mexico; the EU in
Central and Eastern Europe; Japan in Asia) and this trend captures an important share of FDI flows from
developed to developing countries. 52
In the case of East Asia, Athukorala and Menon (2010) find that the region has benefited from a “first-mover”
advantage in hosting assembly operations of multinational corporations. Established companies have
attracted other key market players and, in turn, many have upgraded the technology employed by regional
production networks and assigned greater global production responsibilities to local affiliates, reinforcing
the agglomeration effects.
the risks – and increase the profitability – of investment
in Mexico. Also the recent accession of eastern
European economies to the European Union, as well as
some of the euro-Mediterranean agreements, could be
partly explained as a response to the demand for deep
integration agreements associated with expanding
international production-sharing.
The evolving nature of trade agreements in East Asia,
where a significant and growing share of international
production sharing takes place, also highlights the link
between production networks and deep integration
(see Section D.3 for a more detailed analysis). In this
region, the growth of production sharing first took
place through de facto economic integration. 53
However, more recent North-South agreements, such
as Japan's economic partnerships with Malaysia,
Indonesia, Thailand and Viet Nam, or ASEAN's push
for deeper disciplines, clearly show that this region is
moving towards deeper integration.
Lawrence (1996) was the first to highlight the systemic
implications of international production networks and
deep integration. With increased international
competition flowing from reduced barriers to trade, the
ability to operate abroad – and to locate complex
112
production in the most cost-efficient regions –
becomes
increasingly
important
to
firms'
competitiveness. In order for cross-border production
networks to operate smoothly, certain national policies
need to be harmonized across jurisdictions. This
generates a demand for deep forms of integration.
The trade literature has largely failed to model the
interaction between international production networks
and deep integration. One significant exception is the
recent work by Antràs and Staiger (2008). They show
that the rise of offshoring creates new forms of crossborder policy effects that go beyond the standard trade
policy externalities, when goods are produced in a single
location (i.e. the terms-of-trade effect).54 In this context,
the objective of trade agreements is more complex than
the standard theory would suggest, as negotiating
market access is not sufficient to address distortions of
unilateral policy-making. An implication of this model is
that the changing nature of trade (from trade in final
goods to trade in intermediate goods) is directly
responsible for the growing demand for deep agreements
that can address these new cross-border effects.
Specifically, externalities associated with production
offshoring are different from those associated with
traditional market access, and cannot be easily
II – The WTO and Preferential Trade Agreements
addressed with general rules, such as non-discrimination
and reciprocity (Bagwell and Staiger, 2003). If this
argument is correct and the GATT/WTO system is not
well adapted to handle these non-market access issues,
countries might turn to other available instruments, such
as PTAs, to solve their coordination problems.
(c) The trade-offs involved in deep
integration
Unlike shallow integration, deep integration –
regardless of the form it takes – requires common
policies and regulations among member countries
across a number of areas. 56 This raises a completely
different set of questions. What are the costs and
benefits of common policies? Which countries should
form a deep agreement? Which policies should remain
in the national domain, and which should be
harmonized at – or assigned to – a supranational level
of government? These questions are traditionally
addressed in public economics, and have generated an
extensive literature, mainly focused on fiscal
federalism, which is briefly reviewed below. 57
Economists have developed a simple principle to
understand the costs and benefits of common policies,
known as the Oates' Decentralization Theorem (Oates,
1972). This theorem suggests that there is a basic
trade-off between the benefits of common policies,
which depend on the extent of cross-border policy
spillovers, and their cost, which depends on the extent
of policy preference differences across member
countries. For individual countries, the cost of common
decision-making is that it moves the common policy
away from its preferred national policy (i.e. a loss in
national sovereignty); the benefit is that policy
spillovers are internalized.
This basic principle sheds an important light on the
remaining two questions – i.e. which countries and
which policies should undergo deep integration.
Regarding the first question, countries that have
similar policy preferences would benefit the most from
deep integration, as this would limit the political cost of
integration. Similarly, for a certain spectrum of national
policy preferences, countries that are more
An interesting empirical issue is whether the fiscal
federalism theory can explain observed patterns in
deep integration arrangements. First, the theory
predicts that countries sharing similar policy
preferences and greater levels of interconnection are
the ones that should choose deeper over shallow
integration. While a direct test of this proposition is
hard to verify, several deep PTAs are formed by
geographically close members (the EU being a primary
example). To the extent that policy preferences are
correlated with geographic location, this provides
indirect evidence in support of the theory.
C. Causes and effects
of PTA s: Is it all about
preferences?
This presents the multilateral trading system with a
difficult challenge. The recent wave of preferential
agreements may (at least in part) be an institutional
response to the new problems associated with the
growth in offshoring. On the one hand, this suggests
that PTAs are efficiency-enhancing rather than
beggar-thy-neighbour agreements. 55 On the other
hand, PTAs may make it more difficult for the WTO to
perform its traditional role of providing reciprocal
market access opening. In essence, the institutional
challenge for the WTO is to find an approach that can
facilitate the deeper integration that countries are
seeking while at the same time upholding the core
principle of non-discrimination.
interconnected would also benefit more from deep
integration. Regarding the second question, countries
should take common policy decisions in areas
characterized by large cross-border effects and
maintain national policy prerogatives in areas with low
cross-border impacts (and where policy preferences
are dissimilar).
Secondly, the fiscal federalism theory states that
policies characterized by high cross-border spillovers
and low heterogeneity of preferences for different
countries should be centralized, while the provision of
all other services should be decentralized. Alesina et
al. (2005) contrast this benchmark with a set of
indicators that measure the role of the EU in different
policy areas. They find that there is a partial
inconsistency between the resulting allocation of
competencies to the EU and the Oates Theorem. In
particular, their data suggest that the EU is active in
certain areas where cross-border effects are low and
that its intervention is too limited in some policy
domains characterized by large spill-overs and similar
preferences across countries. 58
Three further issues are relevant to the debate on
deep integration: the welfare effects of deep
agreements on member countries; the trade-offs of
bilateral North-South deep agreements; and the
systemic effects of deep regional arrangements.
As discussed in the preceding section, there is not a
single definition of deep integration agreements, as
this concept generally refers to any agreement that
goes beyond shallow arrangements. As a result, there
is not the same comprehensive analysis of the
economic costs and benefits of deep integration as
there is for preferential tariff liberalization. This is not
surprising for two reasons: first, the effects of FTAplus or customs union-plus agreements are likely to be
different from the effects of standard FTAs or customs
unions. Like shallow agreements, deep agreements
reduce the costs of trade, and thus can be expected to
increase trade among members (Section D provides
an empirical analysis of the trade effects of deep
integration). However, unlike shallow agreements,
deep integration agreements may also provide
supranational public goods (common rules, a stable
monetary system, etc.) that the markets or national
113
world trade report 2011
governments cannot offer. The welfare effects of
these public goods can go well beyond the trade
effects, and are more complicated to measure.
From the perspective of developing countries, deep
integration with advanced economies may create certain
advantages and disadvantages (Birdsall and Lawrence,
1999). As regards advantages, for instance, developing
countries can import international regulatory systems
that are “pre-tested” and represent “best practices”,
without having to pay the costs of developing them from
scratch. As regards disadvantages, developing countries
may be pressurized to adopt common rules which are
inappropriate for their level of development, such as
certain environmental and labour standards. This risk is
higher the weaker the bargaining power of developing
countries vis-à-vis their advanced trading partners (or
when policies and regulations are imposed rather than
developed cooperatively). Such standards could also be
used by advanced economies to protect vested interests
and to close markets to poor countries.
In a model of regional integration where special
interest groups can manipulate the decision-making
process, Brou and Ruta (2006) show that more
advanced economies tend to be more politically
organized and exert a stronger influence on common
policies. While deep integration can still be a boon for
developing economies, the theory supports concerns
that the common policy will shift away from the
interests of the less developed member.
What are the systemic effects of deep integration? There
is a long-standing debate in the trade literature on
whether preferential agreements are friends or foes of
the multilateral trading system. Although this debate is
extensively reviewed in Section E, some preliminary
observations are worth noting. First, deep integration
may, in some cases, have trade-diverting effects. Facchini
and Testa (2009), in their work on common markets,
show that mobile factors of production are more likely to
experience an increase in returns, while immobile ones
are more likely to be made worse-off compared with the
status quo (i.e. no common market). If no form of wealth
transfer across countries is possible, a common market is
politically viable – i.e. it would be supported by the
median voter in each member country – only if some
factors remained protected vis-à-vis the rest of the world
once the integration process is completed.
114
In an empirical study, Chen and Mattoo (2008) find
that regional harmonization of standards significantly
increases intra-regional trade in affected industries,
but that the exports of excluded countries decline.
This suggests that firms in the excluded countries are
hurt more by an increase in the stringency of standards
than by the scale benefit provided by integrated
markets. In other words, standards harmonization in
PTAs can be de facto restrictive.
A second important observation is that the process of
deep regional integration may be a complement to
rather than a substitute for the process of global
integration. Deep agreements address behind-theborder measures that are more difficult to negotiate at
the global level, because of the widely different policy
preferences and needs among countries. Regional
groupings may offer supranational public goods that
governments – as well as multilateral arrangements –
so far fail to supply (e.g. redistribution, infrastructures),
giving them an appropriate intermediate level role in
integration between the national and global levels
(Padoa-Schioppa, 2001).
4. Conclusions
This section has reviewed the main reasons for
establishing PTAs and what the consequences are for
both members and non-members. Much analytical
work in the past has focused on shallow trade
arrangements, such as free trade areas, and the tradecreation/trade-diversion effects of PTAs. As
preferential agreements have evolved over time,
however, the lowering of tariffs is no longer the main
focus of PTAs. Agreements now cover a wider number
of issues – beyond tariffs – and involve more
structured institutional arrangements. Traditional
theories about PTAs fail to explain these new
developments, both in terms of the causes and
consequences of “deep” agreements. In particular,
traditional theories are silent on the relationship
between the growth of international production
networks and the formation of deeper policy
arrangements among countries. While the above
discussion has shed some light on the causes and the
structure of deep integration agreements – a
discussion that falls mostly outside the domain of
trade economics – there is clearly a need for further
research in this area.
II – The WTO and Preferential Trade Agreements
Endnotes
The empirical relevance of terms-of-trade effects in trade
policy has been the subject of a recent debate in the
empirical literature. Broda et al. (2008) and Bagwell and
Staiger (2011) find evidence consistent with the view that
governments set policy to exploit terms-of-trade gains.
2
In game theory, the Prisoners’ Dilemma represents a
situation where beneficial cooperation does not emerge. In
the game it is assumed that players (the prisoners) can
either cooperate or not and that cooperation involves higher
joint welfare than non-cooperation. However, whenever
others choose to cooperate, each player acting individually
will be better off by deviating and choosing noncooperation. Given that all players are trying to maximize
their individual welfare, the only rational equilibrium implies
the inferior situation of non-cooperation.
3
4
As it is well understood in the theoretical literature and in
the practice of trade policy, cooperation among countries
cannot be achieved in the absence of a trade agreement.
The reason is that, if a country unilaterally reduces its tariff,
the trading partners would still have an incentive to maintain
its level of protection. A “trade war”, on the other hand, is a
stable (Nash) equilibrium, as once high protections are in
place, no country has an incentive to reduce its tariff
unilaterally.
As discussed in Bagwell and Staiger (1998), PTAs may even
pose a threat to the functioning of the multilateral trading
system. See Section E for a discussion of the relationship
between preferential and multilateral agreements.
5
Section C.3 will, however, analyse cases where preferential
agreements may address coordination problems beyond
terms-of-trade or production relocation externalities.
6
Time inconsistency arises, for example, when a policy
decision is separated through time from its implementation,
with the result that for some reason (e.g. organized political
opposition) the initial policy intention is no longer feasible.
7
8
9
Put simply, a time-inconsistency problem refers to a
situation whereby a decision-maker’s preferences change
over time so that what is preferred at one point might be
inconsistent with what is preferred at another point in time.
Whether an agreement can increase trade policy credibility
and whether countries are likely to sign agreements to
commit their trade policy are ultimately empirical questions.
Staiger and Tabellini (1999) and Tang and Wei (2008)
provide evidence that the GATT/WTO increased credibility
of policy commitments. Arcand et al. (2010) find that the
probability that two countries sign a PTA is larger when
such agreement leads to credibility gains.
The key reference in the lobbying literature in trade is
Grossman and Helpman (1994). Several studies have
documented the role of lobbying groups in influencing trade
policy outcomes. For a review of this empirical literature, see
Gawande and Krishna (2003).
10 This political economy literature is more extensively
discussed in Section C.2.
11 Levy and Srinivasan (1996) provide an example of this logic.
A particular feature some PTAs have that the WTO system
is lacking is private agents’ access to dispute settlement
mechanisms. In the multilateral system, private disputants
have to rely on their governments to act on their behalf even
though the ultimate incidence of the costs and benefits of
the settlement fall largely on them. Meanwhile, a PTA like
the European Union allows private parties indirect access to
dispute settlement through the European Court of Justice.
Levy and Srinivasan (1996) argue that this difference in the
design of dispute settlement mechanisms might be a motive
for preferring PTAs.
12 Naturally, this argument would only hold true when MFN
rates are positive and non-negligible. With zero MFN rates,
there would be no scope for using PTA preferences (as
explained in Section B).
13 An empirical study motivated by a formal general equilibrium
model of the demand for and supply of PTA membership.
14 These relationships become statistically insignificant when
such fixed effects are controlled for. Dyadic variables such
as bilateral distance are time-invariant and hence not
de-meaned following the differencing transformation.
15 Most agreements require all existing members to admit a
new entrant.
16 This empirical finding is facilitated by the fact that unlike
other models, Bergstrand et al. (2010) do not assume an
infinitely elastic supply of PTA membership.
C. Causes and effects
of PTA s: Is it all about
preferences?
1
17 These three relationships are robust to the inclusion of
country pair fixed effects introduced via a time de-meaned
differencing transformation.
18 This refers to a widely-used measure of the “political regime
characteristics” of states. The polity score measures the
governing authority of states ranging from fully
institutionalized autocracies to fully institutionalized
democracies. States are ranked on a 21-point scale ranging
from -10 (hereditary monarchy) to +10 (consolidated
democracy). See http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/
polity4.htm.
19 Depending on the assumptions on preferences, it would be
possible to have effects also on the market for good 3 even
in case RoW maintains the same non-discriminatory tariff.
However, in this discussion we abstract from these
additional effects.
20 In a model with more than three countries, the extent of this
rent can be shown to depend on the number of countries
that have preferential access to the market of the trading
partner. Specifically, as this number increases, the
preference rent decreases, a situation referred to in the
literature as “preference erosion”.
21 The next subsection provides a simple graphical analysis in
the special case where the importing economy is small and
does not alter the world price.
22 See Baldwin (2009) for a critical survey of Vinerian
regionalism and for a discussion of the limits of the
traditional graphical approach presented in Box C.2.
23 In neoclassical economics, a Pareto improvement is
characterized by an action that makes at least one individual
better off without making any other individual worse off.
Pareto optimality describes a situation where no further
improvements to welfare can be made. The Pareto optimum
is indifferent to the distributional consequences of the
outcome.
24 Dixit and Norman (1980) have shown that intra-PTA
commodity taxes and subsidies are sufficient to obtain the
same result without lump-sum transfers.
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world trade report 2011
25 Schiff (1999) states that the volume of trade does not
necessarily provide an objective measure of the extent to
which trading partners are “natural” because the volume of
trade is itself affected by policy. Instead, Schiff proposes to
define countries as “natural trading partners” if they tend to
import what the prospective partner exports.
26 For instance, Bustos (2011) studies the impact of
MERCOSUR on technology upgrading by Argentinean firms.
She shows that the increase in revenues produced by trade
integration can induce exporters to upgrade technology. An
empirical test of the model reveals that firms in industries
facing higher reductions in Brazil’s tariffs increase
investment in technology faster. Similarly, there is evidence
that NAFTA had positive effects on productivity and
technology adoption for new exporting firms. In particular,
Lileeva and Trefler (2010) find that lower-productivity
Canadian plants that were induced by the tariff cuts to start
exporting, increased their labour productivity, engaged in
more product innovation, and had high adoption rates of
advanced manufacturing technologies.
27 A summary of the main findings is provided in Appendix
Table C.1.
28 Other studies analysing the welfare effects of NAFTA
through a general equilibrium approach are Brown (1994);
Brown et al. (1992); Brown et al. (1995); Cox (1994); Cox
(1995); Cox and Harris (1992); Sobarzo (1992); Sobarzo
(1994); Sobarzo (1995).
29 In an econometric model, a variable is said to be
endogenous when there is a correlation between the
variable and the error term, which is the unexplained
deviation of sample data from their unobservable “true”
value.
30 In a recent paper, Baier and Bergstrand (2009) provide
evidence of the trade effect of PTAs by using nonparametric estimates. When the selection into a PTA is not
random, as shown by Baier and Bergstrand (2004), and
some non-linearities exist between co-variates in gravity
equation and PTA dummies (see Frankel, 1997, and Brada
and Mendez, 1985), parametric estimators can be biased. In
this case, non-parametric estimators are needed. Using this
econometric technique, the authors provide more
economically plausible effects of PTAs on trade compared
to previous estimates.
31 The likelihood of a PTA is shown to depend on:
(i) geography (the closer the two countries are to each other
and the further they are to the rest of the world); (ii) income
(the larger their GDPs and the smaller the difference
between their GDPs); and (iii) endowments (the larger their
relative factor endowment difference and the wider absolute
difference between their and the rest of the world’s
capital-labour ratios).
32 Bergstrand et al. (2010) find similar results considering the
timing of all PTAs by using a duration analysis.
33 Other studies include Richardson (1994) and Panagariya
and Findlay (1996).
34 The prospects for an agreement improve if politically
sensitive sectors can be excluded from the agreement
(Grossman and Helpman, 1995). This is because sectors
that anticipate large losses from a PTA, and lobby for
rejection, may be indifferent if the agreement would not
alter the protection they are granted from the government.
In other words, excluding some sectors may be a way to
diffuse political opposition to an agreement and improve the
chances of achieving an accord that is both politically viable
and welfare improving.
116
35 The work by Krishna (1998) has also important implications
for the regionalism versus multilateralism debate, as it
implies that politically feasible PTAs are likely to hinder
multilateral trade opening. This issue will be further taken
up in Section E.
36 This would be the case if p BT, the border price faced by
producers located in 1 that sell in the Home market, is lower
than p C , the price at which producers located in 2 can sell in
Home.
37 Those analyses are restricted to non-cooperative multilateral
settings (i.e. where a multilateral trade agreement such as
the GATT/WTO is not in place). Ornelas (2008) studies how
the formation of PTAs affects external tariffs and global
welfare in a cooperative multilateral environment. This model
shows that the complementarity between external and
preferential tariffs found in the literature discussed in
Section C.2(e) generalizes to the case where cooperation at
the multilateral level is significant.
38 Other works that have made a similar point on the role of
trade preferences in inducing cooperation in other policy
domains are Jackson (1997); Perroni and Whalley (2000);
and World Bank (2000).
39 Hereafter referred to as RoOs.
40 This is affected by the MNCs operating in Chile, of which
53 per cent responded that the RoOs had been the deciding
factor. In the other three countries, less than 20 per cent of
MNCs reported RoOs as the determining factor.
41 The authors control for other variables that changed
between the pre-1997 and post-1997 periods, as well as for
unobservable pair-specific factors.
42 Note that Table C.1 does not necessarily imply a linear
progression between different stages of integration. For
instance, a customs union can be formed even in the
absence of FTA+ harmonizations or a monetary union does
not necessarily imply that a common market has been
preliminarily established.
43 See Section B.1 for data and a further discussion.
44 Systematic empirical analysis of the international
fragmentation of production is missing due to lack of data.
However, recent economic literature highlights three major
trends. First, both merchandise and services offshoring has
rapidly increased in the last two decades. Second, although
international outsourcing of intermediate goods is
quantitatively more important, services offshoring has been
increasing at a faster pace in recent years. Third, these
trends have been widespread across sectors and types of
inputs (Helpman, 2006).
45 See Lipson (1982); Cantwell (1994); Cheng et al. (2000);
Arndt and Kierzkowski (2001); Cheng and Kierzkowski
(2001); Ando (2005); and Blanchard (2005).
46 See Arndt (2004a, 2004b).
47 Potential cost savings from intra-product specialization may
be lowered by restrictive rules of origin in the case of a free
trade area.
48 See Grunwald and Flamm (1985).
49 In addition, studies such as Anderson and van Wincoop
(2004) have also shown that, following recent waves of
liberalization, non-tariff barriers to trade like shipping costs
have become more relevant.
II – The WTO and Preferential Trade Agreements
50 See Fujita et al. (2001) for a theoretical analysis of
clustering at the international level.
51 Several empirical papers using gravity models show that
there is a positive relationship between proximity to
international centres of economic activity and per capita
income levels (Hummels, 1995; Leamer, 1997).
52 Horizontal FDI, on the other hand, is still determined mostly
by market size and these investment flows are characterized
by being between developed economies.
54 In the Antràs and Staiger (2008) model, final goods
producers and input suppliers are located in different
countries. Contracts are incomplete and investments are
relation-specific. In this context, governments have an
incentive to use trade policy beyond terms-of-trade effects,
as it affects the conditions of ex post bargaining between
foreign suppliers and domestic producers. This is at the root
of the new cross-border spillover effect created by the rise
in offshoring.
56 Common policies and regulations are seen here as the
result of international cooperation. An alternative is that one
country that has a higher bargaining power imposes its
policy and regulatory framework on the other (possibly in
exchange for market access or as a form of hegemonic
imposition). The latter case is briefly discussed below.
57 For a survey of this literature, see Oates (1999). Ruta
(2005) and Alesina and Spolaore (2005) provide extensive
discussions of the related political economy literature on
deep integration (i.e. the formation of international unions).
58 The Oates Theorem is based on the assumption that
governments have no political motivations and maximize
social welfare. A large body of literature has revisited this
principle in models that account for political motivations of
governments (Alesina and Spolaore, 1997; Bolton and
Roland, 1997; Besley and Coate, 2003; Alesina and
Spolaore, 2005; Alesina et al., 2005; Lockwood, 2008;
Brou and Ruta, 2006). These political economy motivations
can explain the departure from Oates’ normative theory and
the observed allocation of competencies in the EU (Ruta,
2010).
C. Causes and effects
of PTA s: Is it all about
preferences?
53 The lack of a deep Asian regional trade agreement has
been compensated with other ways of liberalization such as
bilateral investment treaties (BITs), which, according to
UNCTAD, increased dramatically during the 1990s, and
unilateral liberalization and pro-business reforms promoted
by emerging markets to attract FDI. In addition, there is also
evidence that several countries in East Asia have
concentrated their public resources on the development of
economic infrastructures that facilitate production-sharing
(Ando and Kimura, 2005; Ando, 2005).
55 Beggar-thy-neighbour is an expression in economics
describing policies that seek benefits for one country at the
expense of others.
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world trade report 2011
Technical Appendix: Systemic effects
of PTAs
This appendix focuses on the systemic effects of PTAs
− that is, on the consequences of preferential
arrangements for members and non-members. The
approach used is based on a graphical analysis and
draws on the work of Baldwin and Wyplosz (2004).
If Home moves from free trade to applying a uniform
MFN tariff to all countries, the imposition of such a
tariff shifts the import supply curve up to MS MFN . As a
consequence of the tariff T, the domestic price for the
good at Home rises to P' and the quantity of imports is
reduced to M'. Meanwhile, the new border price for
countries exporting to Home is given by P' – T. At this
lower price, producers from RoW and Partner are
willing to supply less and exports are reduced to X' R
and X' P , respectively.
Suppose that initially there is open trade across all
countries. Under these conditions, Home imports the
quantity M at a price of P FT defined by the equilibrium
of the import supply (MS) and import demand (MD)
curves in Home (see Appendix Figure C.1). Note that
M is the sum of the export quantities from RoW (X R)
and Partner (X P) given by the intersection of the open
trade price line P FT , with each country export supply
curve shown as points 1 and 2 in the diagram,
respectively.
After Home and Partner conclude a PTA, one of
Home's import suppliers gets duty-free access while
the rest still pay T. Therefore, the new import supply
curve in Home, given by MS PTA , will lie between the
original open trade and MFN supply curves (Appendix
Appendix Figure C.1: Open trade and MFN tariffs
RoW
Partner
Home
Border price
Border price
Domestic price
MSMFN
MS
XSp
XSR
2
1
P’
T
PFT
P’-T
MD
X’R XR
RoW exports
M’ M = XP + XR Home imports
X’p Xp Partner exports
Appendix Figure C.2: PTA price and quantity effects
RoW
Partner
Home
Border price
Border price
Domestic price
MSMFN
MSPTA
MS
XSp
XSR
P’
P’’
T
P’-T
P’’-T
Pa
T
1
P*
MD
X’’R X’R
118
RoW exports
X’p X’’p
Partner exports
M’ M’’
Home imports
II – The WTO and Preferential Trade Agreements
Figure C.2). MS PTA is not a straight line because there
is a threshold price below which only producers from
Partner will be willing to export. The tariff prevents
RoW firms from exporting until the domestic price at
Home rises above the price marked Pa . This is so
because when Home's domestic price is below Pa , the
border price faced by RoW exports is below their zerosupply price marked as P*. Consequently, Partner firms
have an effective “monopoly” over the access to
Home's market up to the quantity denoted by the
point 1. After this point, firms from RoW will also supply
imports to Home and MS PTA resumes its normal slope.
In the post-PTA equilibrium where MS PTA meets MD,
Home will import the quantity M'' and the new
domestic price is P'', which is lower than the MFN
domestic price P'. The PTA's impact on border prices is
more complex. For Partner-based producers,
liberalization means that their border price rises from
P' – T to P'', Home's new domestic price. For RoWbased producers, however, the border price falls from
P' – T to P'' – T. A way to understand this effect is to
think that RoW firms must cut their border price so that
they can enter Home's market and be competitive
(be able to sell at a domestic price of P'') after the
tariff T is added to their exports. As a result of this
change in border prices, Partner exports increase to
X''P while those from RoW fall to X'' R .
The PTA has more ambiguous welfare effects on
Home as it has created a positive trade-volume effect
but also some conflicting terms-of-trade effects that
stem from the differentiated (discriminatory) post-PTA
border-prices Partner and RoW face. By lowering the
domestic price, preferential liberalization has increased
imports from M' to M'', leading to a gain in consumption
measured by the shaded area A. The positive tradevolume effect that has led to an efficiency gain in
consumption can be seen as the trade creation effect
of the PTA. In other words, the PTA has created trade
by allowing Home to add the import quantity M'' – M'
that was not present before the agreement.
The change in Home's import composition where
goods from Partner are favoured over those of RoW is
known as trade diversion. In other words, discriminatory
liberalization induces Home to switch some of its
purchases to import suppliers who benefit from the
PTA and away from suppliers from nations that were
excluded. The PTA has distorted price signals so that
Home consumers are not aware that Partner goods
may actually cost more than those from RoW. Home
consumers ignore the border price of goods and only
observe the domestic price P'', which is the same for
imports from any source.
Turning to the price effects of the PTA, Home
experiences an improvement in terms of trade against
RoW as imports from this country have become
cheaper. Thus, Home imports a quantity of X'' R from
RoW at a lower cost and gains from this change in
border price (the shaded area B). The area B can be
seen as a production efficiency gain, as producers
from RoW have to become more efficient to compete
in Home's market while facing a lower border price. On
the other hand, Home experiences a deterioration in
terms-of-trade against Partner as imports from this
country have become more expensive after the PTA.
C. Causes and effects
of PTA s: Is it all about
preferences?
To measure the welfare effects of the PTA, we must
evaluate the impact it has on the foreign exporting
countries (Partner and RoW) and on the importing
country (Home). These effects are shown in Appendix
Figure C.3. It is straightforward that the trade
agreement has favoured Partner as it experiences a
positive border price effect (from price P' – T to P'')
and a positive trade volume effect (from quantity X' P to
X'' P). Thus, Partner's gains are captured by the shaded
area D. The opposite is true of RoW as it experiences
equal but negative effects. RoW loses from the PTA
because it faces a lower border price for its goods at
P'' – T and its trade volume also falls to the quantity
X'' R . These losses are captured by the shaded area E.
Appendix Figure C.3: Welfare effects of preferential liberalization
RoW
Partner
Home
Border price
Border price
Domestic price
XSR
XSp
A
P’
P’’
P’’
D
P’-T
E
P’’-T
P’-T
B
P’’-T
C
P*
MD
X’’R X’R
RoW exports
X’p X’’p
Partner exports
X’’R M’ M’’
Home imports
119
world trade report 2011
The hike in the border price affects the quantity M' – X'R
and yields a loss to Home equal to the shaded area
marked C in the diagram. Since we have assumed
Partner and RoW to be identical, and therefore there is
not a more efficient producer, we concluded that under
open trade Home imported an equal amount from both
countries (50-50 share). After the PTA, however,
imports from Partner are favoured and represent a
larger share of Home's imports. Thus, a portion of
area C captures the trade-diversion effect of the PTA,
namely the amount of imports that have been diverted
away from RoW's original share in Home's market. The
net welfare effects of the PTA on Home are given by
(A + B) – C, which might be positive or negative.
Appendix Table C.1: Empirical findings on trade creation and trade diversion
120
Authors
Data and methodology
Trade creation
Trade diversion
Romalis (2007)
CGE approach on trade flows between the
United States, Canada, Mexico and the
rest of the world in the period 1989-1999.
The paper focuses on Canada-US Free
Trade Agreement (CUSFTA) and North
America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
Evidence of trade creation only
for trade flows involving Mexico
Evidence of trade diversion by
CUSFTA and NAFTA
Trefler (2004)
CGE approach on Canadian imports from US
and the rest of the world in the period
1989-1996. The paper focuses on NAFTA
NAFTA raised Canadian
imports from the United States
NAFTA lowered Canadian
imports from the rest of the
world
Clausing (2001)
CGE approach on US imports from Canada
and the rest of the world between 1989
and 1994. The paper focuses on CUSFTA
The tariff liberalization by
CUSFTA was responsible for
USD 21 increase in US imports
from Canada between 1989
and 1994
There is no evidence of trade
diversion
Soloaga and Winters
(2001)
Gravity model on bilateral imports for 58
countries from 1980 to 1996. The paper
focuses on the European Union (EU),
European Free Trade Area (EFTA),
Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN), Gulf Co-operation Council
(GULFCOOP), NAFTA, Central American
Common Market (CACM), Latin American
Integration Association (LAIA), Andean
Community (ANDEAN), Southern Common
Market (MERCOSUR)
All the PTAs involving Latin
American countries have a
positive effect on intra-bloc
trade
Trade diversion effect for EU
and EFTA
Baier and
Bergstrand (2007)
Gravity model on bilateral trade flows for
96 countries from 1960 to 2000
PTA increases trade between
two member countries by about 100 per cent on average after 10 years
-
Frankel et al. (1995)
Gravity model on bilateral trade flows for
63 countries over the period 1965-1990.
The paper focuses on East Asia Economic
Caucus (EAEC), Asia-Pacific Economic
Co-operation (APEC), European
Community (EC), EFTA, NAFTA,
MERCOSUR and ANDEAN
PTAs boost trade between
member countries (exceptions
are EFTA and NAFTA which do
not have significant effect on
trade flows)
-
Lee and Shin (2006)
Gravity model on bilateral trade flows for
175 countries from 1948 to 1999
Joining a PTA raises intra-bloc
trade by 51.6 per cent
PTA members' trade with
non-members rises by 6.5 per cent
Carrere (2006)
Gravity model on bilateral imports for 130
countries from 1962-1996. The paper
focuses on EU, ANDEAN, CACM, LAIA,
MERCOSUR, NAFTA and ASEAN
There is evidence of trade
creation effect for 5 out of 7
PTAs analysed
The increase in intra-regional
trade is coupled with a
reduction in imports from the
rest of the world in 6 out of 7 PTAs analysed
Egger (2004)
Gravity model on bilateral exports for
OECD countries from 1986 to 1997. The
paper focuses on EU, EFTA and NAFTA
Strong evidence of trade
creation effect
-
Magee (2008)
Gravity model on bilateral trade flows for
133 countries from 1980 to 1998
The long run impact of a PTA is
estimated to be an 89 per cent
increase in trade flows
No evidence of trade diversion
Silva and Tenreyro
(2006)
Gravity model on bilateral export flows for
136 countries in 1990
Strong evidence of trade
creation
-
II – The WTO and Preferential Trade Agreements
Appendix Table C.1: Empirical findings on trade creation and trade diversion (continued)
Data and methodology
Trade creation
Trade diversion
Ghosh and Yamarik
(2004)
Gravity model on bilateral trade flows for
186 countries over the period 1970-1995
PTA membership raises
intra-bloc trade by 39 per cent
PTA membership lowers trade
outside the bloc by 6 per cent
Baier and
Bergstrand (2009)
Non-parametric estimations on bilateral
trade flows for 96 countries over the
period 1965-2000
Average long run effect of PTAs on trade flows is 100 per cent
-
Aitken (1973)
Gravity model on bilateral trade flows for
12 countries over the period 1951-1967.
The paper focuses on EFTA and EEC
Positive effect of PTAs on
bilateral trade
-
Bergstrand (1985)
Gravity model on bilateral trade flows for
15 countries for years 1965, 1966, 1975
and 1976. The paper focuses on EFTA and
EEC
PTAs had a positive effect on
bilateral trade
-
Acharya et al. (2011)
Gravity model on bilateral trade flows for
179 countries over the period 1970-2008
The impact of PTAs on
intra-PTA trade is positive for
17 out of 22 PTAs analysed.
PTAs also increase imports and
exports from member countries
to non-member countries by 20 per cent and 21.5 per cent
on average
Intra-PTA trade diversion has
been found in 3 out of 22 PTAs
analysed; 5 PTAs lower the
extra-PTA exports from
member to non-member
countries
C. Causes and effects
of PTA s: Is it all about
preferences?
Authors
121
world trade report 2011
D. Anatomy of preferential
trade agreements
This section considers to what extent
conclusions about deep preferential trade
agreements (PTAs) and production networks,
reached in Section C, are supported by
evidence. The evidence presented includes an
examination of the magnitude of preferential
tariff rates, the coverage and contents of the
agreements, econometric evidence on the
relationship between production networks
and deeper PTAs and the integration
experience of specific PTAs.
122
II – The WTO and Preferential Trade Agreements
1. Are lower tariffs still important for PTAs?
124
2. Patterns in the content of PTAs
128
3. Production networks and deep PTAs
145
4. African regional cooperation: lessons from deep integration?
151
5. Conclusions
153
Appendix tables
157
D.anatomy of Preferential
Trade Agreements
Contents
Some key facts and findings
• MFN tariffs are low and equal to 4 per cent on average in 2009.
• Most “sensitive” sectors remain “sensitive” in PTAs. Approximately
66 per cent of tariff lines with MFN rates above 15 percentage points
have not been reduced in PTAs.
• If the preferential access enjoyed by other exporters is taken into
account, less than 13 per cent of preferential trade benefits from a
competitive advantage exceeding 2 percentage points.
• Signing deep integration PTAs increases trade in production
networks by almost 8 per cent on average. In addition, high levels
of trade in production networks raise the likelihood of signing
deep agreements.
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world trade report 2011
1. Are lower tariffs still important for PTAs?
tariffs was more pronounced in West Asia, where the
average MFN applied tariff rate fell from an average of
about 45 per cent to below 15 per cent.
Tariffs have progressively fallen since the establishment
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
in 1948. The pre-GATT average tariff among major
trading countries was between 20 and 30 per cent.1
Since then, unilateral liberalization, eight rounds of
multilateral trade negotiations and numerous PTAs have
significantly reduced the tariffs applied by WTO
members. In 2009, the average applied tariff across all
products and countries was a mere 4 per cent.
Tariff reductions have not occurred at the same pace
in all sectors. Significant tariff barriers still exist in
agriculture and some manufacturing sectors. Most
MFN tariff reductions took place in manufactured
goods, however, with particular emphasis on parts and
components (see Figure D.2). The latter trend
accompanied the development of production networks.
Despite variance in tariff rates around the average, low
average MFN rates suggest that the scope for
exchanging preferential market access is unlikely to be
extensive. A similar conclusion is suggested by the
data on trade flows. As seen in Section B, the share of
MFN duty-free trade in total trade is estimated at
52 per cent in 2008 (excluding trade within the EU),
and over 70 per cent of total trade occurs at an MFN
tariff rate of below 5 per cent.
The process of most-favoured nation (MFN)
liberalization (i.e. the reduction of tariffs on an MFN
basis for all WTO members) accelerated in the late
1980s and 1990s, when applied tariffs were reduced in
many developing countries. The rates applied by
developed countries were already low, at around 6 per
cent on average by the end of the 1980s. They
continued to decline subsequently, to an average of
approximately 3 per cent in 2009. Average applied
tariffs have been falling in all regions (see Figure D.1). In
South-Central America, the average tariff rate fell from
over 30 per cent at the beginning of the 1990s to less
than 10 per cent ten years later. Over the same period,
tariffs in East Asia dropped from around 15-20 per cent
to some 6 per cent in 2009. Similarly, in Africa, applied
MFN tariffs fell from an average rate of roughly 30 per
cent to some 12 per cent in 2009. The reduction of
Moreover, PTAs cannot be satisfactorily explained by a
desire to remove tariff peaks (i.e. relatively higher
tariffs). Most “sensitive” sectors with higher tariffs also
tend to retain higher tariffs in PTAs. As shown in
Figure D.3, for example, tariff lines subject to an MFN
rate above 15 per cent continue to be subject to
relatively high rates in PTAs. According to the 2007
data reported in the figure, approximately 66 per cent
Figure D.1: MFN tariff trends in developing countries by region (Percentage)
Simple average (at the product level)
50
40
30
20
10
0
1990
1995
Africa
2000
South and
Central America
2005
East Asia
2010
West Asia
Note: In order to avoid sample selection bias, figures have been calculated for a balanced sub-sample of countries in each region and
missing data have been interpolated. In this subsample, East Asia comprises 13 economies (Australia; Kingdom of Bahrain; China; Hong
Kong, China; Indonesia; Japan; Republic of Korea; Malaysia; New Zealand; Philippines; Singapore; Thailand; and Chinese Taipei); West
Asia covers four countries (Bangladesh; India; Sri Lanka; and Nepal); South and Central America is made up of 12 countries (Argentina;
the Plurinational State of Bolivia; Brazil; Chile; Colombia; Cuba; Ecuador; Paraguay; Peru; Trinidad and Tobago; Uruguay; and the Bolivarian
Republic of Venezuela); and Africa includes 11 countries (Burkina Faso; Côte d’Ivoire; Algeria; Ghana; Morocco; Nigeria; Rwanda; Tunisia;
Tanzania; South Africa; and Zimbabwe). The data used in the figure are simple averages of ad valorem lines in all sectors.
Source: Calculations based on Trains database, WITS.
124
II – The WTO and Preferential Trade Agreements
Figure D.2: World MFN applied tariff trends (Percentage)
10
9
MFN applied tariff
8
7
6
5
4
2
1
0
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
Parts and components
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
All products
Note: Underlying data are trade-weighted averages of ad valorem rates.
Source: Trains database, WITS.
D.anatomy of Preferential
Trade Agreements
3
Figure D.3: Preferential reductions of tariff rates above 15 per cent, 2007
Preferential below MFN
34 per cent
Preferential equal MFN
66 per cent
Note: “Preferential equal MFN” denotes the share of tariff lines at the HS-6 level with an MFN rate above 15 per cent that have not been
reduced under PTAs. “Preferential below MFN” denotes the share of tariff lines that have been at least partially reduced.
Source: Calculations based on the Fugazza and Nicita (2010) database, covering the PTAs of 85 countries, accounting for 90 per cent of
world trade.
of the tariffs above this rate have not been reduced at
all through PTAs. This means that “preferential” rates
are no lower than MFN rates.
Recent work has emphasized that the value of a
particular preferential tariff must be gauged in the
context of an importing country's overall tariff policy. 2
Thus, in a world of numerous PTAs, the advantage
conferred by a preferential tariff to a given exporter
does not depend only on that rate, but also on tariffs
faced by competing suppliers from other countries in
the same market.
In order to account for the actual advantage provided by
preferences, Low et al. (2009) use the concept of a
“competition-adjusted” preference margin, calculated as
the percentage-point difference between the weighted
average tariff rate applied to the rest of the world and
the preferential rate applied to the beneficiary country,
where weights are represented by trade shares in the
preference-granting market (see Box D.1).
Unlike a traditional preference margin which was the
basis of the analysis in Section B, this competitionadjusted preference margin can assume positive as
well as negative values. A negative value indicates
that, in a specific market, a certain country faces
worse market conditions than its trade competitors. 3
Competition-adjusted preference margins emphasize
the fact that PTAs can result from the desire to avoid
negative discrimination rather than to benefit from a
positive preference margin. This is the underlying
argument for the so-called “domino effect” to explain
the proliferation of PTAs (see Section C).
125
world trade report 2011
Box D.1: Measurement of the value of preferences
Traditionally, the value of a preference margin for a beneficiary country has been measured simply as the
difference in terms of percentage points between the MFN rate and the preferential tariff. Or, expressed
formally:
Traditional preference margin =
where
TkMFN
,i
TkMFN
 Tk j,i
,i
is the MFN rate applied by country k on product i and
Tk j,i
is the preferential rate applied to
country j. By definition this margin can only be positive.
A limitation of this measure of the value of the preference is that it cannot address the question whether the
putative advantage of a preference effectively helps the beneficiary to export to the preference-giving
country. Since numerous and overlapping preferential trade agreements exist around the world, the MFN rate
does not provide an appropriate basis for calculating the preference margin. On the contrary, the value of a
preference for one country will ultimately depend on the advantage/disadvantage it has vis-à-vis the other
countries competing in the same market.
The “competition-adjusted” preference margin proposed by Low et al. (2009) addresses this concern by
measuring the value of a preference as the percentage-point difference between the weighted average tariff
rate applied to the rest of the world and the preferential rate applied to the preferential agreement partner,
where weights are represented by trade shares in the preference granting market. The formula for this
measure is expressed as follows:
Competition-adjusted preference margin for product i =
where
Tkw,i
Tkw,i  Tk j,i
v
vk ,i k ,i
X T

X
v
v
is the export-weighted (X in the formula denotes exports of v into k) average
vk ,i
tariff imposed by country k on all other exporting countries v (excluding country j) in respect of product i.
Equivalently, the formula captures weighted tariff imposed by k on imports from all other countries but j. As
j
before, Tk ,i is the preferential rate applied to country j. This competition-adjusted preference margin can be
positive or negative, depending on whether exporters of good i from country j benefit from market access
conditions more or less favourable than the other trading partners of country k in the same market.
In order to measure the overall level of advantage or disadvantage that a beneficiary under a PTA faces in
entering another market in the preferential area, Fugazza and Nicita (2010) estimated the overall value to a
country of preferences in terms of the degree of responsiveness of import demand to variations in price (price
elasticity of import demand), taking into account the trade share of the country concerned. Under this
specification of the value of the preference, which the authors call the “relative preference margin” (RPM),
preference margins are thus weighted by the relevant import demand elasticity and by the export share of the
preference-receiving country. The rationale for including these elements in the preference margin calculation is
that a preference margin is more or less valuable to the exporting country depending on the elasticity of
demand in the importing country and on the export capability of the exporting country. When import demand is
elastic, a given preference margin gives rise to larger increases in import demand than when the import demand
is inelastic. In addition, a preference is more valuable to an exporter the higher the level of exports.
The formula for the RPM is:
RPM jk 
X
i
jk ,i
 ki Tkw,i  Tk j,i 
X
i
jk ,i
 k ,i
,jk
where ε is an estimate of the price elasticity of demand for an import, and the other variables are defined as
above.
126
II – The WTO and Preferential Trade Agreements
Table D.1: Share of tariff lines and trade by level of competition-adjusted preference margin,
2000 and 2007 (Percentage)
Competition-adjusted
preference margin
2000
TL covered
2007
trade covered
TL covered
< –30
0.2
0.0
0.1
trade covered
0.0
–30; –15
1.1
0.3
0.5
0.1
–15; –5
7.1
3.4
4.6
2.3
–5; –2
9.3
5.8
6.3
3.5
–2; 2
of which MFN = 0
72.4
77.8
79.0
87.3
9.2
18.5
25.3
42.5
5.7
7.6
5.6
4.5
3.7
4.1
3.1
2.0
15; 30
0.4
0.9
0.6
0.2
> 30
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.0
Source: Calculations based on the Fugazza and Nicita (2010) database, covering the PTAs of 85 countries, accounting for 90 per cent of
world trade.
Table D.1 shows the distribution of competition-adjusted
preference margins at the Harmonized System (HS)
6-digit level for the years 2000 and 2007. The
distribution is highly concentrated, falling within the
range of –2 per cent and +2 per cent. In 2007, over
87 per cent of trade fell inside this range. Except
perhaps for highly demand-elastic goods that are
particularly responsive to price changes, these numbers
suggest that today tariff preferences are unlikely to be
a sole reason, or in some cases not even a major one,
for countries entering PTAs.
A limitation of using competition-adjusted preference
margins as a measure of the value of preferences is
that they do not take into account the fact that imports
of some goods can be more responsive than others to
changes in price. A reduction of the tariff on a good
whose demand is inelastic (i.e. not very sensitive to
price changes) will have a smaller impact on the overall
volume of trade than a reduction of the same
magnitude for demand-elastic goods. Even a low
preference margin may trigger significant changes in
the volume of trade when the import demand for the
good is elastic. In these circumstances, even low
preference margins might lead to the establishment of
PTAs. Applying product-specific price elasticities to
products, Fugazza and Nicita (2010) define an index of
the overall advantage/disadvantage that exporters in
country A face in country B (see Box D.1). This index
accords lower weights to competition-adjusted
preference margins that are less sensitive to price
changes (inelastic goods) than those that are sensitive
(elastic goods).
Data based on this relative preference margin (RPM)
index was calculated for a sample of 85 countries
covering 90 per cent of trade between 2000 and 2008.
As shown in Figure D.4, RPMs improved on average
across all regions between 2000 and 2007, except in
North America, where the initial competitive advantage
of the region has been eroded by the proliferation of
PTAs in other areas. In general, PTAs have helped
countries to offset or reduce the negative discrimination
they suffer vis-à-vis non-PTA trading partners. For
example, countries in South and Central America
significantly improved their conditions of market access
between 2000 and 2007, mainly because of the
numerous PTAs they signed over that period.
D.anatomy of Preferential
Trade Agreements
2; 5
5; 15
Figure D.4 shows that on average RPMs were below
1 per cent in 2007. Africa and South and Central
America had RPMs in excess of this average. Fugazza
and Nicita (2010) calculated that a 1 per cent change
in the RPM would have a trade impact of 0.34 per
cent.4 This implies that a rise or fall of 2 per cent in
trade would require a change in the RPM of at least
5 percentage points. El Salvador is the only country in
the sample covered by the Fugazza and Nicita
database that satisfies these conditions. This finding
reinforces our conclusion that limited scope remains
for the pursuit of preferences in PTAs.
In sum, the proliferation of PTAs between 2000 and
2007 has improved the conditions of market access
for signatory countries. To a large extent, the
improvement has been due to the reduction in the
number of instances where relative preference
margins were negative (i.e. cases where a country
faces worse market conditions than its trade
competitors). One may argue, therefore, that PTAs
have in part restored a “level-playing field” for those
countries that faced worse conditions of access than
others. Whether or not adjusted for tariffs faced by
other suppliers, the overall level of tariffs faced by
exporters is low, as is the volume of trade for which
preference margins are significant. 5 Low average
benefits accruing from preferential tariffs on trade
may nevertheless conceal larger effects for some
products and countries, and this should be borne in
mind in the context of the broader conclusion reached
in this report that preferential tariffs are no longer a
major consideration in PTA formation. We now turn to
127
world trade report 2011
Figure D.4: Relative preference margins by region, 2000 and 2007
2.5
2
1.5
1
0.5
0
-0.5
-1
-1.5
-2
Africa
2000
CIS
East
Asia
EU (27)
Rest of
Europe
Middle
East
2007
North
America
South
and
Central
America
West
Asia
World
Note: Relative preference margins by region are in percentage points and are calculated as the simple average of all RPMs of countries in
the region.
Source: Calculations based on the Fugazza and Nicita (2010) database.
an analysis of other factors at play, linked particularly
to the international fragmentation of production.
2. Patterns in the content of PTAs
If tariffs are no longer so important within PTAs, what
is being negotiated in these agreements? To answer
this question, we examine in detail the contents of a
large sample of PTAs. This examination is conducted
first by analysing the sectoral coverage and legal
enforceability of various PTAs. The identification of the
policy areas and the definition of legal enforceability
are based on Horn et al. (2010). The result of this
analysis shows that commitments in services,
investment, intellectual property protection, technical
barriers to trade and competition policy loom large in
many PTAs. In the second phase of the analysis, the
nature of the commitments in a number of key policy
areas is considered.
(a) Sectoral coverage and enforceability
(i) Methodology
128
The original analysis by Horn, Mavroidis and Sapir (HMS)
examined EU and US PTAs with third countries. Their
approach can be divided into three stages. First, HMS
identify the substantive policy areas covered in PTAs.
They consider an area to be covered by an agreement
when the latter provides for some form of undertaking in
the relevant field. In this respect, HMS base their list of
policy areas on article headings in the case of EU
agreements and chapter headings in the US agreements.
This is one limitation of our use of the HMS approach,
since non-US and non-EU PTAs may contain policy areas
of importance to countries involved in those PTAs that
are not reflected in the US and EU agreements.
The authors identify 52 policy areas which they then
classify into two groups. The first group of policy areas,
called WTO+ provisions, fall under the current
mandate of the WTO and are already subject to some
form of commitment in WTO agreements. WTO+
provisions reconfirm existing commitments and provide
for additional obligations. The second group of policy
areas, which they denote as WTO-X provisions, refer
to obligations that are outside the current mandate of
the WTO. Table D.2 lists the 52 policy areas that HMS
identified as either WTO+ (14 areas) or WTO-X
(38 areas).
In a second stage, the legal enforceability of the PTA
obligations is ascertained. A policy area that is covered
might still not be legally enforceable due to unclear or
loosely formulated legal language. The authors' idea
appears to be that the clearer, more specific and
imperative the legal language used to express a
commitment or undertaking, the more successfully it
can be invoked by a complainant in a dispute
settlement proceeding, and thus the greater likelihood
of it being enforced. They have classified certain terms
as either implying enforceable or non-enforceable
obligations. The strengths and limitations of the
definition of “legal enforceability”, as applied by HMS,
are considered in greater detail in Box D.2.
In a third stage, the “depth” of an obligation is
established for some policy areas. The purpose of this
step is to establish whether a provision that is legally
binding is actually likely to matter in practice. However,
HMS did not delve into any substantive examination of
the policy. To complete this third step, this report
undertakes
an
in-depth
provision-by-provision
examination of a number of policy areas.
II – The WTO and Preferential Trade Agreements
Table D.2: WTO+ and WTO-X policy areas in PTAs
WTO+ areas
WTO-X areas
Anti-corruption
Health
PTA agricultural goods
Competition policy
Human rights
Customs administration
Environmental laws
Illegal immigration
Export taxes
IPR
Illicit drugs
SPS measures
Investment measures
Industrial cooperation
State trading enterprises
Labour market regulation
Information society
Technical barriers to trade
Movement of capital
Mining
Countervailing measures
Consumer protection
Money laundering
Anti-dumping
Data protection
Nuclear safety
State aid
Agriculture
Political dialogue
Public procurement
Approximation of legislation
Public administration
TRIMS measures
Audiovisual
Regional cooperation
GATS
Civil protection
Research and technology
TRIPS
Innovation policies
SMEs
Cultural cooperation
Social matters
Economic policy dialogue
Statistics
Education and training
Taxation
Energy
Terrorism
Financial assistance
Visa and asylum
D.anatomy of Preferential
Trade Agreements
PTA industrial goods
Source: Horn et al. (2010).
Box D.2: Legal enforceability
For the purpose of classifying provisions in PTAs as “legally enforceable” or “non-enforceable”, Horn et al.
(2010) focus on two variables relating to dispute settlement: (a) the actual terminology of a provision, and in
particular whether a provision “specifies at least some obligation that is clearly defined and likely effectively
to bind the parties”, as distinguished from vague undertakings that are “not likely to be successfully invoked
by a complainant in a dispute settlement proceeding”; and (b) whether the agreement “explicitly states that
dispute settlement is not available for the provision” under the PTA.
Although these two variables constitute a solid starting point, there are a number of other variables –
including those related to dispute settlement – that could also have a bearing on the “legal enforceability” of
obligations arising under PTAs. The HMS study, however, focuses solely on the text of PTAs, and not on their
effects or implementation.
Whether or not the actual terminology of a provision establishes a legally enforceable obligation is a question
of treaty interpretation. An important consideration is therefore the approach to treaty interpretation adopted
in the PTA. For example, in the context of WTO dispute settlement proceedings, the Appellate Body has
repeatedly emphasized the principle of “effectiveness” in treaty interpretation, which provides all of the terms
of the WTO agreements with a “legally operative meaning”. The Appellate Body has found on more than one
occasion that the term “should”, in the same way as “shall”, can give rise to a legal obligation.
The tradition of treaty interpretation stems from the Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties 1969
(VCLT). The VCLT is a legal instrument codified by the UN International Law Commission. It sets out rules
recognized as customary international law. For present purposes, the relevant rules of treaty interpretation
are laid down in Articles 31-33 of the Convention. Article 31 of the VCLT establishes four elements that have
to be combined in the interpretation of a treaty. A treaty has to be interpreted: i) in good faith; ii) within the
ordinary meaning of its terms; iii) in its specific context; and iv) in the light of its object and purpose. 6 PTAs
are recognized as treaties under international law and have to be interpreted in accordance with the rules of
the VCLT.7
The strong focus on the use of legal language in a PTA is referred to as a textual or literal interpretation. 8
The language of a provision reveals its intention and the extent to which it declares legal obligations and
rights. 9 The language also helps to define demarcations and the scope of WTO law in dispute settlement
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world trade report 2011
proceedings. In this respect, treaty language also reveals those areas that have not been negotiated within
the framework of the WTO.10 The process of enforcement, however, makes use of other approaches in WTO
dispute settlement. Three aspects of the legal enforceability of a provision are mentioned below, in addition
to the textual approach.
First, obligations arising under the WTO agreements may have a bearing on the legal enforceability of
obligations under PTAs. HMS consider provisions carved out from dispute settlement proceedings as being
non-enforceable. To the extent that a provision of a PTA addresses an area that is also directly or indirectly
covered by one or more obligations under the WTO agreements, it remains to be seen whether a PTA can
deprive a party of its right of access to the WTO dispute settlement system. In other words, the fact that
dispute settlement may not be available in respect of that provision under the PTA would not necessarily
preclude a party from having recourse to WTO dispute settlement procedures in respect of the corresponding
obligation(s) under the WTO agreements. This complex and unsolved legal question leaves open whether
and to what extent rules of conflict leading to the enforcement of a provision under a PTA can override the
WTO dispute settlement system.11
Secondly, to the extent that the concept of legal enforceability is linked to the possibility of applying countermeasures to give force to PTA obligations, rights and obligations under WTO agreements limiting the use of
trade counter-measures may also have a bearing on the enforceability of certain PTA provisions. Another
related issue refers to the enforceability of WTO-X provisions. To what extent is it possible to make use of
trade counter-measures to enforce those policy areas not covered by the WTO (Marceau, 2009)? The scope
and limitations of the relevant law still need to be clarified.12
Thirdly, non-legal considerations are an important factor when determining the enforceability of obligations
in trade agreements. This approach encompasses political factors as relevant in the process of legal drafting,
thus leading to the adoption of loosely formulated legal language. It does not, however, take external political
factors into consideration that might be important for the actual enforcement of a provision in practice.13 As
HMS acknowledge, “provisions may be enforced not only through a formal judicial dispute settlement
mechanism, but also through more political means”. In other words, the fact that particular obligations may be
carved out from dispute settlement procedures does not necessarily mean that parties cannot seek to
enforce such obligations through political or diplomatic means. However, the reverse is also true. The fact
that particular obligations are not carved out from dispute settlement procedures does not necessarily mean
that legal enforcement through dispute settlement proceedings is always a realistic and viable option.
The vast majority of provisions in regional and bilateral trade agreements are never the subject of any dispute
settlement proceedings, even where a right to invoke proceedings exists. In a nutshell, provisions that are
legally enforceable in theory may be difficult to enforce in practice, whether on account of political factors,
resource constraints, or other non-legal considerations.
The analysis conducted here extends HMS's original
analysis of 14 EU and 14 US PTAs to a total of 96 PTAs.
Of these, 33 involve the EU and 11 involve the United
States. The sample covers some recently concluded
EPAs by the EU, with Cameroon and CARIFORUM, for
example, as well as Euromed agreements. The 42 other
PTAs were concluded by regional trading blocs and major
trading powers, such as the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN), China, the European Free Trade
Agreement (EFTA), India and the Southern Common
Market (MERCOSUR). PTAs from Africa (such as
COMESA and ECOWAS) and the Middle East (such as
the GCC and PAFTA) are also included in the analysis.
The sample of PTAs was chosen primarily on account of
the volume of trade within the PTA, but also included the
initial set of PTAs examined in the HMS study (see
Appendix Table D.1 for a detailed list of the PTAs covered).
130
The HMS study only covers PTAs concluded by WTO
members, signed by the parties and mostly notified to
the WTO as of October 2008. It considers agreements
signed both before and after the creation of the WTO,
but excludes those where partners are not members of
the WTO. Three agreements that have been signed but
that are not yet ratified were also included in the study.
HMS further restricts the selection of PTAs in its study
to those concluded under Article XXIV of the GATT or
Article V of the General Agreement on Trade in Services
(GATS). Agreements notified under the Enabling Clause
are not taken into account. All the PTAs considered in
the HMS study are free trade agreements, except for
EU-Turkey, which is a customs union.
The sample used in this report also includes agreements
in which not all partners are members of the WTO.
Some non-notified agreements are covered, but all are
in force. The sample covers the period from 1958 to
2010. PTAs notified under the Enabling Clause are
included along with others notified under GATT Article
XXIV and GATS Article V. Eighty-two of the agreements
covered are free trade agreements, 12 are customs
unions and two are partial scope agreements.14 Four
among the EC agreements are enlargement
agreements.
II – The WTO and Preferential Trade Agreements
(ii) Empirical evidence on PTA content by
income, policy area and over time
between areas covered that are legally enforceable and
those that are not is still higher for WTO-X provisions
than for WTO+ provisions. Horn et al. (2010) characterize
WTO-X provisions as largely regulatory in nature. Using
this interpretation, and even accounting for the smaller
proportion of these areas that are enforceable, the
growth in the average number of WTO-X provisions in
recent PTAs is a testimony to the growing importance of
behind the border measures in PTAs.
Which specific policy areas figure prominently in
preferential trade agreements? Figure D.7 presents the
number of PTAs in the sample with specific WTO+
provisions. As expected, all of the 96 agreements
contain provisions relating to industrial and agricultural
tariffs. However, an increasingly large number of PTAs
now go beyond merchandise tariffs, including provisions
on technical barriers to trade, services, intellectual
property and trade-related investment measures. Figure
D.7 also shows that even if one examines each of the
WTO+ areas individually, there is not much of a gap
between coverage and legal enforceability.
In contrast, the pattern over time of WTO-X provisions is
less clear (see Figure D.6). It is certainly the case that
PTAs coming into force since 2000 cover more WTO-X
areas than agreements established earlier, and that more
of them are legally enforceable. However, the gap
The main policy areas covered by WTO-X provisions
are competition policy, intellectual property rights,
investment and movement of capital (see Figure D.8).
These are also the policy areas that are most often
legally enforceable in PTAs. The next largest group of
policy areas with legally enforceable provisions
(present in about one-third of the agreements) are
environmental laws, labour market regulations and
measures on visa and asylum. The remaining legally
enforceable policy areas appear in less than ten of the
agreements. So while there appears to have been a
significant increase in new policy areas in PTAs, the
picture that emerges from Figure D.8 is more nuanced.
Only a handful of truly important areas are affected,
where importance is judged by whether the provisions
can be enforced by the parties to the agreement.
Figure D.5: Covered and enforceable WTO+
provisions over time
Figure D.6: Covered and enforceable WTO-X
provisions over time
Figure D.5 shows that the average number of WTO+
areas covered by PTAs has been increasing over time.
From 1958 to 2010, the proportion of legally enforceable
provisions was very close to the total number of sectors
covered. As described above, WTO+ areas are those
covered by existing WTO agreements. The pattern
observed suggests that deepening commitments in
these areas, i.e. going beyond commitments in the WTO,
continue to be a major driving force for recent PTAs.
12
Number of WTO-X provisions (average)
Number of WTO+ provisions (average)
12
D.anatomy of Preferential
Trade Agreements
The majority of the EU's PTAs are concluded with
neighbouring countries, whereas those of the United
States tend to be more widely spread geographically.
Included in the coverage are ten PTAs concluded by
Japan, seven by China, five by Australia, five by the
Republic of Korea and four by India. The sample covers
18 major trading blocs. The analysis here departs slightly
from the HMS approach in that certain obligations covered
may not be the subject of a dedicated article or chapter.
Provisions in the areas of “visa and asylum” or “information
society”, for example, are often not explicitly mentioned as
an article or chapter heading, but in the context of other
provisions. Another notable example is export taxes where,
unlike HMS, this report considers “customs duties on
exports” as synonymous with export taxes. Finally, it should
be noted that the analysis relates to the version of the
trade agreement as it was signed or notified to the WTO.
This means it will not capture subsequent changes to an
agreement, such as the addition of new areas of
cooperation or a strengthening of existing provisions.
10
8
6
4
2
0
10
8
6
4
2
0
1958-79
1980-89
1990-99
Covered
Enforceable
Source: WTO Secretariat.
2000-10
1958-79
1980-89
1990-99
Covered
Enforceable
2000-10
Source: WTO Secretariat.
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world trade report 2011
Figure D.7: Number of agreements covering WTO+ provisions
100
90
80
Number of PTAs
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
TRIMS
STEs
SPS
State aid
TRIPS
Legally enforceable
Public procurement
Sector covered
GATS
TBT
Export tax
CVM
AD
Customs
Agricultural tariffs
Industrial tariffs
0
Source: WTO Secretariat.
Figure D.8: Number of agreements covering WTO-X provisions
100
90
Number of PTAs
60
50
40
30
Sector covered
Legally enforceable
20
10
Competition policy
IPR
Investment
Movement of capital
Environmental laws
Agriculture
Research and technology
Regional cooperation
Education and training
Energy
Labour market regulation
Industrial cooperation
Visa and asylum
Cultural cooperation
Social matters
Financial assistance
Consumer protection
Information society
SME
Approximation of legislation
Statistics
Human rights
Political dialogue
Economic policy dialogue
Illicit drugs
Money laundering
Anti-corruption
Data protection
Audiovisual
Illegal immigration
Mining
Taxation
Health
Public administration
Terrorism
Nuclear safety
Innovation policies
Civil protection
0
Source: WTO Secretariat.
To investigate possible differences among PTAs
signed between categories of countries – that is,
developed-developed,
developed-developing
and
developing-developing – the average number of
provisions in these PTA categories are compared (see
Figure D.9). PTAs between developed and developing
countries contain on average a higher number of
legally enforceable WTO+ provisions compared with
PTAs between trading partners with similar levels of
income (i.e. among developed or among developing
countries). How might this be explained? Barriers
affecting goods and services are generally higher in
132
developing than in developed countries. Developed
countries might use PTAs with developing countries to
obtain deeper levels of commitments than those made
in the WTO. In exchange, developing countries might
acquire fuller and greater security of market access to
the large economies of their PTA partners.
As shown in the second panel of Figure D.9, PTAs
between developed and developing countries also cover
a higher average number of WTO-X provisions than
PTAs between two developed countries or between two
developing countries. However, most of these provisions
II – The WTO and Preferential Trade Agreements
Figure D.9: Number of WTO+ and WTO-X provisions
WTO+ provisions
WTO-X provisions
Number of WTO-X provisions (average)
12
10
5
0
10
8
6
4
2
0
Developed
Source: WTO Secretariat.
DevelopedDeveloping
Developing
Covered
are not legally enforceable. Agreements between
developed countries on average have a higher number
of enforceable provisions, with PTAs between
developing countries having the smallest number of
enforceable WTO-X provisions. The pattern between
developed and developing countries observed in the
portion of Figure D.9 dealing with WTO-X provisions is
consistent with the argument made by HMS that
developed countries are seeking to “export” their
regulatory regimes to developing countries. The fact
that most of these WTO-X provisions are not legally
enforceable may suggest limited success in these
efforts, or perhaps that the process of regulatory
convergence in a legally binding sense is a gradual one.
It may at first appear surprising that agreements
between developing countries include WTO-X policy
areas. However, this pattern becomes more
understandable given that many of these PTAs typically
involve upper or middle-income developing countries
such as Chile, the Republic of Korea and Singapore.
They may have the same interest in exporting their
regulatory regimes as developed countries.
Overall, this analysis leads to two main conclusions.
First, where WTO+ provisions are encountered in
PTAs, involving any combination of developed or
developing countries, agreements have generally
served to strengthen rules and commitment levels
compared with the WTO agreements. The fact that
these are policy areas already covered by the WTO
has made it easier to give legal force to the relevant
provisions. Secondly, in spite of the apparent explosion
of new WTO-X issues covered by PTAs, the areas
embodying legally enforceable and therefore
substantive commitments in PTAs are relatively few,
and are to be found predominantly in the fields of
investment, competition policy, intellectual property
rights, and the movement of capital.
Developed
DevelopedDeveloping
Developing
Enforceable
(b) PTA commitments in selected policy
areas
D.anatomy of Preferential
Trade Agreements
Number of WTO+ provisions (average)
15
(i) Services
Services obligations are usually included in
comprehensive PTAs that cover not only trade in
goods, but also, for example, investment, intellectual
property, e-commerce and competition. Out of 85
notifications under Article V of the GATS,15 a little
more than one-third of the agreements follow a
structure that is close to that of the GATS, with a
similar set of obligations (national treatment, domestic
regulation, etc.) that apply to the four modes of
supply,16 and rely on a GATS-type “positive-list
modality” for the scheduling of liberalization
commitments.17 A positive-list approach means that
the obligations stipulated in the agreement apply only
to those services sectors listed in WTO members'
schedules of commitments (and subject to limitations
inscribed), while a negative-list approach means that
obligations in the agreement apply fully to all sectors,
subject only to explicitly listed reservations. In other
words, in a positive list approach only what is listed is
covered, whereas in a negative list approach everything
is covered apart from what is listed.
Almost half of the services PTAs notified follow a
different structure, which is closer to the approach used
in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
than to that of the GATS.18 Such agreements use a
negative-list modality for the scheduling of
commitments, and services trade is covered by different
sets of obligations. These include a chapter on crossborder services trade focusing on mode 1 (cross-border
supply), mode 2 (consumption abroad) and mode 4
(movement of natural persons), a chapter on investment
covering all sectors, including services, and separate
chapters on telecommunications, financial services and
the temporary entry of business persons.19
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Aside from innovations in architecture and marketopening modalities, most services PTAs tend to share
a broad commonality, among themselves and with the
GATS, in terms of a basic set of disciplines relating to
trade in services. These include national treatment
(the principle of giving others the same treatment as
one’s own nationals), market access, domestic
regulation obligations, exceptions, definitions and
scope. In the area of “rules”, for which negotiations are
provided for under the GATS, namely safeguards,
subsidies and procurement, PTAs have tended not to
go further. The same is true for most agreements in
regard to domestic regulation and transparency issues.
Important exceptions exist here, however, as some
countries have gone beyond GATS provisions. These
include a necessity test on domestic regulation in the
Switzerland-Japan PTA , or additional services-specific
provisions on transparency in US agreements. 21
How much more market access than under the
GATS?
In addition to architectural and rules-related differences
in the services provisions in PTAs, a key issue is the
extent of market-opening commitments – that is, the
level of access guaranteed for foreign services and
services suppliers (market access and national
treatment obligations). Studies have found that, overall,
services commitments in PTAs go beyond GATS
commitments currently in force. 22 Some studies also
show that PTA commitments go further than GATS
offers tabled so far in the Doha Development Agenda
(DDA). 23 GATS+ commitments in PTAs take the form of
both new bindings or commitments in services sectors
uncommitted under the GATS and better bindings in
sectors already committed under the GATS.
The value of services commitments in PTAs is largely
based on the fact that they guarantee a minimum level
of treatment – often a better one than that guaranteed
under the GATS. This is important for mode 3 (foreign
commercial presence), where the supply involves large
investments abroad, and for mode 1 (cross-border
supply), where the current lack of restrictions in various
sectors may not last as technological advances lead to
greater trade, and competitive pressures, via that
mode. 24 It is also important for mode 4 (movement of
natural persons), where measures affecting temporary
entry can rapidly be reversed.
134
PTA commitments are not expected to lead to many
occurrences of “real liberalization” – i.e. removal of
applied restrictions. At the same time, although such
information is not readily discernible from PTAs,
evidence suggests that some PTAs have, in certain
instances, directly led to the removal of certain applied
restrictions, for example the phasing out of the
monopoly in the insurance sector in Costa Rica and the
opening of the insurance sector to foreign branches in
Australia, the Dominican Republic or Chile. 25
Figure D.1026 highlights differences between services
commitments in the WTO and in PTAs by focusing on
the proportion of services subsectors that are subject
to market access/national treatment commitments. On
the basis of data for a large number of PTAs, the figure
shows that members involved in PTAs have, on
average, undertaken commitments on a greater
proportion of services subsectors than they have in
the GATS, or even than they have so far proposed in
their current GATS offers in the Doha Development
Agenda (DDA). This trend is clear in both modes 1 and
3, representing more than 80 per cent of the value of
world trade in services. Levels of sectoral coverage
achieved in PTAs are, on average, similar for
developing and developed countries included in the
sample. The contrast with the GATS, however, is
greater for developing countries, whose commitments
tend to apply to a more limited set of services
subsectors at the multilateral level.
Figure D.11 presents a more complete picture of
GATS+ commitments in PTAs by showing the
proportion of subsectors where commitments
undertaken by WTO members in PTAs go beyond
Figure D.10: Sector coverage in PTAs in
comparison with GATS commitments and DDA
offers (Percentage)
100
90
Average % of subsectors committed
for members reviewed
Over time, a number of agreements have innovated in
terms of their structure, combining elements of both
the original NAFTA and GATS-type models. 20 A
number of services PTAs, whether positive-list or
negative-list, also include some additional sectorspecific provisions, contained in annexes to relevant
chapters. Examples of these are recognition for
professional services in various PTAs, provisions
specific to express delivery services in US agreements,
and maritime services in the agreement between the
EU and the Caribbean Forum (CARIFORUM).
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Mode 1
GATS
Mode 3
With GATS offer
With PTA
Note: See Appendix Table D.3 for the list of PTAs covered.
Source: Updated from Roy et al. (2008) on the basis of an
expanded dataset.
II – The WTO and Preferential Trade Agreements
Figure D.11: Proportion of services subsectors subject to new or improved commitments in PTAs,
compared to GATS (by member) (Percentage)
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
D.anatomy of Preferential
Trade Agreements
ARG
ATG
AUS
BHR
BLZ
BRA
BRB
BRN
CAN
CHE
CHL
CHN
COL
CRI
DMA
DOM
EC
GRD
GTM
GUY
HND
IDN
IND
ISL
JAM
JOR
JPN
KNA
KOR
LCA
LIE
MAR
MEX
MYS
NIC
NOR
NZL
OMN
PAK
PAN
PER
PHL
PRY
SGP
SLV
SUR
CHT
THA
TTO
URY
USA
VCT
VNM
Subsectors committed under GATS
that are not further improved
Subsectors committed under GATS
that are further improved in PTAs
Subsectors that are newly
committed in PTAs
Note: GATS stands here for GATS commitments and DDA offers. Blue: subsectors committed under GATS; red: subsectors committed under
GATS but bound at a better level of treatment under PTAs; green: subsectors committed under PTAs that were uncommitted under GATS.
Covers each member’s “best” PTA commitment across all the PTAs it is party to. Covers modes 1 and 3. See Box A.1. The legend of the
acronyms for the members is provided in Appendix Table D.2.
Source: Updated from Roy et al. (2007), on the basis of expanded dataset.
135
world trade report 2011
those in GATS schedules of commitments and offers.
This captures not only those instances where PTAs
include new bindings in subsectors that were
uncommitted in the GATS, but also bindings at better
levels of access in PTAs for those subsectors already
subject to commitments under the GATS and DDA
offers. The underlying PTA information represents the
PTA in which the member concerned has undertaken
the highest level of binding – it is not an average of
bindings in all PTAs with services commitments. These
data underscore the magnitude of GATS+
commitments in PTAs, both among developing and
developed members.
The overall trend of significant GATS+ commitments
observed in many PTAs also embodies large variations
among
parties.
Some
exhibit
spectacular
improvements over what is committed or offered under
the WTO, particularly in the case of a number of
developing countries in Latin America. Others, such as
ASEAN countries (other than Singapore), show
relatively more limited GATS+ commitments in PTAs.
Moreover, a large number of those members that have
made more significant GATS+ commitments have
submitted relatively limited offers in the services
negotiations in the DDA.
The level of services commitments of individual parties
to PTAs also varies significantly among agreements.
Singapore's services commitments, for example, vary
notably in its agreements with the United States,
Japan, and other ASEAN countries. Important
variations can also be observed in the PTA
commitments of Australia, Chile and the Republic of
Korea. Commitments by the United States, in contrast,
do not vary significantly among PTAs, except for its
agreement with Jordan, which was based on the GATS
(see Appendix Figure D.1).
No simple or single reason explains why PTA
commitments are different among the PTAs signed by
various countries, or why PTA commitments are
generally more far-reaching than those offered in the
GATS. It has been argued that factors such as
reciprocity (within services, but also among other
issues) as well as the respective economic size and
importance of the parties involved have played a role.27
For example, the United States always obtains better
commitments overall on modes 1 and 3 from its trading
partners than the commitments these countries
undertake in PTAs with other countries. In Appendix
Figure D.1, this is apparent in the PTA commitments of
Chile, the Republic of Korea, Australia and Singapore.
The type of liberalization modalities used in the PTA is
also a factor, as agreements using negative list28
modalities have tended, on average, to result in greater
commitments than positive list ones. This may, of course,
be due to the fact that governments which are ready to
assume more commitments are more comfortable with
the negative list approach.29 Although not investigated in
136
the context of services PTAs, the nature of political
regimes may also play a role in influencing levels of
GATS+ commitments that governments are ready to
undertake in a preferential context.30
Figure D.12 shows GATS and PTA commitments by
sector for modes 1 and 3. Overall, services commitments
at the sectoral level in PTAs are more numerous than
those in GATS sectors. Sectors that have proved more
difficult at the multilateral level (e.g. audiovisual,
education) have also attracted less GATS+ commitments
than sectors such as telecommunications or financial
services. However, PTA commitments for the former
have still gone significantly beyond GATS commitments.
Qualitative analysis of PTA commitments in a number of
sectors also highlights this point. 31 Nevertheless, the
more sensitive sectors for larger trading partners have
been subject to little or no improvement in PTAs
(e.g. maritime transport for the United States or
audiovisual services for the European Union).
As for differences according to the level of
development among parties, the GATS+ commitments
of developed economies tend to be more limited
overall in PTAs in view of the higher levels of GATS
commitments in these countries. For developed
countries, GATS+ commitments largely take the form
of better levels of bindings for sectors already covered
under the GATS. The GATS+ commitments of
developing countries are spread across all sectors,
with particularly significant advances in such areas as
business,
environmental
services,
distribution,
education and postal-courier services. Overall, PTAs
have narrowed the gap in commitment levels between
developed and developing countries.
GATS+ commitments are more significant in crossborder supply (mode 1) and commercial presence
(mode 3) than they are in respect of the temporary
movement of natural persons (mode 4). Mode 4
commitments are essentially defined in a crosssectoral manner in both the GATS and PTAs. PTAs
have on the whole made notable improvements over
the GATS, although to a lesser extent in such important
categories of natural persons as “independent
professionals” and “contractual service suppliers”. 32
The scale of GATS+ commitments varies significantly
from one member to another. According to Stephenson
and Delourme (2010), Australia, Canada, the European
Union and Japan have undertaken some significant
GATS+ commitments in some recent PTAs. 33 On the
other hand, most United States PTAs on services,
including all those notified to the WTO after 2003, do
not go beyond GATS on mode 4. The same is true for a
number of PTA commitments by developing countries.
However, the broader sectoral coverage of most PTAs
means that, at a minimum, GATS-type mode 4
commitments are extended to many previously
uncommitted sectors. 34
II – The WTO and Preferential Trade Agreements
Figure D.12: GATS+ commitments in PTAs by sector, modes 1 and 3 (Percentage)
Members with commitments under
GATS, without improvement in PTAs
Audiovisual
Computer
Banking and financial
Construction
Education
Distribution
Environmental
Insurance
Tourism
Members improving upon GATS
commitments in PTAs
Health and social
0
Maritime transport
0
Professional
10
Audiovisual
20
10
Computer
20
Banking and financial
30
Construction
30
Education
40
Distribution
40
Environmental
50
Insurance
60
50
Health and social
60
Maritime transport
70
Professional
70
Postal-courier
80
Tourism
80
Telecom
90
D.anatomy of Preferential
Trade Agreements
90
Postal-courier
Mode 3
100
Telecom
Mode 1
100
Members committing for first time
through PTAs
Note: GATS stands here for GATS commitments and DDA offers. Done on the basis of each member’s “best” PTA commitment across all
the PTAs it is party to.
Source: Updated from Roy et al. (2007), on the basis of expanded dataset.
Bilateral investment treaties (BITs) also cover issues
relevant to mode 3. Although the majority of BITs are
limited to post-establishment investor rights, some
also include commitments on investments in services
sectors with respect to the establishment phase. 35
This is particularly the case with BITs concluded by the
United States.
Finally, PTAs are sometimes GATS-minus, in that they
contain commitments that provide for less than what is
bound under the GATS, either by excluding sectors
(e.g. financial services in certain PTAs) or by listing
limitations not foreseen in GATS commitments. 36
(ii) Investment
The trade and investment literature – see, for example,
Helpman (1984); Markusen (1984); Brainard (1993);
Brainard (1997) and Markusen (1998) – allows us to
infer what provisions in trade agreements, and in
investment chapters in particular, will be needed to
facilitate international production networks. A key insight
of this literature is that what gives the multinational
enterprise its competitive edge in international markets
is its firm-specific assets – human capital (management
or technical experts) and intellectual property, such as
patents or blueprints. Hence provisions in PTAs that give
ample protection to these assets will encourage more
FDI flows and production sharing. Examples of such
provisions are protection against expropriation or a
commitment to compensate investors in the case of
expropriation.
Allowing freer movement of corporate personnel would
be another critical ingredient in PTAs motivated by
production sharing. Another provision that may improve
investor confidence is having the right to invoke the
PTA's dispute settlement mechanism. Finally, reducing
barriers to investment will allow more enterprises the
opportunity to establish a production facility in a
foreign location.
What are investment provisions in PTAs commonly
about?
Several studies have analysed investment provisions in
PTAs – see, for example, Dee et al. (2006); Dee (2008);
Houde et al. (2007); Kotschwar (2009) and Berger et
al. (2010). For the purpose of this report, the Kotschwar
study will be used. It is based on an examination of the
investment chapters or provisions in 52 PTAs. The
sample of PTAs includes 22 free trade agreements
among countries of the Americas. Two agreements are
from the 1980s, 13 from the 1990s, and 33 from
137
world trade report 2011
2000 onwards. Seventeen agreements in the sample
pair countries of the Americas with others outside the
region, including eight with Asian countries, six with
countries in the Middle East and three with European
partners. Eight agreements are between Asian
countries, two agreements among European countries
or groups (European transition agreements), and one
each involving Europe-Africa, Europe-Asia, EuropeMiddle East and Africa-Africa. More than 30 specific
features of the investment chapters in these
agreements were examined in Kotschwar's 2009 study.
One potential shortcoming of the approach taken here
to examine investment provisions in PTAs is that these
agreements are not the sole avenue for making
international commitments in investments. Over the
past 20 years, there has been an explosion of bilateral
investment treaties (BITs). The United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)
estimates that the total number of BITs increased
more than six-fold during the 1990s, with their number
rising from 385 in 1989 to some 2,750 by the end of
2009. 37 One reason why investment and trade have
been regulated by distinct treaties is because
investment and trade disciplines focused on “different
but complementary objectives” (DiMascio and
Pauwelyn, 2008). Trade agreements seek to increase
trading opportunities and investment agreements seek
to protect and promote foreign investment.
Even though PTAs increasingly include investment
rules, their numbers are still dwarfed by the BITs. For
instance, UNCTAD's BITs database reports that 82
BITs were signed in 2009, which exceeds the number
of PTAs containing investment provisions notified to
the WTO that year. 38 BITs have clearly been an
important vehicle for guaranteeing investor protection
(Adlung and Molinuevo, 2008). Baldwin (2010)
considers the explosion of BITs in the 1990s as an
important means by which emerging markets were
able to attract offshored manufacturing jobs and
factories. Thus, it could be argued that BITs and
investment chapters in PTAs play largely similar roles
in the spread of international production networks.
Kotschwar's study identifies a number of key elements
in the investment provisions of PTAs, including
coverage, non-discrimination, standards of treatment,
investor protection, temporary movement and
nationality of senior personnel, and dispute settlement.
Each of these is considered briefly below.
Coverage
The coverage of the investment chapter depends on how
investment is defined and what disciplines are contained
in the chapter. Investment may be defined in either a
broad, asset-based way (including both FDI and portfolio
investment) or more narrowly using an enterprise-based
approach (comprising the establishment or acquisition of
a business enterprise). Investment disciplines may be
138
divided between the investment and services chapters of
an agreement. As a consequence, interactions between
them are more prevalent, and are governed either in the
investment or the services chapter (Houde et al., 2007).
Alternatively, investment disciplines are contained in the
investment chapter and there is limited interaction with
the services chapter.39
Principle of non-discrimination
A key mechanism for opening up investment
opportunities in a PTA is the application of the principle
of non-discrimination to foreign investors. The extent of
opening depends upon how broadly investment is
defined in the agreement (i.e. the range of assets to
which non-discrimination applies), whether the principle
is applied to the entire lifetime of the investment (preand post-establishment), and the number of reservations.
There are two broad approaches for determining
reservations: the negative list and positive list approach,
as explained earlier. In general, a negative list approach
is likely to yield greater investment opportunities.
Standard of treatment
Beyond non-discrimination, investment provisions also
specify other standards of treatment of foreign
investors. These include such standards as fair and
equitable treatment under international law, and
freedom in transferring payments abroad.
Investor protection
Most investment chapters contain provisions
stipulating that investors are protected or will be
compensated in the event that the host country
nationalizes or expropriates an investment.
Senior management and personnel
Most PTAs provide for the temporary entry of managers
and key personnel of a foreign investor. Some
agreements allow hiring of top managerial personnel
regardless of nationality, while other agreements hold
that the foreign investor may not stipulate the nationality
of a majority of the board of directors.
Dispute settlement
While many investment chapters in PTAs now contain
provisions on dispute settlement, disputes are handled
in a variety of ways. Some PTAs provide for the
settlement of disputes through coordination and
negotiation; others contain provision only for state-tostate settlement of disputes. However, some PTAs,
such as NAFTA, now allow investor-state dispute
settlement. An investor that is a national of a PTA
member may submit to international arbitration a claim
that a PTA member (state) has breached obligations
under the investment provisions of the PTA.
II – The WTO and Preferential Trade Agreements
Patterns over time
The agreements in Kotschwar's sample span from the
early 1980s to around 2009. Using the total number
of provisions in the investment chapter as an indicator
of investment openness, later agreements appear to
be more open than earlier ones (see Figure D.14).40
This trend is the same even if a narrower set of
provisions in the investment chapter are used, such as
only those limited to MFN and national treatment.
Are there families of investment provisions?
Kotschwar finds that PTAs are grouped roughly around
two hubs: a NAFTA-type hub, which includes
agreements among countries in the Americas and
increasingly in the Asia-Pacific region, and the
European-style hub. She characterizes all the PTAs in
Figure D.13: Proportion of PTAs with selected provisions in investment chapter (Percentage)
80
D.anatomy of Preferential
Trade Agreements
Kotschwar's sample of PTAs is used to provide a more
detailed analysis of those elements of the agreements
that might be seen as essential for production networks.
Figure D.13 shows that a large proportion of the sample
of the PTAs (between 60 and 70 per cent) have adopted
a negative list approach to investment commitments.
MFN and national treatment have also been widely
guaranteed to foreign investors who wish to establish a
presence, or acquire or resell holdings. Investor
protection guarantees are written into most agreements,
and private investors are frequently granted the right to
dispute settlement. In general, the investment provisions
in these PTAs appear to be rather open, although no
attempt was made in the Kotschwar study to test how
much these provisions actually affected FDI flows.
Some econometric evidence is available, however,
showing that FDI flows respond to provisions in the
investment chapters of PTAs. See Dee et al. (2006),
Dee (2008) and Berger et al. (2010).
60
40
20
0
Negative list
approach
Establishment
Acquisition
Post-establishment
Resale
Investor
protection
MFN and national treatment
Investor access
to dispute
settlement
mechanism
Source: Calculated from Kotschwar (2009).
Figure D.14: Total number of provisions in investment chapter over time
18
Total number of provisions
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
1982
1987
1993
1998
2004
2009
Source: Calculated from Kotschwar (2009).
139
world trade report 2011
the sample involving the three NAFTA members
(Canada, Mexico and the United States) with their
respective partners in the Americas as “encompassing”,
since they apply the four modalities that determine
investment conditions: establishment, acquisition,
post-establishment operations and resale. They also
cover such disciplines as MFN treatment, national
treatment, and dispute settlement. Eighty per cent or
more also cover transparency, protection against
denial of benefits and restriction of transfers, minimum
limitations on the nationality of management and the
board of directors, no performance requirements and
guarantees against expropriation.
The United States leads the way in designing
particularly comprehensive PTAs. In Asia, Kotschwar
finds that Singapore and Australia’s agreements are
more comprehensive, but other agreements have scant
coverage. In interregional agreements, she finds that
the coverage is somewhat lower due to the limited
coverage of disciplines in the EU-Mexico and EU-Chile
agreements, as well as in the Chile-China Free Trade
Agreement (FTA), the P-4 Agreement (Australia,
Brunei Darussalam, Chile and Singapore), and the USJordan FTA.
Kotschwar observes that the agreements signed among
developed economies tend to go beyond provisions at
the multilateral level. This is most obvious where they
include separate investment chapters that go beyond
services, cover all investment phases, employ a negative
list approach, and have little or no limitations on the
nationality of board members and management. A
geographic divide exists with respect to limitations on
performance requirements. United States agreements
(except
for
US-Israel)
restrict
performance
requirements. Singapore agreements (except for USSingapore and Japan-Singapore) do not.
A similar division is seen in terms of transparency
requirements. Agreements in the Americas tend to add
prior comment and publication obligations to the
GATS, and establish national enquiry points. Asian
agreements, by and large, do not. Australian
agreements (with the United States and with
Singapore) incorporate GATS-style denial of benefits.
Among agreements that include Asian members, only
a handful adopt tougher-than-GATS treatment. All of
these are with countries in the Americas (Chile-Korea,
Mexico-Japan,
US-Korea
and
US-Singapore).
Agreements with Australia or Israel do not contain
investor-state dispute settlement mechanisms except
for the Singapore-Australia agreement – all Singapore
agreements incorporate this element.
As for agreements between developed and developing
countries, those in the Americas all contain a separate
investment chapter or incorporate a BIT. EU
agreements with developing countries generally do
not. PTAs among developing countries vary
considerably in content and approach. Agreements
140
signed by Chile and Mexico with other developing
countries look much more like the agreements
involving developed countries than those signed
among other developing countries, such as
MERCOSUR. These latter agreements tend to open
markets more gradually.
(iii) Technical barriers to trade
In a world where tariff barriers have progressively
fallen, non-tariff barriers to trade have acquired more
significance. As noted above, many PTAs include
norms on technical barriers to trade (TBT) and a
growing number include TBT provisions.
Data reported here on TBT provisions in PTAs are
taken from a study by Piermartini and Budetta (2009)
of 70 PTAs that differ in terms of geographical
characteristics, level of development and the extent of
intra-regional trade. Fifty-eight of the 70 PTAs
surveyed contained TBT provisions. The study employs
a template that maps TBT provisions in terms of the
integration approach chosen for standards, technical
regulations and conformity assessment procedures
(i.e.
harmonization
or
mutual
recognition),
improvements in transparency, institutions or
mechanisms to administer the agreement and solve
disputes, and the possibility of cooperation among
regional partners on standards-related issues beyond
trade objectives and technical assistance. Since this
database primarily41 relies on the legal texts of the
agreements, it does not allow an assessment of the
actual extent of implementation of the provisions.
What are TBT provisions in PTAs commonly
about?
The most common provisions in PTAs (occurring in
over 50 per cent of the 58 PTAs included in the
Piermartini and Budetta study that contain TBT
provisions) are mutual recognition of conformity
assessment, harmonization of technical regulations,
transparency provisions, and provisions that establish
institutional machinery such as a committee, a body or
a network for standard-related matters (see
Figure D.15). Harmonized standards, harmonized
conformity assessment procedures and dispute
settlement provisions were found in more than 40 per
cent of the agreements contained in the sample of 58
PTAs. Provisions dealing with the mutual recognition
of regulations and standards, common policies,
technical assistance and metrology occurred in less
than 30 to 40 per cent of the agreements.
Mutual recognition means that countries agree to
recognize each other's regulations, standards or
conformity assessment procedures as equivalent, thus
facilitating the unimpeded flow of goods into partner
markets. Like mutual recognition, harmonization of
regulations and standards is a step towards more open
trade. Both mutual recognition and harmonization
II – The WTO and Preferential Trade Agreements
Figure D.15: Percentage of PTAs by TBT provision
80
70
50
40
30
20
Metrology
Technical assistance
Common policy
Dispute settlement
mechanisms
Administrative bodies
Transparency
Harm. conformity
assessment
Harm. technical
regulations
Harm. standards
MR conformity
assessment
MR technical
regulations
MR standards
0
Note: Percentages are relative to the 58 PTAs in the sample containing TBT provisions. MR denotes mutual recognition and Harm. means
harmonization.
D.anatomy of Preferential
Trade Agreements
10
Source: Authors’ calculations on Piermartini and Budetta (2009) database.
The advantage of harmonization relative to mutual
recognition in terms of its effects on trade is that with
harmonization products produced in different countries
are more similar (more homogeneous) and therefore
better substitutes from the point of view of producers
and consumers. This, in turn, may facilitate trade by
improving consumer confidence about the quality of
imported goods. In enhancing compatibility between
imported
and
domestically
produced
goods,
harmonization makes it easier for consumers to match
products. It is also likely to increase competition, reduce
prices and increase trade. However, harmonization
involves more arduous negotiations and carries higher
regulatory costs than mutual recognition.
Finally, strengthening cooperation on the institutional
set-up for the standards regime is a step towards
further trade opening because it is likely to promote
the effective implementation of measures. In general,
the gap between law and practice will depend on
institutions and administrative procedures.
Who integrates TBT provisions the most?
Agreements signed between countries similar in terms
of levels of development, technology, environmental
requirements and preferences are likely to be deeper
in terms of TBT integration than those between more
dissimilar countries. This is because countries that are
alike tend to share similar policy objectives and
therefore similar types of standards. In addition,
countries at a higher level of development are more
likely to trust one another's conformity assessments
and standards than countries at a lower level of
development.
In order to understand the overall level of TBT
integration, PTAs have been ranked on the basis of
provisions that go beyond WTO commitments
(i.e. WTO+ integration). Figure D.16 shows the average
Figure D.16: Average degree of TBT integration
by level of development
16
Number of WTO+ TBT provisions (average)
promote transparency and trade opening by reducing
the costs to exporters of monitoring destination country
policy changes. These arrangements also provide
exporters with easier access to information about the
preferences of consumers in partner countries.42
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
South-South
North-North
North-South
Note: The “North” consists of the EU, EFTA countries, Australia,
New Zealand, the United States, Canada and Japan.
Agreements with no TBT provisions are included.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Piermartini and Budetta
(2009) database.
141
world trade report 2011
level of WTO+ integration achieved by PTAs classified
according to the level of development and similarity of
their member countries. In line with the prediction that
a deeper level of integration is likely to be achieved in
PTAs among countries with a similar level of
development and higher incomes, agreements
between developed countries (the North) display the
highest degree of TBT integration on average. PTAs
between developing countries (the South) score more
highly than agreements between a developed and a
developing country, confirming the proposition that
integration is more likely among similar countries.
PTAs that harmonize standards are likely to feature
hub-and-spoke characteristics, with a larger partner
representing the hub to whose standards the spokes
will conform. This tendency can result in standards
becoming a barrier to trade and integration among
major regional groupings.43
(iv) Competition policy
Table D.3 shows patterns of TBT integration by region.
The most common provisions (defined as those that
occurred in over 60 per cent of the cases) are shaded
in green, the least common (those occurring in less
than 40 per cent of cases) are shaded in blue, and the
rest (occurring between 40 and 60 per cent of cases)
are shaded in red. While mutual recognition of
conformity assessment is common across the board,
significant differences are discernible in relation to
other measures adopted in PTAs.
The presence of monopolies, cartels and other forms
of private anti-competitive practices can frustrate the
benefits of trade, investment and services reform.
These market features prevent multinational
enterprises from taking full advantage of differences
in costs among countries through fragmenting
production. The adoption of competition policy is in
many ways a natural complement to the reduction of
trade, investment and services barriers. While the
latter reduce or eliminate policy-created distortions,
competition policy dilutes or prevents the abuse of
market power. As noted by many commentators, the
stillborn 1948 Havana Charter of the International
Trade Organization included provisions on restrictive
business practices, testifying to the recognition by
negotiators of the link between trade opening and
competition law.
A major difference exists between EU-type and North
American-type agreements in terms of the choice
between harmonization and mutual recognition as a
vehicle for TBT integration. PTAs involving the EU
typically prefer harmonization, while North American
agreements tend to prefer mutual recognition. In
addition, TBT provisions in PTAs in North America,
East Asia and South-Central America mainly focus on
introducing transparency requirements and developing
institutional bodies, while EU and African agreements
barely consider these issues.
The following analysis of competition rules in PTAs is
based on recent research by Silva (2004); Brusik et al.
(2005); Anderson and Evenett (2006); Solano and
Sennekamp (2006); Teh (2009) and Dawar and
Holmes (2010). Many studies of competition rules in
PTAs have focused only on the competition policy
chapters of agreements. However, as Anderson and
Evenett (2006) have emphasized, competition-related
provisions also appear in other provisions. In their view,
these sector-specific competition provisions may have
stronger pro-competitive effects than the competition
Are there families of PTAs in the context of TBT
integration?
Table D.3: Patterns of TBT integration across regions (percentage of PTAs by provision and region)
EU
MR standards
13
7
MR technical regulations
13
40
South
Central
America
Africa
8
6
0
31
41
0
East Asia
MR conformity assessment
67
73
69
76
70
Harm. standards
80
20
31
47
60
Harm. technical regulations
73
27
54
59
50
Harm. conformity assessment
80
20
31
47
60
Transparency requirements
20
67
62
65
20
Administrative body
20
67
62
76
40
Dispute settlement body
20
33
46
47
20
Common policy
7
0
15
6
20
Technical assistance
40
40
23
65
40
Metrology
47
13
8
47
60
Note: MR refers to mutual recognition and Harm. to harmonization.
Source: Calculations on Piermartini and Budetta (2009) database.
142
North
America
Provisions
II – The WTO and Preferential Trade Agreements
policy chapter itself, assuming that the trade
agreement even has one. The authors also draw
attention to what they refer to as “horizontal principles”
relating to the non-discrimination, procedural fairness
and transparency provisions in the agreements.
Confirming the hypothesis of Anderson and Evenett,
the study by Teh (2009) documents how a large
number of PTAs include competition disciplines in the
chapters
on
investment,
services
(in
telecommunications, maritime transport and financial
services), government procurement and intellectual
property. Based on his sample of 74 PTAs, Figure D.17
shows the proportion of PTAs which contain
competition-related elements in the other chapters of
the agreements. More than a quarter of the PTAs, for
example, have provisions that guard against major
telecommunications suppliers engaging in anticompetitive practices. About one-fifth of the PTAs
have an intellectual property (IP) chapter preventing
abuse or anti-competitive behaviour by IP rights
holders.
The main obligations found in the competition policy
chapters of PTAs are the adoption or application of
competition law and closer cooperation among
competition authorities of PTA partners. Several types
of behaviour are considered anti-competitive or as
having the potential to affect competition adversely,
and are explicitly mentioned in the agreements. These
include concerted actions, abuse of a dominant
position and state aid. Monopolies, state enterprises
and undertakings with special or exclusive rights are
also given particular attention.
Competition policy chapters typically mandate closer
cooperation among national competition authorities,
although for the most part the scope of cooperation is
limited to the exchange of information, notification and
consultation. A small number of PTAs, however, give a
substantial role to regional bodies in carrying out
surveillance and investigations, and in taking measures
to curb anti-competitive behaviour.
D.anatomy of Preferential
Trade Agreements
Transparency requires the publication of laws
promoting fair competition and addressing anticompetitive practices. Procedural fairness requires
that administrative proceedings are consistent,
impartial and reasonable and that it is possible to
review or appeal any decisions taken in administrative
proceedings. Anderson and Evenett (2006) argue that
these horizontal principles have a bearing on
competition law and policy.
As has been argued in this report, infrastructural
services, investments, and intellectual property
protection are likely to be central ingredients of wellfunctioning production networking arrangements. The
application of competition rules in these areas
complements the reduction of trade and other
regulatory barriers.
One complication in assessing the policy effects of
competition policy chapters, as distinguished from the
sector-specific competition provisions and horizontal
Figure D.17: Sector-specific competition provisions in PTAs
30
25
Frequency
20
15
10
5
Investment
Services
Telecommunications
Govt. procurement
Prevent abuse of IP rights
Permit use of IP to remedy
anti-competitive practice
Treatment of tenders
and awarding of contracts
Limited tendering
Info. on intended procurements
(incl. technical specifications)
Tendering principles (incl. nondisclosure of confidential info.)
Maritime transport
Value-added services
Universal service
Major suppliers/
competitive safeguards
Financial services
Monopolies and exclusive
service providers
National treatment
Information requirements
Performance requirements
0
Int. property
Source: Teh (2009).
143
world trade report 2011
Figure D.18: Competition disciplines in PTAs over time
14
Number of competition provisions
12
10
8
6
Average
4
2
0
1957
1964
1971
1978
1984
1991
1998
2005
Source: Teh (2009).
principles, is that a sizeable number of PTAs exclude
them wholly or in part from dispute settlement
provisions in the agreement. Out of the 55 PTAs with
competition policy provisions in the sample of 74 PTAs
in Teh (2009), 14 exclude all of these provisions from
dispute settlement, while another two exclude parts of
the competition provisions. These carve-outs suggest
that competition policy chapters are for the most part
intended to operate on a “best endeavour” basis only.44
They also underscore the importance of the horizontal
principles and sector-specific competition provisions
outside the competition policy chapters of the relevant
PTAs.
Pattern over time
Figure D.18 shows that the commitment to promote
competition though PTAs has increased over time. The
focus of this analysis is limited to sector-specific and
horizontal competition provisions, given that a sizeable
number of PTAs exclude, completely or in part, the
competition policy provisions from dispute settlement.
The vertical axis in Figure D.18 measures the frequency
of the sector-specific and horizontal provisions of each
PTA in the sample while the horizontal axis shows the
date on which the PTA entered into force. The increased
commitment to promote competition is shown by the
ascending blue line for the entire sample of 74 PTAs
which came into force from 1958 to 2006.
Are there families of PTAs in the context of
competition policy?
The question whether distinct kinds of competition
provisions are found in agreements involving particular
countries is relevant in light of the claim by Horn et al.
(2010) that certain PTA hubs tend to export their
regulatory regimes to PTA partners. Solano and
Sennekamp (2006) argue that distinct patterns can be
detected in the competition policy provisions in EUand NAFTA-style agreements. Since that study
144
focused only on the competition policy chapters of the
agreements, the question arises whether the finding
holds if a broader view is taken of competition
provisions in PTAs.
The analysis undertaken in this report suggests that
the Solano and Sennekamp finding is robust, even if
we include the sector-specific and horizontal
provisions. Four salient differences are identifiable in
the treatment of competition policy in PTAs involving
the EU and the United States. First, horizontal
principles are more pronounced in US-centred PTAs.
Secondly, competition disciplines are fairly prominent
in the sectoral chapters of US PTAs, particularly in
telecommunications, government procurement and
investment. Thirdly, compared with the EU agreements,
there is less likelihood of finding a specific competition
policy chapter in North American PTAs. Nearly all of
the PTAs concluded by the EU contain competition
policy chapters. Finally, US-centred PTAs exclude
competition policy chapters from dispute settlement.
It is difficult to ascertain the practical relevance of
these differences. In the analysis of TBT provisions in
PTAs, one explanation for the observed existence of
families of PTAs was that the hub in hub-and-spoke
PTAs was exporting its regulatory regime to the
spokes. Thus one interpretation is that the two trading
powers are interested in exporting different aspects of
their competition regulations to their PTA partners.
Are competition rules preferential?
Unlike traditional market access provisions, many
elements of competition rules in PTAs are
characterized by non-discrimination, see for example,
Teh (2009) and Dawar and Holmes (2010).
Competition disciplines usually operate through the
use of domestic regulations.45 While it is not
impossible for these regulations to be tailored to
favour enterprises originating from PTA partners, it
II – The WTO and Preferential Trade Agreements
may be costly to do so and becomes even more
difficult as the number of PTAs to which a country is a
signatory increases. Transparency, and in particular
the obligation to publish laws promoting competition,
provides information that is available to PTA and nonPTA members alike.
Finally, positive benefits (spillovers) may arise from
competition provisions, particularly if they are
contained in regional rather than bilateral agreements
(Dawar and Holmes, 2010). Economies of scale can be
realized from the creation of a regional competition
authority. Even if no centralized authority is
established, beneficial spillovers can result from
information sharing and cooperation among
enforcement authorities. There can also be
demonstration effects in other jurisdictions, when a
competition authority in one PTA member takes action
against another for anti-competitive behaviour.
Eventually, more common competition norms and
practices within a PTA will prevent regulatory arbitrage,
where enterprises locate in a jurisdiction in the PTA
with relatively lax competition policy.
3. Production networks and deep PTAs
In this section of the report, we turn to the role of
international production networks in encouraging the
establishment of “deep” PTAs that go beyond reducing
tariffs. The econometric results show that greater
trade in parts and components is associated with the
greater depth of newly signed agreements among PTA
members. In addition, the analysis shows that the
greater the depth of an agreement, the bigger the
increase in trade among PTA members. To complement
this analysis, we examine two case studies from
different regions of the world: ASEAN (Association of
Southeast Asian Nations) and Costa Rica. These
provide useful insights into the link between production
networks and the process of creating a PTA.46 The
intention is to document the growth of trade in parts
and components as well inflows of foreign direct
investment during the period leading up to the
conclusion of the trade agreement.
The theoretical literature on PTAs reviewed in
Section C.2 suggests that the relationship between
deep integration and trade goes in both directions. On
the one hand, PTAs may stimulate the creation of
production networks by facilitating trade among
potential members of a supply chain. On the other
hand, countries already involved in the international
fragmentation of production are willing to sign
preferential trade agreements with their partners in
order to secure their trading relationships as providers
of intermediate goods and services. Moreover, when
production networks take place among countries with
significant gaps (or differences) in business laws and
regulations, deep PTAs are a vehicle for narrowing
such gaps and further developing production sharing
activity. In this section we will empirically test both
directions of causality.
The impact of PTAs on trade has been widely
studied.47 The main conclusion of these studies is that
PTAs boost trade among members. The literature on
the effects of deep integration, however, is limited.
One of the main reasons for this is that difficulties
arise in defining and measuring the depth of
agreements (see Section C.2). In this section, an
attempt will be made to investigate the effects of deep
integration on trade with a focus on production
networks for the sub-set of agreements analysed in
Section D.2.48
D.anatomy of Preferential
Trade Agreements
Competition policy chapters typically mandate the
application of competition law and the establishment
of a competition authority. To the extent that
enforcement of competition law in a country reduces
the market power of domestic incumbents, all foreign
enterprises that operate in the market stand to benefit,
regardless of whether or not they are from a PTA
member. Competition policy obligations also provide
opportunities for new foreign entrants (either from
PTA or non-PTA members) to challenge domestic
incumbents.
(a) Deep integration and production
networks: an empirical analysis
The depth of an agreement will be defined in terms of
coverage and will be captured by two sets of indices.
The first group of indices is constructed on the basis
of the number of legally enforceable WTO+ and
WTO-X provisions included in each agreement. The
higher the number of enforceable provisions covered
by an agreement, the deeper the agreement. A
limitation of these indices is that they give the same
weight to each of the areas covered in a PTA, thereby
assuming that the potential impact of each provision
on production networks is of the same magnitude.
To deal with this problem, another method – known as
a principal factors component methodology49 – will
also be used to generate an index capturing the depth
of an agreement. This methodology is not theoretically
founded but it can be used as a starting point for
further research on how to quantify deep integration.
Two alternative indices capturing the depth of an
agreement in areas such as competition policy and TBTs
are also considered. These indices are also computed in
terms of the coverage of provisions, with a higher index
score representing increased depth in the relevant
area. 50 These particular provisions are chosen for two
reasons. First, an existing literature51 has attempted indepth analysis and a mapping of the provisions.
Secondly, as discussed in Section D.2, areas such as
145
world trade report 2011
competition policy and TBT are important in terms of
production sharing. The integration of TBT measures
makes international fragmentation of production easier
by lowering the cost of testing and product certification.
Competition policy allows multinational enterprises to
take full advantage of cost differences among countries
when production is fragmented.
An augmented gravity equation52 is estimated for 200
countries, using data from 1980 to 2007, in order to
investigate the effect of deep integration on production
networks. This methodology has been extensively used
by economists to test empirically the determinants of
trade flows, and in particular to estimate the effect of
preferential trade opening on trade flows. Estimating
the effects of PTAs on bilateral trade in parts and
components using a gravity equation is, however,
susceptible to an endogeneity problem. 53 In order to
take account of this, the approach used by Baier and
Bergstrand (2007) is followed. 54
Lack of data poses some difficulties in assessing the
international fragmentation of production. This is why
the empirical literature often draws on proxy measures
for production networks. Different approaches have
been used to quantify the magnitude and pattern of
manufacturing trade directly attributable to production
networks. 55 We follow Yeats (1998) and Hummels et
al. (2001) and use trade in parts and components to
proxy for global production sharing. 56
Preliminary results show that, as expected, signing a PTA
increases production sharing among countries. More
specifically, preferential trade agreements increase trade
in parts and components by 35 per cent among country
members (see column (1) of Appendix Table D.4). In
addition, countries that sign deep agreements trade more
than countries that sign shallow agreements. In other
words, having an additional provision in an agreement will
increase trade by almost 2 percentage points on average
(see columns (2) (3) and (4) of Appendix Table D.4).
Interpreting the magnitude of deep integration when it is
measured using principal component analysis is less
intuitive, since it is not easy to understand the meaning of
a one-unit increase in such an index. However, results
show that on average, signing deep agreements
increases trade in production networks between member
countries by almost 8 percentage points (see column 5
of Appendix Table D.4).
Preliminary evidence also shows that deeper
agreements in areas such as TBT measures and
competition policy have a positive and significant
impact on production networks (see the last two
columns of Appendix Table D.4). Including an additional
provision in competition policy or TBTs will increase
trade by one and three percentage points respectively.
Results confirm that TBT integration involving mutual
recognition, harmonization of standards and
transparency decreases the costs of fragmentation of
production. The adoption of competition law and
146
higher levels of cooperation among country members
of a PTA also make production sharing more profitable
for firms in the countries concerned.
Since the TBT integration and competition policy
indices are based on different samples of countries, it
is not possible to compare the magnitude of these
coefficients in order to determine which policy area is
the most important in relation to production networks.
So far, we have considered whether deep agreements
increase trade in parts and components. The second
question noted at the start of this subsection was
whether higher levels of trade in parts and components
increase the likelihood of signing deeper agreements. In
order to answer this, we follow the literature on the
determinants of preferential trade agreements57 and
estimate an equation in which the depth of an agreement
is now the dependent variable to be explained and the
share of trade in parts and components in total trade is
included as an explanatory variable. 58
Results (see Appendix Table D.5) show that higher
levels of trade in parts and components relative to
total trade have a positive impact on the depth of an
agreement. This effect is still significant after taking
account of other PTA determinants, such as the
economic similarity between countries and their
differences in relative factor endowments.
(b) ASEAN: from regionalization to regionalism
In Section B of this report, reference was made to the
large increase and regional concentration of trade in
parts and components in East Asia in recent years. This
pattern is consistent with the findings of Ando and
Kimura (2005) and Kimura et al. (2007) for a broader
class of products which they termed “machinery
industries”. 59 The authors link the large share of these
products in the trade of East Asian countries to the rise
of international production networks in the region.
International production networks are not, of course,
unique to East Asia. It is possible to identify such
networks in North America (involving American firms and
Mexican maquiladoras) and in Europe (featuring, for
example, German car companies and Hungarian and
Czech affiliates). However, there are at least three factors
that make the East Asian networks distinctive (Ando and
Kimura, 2005). First, countries' manufacturing activities
and international trade are more intertwined. Secondly,
the networks involve a large number of countries at
different levels of income. Thirdly, the networks include
both intra-firm and arm’s length relationships.
ASEAN was established in 1967 largely to deal with
rising territorial tensions among some of its members (the
original signatories were Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines,
Singapore and Thailand), and with possible spillovers from
the conflict in Indochina. As a result, economic
II – The WTO and Preferential Trade Agreements
cooperation did not appear to be a priority until 1977,
when a partial-scope PTA was established. However, the
scheme only had a limited impact because of long
exclusion lists and low preference margins (Cuyvers and
Pupphavesa, 1996). It was not until 1992 that formal
economic cooperation took a significant step forward
when the members decided to create a free trade area.
The initial goal was to reduce tariffs between member
countries to a range of 0 to 5 per cent within 15 years, but
that horizon was subsequently shortened to ten years.
infrastructural services (such as transportation and
telecommunications) or bureaucratic red tape.
As production networks expand, they result in greater
economic integration. Differences in legal systems
and economic institutions among countries in such
areas as product and services standards, intellectual
Figure D.19: Share of parts and components
in intra-regional trade
Equally telling was the increased prominence of parts
and components in intra-regional trade. In 1967, parts
and components made up less than 2 per cent of intraregional trade and by 1992 accounted for
nearly 18 per cent of such trade (see Figure D.19).
In their description of East Asian production networks,
Ando and Kimura argued that Japanese firms had a large
role in the development of these networks. They note
that by 2000 as many as 80 per cent of the Japanese
firms going abroad had at least one affiliate in East Asia,
and 54 per cent of the foreign affiliates of Japanese
firms were located in East Asia (Ando and Kimura, 2005).
Complementary data from the Japanese External
Trade Organization (JETRO) show the large flow of
Japanese FDI to the original five ASEAN members.
Between 1967 and 1992, Japanese FDI to these five
countries averaged about 15 per cent of all its outflows
and 30 per cent of all Japanese FDI to developing
countries.60 Taking into account all sources of FDI,
annual inflows to the five ASEAN countries grew
significantly during this period, starting from less than
a billion dollars in 1970 to reach nearly US$ 13 billion
in 1992. These flows represented a large share of all
FDI going to developing countries, averaging more
than one-fifth during the 1970s and remaining above
one-sixth in the 1980s (see Figure D.20).
While the increased regionalization of trade in parts and
components would not have been possible without
ASEAN's openness to trade and foreign investment, this
may not have been sufficient for production networks to
flourish. Production networks require low trade costs.
They also require predictability in economic policy. Even
if tariffs were being lowered by ASEAN countries, trade
costs could still be a problem because of inadequate
1967
Intra-ASEAN P&C exports
2 per cent
1992
Intra-ASEAN P&C exports
18 per cent
D.anatomy of Preferential
Trade Agreements
In the quarter of a century that spanned the creation of
the association and the decision formally to establish a
free trade area, a shift occurred in economic policy
from traditional import substitution to export promotion
and openness to FDI. Total merchandise exports of the
five original members expanded from US$ 8.9 billion
in 1967 to US$ 357 billion in 1992 (see Table D.4). In
particular, exports of parts and components became
increasingly important, rising from about 2 per cent of
total exports in the year of the Association's founding
to 17 per cent by the time the free trade agreement
was signed.
Source: Calculations using UN Comtrade data.
Table D.4: ASEAN-5 exports, 1967-92
(Million dollars)
Year
Parts and
components
exports
Total exports
1967
154.9
8,867.0
Share
(per cent)
1.7
1970
235.1
12,213.7
1.9
1980
3,905.2
135,657.5
2.9
1990
38,562.2
276,095.8
14.0
1992
60,637.9
356,829.4
17.0
Source: Calculations using UN Comtrade data.
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world trade report 2011
Figure D.20: FDI flows to ASEAN-5 and as share of FDI to developing countries, 1970-92
$ Billions
Per cent
60
12
50
FDI inflows
10
40
8
30
6
20
4
10
2
0
Share of FDI to developing countries
14
0
1970
1972
1974
1976
1978
1980
1982
Share of FDI to developing countries
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
FDI flows to ASEAN-5
Source: UNCTAD FDI database (see http://unctadstat.unctad.org/).
property rights protection, investment protection, and
access to dispute settlement mechanisms become
more critical as a potential hindrance to production
sharing. To keep the momentum of production
networks going, countries increasingly needed to turn
their attention to policies beyond tariff reduction.
Two recent papers by Pomfret and Sourdin
(2009 and 2010) substantiate this view of the role
played by the ASEAN free trade area. They maintain
that ASEAN countries used their PTA as a vehicle for
concerted trade facilitation and that the driving force
behind these policies was the emergence of
international production networks and the desire of
ASEAN governments to increase the efficiency of
these arrangements. Progress in reducing trade costs
through improved customs administration and other
facilitation measures benefits all trade and so gains
accrue to members and non-members alike. It is
therefore possible to use trade costs between ASEAN
members and countries who are not parties to the PTA
(such as Australia) to measure the impact of ASEAN's
trade facilitation initiatives.
Pomfret and Sourdin find that the simple average ad
valorem trade costs associated with the ten ASEAN
countries' exports to Australia declined from 10.3 per
cent in 1990 to 3.9 per cent in 2007, which was much
more pronounced than the drop in the global average.
The results are similar if data from other countries
such as the United States or Brazil were used instead.
The authors note that most of the observed reduction
in trade costs relative to the global average occurred
before 2002, when ASEAN was constructing its free
trade area and there was little global movement
towards implementing trade facilitation measures.
148
Another important element that may have played a role
in the creation of regional rules and institutions was
the expansion of ASEAN's membership. In the 1990s,
four new members, Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar and
Viet Nam, acceded to the organization.61 The
economies of the new members were different from
the older members both in terms of their stage of
development and their market orientation. Lao PDR
and Viet Nam were socialist economies and Cambodia
was just emerging from a long civil war. With the
exception of Myanmar, none were GATT/WTO
members at that time.
The ASEAN Free Trade Area in 1992 was only the
start of the PTA process. It was followed by services
and intellectual property agreements in 1995, an
investment agreement and dispute settlement
mechanism in 1996, and a framework agreement on
mutual recognition arrangements for standards in
1998. In sum, the trajectory followed by the ASEAN
PTA process began with the regionalization of trade
and production and culminated with the creation of
formal regional rules and institutions to oversee a
thriving and integrated regional economy.
The focus of this discussion on production networks
and ASEAN is not intended to suggest that regionalism
in South-East Asia is only about trade. As noted
previously, the Association was partly intended to
manage territorial disputes among some of its
founding members and to contain any fallout from the
war in Indochina. With respect to these goals, the
Association has outdone even its most optimistic
expectations. The region has been largely free of
major conflict since the end of the war in Indochina.
The organization has played a key role in managing
big-power rivalries in East Asia. It has arguably
facilitated the integration of Cambodia, Lao PDR and
Viet Nam into the international community. Both
Cambodia and Viet Nam are now members of the WTO
II – The WTO and Preferential Trade Agreements
and among the fastest growing developing economies.
Lao PDR is in the process of accession to the WTO.
As is the case of other successful models of regional
cooperation, the creation of regional public goods has
also produced global benefits.
(c) Costa Rica
Monge-Ariño (2011) provides an insightful account of
Costa Rica's trade policies over the past few decades.
The country has managed to combine an active
agenda in multilateral trade negotiations at the WTO
with the negotiation of several preferential trade
agreements. Its trade opening started in the mid1980s with the unilateral reduction of import tariffs
and continued with the accession to the GATT in
1990. Further trade opening resulted from the
Uruguay Round (concluded in 1994) as well as from
PTAs negotiated with Mexico, Chile, the Dominican
Republic, Canada, the Caribbean Community
(CARICOM), Panama, the United States, China,
Singapore and the EU (see Table D.5). In addition,
negotiations for a PTA with Peru began in 2010 and
negotiations for a PTA with South Korea are
anticipated to begin in 2011. Costa Rica's policy of
trade opening has been accompanied by a strong
emphasis on attracting FDI, particularly in high-tech
manufacturing and services activities.
One of the pivotal moments in Costa Rica's involvement
in international production networks came with the
decision by Intel in 1996 to establish a US$ 300
million semiconductor assembly and test plant in the
country (World Bank, 2006). The variety of goods and
services produced in Costa Rica and exported as part
of these networks is relatively wide for an economy of
Costa Rica's size. They range from computer parts and
medical equipment to parts for cars and airplanes, and
services such as the design of turbines for airplanes
and the first ever plasma-propelled engine for space
shuttles.
D.anatomy of Preferential
Trade Agreements
Production networks are often associated most closely
with the Asia-Pacific region and Eastern Europe.
Countries from other regions, however, may also be
involved in international production networks where
they also play a part in the process of PTA formation.
These policies resulted in significant changes in the
structure of Costa Rica's exports, leading to a
substantial rise in the share of manufacturing exports
as well as trade in services in total exports, and a
decrease in the dependence of the Costa Rican
economy on traditional export commodities, such as
coffee and bananas (Echandi, 2006). Costa Rica also
saw an increase in its participation in international
production networks, with 43 per cent of its total
merchandise exports in 2009 directly related to five
main supply chains: electronics, medical devices,
automotive products, aeronautic/aerospace products
and film/broadcasting devices (Monge-Ariño, 2011).
The overall average for the domestic component of
exports associated with production networks was
36 per cent in 2009, ranging from 72 per cent in
aeronautics/aerospace to 22 per cent in electronics
(Monge-Ariño, 2011). The joint contribution of labour
and capital to the domestic component of exports was
40 per cent in 2009, while locally provided services and
supplies accounted for almost one-sixth and one-tenth,
Table D.5: Costa Rica’s preferential trade agreements
PTA
CACM
Current partners
El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras,
Nicaragua
Entry into force
23 September 1963
Costa Rica – Mexico
Mexico
1 January 1995
Costa Rica – Chile
Chile
15 February 2002
Costa Rica – Dominican Republic
Dominican Republic
7 March 2002
Costa Rica – Canada
Canada
1 November 2002
Trinidad & Tobago
15 November 2005
Guyana
30 April 2006
Barbados
1 August 2006
Costa Rica – Panama
Panama
24 November 2008
CAFTA-DR-US
United States, El Salvador, Guatemala,
Honduras, Nicaragua, Dominican
Republic
1 January 2009 *
Costa Rica – CARICOM
Costa Rica – China
China
**
Costa Rica – Singapore
Singapore
**
AACUE
EU – 27
***
* This date refers to when the agreement entered into force for Costa Rica.
** Negotiation finished in early 2010 and submitted for legislative approval; entry into force expected in 2011.
***Negotiation completed in early 2010; legal “scrubbing” is expected to be completed in early 2011.
Source: Monge-Ariño (2011).
149
world trade report 2011
respectively. The contribution of capital is more
significant in the electronics sector, while the respective
contributions of labour and locally provided services are
more significant in the aeronautic/aerospace sector.
The link between production networks and PTAs
seems apparent in Costa Rica's agreements with the
United States (United States-Dominican RepublicCentral America Free Trade Agreement) and with
China.62 The share of parts and components in total
trade, a customary indicator of production sharing,
rose rapidly with both countries between 1995 and
2008. While total two-way trade with the United
States grew by about 11 per cent annually, Table D.6
shows that parts and components trade expanded at
about twice that rate.
fold between 1982 and 2008, from US$ 142 million to
US$ 2.6 billion (see Figure D.21). As a consequence,
Costa Rica's share of US FDI to Central America63
climbed from less than 3 per cent in 1982 to about 20
per cent in 2008.
Turning to Costa Rica's links with China, two-way trade
grew by an annual average rate of nearly 30 per cent
between 1995 and 2008, while trade in parts and
components grew at more than twice that rate (see
Table D.7). Overall, trade in parts and components now
make up about half of Costa Rica's trade with China.
These facts are consistent with the explanation that
Costa Rica's participation in international production
networks was an important trigger for its trade
agreements with the United States and China.
Along with the strong trade performance between the
two countries, US FDI flows rose more than eighteenTable D.6: Costa Rica’s two-way trade with the United States, 1995-2008 (Million dollars)
Items
1995
Parts & components
All merchandise goods
Average annual growth
(Per cent)
2008
209.3
2,600.6
21.4
2,537.6
9,571.4
10.8
8.2
27.2
Share of parts and components (%)
Source: UN Comtrade.
Figure D.21: Costa Rica’s share of US FDI flows to Central America, 1982-2008
US$ millions
Per cent
3000
30
2500
25
2000
20
1500
15
1000
10
500
5
0
0
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
Share of US FDI to Central America
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
US FDI to Costa Rica
Source: US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Table D.7: Costa Rica’s two-way trade with China, 1995-2008 (Million dollars)
Items
Parts & components
All merchandise goods
Share of parts and components (%)
Source: UN Comtrade.
150
1995
2008
Average annual growth
(Per cent)
1.1
694.2
64.2
50.1
1,478.4
29.7
2.2
47.0
II – The WTO and Preferential Trade Agreements
4. African regional cooperation:
lessons from deep integration? 64
The geopolitical configuration of Africa has been largely
determined by the political forces of colonialism. The
borders of African countries demarcated the colonies of
the European powers, not the emergence of nation
states in Africa. A fragmented continent is the result, with
small markets, small economies, and a large number of
landlocked countries significantly limiting development
options. Fragmentation is associated with the lack of
economies of scale in the production and distribution of
goods and services and the impact of scale on the cost
of public goods. In the early years of independence,
attention focused strongly on the need to overcome the
problems of scale and fragmentation. Continental
economic and political unification was accepted as a
rational response in order to create a larger economic
space for industrialization and economic development.
This was an era of economic planning, and Africa’s
leadership believed that economic planning would be
more practicable at a regional, and ultimately
continental, level. Underpinning this policy approach
was the conviction that the path to development would
be industrialization, and diversification away from
reliance on primary commodity production. The
industrialization-regional integration links were clear. A
larger, protected market would provide the space for
viable industrialization to replace certain imports. This
was at the time a well-accepted strategy for developing
countries. The aim was to establish a broad range of
industries across different sectors. Economic
unification was seen as a solution to Africa’s
development dilemma, and political unification was
required to make economic integration work. More
recent experience has confirmed that political
considerations are also key drivers of many African
integration arrangements. However, even in these
cases, regional integration remains a political
arrangement that must be justified in economic terms.
The ambition of regional economic integration and the
commitment to develop through industrialization were
The LPA emphasized the expected contribution of
industrialization and the 1980s became the “Industrial
Development Decade in Africa”. The proposed framework
for industrialization was the division of the continent into
regional integration areas that would eventually constitute
a united African economy, the African Economic
Community. To achieve this, the ECA supported three
regional integration arrangements: i) the Economic
Community of West African States (ECOWAS), which was
established in 1975, predating the LPA; ii) the Preferential
Trade Area (PTA) covering East and Southern Africa,
which was the precursor of the Common Market for
Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA); and iii) the
Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS).
The Arab Maghreb Union was established in 1989,
completing the coverage of the continent.
D.anatomy of Preferential
Trade Agreements
Not all PTAs are prompted by international production
networks and the trend towards deep integration.
African regional cooperation is a case in point. Deep
integration may nevertheless hold some useful lessons
that can increase the returns from the process of
African integration. Much of the subsequent discussion
will refer to the experience of Sub-Saharan Africa.
Hence it is essential not to lose sight of efforts by
countries in North Africa to integrate with one another
or with the rest of the continent. Efforts at integration
in North Africa include the Agadir agreement (of which
Jordan, a Middle Eastern country, is also a member)
and the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), which was
created as the North African building block of the
continent-wide African Economic Community.
important during the first decades of independence,
and this provided the motivation for the Lagos Plan of
Action (LPA). The LPA was an initiative of the
Organisation of African Unity (OAU), adopted by Heads
of State in April 1980, and actively supported by the
United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA).
Apartheid South Africa was at this stage still excluded
from the African integration plan. The Southern African
Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) was
established in 1980, supported by the European Union,
with the specific aim of reducing economic dependence
on South Africa. SADCC was not a market integration
arrangement. Its broad development mandate focused on
regional cooperation to ensure independence from South
Africa for countries that were known as the frontline
states.65 As such, SADCC focused on cross-border,
sector-specific projects, such as regional development
corridors and the Southern African Power Pool.
In anticipation of South Africa’s democratic transition,
SADCC was transformed into the Southern African
Development Community (SADC) in 1992. South Africa
joined SADC in 1994, thus becoming part of the continental
integration plan. In contrast to SADCC, SADC adopted an
explicit market integration agenda and is a good example
of a linear model of progressive integration in Africa.
Although the SADC Treaty (and subsequently the SADC
Trade Protocol) does not articulate a detailed plan for
integration, the detail was provided in the Regional
Indicative Strategic Development Plan of 2003. This
strategic plan provides for the establishment of a free trade
area by 2008, a customs union in 2010, a common market
in 2015, monetary union in 2016 and the introduction of a
single currency in 2018.66 This approach was also adopted
by the East African Community (EAC), established in
199967 and also by ECOWAS in West Africa. Progress in
ECOWAS to establish a free trade area has been very slow
and the customs union is still work in progress.
The SADC roadmap and the EAC integration plan
reflect the general trend in Africa to adopt a linear
model of progressive regional integration, characterized
by ambitious targets. Of 14 regional economic
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world trade report 2011
communities that existed in 2001, nine have a full
economic union as the specified objective, one aims to
become a common market (COMESA), one is an
established customs union (the South African Customs
Union) with no plans to move beyond this, while the
remaining three aim for intra-regional free trade or
regional cooperation. These agendas share the aim of
transforming the African economic landscape and
establishing “a strong united bloc of nations” over a
period of just more than three decades.
An important step in this process requires the
strengthening of the building blocks of regional economic
communities. This involves an evolutionary process,
moving from free trade areas and customs unions to a
common market covering the continent (Economic
Commission for Africa, 2004). The member states of
COMESA, SADC and the EAC have undertaken recent
commitments to establish a Tripartite Free Trade Area
consisting of the 26 member states of these agreements.
This is seen as an important step in addressing the
problem of overlapping membership, a key feature of
African regional integration agreements.68
African regional integration focuses primarily on
reducing barriers to trade in goods. Trade in services
becomes a feature of the regional integration model
when the common market stage is reached, but to date
services have received very little attention in formal
African integration arrangements. This is also true of
forays by African countries into preferential trade
agreements with external partners. The inclusion of
services (and also other behind-the-border issues, such
as investment, competition policy and government
procurement) has proven contentious.
Africa’s regional integration initiatives have achieved
limited results, raising doubts about the approach
adopted to addressing factors that inhibit regional trade.
Barriers to trade that raise the costs of doing business
can be classified as border or behind-the-border
measures. African regional free trade arrangements
have focused on border measures, and primarily on
tariffs. Tariffs are undeniably an important barrier but
they may not be the most important one.
152
Abundant anecdotal evidence suggests that timeconsuming and inefficient border procedures may be
more important than tariffs in inhibiting intra-regional
trade. Multiple border crossings for goods to reach landlocked countries add significantly to the transaction costs
of intra-regional trade. Many other constraints besides
border barriers increase the transaction costs of trade.
Geography is an important consideration. Given the
limited availability of navigable inland waterways and the
cheap transport this allows, the logistical costs of trade in
goods are high. This is exacerbated by poorly developed
transport systems, characterized by low per capita
densities of rail and road transport infrastructure, which in
colonial times was designed to transport primary products
to port. Poorly developed cross-country road, air and rail
connections are the outcome (McCord et al., 2005).
Transport costs in Africa are still among the world’s
highest. For example, shipping a car from Japan to
Abidjan costs US$ 1,500 whereas the comparable
cost for transporting the same car from Addis Ababa
to Abidjan would be US$ 5,000 (Economic
Commission for Africa, 2004). Both infrastructural and
regulatory forces are at work. Overall, the high cost
and unreliability of transport services contribute to a
business environment in which firms are forced to
keep higher levels of inventories, ruling out the
possibility of adopting cost-saving management
systems for “just in time” production (Collier, 2000).
The lack of skills and capital to establish and operate
modern communication systems, combined with small
business communities that do not allow financially
viable business publications, mean that business news
and information required for informed decision-making
is another important constraint.69 Fixed-line telephone
services are limited and unreliable, with high call
charges, especially for international calls. In most
African economies the provision of fixed-line phone
services is still the exclusive preserve of public
monopolies. Business contracts require information on
comparative prices and depend on reliable, fast and
low-cost access to market information. Information is
essential to efficient market outcomes, and a lack of
readily available information at reasonable cost will
raise trade transaction costs. Although these barriers
also constrain trade with the rest of the world, their
impact on intra-regional trade is particularly important.
The barriers discussed so far feature strongly on the
demand side of intra-regional trade. These demandside factors, however, may arguably be much less
important than the weak supply-side capacity of
African economies. Indeed, it may be argued that the
real problem facing African economies is not market
access (border constraints) but rather the capacity to
produce tradable products competitively.
Expanding market access by lowering the transaction
costs of trade is necessary, but will not guarantee
economic growth and development. Enhanced market
access without the capacity to produce goods and
services to benefit from those opportunities will fail to
produce higher economic growth. Effective supplyside capacity depends on sound macroeconomic and
microeconomic policies, good governance, wellinstitutional
capacities,
adequate
developed
infrastructure and a sound business environment
capable of attracting investment.
Supply-side constraints to efficient production could
be partly addressed by a deep regional integration
agenda. No single, ready-made recipe exists for
effective deep regional integration. Among the factors
relevant to Africa are integration of services markets,
trade facilitation, improved market intelligence, dispute
settlement mechanisms, revenue systems less
dependent on trade taxes, funding for cross-border
II – The WTO and Preferential Trade Agreements
The analysis in this section demonstrates that PTAs
are not only about lowering tariffs. Ample evidence
shows that commitments in PTAs cover a large number
of non-tariff policy areas and have become deeper. As
far as tariffs are concerned, the proliferation of PTAs
has eroded preference margins over time. If tariffrelated reasons do weigh with countries engaged in
negotiating PTAs, they may be more concerned with
avoiding negative discrimination than securing
preferential tariffs. Furthermore, there is evidence –
both statistical and through case studies – of a role for
production networks in PTA formation.
5. Conclusions
Two important conclusions follow from the analysis in
this section. First, research needs to focus increasingly
on the reasons for establishing PTAs that go beyond
the reduction of tariffs. Secondly, further reflection is
needed on the implications for the multilateral trading
system of deeper integration in PTAs. This and other
questions bearing on coherence between PTAs and
the multilateral trading system are the subject of the
next section of this report.
While not discounting other explanations for PTAs, a
central focus of the literature on this subject has been
on preferential tariffs. As a consequence, much of the
economic analysis of the effects of PTAs has
concentrated on the trade-creation and trade-diversion
impacts of discriminatory access to individual markets.
D.anatomy of Preferential
Trade Agreements
infrastructure, and financing for regional institutions
(Lamy, 2010). Development partners and international
institutions could assist this process by recognizing
that the emergence of regional groupings is relevant to
the planning and implementation of development
assistance. The WTO, for its part, is progressively
regionalizing its Trade Policy Reviews and is now
encouraging the regionalization of Aid for Trade, which
aims to help developing countries develop the traderelated skills and infrastructure needed to implement
and benefit from trade agreements and to expand their
trade.
153
world trade report 2011
Endnotes
1
See World Trade Organization (WTO) (2007).
2
Starting from a theoretical model of intra-industry trade,
Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) derived a gravity-type
reduced form equation for the bilateral trade between two
countries, where trade between two countries depend on
their gross domestic products (GDPs) and their relative
trade costs. In particular, they show that in a theoretically
founded gravity equation, trade between two countries, A
and B, where A is the importer and B is the exporter,
depends not only on their bilateral trade costs, but also on
the overall level of barriers that exports of country B face in
the rest of the world, and the overall level of restriction to
imports that country A imposes on the rest of the world.
3
A similar approach has been used by Hoekman and Nicita
(2008) and Carrère et al. (2008).
4
The estimate is based on a standard gravity model
augmented by the RPM index.
5
Recall that over 70 per cent is traded at an MFN rate below
5 per cent and less than 15 per cent of trade shows relative
preference margins greater in absolute values than 2 per
cent.
6
See Kuijper (2010).
7
See Hsu (2006).
8
See Kuijper (2010).
9
See Hsu (2006).
23 See Roy et al. (2007) and (2008); Marchetti and Roy
(2008b), Fink and Molinuevo (2008a) and (2008b),
Miroudot et al. (2010).
24 On that see Mattoo and Wunsch-Vincent (2004).
25 See Roy et al. (2007).
26 Figures in this section rely on an extension of the dataset
used in Roy et al. (2007), Roy et al. (2008), and Marchetti
and Roy (2008b). It covers 68 PTAs involving 53 WTO
members (counting the EU-15 as one). The list of WTO
members (and their acronyms) and the set of services
agreements covered can be found in Appendix Tables D.2
and D.3 respectively. This includes PTAs notified under
Article V of the GATS between 2000 and 2010, as well as a
few PTAs that have been signed, but have not yet entered
into force and been notified. For each party to each PTA, the
commitments undertaken for market access and national
treatment in each service sub-sector have been compared to
those undertaken in the GATS and those proposed in the
most recent GATS offer in the DDA. The dataset covers mode
1 (cross-border supply) and mode 3 (commercial presence),
and looks at commitments that are GATS+. Further
information on the data can be found at: http://www.wto.org/
english/tratop_e/serv_e/dataset_e/dataset_e.htm
27 See Marchetti and Roy (2008b).
11 See Kwak and Marceau (2006); Hillman (2009).
28 As noted previously, a negative list identifies sectors or
modes in respect of which commitments do not apply, while
a positive list approach does the reverse.
12 See Kwak and Marceau (2006).
29 See Fink and Molinuevo (2008b), Roy et al. (2007).
13 See Horn et al. (2010).
30 For the impact of regime type on PTAs, see, among others,
Mansfield et al. (2008). Roy (2010) looks at the impact of
democracy on levels of GATS commitments.
10 See van Damme (2006).
14 ASEAN-China and MERCOSUR-India.
15 This figure is current as of 1 March 2011, counting
notifications for agreements that are currently in force.
16 The four modes for supplying services under GATS include
cross-border trade (mode 1), consumption abroad (mode 2),
commercial presence (mode 3), and temporary movement of
natural persons (mode 4).
17 Examples of agreements using the GATS approach include,
for example, MERCOSUR and AFAS (ASEAN Framework
Agreement on Services).
18 The rest of the agreements notified under GATS Article V
are agreements that do not easily fit into the GATS-type or
negative-list categories since they aim at deep regional
integration, such as agreements between the EU and EU
candidate countries.
19 Most United States PTAs, including all those notified after
2003, do not include a separate chapter on temporary entry
for business persons.
20 For example, a number of more recent agreements have
used negative-list modalities for a market access obligation
modelled on GATS Article XVI that applies to all modes of
supply. In NAFTA, there is no binding obligation along the
lines of GATS Article XVI, while in GATS-type agreements
such obligations apply on the basis of a positive-list
approach. See Roy et al. (2007).
21 See Mattoo and Sauvé (2010).
154
22 For original WTO members, these are the commitments
made in the period 1995-97.
31 See, for example, Chaudhuri and Karmakar on various
business services, Zhang on postal and courier services,
Marchetti on financial services, Roy on audiovisual and
distribution services or Tuthill on telecommunication
services in Marchetti and Roy (2008a). Commitments on
education and professional services, among others, are also
examined in Roy et al. (2008).
32 See Carzaniga (2008).
33 See Stephenson and Delourme, (2010). See also Sauvé and
Ward (2009) on the EU’s mode 4 commitments in the PTA
with the CARIFORUM.
34 See Miroudot et al. (2010); Fink and Molinuevo (2008b) .
35 See Adlung and Molinuevo (2008), Berger et al. (2010).
36 See Adlung and Morrison (2010).
37 See UNCTAD (2010).
38 See http://www.unctadxi.org/templates/Page____1007.aspx.
39 Houde et al. (2007) refers to the former as “GATS-inspired”
agreements and to the latter as “NAFTA-style” agreements.
40 An alternative to the total number of provisions is a method
that “scores” the various provisions in the investment
chapter for the committed degree of openness. See for
example Dee et al. (2006).
II – The WTO and Preferential Trade Agreements
41 Additional information has been collected on the existence
of mutual recognition arrangements.
42 See Rauch and Trindade (2002) for an assessment of the
importance of information costs for trade.
43 See Collins and Rodrik (2000).
45 See the analysis in Section C which demonstrates why,
under certain conditions, trade-diversion effects are absent
when regulatory barriers are removed in PTAs.
46 See Ravenhill (2009) and Ravenhill (2010) for a sceptical
take on this interpretation of East Asian integration. He
argues that the primary motivation for trade agreements in
East Asia has been to secure diplomatic or strategic gains.
47 See studies such as Baier and Bergstrand (2007), Silva and
Tenreyro (2006), Soloaga and Winters (2001), Ghosh and
Yamarik (2004), Aitken (1973), Bertstrand (1985), Frankel
(1997) and Frankel et al. (1995).
48 This analysis draws on Orefice and Rocha (2011)
(forthcoming).
49 Principal component analysis is a mathematical procedure
that orthogonally transforms a number of possibly
correlated variables – in our case the different provisions
included in an agreement – into a number of uncorrelated
variables called principal components. The transformation is
defined in such a way that the first principal component
accounts for the highest level of variability in the data. Each
succeeding component in turn has the highest variance
possible under the constraint that it be orthogonal (that is,
uncorrelated) to the preceding components.
50 For details on how the index on TBTs has been constructed
see Section D.2. The index on competition policy is built as
the unweighted sum of three different elements. The first
element focuses on the general objectives of an agreement.
This element takes the value of one whenever these
objectives promote and advance conditions of fair
competition between parties or establish cooperation
between them in this field and zero otherwise. The second
element represents the count of the total number of
competition related provisions that are present both in the
competition policy chapter and in other sections of an
agreement such as investment and services. The third
element counts the number of horizontal principles such
transparency, non-discrimination and procedural fairness
that are included in the agreement.
51 See Teh (2009) and Piermartini and Budetta (2009).
52 Gravity equations are derived from models that seek to
explain or predict the relationship between a particular
(dependent) variable (in this case bilateral trade in parts and
components) and a set of other (independent or
explanatory) variables whose values can be estimated (in
this case elements of deep integration).
54 Specifically we estimate a fixed-effect gravity regression:
In(x ijt )= a ij + a it + ajt + β1(PTA ijt * DEEPNESS ij )+ ε ijt where
x ijt represents the imports in parts and components from
country i to country j in time t; α ij are fixed effects capturing
country-pair specific variables such as distance or the fact
that countries share the same border or the same language;
α it and αjt are reporter and partner time specific fixed
effects and capture factors such as the size of a country or
its multilateral trade resistance. β1 is the coefficient of our
interest and it captures the effect of deep integration on
trade. Finally, ε ijt is the error term.
D.anatomy of Preferential
Trade Agreements
44 The extraterritorial application of competition policy may raise
sovereignty concerns. States may prefer engagement in this
area through discussion and political negotiation. Another
possible explanation for these carve-outs from dispute
settlement is that competition provisions are new to some PTA
members, particularly developing countries. While developing
countries might be willing to accept competition policy
provisions (e.g. implement competition law, establish a
competition authority, or act on anti-trust and abuse of
dominant position), they may be uncertain about how quickly or
how successfully they can fully implement these commitments.
53 Endogeneity arises when an explanatory variable in an
equation is correlated with the error term of the equation, and
the error term is the unexplained deviation of sample data
from their unobservable “true” value. Studies such as Baier
and Bergstrand (2007) show that omitted variables, and to a
lesser extent simultaneity, are the two most important
sources of endogeneity bias caused by PTAs. The omitted
variables problem of PTAs arises since the error term may
retain the effect of some unobservable country-specific
policy variables, which at the same time affect both trade and
the probability of forming a PTA. If, for example, the formation
of a PTA also induces reforms in trade-restrictive domestic
regulation, the likelihood of an FTA is higher (since the
expected gains from the FTA are higher), and the omission of
the domestic regulation variable will bias the PTA coefficient
downwards. A simultaneity problem can arise, for instance,
when governments of two countries that trade more than
their “natural” level of trade may be induced to form a PTA, as
there is less probability of trade diversion. In this case, the
PTA coefficients will be upward biased.
55 For a description of the pros and cons of alternative
measures of international fragmentation of production, see World Trade Organization (WTO) (2008), Box 14.
56 For a classification of goods belonging to the category parts
and components see Section B.3
57 See papers such as Baier and Bergstrand (2004) and
Bergstrand et al. (2010).
58 Specifically we regress the following equation:
DEPTH ij = a + β1(PC_ shr) ij + β 2 Xij + ε ij where Pc_ shr ij is the
average share of trade in intermediates over total trade
between countries i and j between 1980 and the year
before the agreement is signed and X is a vector of control
variables for the economic determinants of PTAs as (i) the
economic size of the involved countries (represented by the
sum of the logs of real GDP of the two countries, GDPSUM);
(ii) the economic similarity between the two countries
(represented the log of the product of country i share of
both countries’ real GDP with country j share); (iii) the
difference in the relative factor endowments (represented
by the absolute value of the log difference between
countries’ per capita GDP, GDPDIF); (iv) its square values
(SQGDPDIF); (v) distance and (vi) remoteness.
59 Included in this category are industries that manufacture
general machinery, electrical machinery, transport
equipment, and precision machinery.
60 For this specific calculation, developing countries are
defined as all countries less Australia, New Zealand,
Canada, the United States, the European Free Trade
Agreement (EFTA) members and EC-9 (France, Germany,
Italy, United Kingdom, Ireland, Denmark, Belgium,
Luxembourg and Netherlands).
61 Viet Nam did not become a member until 1995. Lao PDR
and Myanmar became members in 1998; while Cambodia
became a member in 1999.
155
world trade report 2011
62 One cannot, of course, discount the possibility that other
motivations may have also played a role. Griswold and
Ikenson (2004), for instance, have argued that the
CAFTA-DR-US agreement enhances important US foreign
policy goals in a region that has experienced severe civil
strife in the recent past.
63 Central America includes Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador,
Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama.
64 This discussion is based on Hartzenberg (2011).
65 Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique,
Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
66 The free trade agreement adopted in 2008 has not yet been
fully implemented and at a ministerial task force meeting in
March 2010 it was decided to postpone the establishment of
the customs union, without committing to a specific deadline.
67 The EAC was founded when the presidents of Kenya,
Tanzania and Uganda signed the Community’s treaty in
1999. Burundi and Rwanda have since joined the EAC. A
protocol to prepare the way towards a customs union was
signed in March 2004, and a common market protocol was
signed in June 2010. The current EAC is a revival of an
earlier post-independence arrangement, also the East
African Community, which was initiated by the East African
Treaty for Cooperation signed in 1967. This EAC collapsed
in 1977.
156
68 A tripartite summit of the Heads of State and Government
of COMESA, SADC and EAC countries was held in
Kampala, Uganda, on 22 October 2008. The Summit
approved the expeditious establishment of a free trade area
encompassing the member states of the three agreements.
Integrating the three regional communities is seen as an
important step in building the African Economic Community
envisaged in the Abuja Treaty.
69 Collier and Venables (2008) make the point that large
societies can be better informed than small societies
because of the existence of scale economies in the
commercial media. They mention that in Africa only “South
Africa comes anywhere close to providing a market in which
specialist journals are viable”.
II – The WTO and Preferential Trade Agreements
Appendix tables
Appendix Table D.1: List of PTAs and results of HMS mapping
Number of provisions
PTA
Date of
entry into
force
Member
ANDEAN Community
25-May-88
Developing
4
11
3
3
WTO+
WTO-X
WTO+
Leg. Enf.
WTO-X
Leg. Enf.
28-Jan-92
Developing
2
0
2
0
01-Jan-10
Developed-Developing
11
8
11
5
ASEAN-India
01-Jan-10
Developing
9
0
8
0
ASEAN-Korea, Rep. of
01-Jan-10
Developing
12
11
11
8
Australia-New Zealand
01-Jan-83
Developed
8
2
6
1
Australia-Singapore
28-Jul-03
Developed-Developing
13
8
12
7
Australia-Thailand
01-Jan-05
Developed-Developing
14
8
13
5
CAFTA-DR-US
01-Mar-06
Developed-Developing
13
6
13
6
CEFTA
01-May-07
Developed-Developing
13
3
13
3
CIS
30-Dec-94
Developing
9
0
9
0
COMESA
08-Dec-94
Developing
10
19
7
4
Canada-EFTA
01-Jul-09
Developed
11
2
10
1
Canada-Peru
01-Aug-09
Developed-Developing
13
7
11
5
Chile-Australia
06-Mar-09
Developed-Developing
13
9
13
6
Chile-China
01-Oct-06
Developing
11
20
8
12
Chile-Japan
03-Sep-07
Developed-Developing
14
6
14
3
Chile-Korea, Rep. of
01-Apr-04
Developing
14
7
13
6
China-ASEAN
01-Jan-05
Developing
6
1
4
0
China-Hong Kong, China
01-Jan-04
Developing
5
3
5
0
China-New Zealand
10-Oct-08
Developed-Developing
13
8
13
8
China-Pakistan
01-Jul-07
Developing
9
2
9
2
China-Peru
01-Mar-10
Developing
12
13
12
2
China-Singapore
01-Jan-09
Developing
10
6
10
4
Common Economic Zone
20-May-04
Developing
12
5
12
2
EAEC
08-Oct-97
Developing
6
8
6
8
EC Enlargement (12)
01-Jan-86
Developed
6
15
6
14
EC Enlargement (15)
01-Jan-95
Developed
6
6
6
5
EC Enlargement (25)
01-May-04
Developed
8
16
8
16
EC Enlargement (27)
01-Jan-07
Developed
9
11
9
11
Treaty of Rome
01-Jan-58
Developed
10
12
10
9
EU-Albania
01-Dec-06
Developed-Developing
11
31
10
8
EU-Algeria
01-Sep-05
Developed-Developing
9
27
8
5
EU-Bosnia Herzegovina
01-Jul-08
Developed-Developing
9
2
9
2
EU-CARIFORUM
01-Nov-08
Developed-Developing
13
14
13
7
EU-Cameroon
01-Oct-09
Developed-Developing
11
5
7
2
EU-Chile
01-Feb-03
Developed-Developing
13
27
13
4
EU-Croatia
01-Mar-02
Developed-Developing
12
29
10
4
EU-Côte d'Ivoire
01-Jan-09
Developed-Developing
8
4
6
0
EU-Egypt
01-Jun-04
Developed-Developing
10
25
9
3
EU-FYR Macedonia
01-Jun-01
Developed-Developing
12
29
10
5
D.anatomy of Preferential
Trade Agreements
ASEAN free trade area
ASEAN-Australia-New
Zealand
157
world trade report 2011
Appendix Table D.1: List of PTAs and results of HMS mapping (continued)
158
Number of provisions
PTA
Date of
entry into
force
Member
EU-Faroe Islands
01-Jan-97
Developed
5
2
5
1
EU-Iceland
01-Apr-73
Developed
6
1
6
1
WTO+
WTO-X
WTO+
Leg. Enf.
WTO-X
Leg. Enf.
EU-Jordan
01-May-02
Developed-Developing
13
20
9
5
EU-Lebanon
01-Mar-03
Developed-Developing
8
3
8
2
EU-Montenegro
01-Jan-08
Developed-Developing
11
2
10
2
EU-Morocco
01-Mar-00
Developed-Developing
10
18
9
4
EU-Norway
01-Jul-73
Developed
6
1
6
1
EU-Overseas Territories
01-Jan-71
Developed-Developing
8
17
7
6
EU-Palestinian Authority
01-Jul-97
Developed-Developing
11
20
8
3
EU-South Africa
01-Jan-00
Developed-Developing
10
26
8
2
EU-Switzerland
Liechtenstein
01-Jan-73
Developed
6
1
6
1
EU-Syria
01-Jul-77
Developed-Developing
4
4
4
1
EU-Tunisia
01-Mar-98
Developed-Developing
11
20
9
4
EU-Turkey
01-Jan-96
Developed-Developing
10
4
9
3
ECOWAS
24-Jul-93
Developing
7
13
5
3
EFTA-Israel
01-Jan-93
Developed-Developing
9
4
8
2
EFTA-Korea
01-Sep-06
Developed-Developing
13
4
13
4
EU-San Marino
01-Apr-02
Developed
4
3
4
1
EU-Serbia
01-Feb-10
Developed-Developing
9
3
9
2
GCC
01-Jan-03
Developing
5
8
4
4
India-Singapore
01-Aug-05
Developing
11
7
11
5
Japan-ASEAN
01-Dec-08
Developed-Developing
9
10
9
10
Japan-Indonesia
01-Jul-08
Developed-Developing
9
8
9
4
Japan-Malaysia
13-Jul-06
Developed-Developing
10
6
10
5
Japan-Mexico
01-Apr-05
Developed-Developing
12
9
12
9
Japan-Philippines
11-Dec-08
Developed-Developing
11
8
9
5
Japan-Singapore
30-Nov-02
Developed-Developing
12
7
11
3
Japan-Switzerland
01-Sep-09
Developed
12
8
12
7
Japan-Thailand
01-Nov-07
Developed-Developing
9
9
9
4
Japan-Viet Nam
01-Oct-09
Developed-Developing
12
5
12
4
Korea, Republic of-India
01-Jan-10
Developing
14
11
13
4
Korea, Republic
of-Singapore
02-Mar-06
Developing
12
9
12
4
MERCOSUR
29-Nov-91
Developing
9
3
9
3
MERCOSUR-India
01-Jun-09
Developing
7
0
7
0
NAFTA
01-Jan-94
Developed-Developing
14
8
14
7
PAFTA
01-Jan-98
Developing
2
0
2
0
Russian FederationUkraine
21-Feb-94
Developing
4
1
4
0
SACU
15-Jul-04
Developing
7
4
4
0
SAFTA
01-Jan-06
Developing
4
0
2
0
SADC
01-Sep-00
Developing
11
1
10
0
Turkey-EFTA
01-Apr-92
Developed-Developing
11
2
10
2
II – The WTO and Preferential Trade Agreements
Appendix Table D.1: List of PTAs and results of HMS mapping (continued)
Number of provisions
PTA
Date of
entry into
force
Member
US-Australia
01-Jan-05
Developed
14
8
14
6
US-Bahrain
01-Aug-06
Developed-Developing
12
4
12
4
US-Israel
19-Aug-85
Developed-Developing
11
0
10
0
US-Jordan
17-Dec-01
Developed-Developing
6
5
5
4
US-Morocco
01-Jan-06
Developed-Developing
14
6
13
6
US-Oman
01-Feb-09
Developed-Developing
13
6
13
6
US-Peru
01-Feb-09
Developed-Developing
14
7
14
7
Ukraine-Belarus
11-Nov-06
Developing
6
1
6
1
Ukraine-Kazakhstan
19-Oct-98
Developing
4
1
4
1
Ukraine-Turkmenistan
04-Nov-95
Developing
4
1
4
1
WTO-X
WTO+
Leg. Enf.
WTO-X
Leg. Enf.
D.anatomy of Preferential
Trade Agreements
Source: WTO Secretariat.
WTO+
159
world trade report 2011
Appendix Table D.2: Acronyms and members
Acronyms
Member
Acronyms
Member
ARG
Argentina
KNA
Saint Kitts and Nevis
ATG
Antigua and Barbuda
KOR
Rep. of Korea
AUS
Australia
LCA
St. Lucia
BHR
Bahrain
LIE
Liechtenstein
BLZ
Belize
MAC
Macao, China
BRA
Brazil
MAR
Morocco
BRB
Barbados
MEX
Mexico
BRN
Brunei Darussalam
MYS
Malaysia
CAN
Canada
NIC
Nicaragua
CHE
Switzerland
NOR
Norway
CHL
Chile
NZL
New Zealand
CHN
China
OMN
Oman
COL
Colombia
PAK
Pakistan
CRI
Costa Rica
PAN
Panama
DMA
Dominica
PER
Peru
DOM
Dominican Rep.
PHL
Philippines
EC
European Union
PRY
Paraguay
GRD
Grenada
SGP
Singapore
GTM
Guatemala
SLV
El Salvador
GUY
Guyana
SUR
Suriname
HKG
Hong Kong, China
CHT
Chinese Taipei
HND
Honduras
THA
Thailand
IDN
Indonesia
TTO
Trinidad and Tobago
IND
India
URY
Uruguay
ISL
Iceland
USA
USA
JAM
Jamaica
VCT
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines
JOR
Jordan
VNM
Viet Nam
JPN
Japan
Source: WTO Secretariat.
160
II – The WTO and Preferential Trade Agreements
Appendix Table D.3: List of services agreements in the database used for this report
Korea (Rep.)-India
Japan-Thailand
EFTA-Chile
ASEAN-Korea (Rep.)
Chile-Japan
Korea (Rep.)-Chile
ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand
Chile-China
EU-Chile
Honduras-El Salvador-
Taipei, Chinese
India-Singapore
Chile-El Salvador
Peru-China
Panama-Singapore
China-Macao, China
Japan-Viet Nam
US-Bahrain
China-Hong Kong, China
Japan-Switzerland
EFTA-Korea (Rep.)
US-Singapore
Chile-Colombia
Costa Rica-Mexico
US-Chile
Japan-Malaysia
Singapore-Australia
Mexico-Honduras
EFTA-Singapore
Nicaragua-Taipei, Chinese
Jordan-Singapore
Japan-Singapore
China-New Zealand
Mexico-Guatemala
Chile-Costa Rica
Australia-Chile
Mexico-El Salvador
US-Jordan
China-Singapore
Dominican Rep.-Cent. America-USA
New Zealand-Singapore
US-Peru
Korea (Rep.)-Singapore
EFTA-Mexico
US-Oman
US-Morocco
Chile-Mexico
Japan-Philippines
Thailand-New Zealand
EU-Mexico
EU-CARIFORUM
Mexico-Nicaragua
US-Korea (Rep.)
Brunei Darussalam-Japan
ASEAN-China
Mercosur (6 th negotiated round)
Japan-Indonesia
Japan-Mexico
ASEAN (7th package)
Panama-Chile
Panama-El Salvador
US-Colombia
Pakistan-Malaysia
Thailand-Australia
US-Panama
Pakistan-China
US-Australia
D.anatomy of Preferential
Trade Agreements
Canada-Peru
Panama-Taipei, Chinese
Source: WTO Secretariat.
161
world trade report 2011
Appendix Table D.4: The effects of deep integration on production networks
Dependent variable
PTAij
Trade in parts and components (log)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
0.299***
(0.020)
PTAij* Number of
provisions
0.0165***
(0.001)
PTAij* Number of
WTO-X provisions
0.0265***
(0.002)
PTAij* Number of
WTO+ provisions
0.0310***
(0.002)
PTAij* Principal
Component Analysis
Index
0.0773***
(0.007)
PTAij* TBT Index
0.0138***
(0.001)
PTAij* Competition
Policy Index
0.0308***
(0.002)
Country pair fixed
effects
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
Country-time fixed
effects
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
Observations
60,473
60,473
60,473
60,473
60,473
27,524
32,733
R-squared
0.328
0.328
0.327
0.327
0.327
0.434
0.414
Number of country
pairs
3,485
3,485
3,485
3,485
3,485
1,386
1,657
Note: Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: WTO Secretariat estimates.
Appendix Table D.5: The effects of trade in parts and components on deep integration
Dependent Variable
Number of Provision
Number of WTO-X
provision
Number of WTO+
provision
Principal Component
Analysis Index
0.0880***
(0.028)
0.0107
(0.024)
0.0630***
(0.017)
0.0234***
(0.006)
yes
2,572
0.962
yes
2,572
0.955
yes
2,572
0.917
yes
2,572
0.927
Share of trade in parts and
components over total trade (ln)
Country fixed effects
Observations
R-squared
Note: Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.distance and remoteness. Other control variables included in the
regression: GDPSUM, GDPSIM, GDPDIF, SQGDPDIF
Source: WTO Secretariat estimations.
162
II – The WTO and Preferential Trade Agreements
Appendix Figure D.1: Variations in the level of commitments offered in different PTAs: Australia, Chile,
Republic of Korea, Singapore and United States
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
USA-GATS
USA-SGP
USA-PER
USA-PAN
USA-OMN
USA-MAR
USA-KOR
USA-JOR
USA-COL
USA-CHL
USA-BHR
USA-AUS
SGP-GATS
SGP-USA
SGP-PAN
SGP-NZL
SGP-KOR(ASEAN)
D.anatomy of Preferential
Trade Agreements
USA-DR-CAFTA
SGP-KOR
SGP-JPN
SGP-JOR
SGP-IND
SGP-EFTA
SGP-CHN(ASEAN)
SGP-CHN
SGP-AUS
SGP-ASEAN
KOR-GATS
KOR-USA
KOR-SGP
KOR-IND
KOR-EFTA
KOR-CHL
KOR-ASEAN
CHL-GATS
CHL-USA
CHL-SLV
CHL-KOR
CHL-JPN
CHL-EFTA
CHL-EC
CHL-CRI
CHL-COL
AUS-GATS
AUS-USA
AUS-THA
AUS-SGP
AUS-ASEAN
Note: This Figure uses an index that captures improvements in “partial” commitments from one agreement to the next. GATS stands for GATS
commitments and offer. Scores of 0, 0.5 and 1 are given for uncommitted, partially committed and fully committed subsectors, respectively, for
modes 1 and 3. It also captures improvements in partial commitments by attaching to them between 0.5 and 1. This Figure underscores
differences between the commitments a member undertakes in different PTAs, but is not best used to compare GATS+ commitments that
different members undertake. The index is brought onto a 0-100 scale, with 100 representing full commitments in all subsectors and relevant
modes. The legend of the acronyms for the members is provided in Appendix Table D.2.
Source: From updated data Marchetti and Roy (2008).
163
world trade report 2011
E. The multilateral trading
system and PTAs
A perennial policy question is how the
multilateral trading system is affected by the
rise of preferential trading agreements (PTAs).
Is multilateral trade cooperation compromised
by burgeoning regionalism? Should we see
these different approaches as complementing
or competing with each other? Are there
synergies, or inevitable conflicts? Building on
the analysis of the report so far, this final
section examines these questions.
164
II – The WTO and Preferential Trade Agreements
1. Systemic effects of preferential tariff liberalization
166
2. Deep PTA provisions and the multilateral trading system
168
3. Regionalism and the WTO: historical perspective
182
4. The relationship between PTAs and the WTO
187
E.THE MULTILATERAL
TRADING SYSTEM AND PTA s
Contents
Some key facts and findings
• Deep integration is often non-discriminatory in nature.
• Global production networks can result in PTAs with tariff and nontariff measures that are more consistent with the principles of the
multilateral trading system.
• A large number of disputes between PTA members are brought to
the WTO dispute settlement system. On average, about 30 per cent
of WTO disputes are between members who are parties to the same
PTA.
• A critical-mass approach to decision-making in the WTO may be
required, at least in the short term, to move forward on an agenda
that creates greater coherence between PTAs and the multilateral
trading system.
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world trade report 2011
1. Systemic effects of preferential
tariff liberalization
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, a series of events
led analysts to focus on the systemic effects of
regional integration (Baldwin, 2009).1 Regionalism
rose in North America, where the Canada-United
States PTA was followed by the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) negotiations. It also
reignited in Europe with the Single European Market
initiative and the disintegration of the Soviet Union. At
the same time, the prospects for a prompt and
comprehensive completion of the Uruguay Round were
shrouded in uncertainty.
The possibility of a causal link between the expansion
of regionalism and difficulties in coming to closure in
multilateral negotiations could not be ignored. This
turned the regionalism debate into a systemic
discussion. This section provides a short overview of
the literature in this area, drawing on several surveys
that have been published recently: Baldwin (2009),
Freund and Ornelas (2010) and Winters (2011).
The broad concern of this literature is the relation
between discriminatory and non-discriminatory tariff
liberalization. The standard approach is to study whether
preferential tariff cuts lead to a reduction or to an
increase in the most-favoured nation (MFN) tariff, which
is applied by WTO members on a non-discriminatory
basis. As discussed in Section C, the evidence so far is
not conclusive. However, there are some studies that
focus on the effect of preferential tariff liberalization on
non-discriminatory tariff liberalization. 2 Due to the
paucity of adequate data, opportunities for convincing
empirical work are limited. The literature is therefore
mostly theoretical, and its predictions are often
supported only by anecdotal evidence.
(a) Do PTAs foster or hinder multilateral
tariff reductions?
A number of different mechanisms have been
identified through which PTAs could foster or hinder
multilateral trade opening.
As discussed in Section C, the Kemp-Wan theorem is
a theoretical benchmark showing that PTAs need not
have adverse effects on multilateral tariff reductions.
Starting from a situation where all countries have MFN
tariffs, groups of nations can always raise their
collective welfare by forming a trade bloc. A piecemeal
enlargement of the bloc will raise bloc members'
welfare, and the highest welfare will be reached when
all nations are part of the bloc (Kemp and Wan, 1976).
This theoretical result rests on two strong assumptions.
First, PTA members must set external tariffs at levels
that freeze their trade flows with the rest of the world.
Secondly, lump-sum transfers between members
ensure that they all gain from the PTA. 3
166
The fear of preference erosion is an important aspect
of the relationship between preferential and
multilateral tariff opening.4 In a world where more
open trade would be in the interest of all nations but
where individual nations fearing erosion of their
preferences would veto it, regionalism can help
achieve global trade opening. Baldwin (2009)
illustrates the argument with an example where Home
country signs separate PTAs with Partner 1 and with
Partner 2, thereby forming a so-called hub and spoke
system. This system puts Home in a favourable
position as it combines opening trade on the import
side with preferential tariffs on the export side. Home,
the hub, is likely to oppose WTO talks aimed at
achieving more open trade for fear of preference
erosion. Despite this, Home and its two partners could
reach global trade opening, not through multilateral
negotiations, but rather through a PTA between the
two spokes. As Baldwin shows, the two partners would
always prefer global trade opening to the hub-andspoke situation.
The fear of preference erosion can, however, constitute
a potent force of resistance to multilateral tariff
reductions. The economic literature has shown that
two or more nations can form a PTA which increases
their joint welfare at the expense of third nations. Such
a PTA will hinder multilateral trade opening because
its removal will be resisted by member countries
precisely to avoid preference erosion. This can be true
not only if PTA members increase their external MFN
tariffs, but also when external tariffs are frozen.
Baldwin (2009) provides an example in which at a
sufficiently low initial tariff, the gains of maintaining a
PTA that reduces third-country welfare are worth more
than the standard gains of global trade opening. 5
Developing countries that were granted non-reciprocal
preferential access to developed countries’ markets
are particularly concerned by preference erosion,
particularly where reduced advantages from
preferential tariffs are not offset by the gains in market
access due to tariff cuts on goods that do not receive
preferences. 6
Political economy factors can also affect the pace at
which preferential tariffs are extended to nonmembers on a MFN basis. If PTAs are trade-creating,
they will increase the size of export sectors and reduce
the size of import-competing sectors. If political power
is proportional to the size of the sector, the PTA will
increase support for trade opening.7 In particular, it
can make it politically optimal for governments to cut
MFN tariffs to levels that would have been undesirable
without the PTA. 8
Along the same lines, if workers have imperfect
information on how they will be affected by more open
trade, they may initially oppose global trade opening
but accept a PTA, which is an intermediate form of
trade barrier reduction (Frankel et al., 1995). A PTA
II – The WTO and Preferential Trade Agreements
may inform workers on how they will be affected by
global trade opening and make an MFN approach
politically feasible.
The result that specific interest groups might oppose
multilateral trade opening that would be supported in
the absence of a PTA is also obtained in a medianvoter setting by Levy (1997). He shows that a bilateral
PTA might offer disproportionately large gains to key
agents in a country, making them unwilling to support
a multilateral agreement, which would therefore be
blocked. This might be the case, for instance, if the
two countries have similar factor endowments, so that
a lot of trade within the PTA is intra-industry trade,
with limited redistributive effects. A move towards
multilateral opening would alter domestic factor prices,
creating winners and losers and adding only modest
gains from increased variety or specialization based on
comparative advantage. In this case, the median voter
would oppose such a move, and the PTA acts as an
obstacle to multilateral trade opening.
Some PTAs may be concluded partly in pursuit of noneconomic objectives, such as understanding and
reconciliation between former enemies (e.g. France
and Germany), or between nations with former colonial
links (Schiff and Winters, 1998). As discussed in
Section C, some authors have argued that these noneconomic objectives might lead member countries to
oppose further multilateral trade opening. In a model
by Limão (2007), PTAs allow partner countries to
extract mutual cooperation on the non-trade issue,
using preferential tariffs as bargaining chips. The
prospect of dissipating this possibility via multilateral
trade opening might make countries less likely to
favour a global approach.11
PTAs may also increase the adjustment costs
associated with multilateral trade opening when firms
have to make sunk, sector-specific investments to
produce. As shown by McLaren (2002), in such a
situation the ex post gains from multilateral reductions
E.THE MULTILATERAL
TRADING SYSTEM AND PTA s
The political economy models discussed in Section C
(Grossman and Helpman, 1995; Krishna, 1998),
however, offer some insights as to why PTAs might
inhibit multilateral tariff reductions. In such models,
interest groups might seek primarily trade-diverting
PTAs, i.e. agreements that provide enhanced
protection. 9 In Krishna's model the extent of trade
diversion determines the degree of political opposition
to a multilateral agreement that would find support in
the absence of the PTA. Intuitively, if there is little or
no trade diversion, firms from each member country
obtain higher market shares (and profits) in the other
member’s market but lose domestic profits, with an
overall small effect on net profits. However, if the PTA
allows bloc firms to displace those from excluded
countries in each other’s markets, it surely enhances
profits for all firms, at the expense of outsiders (Freund
and Ornelas, 2010).10
can be reduced relative to those from preferential
trade opening, and the latter emerges in equilibrium.
The reason is the following: if firms expect global trade
opening to arise, they will invest in sectors of
comparative advantage, so every country will become
highly specialized. In this situation, the ex ante gains of
multilateral trade opening materialize, and such
opening is likely to occur. If, however, firms expect a
PTA to be signed, they will invest in goods in which
excluded countries have a comparative advantage,
because external tariffs will render these goods
expensive. For similar reasons, firms from excluded
countries will invest in goods where PTA members
have a comparative advantage. As PTA countries
become specialized relative to each other, and less
specialized relative to outsiders, the gains from global
trade opening will be reduced. As McLaren (2002)
explains, the resulting regionalism is “insidious”
because it is an inferior outcome for all participants,
and it emerges only because it prompts sunk
investments that reduce the value of multilateral trade
opening.
Finally, opposition to further multilateral tariff opening
by PTA members might come from excluded countries.
The logic is as follows: if PTA members reduce their
external tariffs for political economy reasons after
signing an agreement, this might result in pure trade
creation. As argued by Ornelas (2005b), non-members
benefit from such PTAs by obtaining increased market
access to member countries without having to reduce
their own tariffs, as would be required under a
multilateral agreement. Therefore, non-members may
turn against multilateral trade opening that they would
support in the absence of the PTA.12
The overview of the literature thus suggests that the
effect of regionalism on the prospects of multilateral
trade opening will depend on a number of factors. The
results depend on how much members and nonmembers stand to gain from a PTA, and how much
they would lose from multilateral trade opening, on the
importance of political economy considerations in
policy formation, and on the extent of lock-in effects of
preferential trade opening. Moreover, results depend
on whether regionalism is open or not (Yi, 1996); on
the presence of dissimilarities in endowments or costs
(Saggi and Yildiz, 2009); on the rules of the multilateral
trade system (Bagwell and Staiger, 1999; Saggi and
Yildiz, 2009); as well as on the formal enforcement
constraints (Bagwell and Staiger, 1997a: 1997b).
(b) Evidence on the systemic effects of
regionalism
When the theory is inconclusive, the most natural thing
to do is to turn to empirical evidence. A first strand of
literature tests whether MFN and preferential tariffs
are complements or substitutes.13 As discussed in
Section C, different results emerge for developing and
developed countries. While in the former group of
167
world trade report 2011
countries preferential trade agreements appear to
reduce external tariffs, in the latter group of countries
they seem to increase them. Most of the contributions
do not distinguish between MFN tariffs that have been
negotiated at the multilateral level and unilateral tariff
reductions.14 The notable exceptions are Limão (2006)
and Karacaovali and Limão (2008), who explicitly
consider the effect of preferential trade opening on
multilateral trade opening at the Uruguay Round in the
United States and the European Union, respectively.15
A second strand of literature investigates the
correlation between PTA formation and multilateralism.
One often-used example of regionalism promoting
multilateral trade opening is when the United States,
which for many years had been advocating
multilateralism, converted to regionalism in the 1990s
and thereby revived the Uruguay Round negotiations
(Bergsten and Schott, 1997).16 Mansfield and
Reinhardt (2003) observe that more PTAs are formed
during multilateral negotiations than at other times.
They interpret this result as evidence consistent with
multilateralism promoting PTAs as devices to obtain
bargaining leverage within the multilateral regime
(pressuring outsiders to open their markets or
escaping from free-riders).
A general problem with the approach of linking PTAs
with multilateral trade rounds is that the latter are rare
events. Moreover, the practice of multilateral trade
rounds is to negotiate multilateral opening with more
or less ambitious scenarios of trade opening, rather
than opting for full or no multilateral opening.
Therefore, a direct test of whether PTAs decrease the
likelihood of signing multilateral trade opening
agreements is impossible (World Trade Organization
(WTO), 2007).
Anecdotal evidence can be found in support both of
the view that PTAs facilitate further multilateral trade
opening and of the view that they hinder it.17 On the
one hand, there is anecdotal evidence that PTAs
increase excluded countries’ incentive to move on the
multilateral front to avoid trade diversion. A related
argument is that the last three rounds of multilateral
trade negotiations have started in tandem with major
moves towards regional integration, which is
sometimes taken as evidence of the building block
relationship between the two processes. Furthermore,
the cost from overlapping PTAs can trigger a
rationalization of the system – as in the case of the
Pan-European Cumulation System – or a recourse to
the multilateral system – as in the case of the WTO
Information Technology Agreement.18
On the other hand, it has been argued that the concern
for preference erosion has contributed to the stalling
of multilateral negotiations and has actually been
reflected in less multilateral trade opening, see for
instance Curtis and Vastine (1971). Furthermore, there
is also evidence that the engagement in regional
168
negotiations may stall the process of multilateral trade
opening by absorbing resources away from the
multilateral negotiations (World Trade Organization
(WTO), 2007).
2. Deep PTA provisions and the
multilateral trading system
While the literature on the systemic effects of
preferential tariffs is rich and very active, so far there
has not been much research on the systemic effects
of other, “deep” integration, provisions. Available
results suggest that in some deep integration areas,
such as technical barriers to trade (TBT), multilateral
regulation may not be economically optimal or
politically feasible. Because deep integration is often
MFN in nature, however, such regulation may also be
less necessary. Indeed, the literature has identified a
number of mechanisms through which deep integration
“automatically” supports further opening, or at least
does not entail negative static effects on the
multilateral trading system.
(a) Deep integration is often nondiscriminatory in nature
By their very nature, some deep integration provisions
are de facto extended to non-members because they
are embedded in broader regulatory frameworks that
apply to all. An example is provided by services trade
opening. Barriers to trade in services are generally
behind-the-border, regulatory measures. Even though
some services barriers could in practice be applied in
a differentiated manner depending on the suppliers'
country of origin (e.g. restrictions on the movement of
persons, foreign equity restrictions, or foreign direct
investment screening), one expects that barriers
removed or relaxed as a result of a PTA be extended
de facto to non-parties. This also makes most
economic sense, and may limit any economic distortion
resulting from services PTAs.19
Evidence suggests that in certain cases, preferential
treatment was granted to PTA parties, but proper
analysis of this is made difficult by the absence of
comprehensive information on the treatment applied
by countries to services and suppliers of their trading
partners. This is compounded by the fact that analysis
of non-discriminatory treatment in services would
need to consider not only treatment specified in laws
and regulations, but also de facto treatment − for
example, which suppliers receive operating licences,
which are sometimes limited in number. Furthermore,
given the importance of first-mover advantage for
suppliers in a number of services sectors, 20 what
matters is whether non-preferential treatment is
available for all suppliers of different origins from the
moment trade opening takes place. While this may well
be the situation most of the time, information is lacking.
II – The WTO and Preferential Trade Agreements
Another factor to consider is that rules of origin (RoOs)
for services do not carry the same potential for
distortion as they do for goods trade. RoOs in services
PTAs are usually liberal, along the lines of GATS
Article V(6), 21 although there are certain exceptions. 22
This reduces the extent of the spaghetti bowl effect
(see Section C).
For mode 1 (cross-border supply), PTAs generally
focus on the territorial presence of the provider rather
than on its nationality or the origin of the service,
according origin status to the services provided by
entities located in a PTA partner nation. For mode 2
(consumption abroad), the supplier's nationality is
unimportant as well; the focus is on the territory in
which the service is supplied and consumed. For
mode 3 (commercial presence), RoOs typically accord
origin status to firms with “substantive business
operations” within the PTA region, irrespective of the
nationality of business owners. In other words, the only
requirement is to establish a legal presence and a
certain level of commercial activity in one of the PTA
members. 23
In other areas, such as mutual recognition agreements
(MRAs) on testing, RoOs are absent. If two nations (for
example, the United States and Singapore) sign an
agreement whereby the United States accepts
products
tested
in
Singapore
laboratories,
independently of their origin, Singapore can become a
regional hub for testing and conformity assessment.
Neighbouring countries can ship their products there
to be certified before being exported to the United
States. The lack of RoOs automatically multilateralizes
the bilateral testing MRA, reducing the spaghetti bowl
effect (Baldwin et al., 2009).
Competition policy provisions in PTAs are also mostly
characterized by non-discrimination (Teh, 2009; Dawar
and Holmes, 2010). Competition disciplines usually
operate through the use of domestic regulations. While
it is not impossible for these regulations to be tailored
to favour enterprises originating from PTA partners, it
may be costly to do so and becomes even more
difficult as the number of PTAs to which a country is a
signatory increases. Transparency and in particular the
obligation to publish laws promoting competition will
provide information that becomes (simultaneously)
available to PTA and non-PTA members alike.
The substantive obligations in the competition policy
chapters of PTAs generally involve applying
competition law or setting up a competition authority.
To the extent that enforcement of competition law in a
country reduces the market power of domestic
incumbents, the prospects of foreign enterprises,
whether they are from a PTA member or not, are
improved. Carrying out the competition obligations
also opens up opportunities for new foreign entrants
(either from PTA or non-PTA members) to challenge
domestic incumbents.
E.THE MULTILATERAL
TRADING SYSTEM AND PTA s
The fact that services commitments in PTAs can be
non-discriminatory also suggests that any technical or
economic obstacle to the multilateral extension of
such PTA commitments as part of the Doha Round
would be limited. It can be hoped that preferential
commitments made by several WTO members make
their way into these members' conditional offers and
inject momentum in the Doha services negotiations.
This has not happened in offers currently on the table
– which for the most part were submitted in 2005 –
therefore suggesting that other factors are at play,
either within the Doha negotiations or domestically.
One such factor may be that, in the context of the
growing number of preferential trade agreements in
recent years, a number of countries may wish to keep
leverage for their PTA negotiations, where
commitments that go beyond the General Agreement
on Trade in Services (GATS+ commitments) are
exchanged as part of the overall trade-off between
parties (e.g. against preferential goods access), even
though the resulting overall outcome is less
economically significant than what the Doha Round
can produce, including for these PTA parties.
Moreover, there are positive effects from competition
provisions, particularly if they are contained in regional
agreements (Dawar and Holmes, 2010). There can be
economies of scale from the creation of a regional
competition authority. Even if no centralized authority
is established, benefits can come from informationsharing and cooperation among enforcement
authorities. There could be demonstration effects to
other jurisdictions when a competition authority in one
PTA member takes action against anti-competitive
behaviour. Eventually, more common competition
norms and practices within the PTA will prevent
regulatory arbitrage, where enterprises locate
themselves in a jurisdiction in the PTA with relatively
lax competition policy.
Finally, PTAs may directly refer to WTO rules. Lesser
(2007) argues that the majority of technical barriers to
trade (TBT) provisions in PTAs signed after 1995
reaffirm the parties' rights and obligations under the
WTO TBT Agreement and make reference to its
objectives.
Furthermore,
most
transparency
commitments
included in PTAs are similar in nature to the ones
included in the WTO TBT Agreement. Finally,
provisions that require parties to provide an explanation
in case of non-recognition of standard-related
measures and mechanisms supporting further
cooperation among parties (e.g. technical assistance,
joint standardization) can in fact support and enhance
the implementation of the WTO TBT Agreement,
supporting the multilateral trading system.
169
world trade report 2011
Box E.1: Investment provisions in international agreements: is there a potential
for third-party discrimination?
The process of gradual opening of foreign direct investment (FDI) has been the outcome of a multi-layered
process combining autonomous MFN investment opening, commitments made in the context of bilateral
investment treaties (more than 2,700 to date), 24 and only more recently commitments made in PTAs. Despite
the progress in investment provisions in PTAs, investment remains overwhelmingly regulated by bilateral
investment treaties (BITs).
Investment provisions are typically included in PTAs to foster investment flows between member countries.
Some provisions are clearly aimed at protecting investors, without increasing barriers to investment from
third countries (Baccini and Dür, 2010). The investment chapters of PTAs normally include absolute standards
of treatment providing a minimum level of protection for investors. In many cases, they reflect the actual state
of domestic legislation concerning FDI and the level of commitment achieved in earlier BITs. The provisions
regarding investment protection are either directly included in the text of the agreement, such as in the
agreements signed by the United States, or they are indirectly referred to in agreements providing that
investors should be treated in accordance with customary international law (Kotschwar, 2009).
It has been noted, however, that the creation of a PTA may be a source of investment discrimination, whereby
potential investors from excluded countries are put at a disadvantage vis-à-vis investors from member
countries. This can occur through two channels: one direct and the other one indirect (Baccini and Dür,
2010). First, investment discrimination can result directly from the inclusion of provisions that open up certain
sectors for investment only on a preferential basis. All PTAs include relative standards of treatment, namely
MFN and national treatment (NT). 25 Most recent PTAs, including the ones signed by the United States and
the ones among Asian countries, tend to provide both MFN and NT during all phases of the investment (preand post-establishment). 26 Relative standards of treatment can provide a competitive advantage to investors
from member countries vis-à-vis investors from non-member countries, especially in the services sector. For
instance, the PTA between Australia and the United States relaxes the requirements for government
screening of FDI for US companies investing in Australia (Baccini and Dür, 2010).
Secondly, investment discrimination can result indirectly from discriminatory tariff reductions. Assume firms
from countries A and B are engaged in market-seeking FDI in country C. They source inputs domestically,
and import them into C at the MFN tariff τC . A PTA between A and C, that eliminates tariffs on intermediary
inputs from A, creates investment discrimination by putting investors from country B at a competitive
disadvantage. However, there is very little empirical evidence on the actual incidence of such discrimination.
The extent of potential investment discrimination also depends on the RoOs included in the PTA. Liberal
RoOs in the services sector, for instance, reduce the discriminatory aspects of investment provisions for
services providers. There is, however, considerable variation in the strictness of rules of origin for investment
across PTAs (Baccini and Dür, 2010). Moreover, one should consider the relation between the provisions of
PTAs and the ones contained in BITs.
BITs are traditionally about the protection of investment that is already established in the host countries
(DiMascio and Pauwelyn, 2008), guaranteeing compensation in cases of expropriation and repatriation of
profits. In the early BITs, what mattered for host country governments was the flexibility to differentiate
between national and foreign governments, not so much among foreign investors. Nonetheless, a host
country could wish to exercise selective screening over the admission of foreign investors and the terms of
their admission as part of its policies to promote national investments. For example, it could wish to offer
investment incentives only to certain foreign investors on a discriminatory basis. Despite an improvement in
absolute standards of treatment in recent BITs, most of them still do not cover pre-establishment or entry of
investments, according NT and/or MFN only once investments are in the country. For this reason, and also
because they do not cover tariff reductions, Baccini and Dür (2010) argue that BITs are not very likely to
lower PTAs’ potential for investment discrimination.
It should be noted that investment discrimination need not imply a reduction in FDI flows from excluded
countries into member countries. Tariff discrimination may lead to tariff-jumping FDI (i.e. the establishment of
a production facility in a member country, through FDI, in order to avoid a tariff). Studies finding that PTAs
attract FDI from third countries, such as te Velde and Bezemer (2006), do not, therefore, provide evidence
against PTA-driven investment discrimination.
170
II – The WTO and Preferential Trade Agreements
(b) Several mechanisms supporting further
liberalization are found in PTAs
Secondly, there is a tendency to replicate tradeopening rules in PTAs because template approaches
are often used for PTAs. The spread of the NAFTAstyle telecommunication competition provision is an
example. Baldwin et al. (2009) argue that the large
number of countries that have included this provision
in PTAs suggests that it is progressively becoming a
norm. They further argue that harmonization to a single
regulatory regime, including a common set of rules
that governments apply to private firms in many
nations, tends to foster competition and trade and it
cannot be considered preferential.
Another example is provided by NAFTA's investment
provisions, in particular performance requirements.
These provisions have spread in Latin America and
beyond. Fifteen countries have agreed never to apply
performance requirements against foreign investors
from any jurisdiction. Another 36 countries have
committed to forgo the application of such
requirements, however only against Canadian and US
investors (Baldwin et al., 2009).
Along similar lines, as argued by Anderson et al. (2010),
“the government procurement provisions of RTAs have
made feasible a significant further expansion of the
membership of the Government Procurement
Agreement (GPA), in the event that parties decide to
take this step.”
Thirdly, domino effects (Baldwin, 1993) pointing in the
direction of progressive extension of preferential market
access might be at play also for deep integration
provisions. Consider the example of the GPA. With the
EU enlargement from 15 to 25 members, non-EU GPA
members started facing more competition in
government procurement both in the 15 EU incumbents
(from the ten newcomers) and in the ten EU newcomers
(from the 15 incumbents). As a reaction to this form of
trade diversion, the non-EU GPA members started
pressuring the new EU members to join the GPA. 29
Similar domino effects can be discerned in all cases in
which countries excluded from a PTA find themselves in
(c) The effects of global production sharing
The presence of international fragmentation of
production can alter political-economy forces in favour
of the adoption of tariff and non-tariff measures that
are less discriminatory, and more consistent with the
principles of the multilateral trading system. The
underlying logic can be explained with the example of
the Pan-European Cumulation System (PECS) of rules
of origin (Baldwin et al., 2009).
Firms from EU countries started to relocate labourintensive stages of production in low-wage
neighbouring nations from the 1990s. At the same
time, the European Union engaged in bilateral
agreements with a number of countries both from
Central and Eastern Europe and from the Southern
Mediterranean. These agreements contained nonharmonized rules of origin, giving rise to a spaghetti
bowl effect that restricted firms’ ability to source
intermediate goods from the cheapest source
(Gasiorek et al., 2009).
E.THE MULTILATERAL
TRADING SYSTEM AND PTA s
First, PTAs may include “non-party” MFN clauses.
These clauses stipulate the extension to current PTA
partners of preferences or concessions that member
countries may have granted in the past or may grant in
the future to third nations. 27 In the case of services
and government procurement for instance, such
provisions ensure that future and more advantageous
commitments with other non-member partners should
be granted to PTA partners as well (Fink and
Molinuevo, 2008). Many PTA procurement provisions
require third-party MFN guarantees so as to limit the
extent to which preferential procurement is
undermined by subsequent PTAs (Baldwin et al.,
2009). 28
a position to adopt similar provisions to the ones
adopted by member countries to avoid trade diversion.
The implementation by countries in the European Free
Trade Association (EFTA) of competition policy norms
that mimic the ones of EU countries can be interpreted
as a way of ensuring that firms in EFTA countries do not
find themselves at competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis
firms in the European Union (Baldwin et al., 2009).
Moreover, the downsizing of production in the
European Union, also due to competition from
emerging Asian countries such as China, reduced the
number and political influence of EU-based producers
of intermediate inputs which benefited from the
protectionist effects of the spaghetti bowl. The
political economy forces thus turned in favour of
harmonizing rules of origin across PTAs, to avoid the
cost of different administrative requirements, and
permitting diagonal cumulation (i.e. allowing EU final
good producers to source inputs from a wider set of
countries without fear of losing origin status). This was
accomplished with the signing of the PECS in 1997. 30
International fragmentation of production may also be a
driver of deep integration, and of the multilateral
extension of deep provisions. Examples can be found in
the field of technical barriers to trade (TBTs), the opening
of markets for trade in services and the presence of
contingency measures within trade commitments
(Baldwin et al., 2009). In TBTs, unbundling of production
may help explain the adoption of international standards,
at least in parts and components, in industries
characterized by global sourcing (e.g. electronics).
Concerning the opening of markets for trade in services,
offshoring is likely to create an incentive for nations to
apply international standards to improve the
competitiveness of their own exporters and to make their
own services markets more attractive to foreign investors.
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world trade report 2011
Box E.2: Making rules of origin more compatible with the multilateral trading system
It has been argued in this report that rules of origin (RoOs) are likely to strengthen the “spaghetti bowl”
effect of PTAs. In view of this adverse effect, various commentators have argued in favour of reforming
RoOs, making them more transparent and compatible with the principles of the multilateral trading system
(see for instance Cadot and de Melo, 2007). 31 This box discusses the system of “cap and convergence”
proposed by Estevadeordal et al. (2009a) and supported by Baldwin and Thornton (2008), based on the two
concepts of “multilateralization” and “convergence”.
"Multilateralization” of RoOs refers to the establishment of multilateral rules that limit the restrictiveness and
complexity of RoOs in PTAs (Estevadeordal et al., 2009a). According to the authors, such rules would ensure
that “at least the qualifying production methods in a given sector remain relatively similar across export
markets”. They claim that multilateralization should ideally be coupled with “convergence”, which is the
“unification of multiple overlapping existing RTAs into a single cumulation zone with a new, single list of rules
of origin”, like in the European PECS.
The proposed system of “cap and convergence” would increase transparency (one of the key principles of the
multilateral trading system). Moreover, it could be subject to WTO discipline. Estevadeordal et al. (2009a)
suggest that the non-preferential RoOs currently negotiated at the WTO could serve as the global benchmark
with which to compare the overall restrictiveness of RoOs of a given PTA. This would be analogous to the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Article XXIV restriction on a customs union's external tariff,
which caps it at the average of the tariffs previously charged by the members (Baldwin and Thornton, 2008).
This provides another strong reason for concluding the long-standing negotiations on non-preferential rules
of origin at the WTO.
The rationale for coupling convergence with capping is the following: larger cumulation zones increase trade,
especially among the current spoke countries (see Section C). However, observed restrictiveness of RoOs is
positively correlated with the size of the cumulation zone, measured as the combined GDP of members
(Estevadeordal et al., 2009b). Larger cumulation zones could therefore end up with highly restrictive RoOs
that would serve to isolate production within each zone, increasing trade diversion and reducing global
efficiency. Trade diversion for third nations justifies involvement of the WTO through multilateralization efforts
aimed at limiting the overall restrictiveness of RoOs within a given cumulation zone.
Finally, unbundling of production may create greater
support for new multilateral rules on contingency
measures, such as safeguards, anti-dumping and
countervailing measures, in trade commitments. When
firms engage in outsourcing, they prefer measures
discouraging the imposition of contingency measures
in as many bilateral trading relationships as possible,
rather than in any one bilateral trade relationship. This
underlies the producer support for the spread of a
common or similar set of rules on the application of
contingency measures (Baldwin et al., 2009).
(d) Relationship between the WTO and
PTA dispute settlement systems
As noted in Section D, the vast majority of PTAs
establish some kind of dispute settlement mechanism.
Porges (2010) presents a survey of dispute settlement
mechanisms in PTAs. She describes these
mechanisms as generally falling into the following
three types: (i) diplomatic or political mechanisms
(such as the Latin American Integration Association,
ALADI); (ii) standing tribunals (such as the European
Union and the Andean Community); and (iii) referral to
ad hoc panels (such as NAFTA and other US FTAs, EU
FTAs with Chile, the Republic of Korea and Mexico, the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations Enhanced
172
Dispute Settlement Mechanism, and the Southern
Common Market − MERCOSUR). The survey indicates
that referral to ad hoc panels is the dominant model for
PTA dispute settlement mechanisms. A slightly
different classification is used in Ramirez Robles
(2006), which classifies the mechanisms as:
(i) diplomatic; (ii) quasi-adjudicative; and (iii) “hybrid”,
(i.e. mechanisms that have features of both models).
The relationship between the WTO and PTA dispute
settlement mechanisms has received considerable
attention in the trade literature and some
commentators have cautioned about potential risks
from the coexistence of dispute settlement
mechanisms at different levels (multilateral, regional
and bilateral) that may have overlapping jurisdictions.
In this subsection, we first describe how the
jurisdictions of the WTO and PTA dispute settlement
systems may overlap. We then discuss the concerns
that have been raised and the recommendations that
have been made to reduce the risks of conflict. This is
followed by a review of the handful of WTO disputes in
which the relationship of the WTO dispute settlement
system and a PTA dispute settlement mechanism has
been raised as an issue. Finally, we present data on
the use of the WTO dispute settlement system by
members who are partners in a PTA.
II – The WTO and Preferential Trade Agreements
(i) Overlapping jurisdictions
Recourse to the WTO dispute settlement system may
be had where a WTO member considers that any
benefits accruing to it directly or indirectly under the
WTO agreements are being impaired by measures
taken by another member. Thus, in principle, a WTO
member may not have recourse to the WTO dispute
settlement system to prosecute an alleged violation of
a PTA obligation. 33 The potential for overlapping
jurisdiction arises where an issue is regulated both
under the WTO and the PTA. Porges (2010) observes
that “(a)lmost all PTAs overlap with the WTO
Agreement, as both PTAS an the WTO require national
treatment and ban quantitative restrictions on trade.
Indeed, many PTAs simply incorporate GATT Articles III
and XI by reference”.
PTAs take different approaches to how they regulate
the relationship between their own dispute settlement
mechanism and that of the WTO. Porges (2010)
identifies the following four approaches. Most PTAs
use the “fork-in-the-road” approach which allows the
party initiating the dispute to choose between the
multilateral or the PTA fora. However, once it has
initiated the dispute in one forum, the other option (be
it the PTA mechanism or multilateral one) is no longer
available to it. (See, for example, the NAFTA and the
Colombia-EU PTA.) The NAFTA has a provision
(Article 2005(4)) under which the respondent party
may require an environmental dispute to be addressed
at the regional level, even if the complaining party has
initially chosen the multilateral fora. This provision is
the subject of a pending dispute between the United
States and Mexico (discussed further below). A third
approach, which has been used in far fewer PTAs, is to
establish the PTA dispute settlement mechanism as
the exclusive forum where the matter is one regulated
under the PTA. The EU-Mexico and EU-Chile PTAs
take the opposite approach, requiring disputes
involving a breach of a PTA obligation that are
equivalent in substance to a WTO obligation to be
brought to the WTO (Porges, 2010).
(ii) Concerns over the coexistence of the
WTO dispute settlement system and
PTA dispute settlement mechanisms
The concerns raised about the coexistence of the WTO
dispute settlement system and the increasing number
of dispute settlement mechanisms of PTAs revolve
around two sets of issues. The first set of issues derive
from the view that the proliferation of PTA dispute
settlement mechanisms could undermine the WTO
dispute settlement system's status as a public good.
Those who hold this view consider that the WTO dispute
settlement system has positive externalities for
members that are not parties to a particular dispute.
E.THE MULTILATERAL
TRADING SYSTEM AND PTA s
Article 23.1 of the WTO's Dispute Settlement
Understanding (DSU) provides that “(w)hen Members
seek the redress of a violation of obligations or other
nullification or impairment of benefits under the
covered agreements or an impediment to the
attainment of any objective of the covered agreements,
they shall have recourse to, and abide by, the rules and
procedures of this Understanding.” The Appellate
Body has explained that “Article 23.1 lays down a
fundamental obligation of WTO Members to have
recourse to the rules and procedures of the DSU when
seeking redress of a violation of the covered
agreements” and “establishes the WTO dispute
settlement system as the exclusive forum for the
resolution of such disputes" 32 (Appellate Body Report,
US / Canada – Continued Suspension, para. 371).
There are many factors that can influence a country's
decision to bring a dispute to one forum over the other
where the choice is available to it. Horlick and Piérola
(2007) examine a list of factors that may be relevant,
including: the type of measure that is being challenged,
the applicable law, issues of standing, the time-frame
of the proceedings, the remedies available, and the
possibility of other countries participating in the
dispute as third parties. According to Horlick and
Piérola (2007), “the cautious decision-making process
to choose the appropriate forum requires weighing
and balancing of all these factors in accordance with
the ultimate needs and objectives of the complainant”.
Drahos (2005), for example, notes that the interpretation
of the WTO agreements provides greater certainty to
WTO rules. He also observes that when a respondent
member brings an infringing measure into conformity
with its WTO obligations, this will be of benefit to the
membership at large because of the MFN principle.
Thus, Drahos (2005) proposes that where a dispute
concerns a matter regulated under both the WTO and
the PTA, it be brought to the WTO. Davey and Sapir
(2009) take a different approach and propose that the
WTO should require members that do not belong to a
PTA to be allowed to participate in the PTA dispute
settlement forum as third parties.
The other set of concerns relates to the possibility that
a dispute is brought under both the WTO and PTA
dispute settlement mechanisms. Here there is concern
over the inefficiency of litigating similar matters twice
and more importantly about fairness to the respondent
party that would have to defend itself in two fora (see
Kwak and Marceau, 2006). There is also concern about
the more extreme situation in which the WTO and PTA
fora issue parallel or consecutive conflicting decisions.
One way of reducing the risks of this happening is
through stricter jurisdictional clauses in PTAs that
preclude a dispute from going to both fora or foreclose
bringing a dispute to the WTO over a matter regulated
under the PTA (Marceau and Wyatt, 2010). This raises,
however, the question of the extent to which such
clauses would bind WTO adjudicatory bodies.
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world trade report 2011
At the other extreme, there is the risk that the
jurisdiction of the WTO could be gradually “carved
out”. For the moment, it appears that few PTAs
completely close off access to the WTO dispute
settlement, but rather leave the choice of forum to the
complaining party. The data discussed below show
that an important number of disputes between
members that are partners in a PTA continue to be
brought to the WTO dispute settlement system. Some
could also conceive of making changes to the WTO's
Dispute Settlement Understanding to regulate the
relationship with dispute settlement fora of PTAs. This
approach, however, has not been taken up by WTO
members in the negotiations to improve the Dispute
Settlement Understanding currently under way.
The academic literature discusses other more complex
arrangements that could minimize the risks of conflicts
and promote more coherence between the multilateral
dispute settlement system and the dispute settlement
systems of PTAs. For example, there has been
discussion of making exhaustion of PTA dispute
resolution procedures a prerequisite to initiation of
WTO dispute settlement (see Kwak and Marceau,
2006). Another suggestion is to create a system of
preliminary references from the dispute settlement
systems of PTAs to the WTO dispute settlement
system where the issue concerns the interpretation of
provisions of the WTO agreements (Kuijper, 2010).
Commentators have also referred to several
international law doctrines that could be used to avoid
or
resolve
conflicts
between
overlapping
jurisdictions. 34 The doctrine of res judicata or finality
refers to situations where a matter has been decided
by a competent adjudicative body barring its relitigation
in subsequent proceedings. Lis Alibi Pendens, for its
part, refers to parallel proceedings and is a principle
pursuant to which once a dispute is pending in one
forum, it cannot be brought before another forum.
However, for these doctrines to apply, there must be
an “inextricable link” between the proceedings, which
usually is understood as an identity of the parties and
of the issues (Shany, 2005). Thus, application of the
doctrines can be avoided in certain circumstances. 35
Under the principle of comity or forum non conveniens,
an adjudicative body could seek to avoid exercising
jurisdiction over a dispute if it considers that it would
be more appropriate for another tribunal to exercise
jurisdiction. There is considerable debate as to the
applicability of these principles to resolve a potential
conflict of jurisdiction involving the WTO dispute
settlement system and a PTA dispute settlement
mechanism (see Kwak and Marceau, 2006). The WTO
dispute settlement system is available to WTO
members as of right; they do not have to seek leave to
start the process under the current rules. Thus, some
would consider that applying these prerequisites could
only be effected through a change in the rules.
174
As discussed below, questions about the relationship
between the WTO dispute settlement system and PTA
dispute settlement mechanisms have come up in only
a handful of WTO disputes. It should be noted that so
far concerns over potential conflicts have not
materialized to the extent that some had feared. 36 This
is not to say that it is not important to think through
issues arising from the coexistence of the multilateral
and PTA settlement systems.
(iii) Issues relating to PTA dispute settlement
raised in WTO disputes
As noted earlier, issues touching on the relationship of
the WTO dispute settlement system and PTA dispute
settlement mechanisms have come up in a handful of
WTO disputes. In Argentina – Poultry, Argentina argued
that Brazil was “estopped” from pursuing the dispute
at the WTO because Brazil had first challenged the
anti-dumping measures in the MERCOSUR forum. The
panel rejected Argentina's argument, noting that there
was “no evidence on the record that Brazil made an
express statement that it would not bring WTO dispute
settlement proceedings in respect of measures
previously challenged through MERCOSUR”. Moreover,
the panel found that:
"In particular, the fact that Brazil chose not to
invoke its WTO dispute settlement rights
after
previous
MERCOSUR
dispute
settlement proceedings does not, in our view,
mean that Brazil implicitly waived its rights
under the DSU. This is especially because
the Protocol of Brasilia, under which previous
MERCOSUR cases had been brought by
Brazil, imposes no restrictions on Brazil's
right to bring subsequent WTO dispute
settlement proceedings in respect of the
same measure. We note that Brazil signed
the Protocol of Olivos in February 2002.
Article 1 of the Protocol of Olivos provides
that once a party decides to bring a case
under either the MERCOSUR or WTO
dispute settlement forums, that party may
not bring a subsequent case regarding the
same subject-matter in the other forum. The
Protocol of Olivos, however, does not change
our assessment, since that Protocol has not
yet entered into force, and in any event it
does not apply in respect of disputes already
decided in accordance with the MERCOSUR
Protocol of Brasilia. Indeed, the fact that
parties to MERCOSUR saw the need to
introduce the Protocol of Olivos suggests to
us that they recognised that (in the absence
of such Protocol) a MERCOSUR dispute
settlement proceeding could be followed by
a WTO dispute settlement proceeding in
respect of the same measure.” (Panel Report,
Argentina–Poultry, para. 7.38)
II – The WTO and Preferential Trade Agreements
Alternatively, Argentina argued that if Brazil were entitled
to bring the dispute to the WTO, “then the Panel is bound
by the earlier MERCOSUR ruling on the measure at issue
in this case” as “the earlier MERCOSUR ruling is part of
the normative framework to be applied by the Panel as a
result of Article 31.3(c) of the Vienna Convention”. This
argument was also rejected by the panel, which explained
its reasons as follows:
The panel report in that case was not appealed.
The issue also arose in Mexico – Taxes on Soft Drinks,
where the United States was challenging certain tax
measures and book-keeping requirements imposed by
Mexico on soft drinks and other beverages that used
sweeteners other than cane sugar. Mexico argued that
the WTO dispute was “inextricably linked to a broader
dispute regarding access of Mexican sugar to the
United States' market under the NAFTA.” Mexico
requested the panel to decline jurisdiction over the
dispute. According to Mexico, WTO panels have
“implied jurisdictional powers” and these include “the
power to refrain from exercising substantive
jurisdiction in circumstances where 'the underlying or
predominant elements of a dispute derive from rules of
international law under which claims cannot be
judicially enforced in the WTO, such as the NAFTA
provisions' or 'when one of the disputing parties
refuses to take the matter to the appropriate forum'.”
The Appellate Body affirmed the panel's finding that,
under the DSU, it had no discretion to decline to
exercise its jurisdiction in that case. Before reaching
this finding, however, the Appellate Body noted that
Mexico had not argued that the subject matter nor the
respective positions of the parties were identical in the
NAFTA and WTO disputes and Mexico had not
identified a legal basis that would allow it to raise, in a
WTO dispute settlement proceeding, the market
access claims Mexico was pursuing under NAFTA.
Furthermore, it was undisputed that no NAFTA panel
Another case that has been discussed in the literature
is a dispute between Canada and the United States
over the imposition by the latter of anti-dumping and
countervailing duties on imports of softwood lumber
from the former. Various aspects of this dispute were
the subject of litigation in both the WTO and NAFTA.
At one point an injury determination made by the US
investigating authority was found to be lacking by a
NAFTA panel, while a WTO panel upheld it. The
conflict nevertheless was eventually resolved when
the decision of the WTO panel was eventually
overturned upon review by the Appellate Body
(Hillman, 2009). 37
E.THE MULTILATERAL
TRADING SYSTEM AND PTA s
"Rather than concerning itself with the
interpretation of the WTO agreements,
Argentina actually argues that the earlier
MERCOSUR Tribunal ruling requires us to
rule in a particular way. In other words,
Argentina would have us apply the relevant
WTO provisions in a particular way, rather
than interpret them in a particular way.
However, there is no basis in Article 3.2 of
the DSU, or any other provision, to suggest
that we are bound to rule in a particular
way, or apply the relevant WTO provisions
in a particular way. We note that we are not
even bound to follow rulings contained in
adopted WTO panel reports, so we see no
reason at all why we should be bound by
the rulings of non-WTO dispute settlement
bodies.” (Panel Report, Argentina – Poultry,
para. 7.41)
had yet decided the “broader dispute” to which Mexico
had alluded and Mexico had acknowledged that the
“exclusion clause” of Article 2005(6) of NAFTA had
not been exercised. Thus, the Appellate Body did not
“express any view on whether a legal impediment to
the exercise of a panel's jurisdiction would exist in the
event that features such as those mentioned above
were present.” (Appellate Body Report, Mexico – Taxes
on Soft Drinks, paras. 44-57)
The relationship between the dispute settlement
mechanisms of NAFTA and the WTO has surfaced
again in a more recent dispute between Mexico and the
United States. In 2009, Mexico requested that a WTO
panel examine the consistency of certain requirements
concerning the labelling in the United States of tuna
products as “dolphin safe” (WT/DS381/4). In response,
the United States invoked Article 2005(4) of NAFTA,
which it considers to require that in certain types of
disputes, if the defending party makes such a request,
NAFTA rather than any other forum should be the sole
venue of the dispute. The United States initiated a
dispute under NAFTA challenging Mexico's decision not
to move the dispute from the WTO to NAFTA, as
requested by the United States (United States Trade
Representative (USTR), 2010). Both proceedings are
presently ongoing.
(iv) WTO disputes between WTO members
that are partners in a PTA
In this subsection, we examine data on WTO disputes
between WTO members who are partners in a PTA.
Data on the number of disputes refer to requests for
consultations, which is the first step under the WTO
dispute settlement procedures. The data concern
participation by WTO members (who are PTA partners)
as complainants and respondents, and does not
include participation as third parties. Moreover, the
exercise looks only at WTO dispute settlement and
does not examine whether the disputes could have
been brought under the PTA dispute settlement
mechanism. Certainly a more complete analysis would
require looking at whether the disputes could have
been taken to the PTA dispute settlement mechanism.
Notwithstanding this limitation, the data provide some
useful insights.
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world trade report 2011
First, the data show that WTO members that are
partners in a PTA continue to have frequent recourse
to the WTO dispute settlement system to resolve trade
disputes (the methodology employed in Tables E.1 to
E.3 and Figure E.1 is explained in Box E.3). As
illustrated in Table E.1, 82 of the 443 disputes brought
to the WTO up to 2010 were between complainant and
respondent members who at the time were partners in
a PTA. Disputes between PTA partners represent
19 per cent of all disputes. The ratio is higher where
the complainant is a developing country (28 per cent)
than when it is a developed country (13 per cent). This
is probably explained by the fact that the United
States, the European Union, Japan and China do not
have PTAs between them, and they have been parties
in an important number of disputes.
The largest share of the disputes between PTA
partners brought to the WTO is made up of disputes
between parties to NAFTA, but there also have been
WTO disputes between WTO members that are
partners in other PTAs, as illustrated in Figure E.1.
As depicted in Table E.2, the share of WTO disputes
between PTA partners increased steadily since 1995,
reaching a peak of 50 per cent in 2005. Since then,
the share has remained around 30 per cent, although
it was significantly below this number in 2009. The
steady increase in the share of disputes between PTA
partners may be partly a reflection of the negotiation
of new PTAs, but is more likely a reflection of the
diversification of parties making use of the WTO
dispute settlement system. An interesting point that
Table E.1: Frequency of requests for consultations, by development level and existence of PTAs
in force between the parties, 1995-2010 (Total number of pairs of members/pairs with a PTA in force)
DEFENDANT
COMPLAINANT
Developed
Developing
LDC
TOTAL
Developed
154 / 24
115 / 10
0/0
269 / 34
Developing
102 / 8
71 / 39
1/1
174 / 48
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
256 / 32
186 / 49
1/1
443 / 82
LDC
TOTAL
Source: WTO Secretariat based on Legal Division's and RTA's databases. The table takes account of 419 requests for consultations under
the WT/DS document series as of 31 December 2010, which account for a total of 443 pairs of members (i.e. complainant-defendant). See
Box E.3.
Figure E.1: PTAs in force at the time of the request for consultations, 1995-2010
35
No. of pairs of members
30
25
20
15
10
5
Source: WTO Secretariat.
176
SAPTA
Panama-Mexico
NAFTA
Mexico - Northern Triangle
Mexico - Nicaragua
MERCOSUR - Peru
MERCOSUR
LAIA
EC-Mexico
EC-Chile
EC - Norway
DR - Central America
Colombia-Panama
Chile - Mexico
Chile - MERCOSUR
CAFTA-DR
Australia - New Zealand
ASEAN
Armenia - Ukraine
0
II – The WTO and Preferential Trade Agreements
Table E.2: Requests for consultations, by year and subsequent procedures, 1995-2010
Request for consultations
Year of request
for consultations
Total requests
for
consultations
Total pairs of
members
1995
22
1996
With a panel established
Pairs w/ a PTA in force
Total panels
established
Total pairs of
members
Share (%)
No.
Share (%)
25
1
4.0
12
12
0
0.0
42
50
3
6.0
19
24
1
4.2
1997
47
47
2
4.3
20
20
1
5.0
1998
43
43
3
7.0
15
15
1
6.7
1999
31
35
4
11.4
17
17
1
5.9
2000
30
30
7
23.3
11
11
3
27.3
2001
27
36
12
33.3
11
20
7
35.0
2002
34
34
7
20.6
23
23
5
21.7
2003
28
28
9
32.1
16
16
4
25.0
2004
20
20
5
25.0
9
9
1
11.1
2005
12
12
6
50.0
5
5
1
20.0
2006
18
18
6
33.3
13
13
4
30.8
2007
15
15
5
33.3
7
7
4
57.1
2008
17
17
4
23.5
10
10
4
40.0
20091
16
16
2
12.5
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
20101
17
17
6
37.5
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
TOTAL
419
443
82
18.5
188
202
37
18.3
E.THE MULTILATERAL
TRADING SYSTEM AND PTA s
No.
Pairs w/ a PTA in force
Note: The numbers for each row were calculated for the year in which the request for consultations was made (i.e. they always refer to the
same group of requests for consultations made in that year and not to the number of panels established during a particular year).
1 The figures relating to the number of panels established for the period 2009-2010 were not included because they are not comparable
(i.e. due to ongoing procedures).
Source: WTO Secretariat based on Legal Division's and RTA's databases. See Box E.3.
comes out of Table E.2 is that the share of disputes
between PTA partners that advance to the panel stage
(45 per cent) is very close to the overall average,
indicating that a dispute between PTA partners is just
as likely to be settled at the consultations stage as a
dispute between non-PTA partners.
Table E.3 compares the number of times a particular
WTO agreement has been the subject of a dispute
between PTA partners with the number of times it has
been invoked in all disputes. There are significant
differences with respect to some of the agreements,
though it may be difficult to draw conclusions in many
cases given the small number of disputes involving
certain agreements. The most frequently cited
agreements in disputes between PTA partners are the
GATT 1994, the Anti-dumping Agreement, the
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM)
Agreement, the Agreement on Safeguards, and the
Agreement on Agriculture. Interestingly, subsidy and
safeguards disputes make up a larger share of
disputes between PTA partners (intra-PTA) than of
overall disputes, while intra-PTA disputes involving the
GATT 1994 represent a lower share than overall.
Porges (2010) offers some possible explanations for
the continued use of WTO dispute settlement by
members that are partners in a PTA: the WTO's “familiar
institutions” and “unblockable” dispute settlement
procedures; the possibility to suspend MFN tariffs and
other WTO obligations (particularly where the PTA's
margin of preference is low); the broader pool of neutral
panellists; the broader issue scope of the WTO; the
possibility of forming alliances; access to assistance
177
world trade report 2011
Table E.3: WTO Agreements cited in the requests for consultations, 1995-2010
No. of references to the
Agreements1
WTO Agreement
In requests where a pair of members has a PTA
in force
Frequency
Share of references
in disputes between
PTA partners (per cent)
Share of overall
references (per cent)
31.0
31
23.7
13.7
86
11.7
16
12.2
18.6
Anti-dumping
84
11.5
27
20.6
32.1
Agriculture
66
9.0
12
9.2
18.2
TBT
41
5.6
7
5.3
17.1
Safeguards
38
5.2
15
11.5
39.5
SPS
37
5.0
6
4.6
16.2
Import Licensing
34
4.6
4
3.1
11.8
TRIPS
29
4.0
1
0.8
3.4
TRIMs
27
3.7
1
0.8
3.7
GATS
22
3.0
3
2.3
13.6
ATC
16
2.2
1
0.8
6.3
Customs Valuation
15
2.0
5
3.8
33.3
Rules of Origin
7
1.0
2
1.5
28.6
Gov. Procurement
4
0.5
0
0.0
0.0
733
100
131
100
17.9
Frequency
Share of
references (per cent)
GATT 1994 (adjusted)2
227
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures
TOTAL
1
References to the DSU and the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the WTO were not taken into account.
2
See Box E.3 for a description of the adjustment methodology used.
Source: WTO Secretariat.
from the Advisory Centre on WTO Law; the multilateral
surveillance process; the institutionalized framework for
taking countermeasures; and the fact that the cost of
WTO dispute settlement is included in a member's
annual assessment, while in most PTAs, the parties pay
the panellists, or pay for the cost of the tribunal.
(e) Caveats: mechanisms generating
negative systemic effects
Some of the deep provisions contained in new-era
PTAs can contain discriminatory aspects, creating a
tension with the multilateral trading system. The most
prominent examples are the area of contingency
measures (anti-dumping and safeguards).
(i) Discriminatory aspects in anti-dumping
rules in PTAs
Recent research suggests that the risk of trade
diversion may extend beyond tariffs. Prusa and Teh
178
(2010) uncover what they call a protection analogue to
the trade creation-trade diversion impact of PTAs in
the area of anti-dumping. Anti-dumping provisions in
PTAs result in members being spared from antidumping actions (“protection reduction”) while nonPTA members face even greater anti-dumping scrutiny
(“protection diversion”).
The idea that PTAs may have this distortionary effect is
not new. In a series of papers, Bhagwati (1992: 1993)
and Bhagwati and Panagariya (1996) conjecture that
due to its “elastic” and selective nature, anti-dumping
can increase the risk of protection diversion from PTAs.
According to their explanation, contingency measures
are driven by import volume. Who is targeted in the antidumping petition is entirely up to the discretion of the
domestic industry.
If anti-dumping provisions make PTA members more
difficult to sanction, the domestic industry will simply
target other sources. As a result, we might see an
increase in anti-dumping protection directed towards
II – The WTO and Preferential Trade Agreements
Box E.3: Methodology
A Data sources
The tables and graphs in this section are based on a specialized dataset that was developed based on
databases maintained by the Legal Affairs division and the Regional Trade Agreements unit of the WTO. The
dataset includes a total of 419 requests for consultations submitted under the WT/DS document series as of
31 December 2010.
C Adjusting the references to the GATT 1994
Santana and Jackson (2011) noted that, because complainants tend to cite a large number of agreements
and provisions in their requests for consultations under the DSU, frequency counts of provisions cited tend to
overestimate the importance of the GATT 1994. This is mainly because references to certain GATT Articles
tend to be subsidiary in nature when made together with other “specialized” agreements or even Articles in
the GATT. For example, the complainant in a typical anti-dumping case will normally claim that the defendant
is in breach of provisions in the Agreement on Anti-dumping, Article VI of the GATT, and that the antidumping duty imposed is in violation of the tariff binding (Article II:1(b) of the GATT) and the MFN clause
(Article I of the GATT).
E.THE MULTILATERAL
TRADING SYSTEM AND PTA s
B "Pairs” of members (i.e. complainant-defendant)
Seven requests for consultations involved more than one complainant (i.e. DS16, DS27, DS35, DS58, DS158,
DS217 and DS234), which meant it was not possible to establish whether a PTA was in force between the
parties without creating a bias in the figures. For this reason, the 419 requests for consultations as of
31 December 2010 were re-expressed as 443 pairs of complainants-defendants. Figures relating to the
prevalence of a PTA at the time of filing the request for consultations were derived on this basis.
In spite of the four Articles cited, the GATT normally plays a secondary role in these disputes. Similarly, a
request for consultations citing both Articles II and XIX of the GATT is almost certainly a case about
safeguards and not about tariff bindings. To minimize the incidence of those secondary references, and
following the principle of lex specialis, Santana and Jackson proposed a methodology that does not take into
account references to certain Articles of the GATT 1994 when cited together with other provisions. The
adjustments are as follows:
1.Article I was excluded when a reference was made in the same dispute to the Agreements on Antidumping, Safeguards, SCM (related to countervailing duties - CVD), sanitary or phytosanitary measures
(SPS), or technical barriers to trade (TBT), or when a reference was made to Article VI of the GATT (i.e. CVD
or anti-dumping related).
2.Article II was excluded when a reference was made in the same dispute to the Agreements on Antidumping, Customs Valuations, Safeguards or SCM (CVD related), or retaliation under Article 22 of the DSU.
It was also excluded when a reference was made to GATT Articles VI (i.e. CVD or anti-dumping related) or
XIX (safeguards).
3.Article III was excluded when a reference was made in the same dispute to either the SPS or the TBT
Agreements.
4.Article VI was excluded when a reference was made in the same dispute to Anti-dumping or SCM (CVD
related) Agreements.
5.Article XI was excluded when a reference was made in the same dispute to the Safeguards, SPS, TBT
Agreements, as well as GATT Articles XII and XIX.
6.Article XVI was excluded when a reference was made in the same dispute to the SCM Agreement (related
to the provision of subsidies), or to Articles 3, 6-11 of the Agreement on Agriculture.
7. Article XIX was excluded when a reference was made in the same dispute to the Safeguards Agreement
On the basis of an adjusted dataset, an agreement is considered “cited” if one or more of its provisions are
cited in a specific request for consultations.
179
world trade report 2011
non-PTA members when in fact the injury to domestic
industry mostly stems from imports from other PTA
members. 38 The work by Prusa and Teh (2010)
provides the first empirical support for this
conjecture. 39 Their findings are especially relevant
given the prominence of anti-dumping in the trade
policy arena. Anti-dumping has long been the
contingency measure of choice and its prominence
has increased over the past two decades. The number
of countries using anti-dumping has increased fivefold and the annual number of anti-dumping initiations
has more than doubled (Prusa, 2005).
Table E.4: Anti-dumping initiations by PTA status
Target country
Non-PTA country
PTA country
506
370
58%
42%
3,554
375
90%
10%
Pre-PTA
Post-PTA
Source: Prusa and Teh (2010).
prior to PTA enactment but a remarkable 90 per cent
following enactment. Again, this strongly suggests that
PTAs are changing the pattern of protection.
Figure E.2 shows a discernible difference in the
pattern of anti-dumping activity of countries before
and after entering into a PTA. Measuring time relative
to the year the PTA was enacted, year zero is the year
the PTA was established, year t – 1 is the year before
while year t + 1 is the year after, etc. Notice that during
the years prior to the establishment of the PTA
enactment, intra-PTA anti-dumping activity is growing.
The number of anti-dumping initiations drop sharply in
the year of establishment (t = 0) and remain much
lower in subsequent years as compared to the years
prior to enactment. On average, during the ten years
prior to establishment there were 29.5 anti-dumping
cases per year and during the ten years following
establishment there were just 23.6 cases per year.
While illustrative, are these patterns statistically
significant (unlikely to have occurred by chance)?
Furthermore, there may be other provisions in PTAs
that can explain the pattern in the anti-dumping data.
PTAs often liberalize investment, thus increasing the
level of FDI flows between PTA partners. The fall in
anti-dumping activity between PTA members might
thus arise because imports are sourced from
multinational affiliates. Another concern is that the
results may be entirely driven by the big users
(European Union and the United States) or targets
(China) of anti-dumping.
There is another way to show how PTA membership
changes the pattern of anti-dumping activity. Table E.4
depicts anti-dumping filings when countries are
distinguished between (i) those who are members of a
PTA and (ii) those who are not, and the time period is
distinguished
between
preand
post-PTA
establishment. As seen, countries file about 58 per
cent of anti-dumping cases against non-PTA countries
Prusa and Teh's econometric analysis (a method
known
as
difference-in-difference
regression)
establishes that the patterns do not arise simply from
chance.40 In addition, they find that PTAs cause as
much as a 60 per cent reduction in anti-dumping
disputes between PTA members. This result is not
solely driven by those PTAs that have abolished antidumping (for whom intra-PTA anti-dumping activity is
Figure E.2: Intra-PTA anti-dumping initiations
50
29.5 cases/yr
45
23.6 cases/yr
PTA enactment
40
Number of AD cases
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
-10
-9
-8
-7
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
Time (relative to enactment of PTA)
180
Source: Prusa and Teh (2010).
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
II – The WTO and Preferential Trade Agreements
essentially eliminated). When they only look at those
PTAs that have adopted PTA-specific anti-dumping
rules, they find a 33-55 per cent reduction in intra-PTA
anti-dumping activity. They find no significant change
in anti-dumping activity for PTAs without PTA-specific
anti-dumping rules.
Their results appear to be extremely stable. Even when
they excluded the EU, NAFTA and China individually
from their analysis, the results were essentially
unaffected. To take account of the possible effects of
other PTA provisions, they included FDI flows and a
measure of the investment liberalization in each PTA
based on work done by Dee et al. (2006) and Dee
(2008). While investment provisions in PTAs reduce
the incidence of anti-dumping disputes, they continued
to find that anti-dumping rules remain a significant
independent explanation for the reduction in intra-PTA
anti-dumping cases.
(ii) Discriminatory aspects in safeguard
rules in PTAs
There are typically two types of safeguard actions
which are covered in PTAs: “bilateral” and “global”
safeguard actions.41 Bilateral safeguard actions are
meant to apply only to the trade of other PTA members.
They provide a temporary escape for members when,
as a result of undertaking the commitments under the
agreement, increased imports from PTA partners
result in serious injury to the domestic industry. Global
safeguard actions, on the other hand, are triggered
under GATT Article XIX (Emergency Action on Imports
of Particular Products) and the Agreement on
Safeguards. Multilateral rules require that any
safeguard measures be applied on a nondiscriminatory basis. Typically, the PTA provisions on
global safeguard actions specify the conditions under
which PTA partners could be excluded from multilateral
safeguard actions invoked by a member.
While most of these PTAs state that their safeguard
provisions are in accordance with or do not affect their
members' rights and obligations under the multilateral
agreements, many go on to exclude the imports of PTA
partners from global safeguard actions. 42
The conditions under which imports from PTA
members can be excluded from a global safeguard
action are if those imports do not account for a
substantial share of total imports and if they do not
The Agreement on Safeguards requires that safeguard
measures be applied to all imports irrespective of
source (non-discrimination). Thus, the exclusion of
PTA partners from a safeguard action poses a
potential conflict between regional and multilateral
rules. This conflict has been addressed in a number of
WTO dispute cases (Argentina–Footwear, United
States–Wheat Gluten, United States–Line Pipe and
United States–Steel). In these cases, the investigating
authority had included imports from all sources in
making the determination that imports were entering
in such increased quantities so as to cause serious
injury to the domestic industry. However, instead of
applying safeguard measures to all imports
irrespective of their source, the country invoking the
safeguard action excluded its PTA partners.44 In all
four cases, the Appellate Body has ruled against the
WTO member which included its PTA partners in the
safeguard investigation but excluded them in the
application of the safeguard measure.
E.THE MULTILATERAL
TRADING SYSTEM AND PTA s
Their econometric estimates also suggest that PTAs
cause a 10-30 per cent increase in the number of antidumping filings against non-PTA members. Taking the
protection reduction and diversion results together,
they find that the reduction in intra-PTA activity is
more than offset by the increase in activity against the
far larger set of non-PTA members. Overall, they
conclude that PTAs increase the number of antidumping filings by perhaps as much as 10 per cent.
contribute to serious injury to the domestic industry or
the threat thereof.43
The key concept that underlines all these cases has
been called “parallelism”.45 In brief, parallelism
prohibits any differences in the application of
safeguards measures.46 In the case of PTAs,
parallelism means that when a WTO member has
conducted a safeguard investigation considering
imports from all sources, it cannot, subsequently,
without any further analysis, exclude imports from PTA
partners from the application of the resulting
safeguard measure. In order to be able to exclude
imports from PTA partners, the investigating authority
must establish explicitly that imports from non-PTA
sources alone caused serious injury or threat of
serious injury to the domestic industry. The
investigating authority, in its causality analysis, should
further ensure that the effects of the excluded (PTA)
imports are not attributed to the imports included in
the safeguard measure.
While the elaboration of the principle of parallelism by
the Appellate Body in these four cases has clarified
one issue, WTO jurisprudence has not provided a
definitive ruling to what extent GATT Article XXIV
could be relied on by a WTO member to exclude PTA
partners from the application of a safeguard
measure. 47 The provisions excluding PTA partners
from global safeguard actions raises concerns about
increased discrimination against non-members and
trade diversion. Although WTO dispute settlement
panels have ruled against excluding PTA partners from
safeguard measures if imports from those PTA
partners had been included in the investigation, they
appeared to have done so on quite narrow grounds –
on the lack of parallelism in the application of
safeguard measures. So far the Appellate Body has
not ruled on whether such exclusions will be justifiable
under GATT Article XXIV. Conceivably, under a
181
world trade report 2011
different set of circumstances, exclusion of PTA
partners from safeguard measures could pass muster.
(iii) Other mechanisms
The non-discriminatory nature of deep provisions
might in principle create adverse systemic effects,
namely
political-economy
and
third-country
resistances to further multilateral liberalization. If
preferential liberalization is non-discriminatory in
nature, it might be opposed by political-economy
forces, because higher market shares (and profits) in
the other member’s market might be more than offset
by the loss of domestic profits vis-à-vis firms from
partners and non-members.48
Secondly, the non-discriminatory nature of deep
provisions may undermine the willingness of
developing countries to engage in multilateral
negotiations with developed countries with the
objective of exchanging deep regulatory commitments
with market access for goods (Chauffour and Maur,
2011). This is because preferential tariffs are bound to
be eroded over time, whereas regulatory commitments
are both permanent and MFN; thereby they cannot be
used as bargaining chips over time and vis-à-vis
different countries.
Thirdly, it has been argued that lock-in effects of
regulatory harmonization within a given PTA may have
negative systemic effects (World Trade Organization
(WTO), 2007). Competing PTAs with incompatible
regulatory structures and standards may lock-in
members. This can constitute a threat to the
multilateral trading system for two reasons. First, it
undermines the principles of transparency and
predictability of regulatory regimes. Secondly, it may
hinder further multilateral liberalization. A recent study
(Piermartini and Budetta, 2009) has found evidence
of distinct “families” of PTAs with differentiated rules
on technical barriers to trade. The study shows that a
number of regional arrangements that have the
European Union as the hub include provisions to
harmonize the standards of the spoke partner country
to EU standards. To the extent that the adjustment to
European standards requires making investments,
these provisions may lock-in a country to the regional
arrangement, thus making movement towards
multilateral liberalization costly.
Finally, it has been argued above that third-party MFN
clauses have the potential to reduce the discriminatory
nature of preferential agreements. However, a variety
of PTAs do not contain third-party MFN clauses (e.g.
China – ASEAN). In this case, the provisions of the
agreement effectively discriminate vis-à-vis third
countries, and there is the risk of discriminatory
treatment between different parties of different PTAs
signed by the same country (Houde et al., 2007). In
their services and investment chapters, other PTAs
include sectoral exceptions to the automatic extension
182
of the third-party MFN treatment. Excluded sectors do
not therefore automatically benefit from the better
treatment of future agreements. However, as reported
by Houde et al., very few sectors are concerned.
Moreover, as argued by Adlung and Morrison (2010), a
number of agreements exclude some of the potentially
most distortive types of intervention from third-party
MFN obligations (e.g. all subsidies are excluded under
the Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement –
AUSFTA). The Economic Partnership Agreements
(EPAs) that the EU concluded with African, Caribbean
and Pacific (ACP) countries contain MFN clauses
requiring that, if an ACP country concludes a
subsequent PTA with a major trading economy other
than the EU, such as the United States or Brazil, the
EU should automatically receive the benefits conceded
in such PTA. As argued by Pauwelyn (2009), inclusion
of this clause in recent EPAs is controversial. It could
in fact have a chilling effect on third countries
qualifying as “major trading economies” that were
previously interested in concluding a PTA with ACP
countries.
3. Regionalism and the WTO:
historical perspective
The MFN principle is at the core of the multilateral
trading system. Nevertheless, from its very beginnings,
the multilateral trading system has allowed some
space for member countries to grant each other more
preferential treatment under free trade areas or
customs unions. As one commentator has put it, “(t)he
real thrust of the GATT had been to control and
contain discrimination rather than eliminate it” (Hudec,
1990). The rules applicable to free trade areas and
customs unions under Article XXIV of the GATT have
been incorporated into the WTO with little change and
the many interpretative questions that arise under that
provision remain intensely debated today. 49 Although
there are still many observers who would like to see
the rules clarified and strengthened, recent efforts
have focused on improving transparency.
(a) The origins of the GATT
Preferential trading arrangements were one of the main
issues of concern of some of the countries that
participated in the negotiations for the establishment of
an International Trade Organization (ITO), which
eventually became the basis for the GATT. In particular,
some countries saw the ITO negotiations as an
opportunity to dismantle certain existing preferential
trade arrangements, such as the preferences between
territories belonging to the British Commonwealth, while
the British seemed willing to dismantle these preferences
only if they obtained meaningful access to other markets,
particularly the United States (Hudec, 1990). Indeed,
several commentators note that this was an important
objective for the United States, which made a proposal to
II – The WTO and Preferential Trade Agreements
allow preferences only between territories that formed
part of a customs union and later accepted interim
arrangements that would lead to a customs union. A
group of developing countries that included Syria and
several Latin American countries sought to widen the
exception to include free trade areas.
In a recent historical study, Chase (2006) summarizes
the reasons that were traditionally given for the
acceptance of free trade areas within the framework
of the GATT: the need to compromise to reach
agreements
(Viner,
1950);
discouraging
a
consolidation of the Commonwealth preferences
(Odell and Eichengreen, 1998); encouraging European
integration (Bhagwati, 1991; Odell and Eichengreen,
1998); or pressure from certain developing countries
(Haight, 1972; Mathis, 2002; World Trade Organization
(WTO), 1995). Chase (2006) disagrees with these
traditional views and, based on his archival research,
suggests that the United States and Canada were
secretly negotiating a bilateral free trade agreement
and the United States changed its position on free
trade areas to accommodate this eventuality.
According to Chase (2006), the United States did not
have to make a new proposal because it saw an
opportunity in the proposal allowing free trade areas
submitted by Lebanon and Syria.
Article XXIV of the GATT recognizes “the desirability
of increasing freedom of trade by the development,
through voluntary agreements, of closer integration”,
yet cautions “that the purpose of a customs union or of
a free-trade area should be to facilitate trade between
the constituent territories and not to raise barriers to
the trade of other contracting parties with such
territories.” Article XXIV:5 establishes that the
provisions of the GATT “shall not prevent, as between
the territories of contracting parties, the formation of a
customs union or of a free-trade area or the adoption
of an interim agreement necessary for the formation of
a customs union or of a free-trade area”.
For purposes of Article XXIV, a customs union is
understood as “the substitution of a single customs
territory for two or more customs territories, so that
(i) duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce
(except, where necessary, those permitted under
Articles XI, XII, XIII, XIV, XV and XX) are eliminated with
respect to substantially all the trade between the
constituent territories of the union or at least with respect
to substantially all the trade in products originating in
such territories, and, (ii) ... substantially the same duties
Article XXIV sets out additional conditions that must
be met by customs unions and free trade areas.
Generally speaking, in both cases, the duties and other
regulations applied upon formation may not be higher
or more restrictive than previously. In the case of
customs unions, the duties or regulations may not be
“on the whole” higher than the “general incidence” of
the duties and regulations of commerce previously
applicable in the constituent territories. Interim
agreements for the formation of a customs union or
free trade area must include “a plan and schedule” for
the formation of the customs union or free trade area
“within a reasonable length of time”. Certain
notification
requirements
also
apply
under
Article XXIV. Furthermore, Article XXIV includes
provisions on frontier traffic (Article XXIV:3) and on
observance of GATT obligations by regional and local
governments and authorities (Article XXIV:12).
Specific exceptions for preferences between certain
neighbouring countries (for example, Lebanon and
Syria;
Belgium-Luxembourg-Netherlands)
were
included in Article I of the GATT.
E.THE MULTILATERAL
TRADING SYSTEM AND PTA s
The language adopted at the Havana Conference of
1947-48, which was later incorporated into the GATT,
allowed for free trade areas and customs unions, as
well as interim arrangements leading to their formation.
Several explanations have been put forward by
commentators to explain the eventual acceptance of
preferences under free trade areas, especially by the
United States, which initially had opposed them.
and other regulations of commerce are applied by each
of the members of the union to the trade of territories not
included in the union”. A free-trade area is “a group of
two or more customs territories in which the duties and
other restrictive regulations of commerce (except, where
necessary, those permitted under Articles XI, XII, XIII,
XIV, XV and XX) are eliminated on substantially all the
trade between the constituent territories in products
originating in such territories”.
(b) Developments during the GATT years
The creation of the European Economic Community
(EEC) and its association agreements were the
principal focus of the discussions around Article XXIV
during the early years of the GATT. Commentators
describe intense debates among the GATT contracting
parties on the consistency of the EEC with the
requirements of Article XXIV. The compatibility of the
Treaty of Rome with the requirements of Article XXIV
was not resolved by the contracting parties. As Ladreit
de Lacharrière (1987) notes, in 1958, the contracting
parties considered it “more fruitful if attention could
be directed to specific and practical problems, leaving
aside for the time being ... debates about the
compatibility of the Rome Treaty” with the GATT. 50
Eventually the GATT contracting parties opted for
resolving some of the tariff issues surrounding the
formation of the EEC as part of the Dillon Round
(Hoda, 2001). The EEC association agreements with
other countries were also the subject of intense
debates. Here the concern was about the lack of a
clear commitment to full liberalization or membership.
EFTA's notification also gave rise to discussions,
particularly because of its exclusion of agriculture and
fisheries (Hudec, 1990). Another agreement that was
notified at the time was ALALC, which included several
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world trade report 2011
Latin American countries, and which raised concerns
as to the ambitiousness of the liberalization programme
and its objective of promoting infant industries51
(Hudec, 1990).
At the time, there was no standing body of the GATT
that was responsible for reviewing agreements notified
under Article XXIV. Instead, these agreements were
reviewed by individual working parties. GATT
contracting parties did not adopt definitive reports
with respect to these agreements. Most commentators
agree that, despite the many questions raised by some
contracting parties with respect to the PTAs that were
notified, what essentially developed was a policy of
tolerance towards these agreements. Jackson (1969)
observes that generally speaking the practice of the
GATT was of “a high degree of tolerance for a wide
diversity of regional arrangements”. Nevertheless, he
recognizes that “legal discussions about criteria in
Article XXIV and consultations may have enabled the
interests of parties that were not members to regional
arrangements
to
influence
those
regional
arrangements in a way that softened their detrimental
impact on the trade of non-members”.
Another important development during the GATT was
the adoption of the Decision on Differential and More
Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller
Participation of Developing Countries, commonly
known as the “Enabling Clause”. In addition to
providing a basis for unilateral tariff preferences for
developing countries, the Enabling Clause provides an
exemption from the MFN obligation in Article I of the
GATT for “(r)egional or global arrangements entered
into amongst less-developed contracting parties for
the mutual reduction or elimination of tariffs and, in
accordance with criteria or conditions which may be
prescribed by the CONTRACTING PARTIES, for the
mutual reduction or elimination of non-tariff measures,
on products imported from one another”.
184
abused” and that “(t)o prevent further erosion of the
multilateral trading system, they need to be clarified
and tightened”.
The Report indicated that, while the European
Community and EFTA met the conditions in
Article XXIV, “many agreements presented under the
rules, including some agreements between the
European Community and its associates, fall short of
the requirements”. It further cautioned that “(t)he
exceptions and ambiguities which have thus been
permitted have seriously weakened the trade rules,
and make it very difficult to resolve disputes in which
Article XXIV is relevant”. Accordingly, the Report
proposes that “GATT rules on customs unions and free
trade-areas should be examined, redefined so as to
avoid ambiguity, and more strictly applied, so that this
legal cover is available only to countries that genuinely
use it to establish full free trade among themselves”
(Leutwiler, 1985).
(c) PTAs in the Uruguay Round
During the Uruguay Round, a group of countries that
included Australia, India, Japan, New Zealand and the
Republic of Korea favoured strengthening the
disciplines of Article XXIV. Japan, in particular,
proposed among others, improving the consultations
before and after agreements were reached;
establishing a firm time limit on “interim agreements”,
to ensure that members moved to genuinely open
trade; clearly defining “general incidence” of duties or
other regulations; and limiting the credit that a new
customs union could claim if the general incidence of
duties or regulations was actually lower than before.
India, for its part, proposed reviewing the requirement
that duties and other restrictive regulations be
eliminated on “substantially all trade” between the PTA
partners (Croome, 1995).
A total of 124 agreements were notified to the GATT
between 1948 and 1994. Of these, however, only 38
remained in force in 1995 when the WTO was
established. As explained in a WTO Secretariat Report,
this reflects “in most cases the evolution over time of
the agreements themselves, as they were superseded
by more modern ones between the same signatories
(most often going deeper in integration), or by their
consolidation into wider groupings” (Crawford and
Fiorentino, 2005).
In a second set of proposals, Japan sought to improve
the procedures for examination of preferential trade
agreements, suggesting the establishment of special
procedures, separate from GATT dispute settlement,
to assess and discuss compensation for damages
caused by preferential agreements to the trade of nonmembers. Some of those who opposed this proposal
suggested that surveillance of preferential trade
agreements could be undertaken under the newlycreated Trade Policy Review Mechanism (Croome,
1995).
Discriminatory treatment under PTAs became a topic
of increasing concern over the years. In 1983, the
Director-General of the GATT created an independent
group of seven eminent persons to study and report on
the problems facing the international trading system.
The group issued its report in March 1985. Commonly
referred to as the “Leutwiler Report”, one of its
conclusions is that “(t)he rules permitting customs
unions and free-trade areas have been distorted and
Another issue discussed during the Uruguay Round in
connection with preferential trade agreements was the
obligation in Article XXIV:12 relating to federal states.
This point was initially raised by India, but was later
taken up by the European Community, which presented
a proposal to tighten Article XXIV:12 by affirming the
full responsibility of GATT members for measures
taken by their regional or local governments or
authorities (Croome, 1995).
II – The WTO and Preferential Trade Agreements
Ultimately, the discussion coalesced around the idea
of negotiating an Understanding on Interpretation of
Article XXIV, which would focus on the calculation of
the level of duties before and after a customs union is
formed, reassert the obligation to compensate, set out
requirements for interim arrangements, limit the
“reasonable period of transition” to ten years unless
otherwise authorized, and acknowledge that matters
arising under Article XXIV could be submitted to
dispute settlement.
An additional development of significance during the
Uruguay Round was the inclusion in the GATS of a
provision on preferential agreements relating to trade
in services. 52
(d) Developments in the WTO
(i) Committee on Regional Trade
Agreements
The WTO Committee on Regional Trade Agreements
(CRTA) was established by the General Council in 1996
(WT/L/127). It was initially foreseen that the CRTA
would carry out the examinations of the regional trade
agreements notified to the WTO, thus taking over the
functions of the individual working parties of the GATT.
Despite the establishment of the CRTA in 1996, the
examination of RTAs resulted in stalemate. Between
1996 and 2001 not a single examination report had
been adopted by the CRTA, in part due to continuing
disagreements over the inherent ambiguities in GATT
Article XXIV, the lack of information submitted by RTA
parties, and the fact that the determination of
consistency was to be made by all WTO members,
including those whose RTAs were under examination.
In December 2006, WTO members adopted on a
provisional basis a new transparency mechanism for
regional trade agreements (WT/L/671). 53 The new
mechanism calls on members to provide an “early
announcement” of their involvement in negotiations for
a regional trade agreement, requires members to
promptly notify a newly concluded regional trade
agreement, and sets out a schedule for its
consideration by WTO members. 54 The mechanism
provides that consideration of notified regional trade
agreements should conclude within a year from the
date of notification. For this purpose, parties to a
Based on this data, the text of the agreement, and
information from other sources, the WTO Secretariat
prepares a factual presentation that is intended to
assist members in their consideration of the notified
regional trade agreement. WTO members are currently
reviewing the transparency mechanism with a view to
making it permanent. The transparency mechanism
places emphasis on the “consideration” of RTAs rather
than on their “examination”, which may be viewed by
some as a tacit acknowledgement by members that
their interests would be better served by focusing
efforts on improving transparency.
WTO members are also engaged in negotiations as
part of the Doha Round aimed at “clarifying and
improving disciplines and procedures under the
existing WTO provisions applying to regional trade
agreements.” Negotiations are to “take into account
the developmental aspects of regional trade
agreements” and have been taking place in the
Negotiating Group on Rules. 55
E.THE MULTILATERAL
TRADING SYSTEM AND PTA s
Despite initial opposition from the European
Community (which wanted fuller credit in compensation
negotiations for tariff reductions made by group
members and was dissatisfied with the text on
Article XXIV:12), India (which considered the text
disproportionately weak), and Yugoslavia (which
objected to the text on Article XXIV:12), the
Understanding on Interpretation of Article XXIV was
adopted and became part of the Uruguay Round
agreements (Croome, 1995).
regional trade agreement are required to submit
certain data to the WTO Secretariat, such as tariff
concessions, MFN duties, rules of origin and import
statistics.
The CRTA reported that, as of 1 November 2010, 479
regional trade agreements, counting goods and services
notifications separately, had been notified to the GATT/
WTO, 288 of which were in force at the time.56 These
figures correspond to 375 “physical” agreements, of
which 197 were in force (117 goods, 1 services and 79
goods and services). Of the 288 notifications, 174 were
notified under GATT Article XXIV, 31 under the Enabling
Clause, and 83 under GATS Article V. A total of 92
regional trade agreements had been considered under
the Transparency Mechanism since its adoption in
December 2006.57
(ii) Dispute settlement
Despite the concerns expressed by many observers
regarding the compatibility of many notified regional
trade agreements with Article XXIV of the GATT,
issues relating to regional trade agreements have not
figured prominently in WTO dispute settlement. The
most important issue that came up was the question of
whether the consistency of a regional trade agreement
with Article XXIV could be examined in WTO dispute
settlement. In Turkey–Textiles, the Appellate Body held
that panels have the authority to examine whether a
regional trade agreement meets the requirements of
Article XXIV. The burden of establishing that the
regional agreement meets the requirements of
Article XXIV falls on the respondent WTO member to
the extent that it invokes the regional agreement as a
defence to justify a discriminatory measure.
The availability of WTO dispute settlement to challenge
regional trade agreements has given rise to mixed
185
world trade report 2011
reactions from commentators. Roessler (2000) has
argued that the examination of the consistency of
regional trade agreements was a matter that should
have been reserved exclusively to the WTO's political
organs and specifically to the CRTA. By contrast,
Davey (2011) has suggested that WTO dispute
settlement could be used to further clarify the
disciplines of Article XXIV. WTO members so far have
been reluctant to use the WTO dispute settlement
system to enforce the obligations of Article XXIV of
the GATT and Article V of the GATS.
Issues concerning the relationship between the WTO
dispute settlement system and the dispute settlement
systems of PTAs have been discussed in connection
with a handful of WTO disputes. These disputes were
addressed in subsection E.2. In this subsection, we
address the small number of disputes in which
Article XXIV has been explicitly raised.
As noted above, the case that has dealt most directly
with the requirements of Article XXIV is Turkey –
Textiles. In this case, the Appellate Body examined the
requirements applicable to customs unions under subparagraph 5 of Article XXIV and explained that a party
invoking this provision to justify an otherwise WTOinconsistent measure must establish that the following
two conditions have been fulfilled. First, it “must
demonstrate that the measure at issue is introduced
upon the formation of a customs union that fully meets
the requirements of sub-paragraphs 8(a) and 5(a) of
Article XXIV”. Secondly, it must show that “the
formation of that customs union would be prevented if
it were not allowed to introduce the measure at issue”
(Appellate Body Report, Turkey – Textiles, para. 58).
Article XXIV has also been raised in the context of
several safeguard cases, where the issue has been
whether a WTO member could exclude one of its
partners in a preferential trade agreement from the
application of a safeguard measure in departure from
Article 2.2 of the Agreement on Safeguards. These
cases were discussed in subsection E.2.
A measure taken pursuant to a PTA became relevant
in a dispute in which Brazil invoked the General
Exceptions in Article XX of the GATT to justify an
import ban on retreaded and used tyres on public
health grounds. As a result of a decision by a
MERCOSUR tribunal, however, the import ban was not
applied to imports of remoulded tyres from
MERCOSUR members.
The panel found that “(t)he exception of remoulded
tyres originating in MERCOSUR therefore does not
seem to be motivated by capricious or unpredictable
reasons” and that “(t)o the extent that the existence of
some discrimination in favour of other members of a
customs union is an inherent part of its operation, the
possibility that such discrimination might arise
between members of MERCOSUR and other WTO
186
Members as a result of the implementation of the
MERCOSUR Agreement is not, in our view, a priori
unreasonable”.
The panel nevertheless noted that “the fact that we give
due consideration to the existence of Brazil's
commitments under MERCOSUR in our assessment
does not imply that the exemption must necessarily be
justified. Rather, we must now examine the manner in
which the import ban is applied, taking into account the
existence of an exemption for MERCOSUR members, in
order to determine whether the discrimination arising
from the MERCOSUR exemption is arbitrary or
unjustifiable”. Because the panel found that the “volumes
of imports of retreaded tyres under the exemption appear
not to have been significant”, it concluded that “the
measure's ability to fulfil its objective does not appear to
have been significantly undermined by the occurrence of
imports from other sources, even in the presence of an
exemption for MERCOSUR imports”.
Therefore, the panel concluded that “the operation of
the MERCOSUR exemption has not resulted in the
measure being applied in a manner that would
constitute arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination”. The
panel also relied on its analysis of the volume of
imports to conclude that the MERCOSUR exemption
did not result in the import ban being a disguised
restriction on international trade (Panel Report, BrazilRetreaded Tyres, paras. 7.272-7.289 and 7.354-7.355).
The Appellate Body disagreed with the panel's finding,
explaining that the ruling of the MERCOSUR arbitral
tribunal was not an acceptable rationale for the
discrimination, because it bore no relationship to the
protection of public health, the legitimate objective
pursued by the import ban under Article XX(b), and
“even [went] against this objective, to however small a
degree”. The Appellate Body held “that the
MERCOSUR exemption has resulted in the Import Ban
being applied in a manner that constitutes arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination”.
Moreover, the Appellate Body disagreed with the panel's
consideration of the volumes of imports. According to
the Appellate Body, the analysis of “whether
discrimination is 'unjustifiable' will usually involve an
analysis that relates primarily to the cause or the
rationale of the discrimination”, and does not depend on
“the quantitative impact of this discrimination on the
achievement of the objective of the measure at issue”.
For the same reason, the Appellate Body reversed the
panel's finding that the import ban was not applied in a
manner that constituted a disguised restriction on
international trade (Appellate Body Report, Brazil–
Retreaded Tyres, paras. 228-229).
A point emphasized by the Appellate Body was that
“before the arbitral tribunal established under
MERCOSUR, Brazil could have sought to justify the
challenged Import Ban on the grounds of human,
II – The WTO and Preferential Trade Agreements
animal, and plant health under Article 50(d) of the
Treaty of Montevideo”, yet Brazil decided not to do so.
The Appellate Body observed that “Article 50(d) of the
Treaty of Montevideo, as well as the fact that Brazil
might have raised this defence in the MERCOSUR
arbitral proceedings, show, in our view, that the
discrimination associated with the MERCOSUR
exemption does not necessarily result from a conflict
between provisions under MERCOSUR and the GATT
1994” (Appellate Body Report, Brazil–Retreaded Tyres,
para. 234).
(a) Coherence in international trade
governance
The quest for coherence between regionalism and
multilateralism is nothing new. In the early days of the
multilateral trading system, economic thinking focused
on the welfare effects of PTAs. As explained in Section C,
the main finding was that these effects were ambiguous
for members and generally negative for third parties. As
PTAs were mostly about tariff reductions, multilateral
market opening which, even if it does not mean
completely open trade, reduces discrimination, was seen
as superior to preferential opening.58 In this context,
ensuring coherence was understood as accepting that
PTAs and the multilateral system could complement each
other while imposing disciplines aimed at minimizing the
negative effects that PTAs could have.
As mentioned above, in the 1990s, the expansion of
regionalism brought the coherence issue back to the
forefront. Many analysts re-examined the relationship
between the two approaches, this time focusing on the
systemic effects of regional integration. They showed
that PTAs could either be stepping stones or stumbling
blocks on the road to multilateral market opening. This
literature, however, did not provide much guidance on
how to improve coherence.
Whether they view the multilateral trading system and
PTAs as complementing each other or think that the
multilateral system is simply superior to the regional
approach, observers broadly agree that “the case for
finding ways of strengthening the ability of the WTO to
influence and discipline PTAs, or at least to blunt their
more exclusive and distorting features, remains strong”
(Low, 2008). 59 Subsection 3 has shown how since its
inception the multilateral system has accommodated
preferential trade agreements. GATT/WTO members
have largely taken a non-confrontational and nonlitigious approach. Approaches to improving coherence
have focused on the weaknesses of multilateral
disciplines and how they could be fixed. This subsection summarizes the debate and briefly discusses
the main proposals. It appears that feasibility is the
main issue and political economy is the key.
This has led some observers to think that regionalism
has entered a “new era” where the old analytical
framework is no longer valid and where ensuring
coherence no longer means merely imposing multilateral
disciplines on discrimination. Baldwin (2010), for
instance, sees recent PTAs as providing the framework
to underpin the “production unbundling” that
characterizes a growing share of world trade. In his view,
twenty-first century regionalism is more about reducing
frictional trade barriers and the cost of doing business
and removing domestic entry barriers than about tariff
preferences. Given that preferential agreements on
such behind-the-border measures do not typically
induce trade diversion, their systemic implications
cannot be analysed using the traditional stumbling
block/stepping stone framework (see Section C).
E.THE MULTILATERAL
TRADING SYSTEM AND PTA s
4. The relationship between PTAs
and the WTO
Recent developments in PTA activity may well change
the perspective on coherence. As documented in
Section B, PTA activity accelerated noticeably from
1990 onwards. The number of PTAs had more than
doubled by 1995 and more than quadrupled by 2010,
resulting in close to 300 active PTAs today. As
previously discussed, new PTAs – or at least some of
them – are qualitatively different from older ones. While
part of recent PTA activity has consisted of the
consolidation
and
rationalization
of
bilateral
arrangements, there has also been a trend towards
bilateral deals across the world. Since 1995, PTA
activity has increasingly crossed regional boundaries.
The coverage of PTAs in terms of both policy areas and
products has also widened and deepened over time.
The political economy of more recent PTAs is also
about a lot more than preferential tariffs. First,
according to Baldwin (2010), only a few countries can
play a leading role in such agreements. PTAs motivated
by production sharing, in particular between developed
and developing countries, may be seen as an exchange
of factories for the relaxation of behind-the-border
barriers and assurances to offshoring firms that their
investments and intellectual property will be safe. Few
countries, in Baldwin's view, have the sort of factories
that can be exchanged for deep reform of behind-theborder measures.
Secondly, negotiating behind-the-border reform in the
WTO may not help to directly foster inward investment.
Thirdly, the nature of behind-the-border policies makes
it difficult to multilateralize PTAs. For example, the
principle of subsidiarity (see below) may apply in that
some areas may best be disciplined at the regional or
bilateral level. These considerations lead Baldwin
(2010) to the conclusion that “it is, thus, possible and
even likely that the new disciplines form an independent
system of governance that does not intersect much, or
at all, with Marrakesh rules”. If this is the case, the
coherence challenge posed by recent trends in regional
agreements may be quite different from that arising
from discriminatory tariff reductions. It may be that new
international trade rules are being negotiated and
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world trade report 2011
decided outside the WTO in a setting where differences
in power are greater and in the absence of the basic
principles of non-discrimination and reciprocity.60
Whether and how this new challenge needs to be
addressed is an open question. Further research will be
necessary to understand better the systemic effects of
deep integration. One issue that may require further
investigation is the effects of power asymmetries and
options for mitigating them. Also, as already mentioned,
the principle of subsidiarity could be used to assess
whether measures agreed at the bilateral or regional
level need to be submitted to multilateral disciplines.61 62
This principle states that “action to achieve agreed policy
objectives should be taken at the lowest level of
government capable of effectively addressing the
problem at hand” (Sauvé and Beviglia-Zampetti, 2000).
Because countries have different tastes, cultures,
endowments, or institutions, their social choices differ. At
the same time, efficiency criteria suggest that regulatory
regimes should apply to the largest possible communities.
Given this trade-off, the subsidiarity principle states
that the determination of regulatory regimes should be
as decentralized as possible unless action in one
jurisdiction has an impact in others (spillovers) –
resulting
in
cross-border
external
effects
(externalities), or the creation of economies of scale or
public goods, in which case they too should be
consulted. In other words, “unless there are significant
spillovers, there is no efficiency case for imposing one
set of standards across different regulatory domains”
(Rollo and Winters, 2000).
188
section provides a short summary of the debate on
existing multilateral disciplines. This overview is
followed by a discussion of some of the main options
for improving coherence.
(b) Multilateral disciplines on PTAs
As explained in subsection 3, the multilateral system
has generated three core provisions to deal with
regionalism. The first provision is GATT Article XXIV,
which allows departures from MFN for customs unions
and FTAs. The Uruguay Round Understanding on the
Interpretation of Article XXIV of the GATT seeks to
clarify the criteria and procedures for assessing new
or enlarged agreements and to improve transparency.
The second provision is the “Enabling Clause”, which
relaxes (some of) the GATT provisions on PTAs for
developing countries in the name of “special and
differential treatment” for this group of countries. The
third provision is Article V of the GATS, which sets out
the rules for PTAs in the services field. As discussed
above, WTO members more recently also adopted on a
provisional basis a new transparency mechanism for
regional trade agreements.
Over the years, a number of concerns regarding the
effectiveness of the multilateral oversight of regional
agreements have emerged (Davey, 2011; Low, 2008).
First, it has been argued that a number of Article XXIV
provisions defy uncontested legal interpretation and,
more generally, are deficient. 64 The debate has
focused on the interpretation of:
• Paragraphs 5(a) and 5(b) of GATT Article XXIV,
which state that “the duties and other regulations of
commerce” imposed on third parties should not “on
the whole be higher or more restrictive than the
general incidence” of the pre-PTA duties and
regulations; 65
A basic rationale for international cooperation on
regulation is that the cost of complying with different
standards may be high. Economies of scale (across
countries) and scope (across issues) are likely to exist in
rule-making. However, conflicts of interest can arise
between countries with permissive regulations and
countries with strict regulations that make multilateral
coordination hard and perhaps in some instances
undesirable. If these factors are sufficiently prevalent,
mutual recognition and harmonization of product norms
and testing may work better bilaterally and plurilaterally
(between relatively similar countries) than multilaterally.
While there may be concerns regarding possible negative
third-party effects of common or mutually recognized
standards and shared conformity assessment in PTAs,
empirical evidence suggests that the EU's single market
programme increased access at least as much for thirdparty firms (Mayer and Zignago, 2005).63
• Paragraphs 8(a) and 8(b) of GATT Article XXIV,
which state that duties and other restrictive
regulations of commerce should be eliminated with
respect to “substantially all the trade” between the
constituent territories, and Paragraph 1(a) of GATS
Article V, which states that an RTA should have
“substantial sectoral coverage";
Finally, the fact that PTAs where preferential tariffs
are still important have not disappeared means that
both the new and the old coherence challenges need
to be tackled at the same time. The evidence presented
in Section D suggests that only a (relatively small)
number of the new PTAs have little or nothing to do
with preferential tariffs, and that tariff preferences still
play a role in many new agreements. The next sub-
Secondly, several gaps in the GATT/WTO legal and
institutional framework have been identified. The
absence of disciplines regarding rules of origin for free
trade agreements, in particular, has become an issue
with the multiplication of such agreements and the
resulting expansion of a spaghetti/noodle bowl.
Similarly, there is no indication regarding how
agricultural tariff quotas should be treated in
• Paragraph 3 of the Understanding on the Interpretation
of Article XXIV of the GATT, which states that the
“reasonable length of time” within which the
implementation of an RTA should take place should
exceed ten years only in exceptional cases.
II – The WTO and Preferential Trade Agreements
preferential agreements, whether members of such
agreements are allowed to exclude their PTA partners
from the application of contingency measures applied
to the trade of third parties, or whether PTA parties
may or may not apply safeguards on their trade with
each other. Another question that has been raised is
whether the special and differential treatment
provisions for developing country PTAs should be
extended beyond those in the Enabling Clause. 66
In the eyes of some observers, it is revealing that the
Transparency Mechanism for Regional Trade
Agreements is the only result of the Doha Round
negotiations that has been allowed to go forward
independently of the full results of the Round.67 This
suggests both that WTO members are aware of the
need to understand better what regional trade
agreements are about and that they continue to
privilege a cautionary approach (Low, 2008). Others
go even further and consider that the Transparency
Mechanism advantageously substitutes the “old”
review process (Mavroidis, 2010). With trade diversion
reduced as a result of multilateral tariff reductions,
along with empirical evidence suggesting that PTAs
can be welfare improving, and with PTAs covering a
number of issues not covered by the WTO, existing
rules are considered to be of limited relevance.
Mavroidis (2010) argues that the Transparency
Mechanism should become the de jure new forum to
discuss PTAs within the multilateral trading system. 68
(c) Possible ways to improve coherence
This report has discussed the idea that there may be a
case for maintaining separate regimes for regional and
multilateral cooperation. This would be the case where
particular types of cooperation are more appropriately
managed at the regional rather than the multilateral
level. By the same token, there are issues that cannot
be addressed adequately at the regional level. In
between these two polar realities, the coherence
question arises. Essentially, the challenge is to identify
where there are gains from ensuring greater coherence
among PTAs and between PTAs and the multilateral
trading system.
A number of different approaches have been proposed
for improving coherence between PTAs and the
multilateral trading system (Davey, 2011; Low, 2008;
Lowering MFN tariffs would reduce discrimination and
thereby blunt the adverse effects of PTAs. The
Sutherland Report, for instance, recommended that all
developed country tariffs should be bound at zero in
WTO members' schedules of commitments at some
agreed upon time in the future. While a reduction to
zero of all developed country tariffs on industrial
products may not seem impossible to achieve in a not
too distant future, the Doha Round negotiations
suggest that this may not happen without a measure of
reciprocity from emerging economies. As for the
elimination of all tariffs on agricultural products, this
does not seem to be politically feasible in the current
context. Also, binding all tariffs at zero may take care
of tariff-induced trade diversion but it would not
eliminate all potentially adverse effects of deeper
integration measures.
E.THE MULTILATERAL
TRADING SYSTEM AND PTA s
Thirdly, while the law of the GATT/WTO may have
influenced PTA negotiations, in practice, it has never
been used to impose discipline on discriminatory
reciprocal trade agreements (Davey, 2011; Low, 2008).
Governments have almost never agreed through
established procedural arrangements whether any
given PTA is in conformity with the multilateral rules.
Procedural requirements such as notifications have
been partially observed at best and dispute settlement
findings have not helped address existing weaknesses
in the disciplines.
Sutherland Report, 2004; The Warwick Commission,
2007; World Trade Organization (WTO), 2003). This
subsection reviews these proposals and groups them
under four headings: i) accelerating multilateral trade
opening; ii) fixing the deficiencies in the WTO legal
framework; iii) adopting a softer approach as a
complement to the existing legal framework; and
iv) multilateralizing regionalism. These approaches are
not necessarily mutually exclusive. They all aim at
reinforcing compatibility and coherence, which
essentially means making sure that PTAs contribute to
trade cooperation and opening in a fundamentally
non-discriminatory manner. They differ mainly in terms
of what they see as a politically feasible strategy to
reach this objective.
As for the idea of filling gaps in the WTO legal
framework, the Doha Round includes a mandate to
negotiate with a view to “clarifying and improving
disciplines and procedures under the existing WTO
provisions applying to regional trade agreements”. The
negotiations have been pursued along two tracks. On
the one hand, members addressed procedural issues
relating to the transparency of PTAs. On the other
hand, they tried to identify issues for negotiation,
including “substantive” issues, such as systemic and
legal issues.69 As already mentioned, negotiations on
the procedural issues resulted in the adoption on a
provisional basis of a new transparency mechanism for
regional trade agreements (WT/L/671). The
negotiations on the “substantive” issues have so far
generated proposals by various members mainly aimed
at clarifying the provisions of GATT Article XXIV. While
these proposals contribute usefully to the debate, they
do not seem to have converged towards any form of
consensus on possible reforms to the rules.70
This should not come as a complete surprise as
previous discussions have not led to much progress on
substantive issues.71 One possible explanation for the
lack of progress is that members who have entered
PTAs in the past may be reluctant to sign off on
clarifications in the rules that might suggest that the
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world trade report 2011
PTAs they belong to did not comply with Article XXIV
(Davey, 2011). Considering that efforts to clarify
concepts such as “substantially all trade”, “other
restrictive regulations of commerce”, etc. have had
limited success so far, it seems unlikely that the
second option referred to above – that of clarifying
and strengthening existing rules – would be viable.
Moreover, WTO members have been reluctant to use
the WTO dispute settlement system in order to clarify
existing rules and it does not seem likely that they will
change this posture in the near future. This does not
mean that revised and improved rules will not one day
be part of any significant progress towards more
coherence, only that this does not seem to be a
promising starting point. In that context, economic
analysis could help strengthen the existing provisions.
It shows, for example, that the condition in GATT
Article XXIV that the protection applicable to nonmembers should not increase with the creation or
extension of a PTA will not necessarily protect the
latter from a welfare loss.72
The third option noted above would be to adopt a “soft
law” approach to complement the “hard law” and the
dispute settlement mechanism. There is no agreement
in the literature regarding the definition of the concept
of “soft law”, although legal scholars often seem to
define hard law as binding and soft law as non-binding
(Shaffer and Pollack, 2010). One example of soft law
would be the Code of Good Practice for the
Preparation, Adoption and Application of Standards
annexed to the WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers
to Trade. Following the Code is optional for WTO
members and WTO dispute settlement is unavailable
as a remedy under the Code. Another example would
be APEC's Best Practices for Free Trade Agreements
and Regional Trading Agreements.73 The rationale for
using a soft law approach would be to allow WTO
members to better understand their respective
priorities and interests, with a view eventually to
unblocking progress towards legal interpretations of
particular provisions that would ensure coherence.
The soft law approach is not without risk. As pointed
out by Shaffer and Pollack (2010), soft law and hard
law could become antagonistic to one another if the
underlying conditions for cooperation are absent. Low
(2008) argues that a shared perception of objectives
and the nature of the transition to hard law would
increase the chances that soft law could help rebuild
hard law. In view of these considerations, he proposes
a three-stage approach. The first stage would involve
increased transparency and information sharing under
the new Transparency Mechanism. This reinforced
exchange of views would pave the way for the
progressive development of soft law in the form of a
code of good practices in the second stage. Finally, in
a third and last stage, when governments become
comfortable with the soft law, negotiations aimed at
improving the hard law provisions could be undertaken.
190
The fourth and last proposal is to multilateralize
regionalism (Baldwin, 2006; Baldwin and Thornton,
2008). Baldwin (2009) defines a process of
multilateralization as the extension of existing
preferential arrangements in a non-discriminatory
manner to additional parties, or a fusion of distinct
PTAs. The idea is that, as a result of global production
sharing, political economy forces that were behind the
proliferation of PTAs and the creation of the so-called
spaghetti bowl have weakened and are being
progressively replaced by new forces favourable to the
multilateralization of preferences. This translates into a
number of multilateralization initiatives both at the
regional and at the multilateral level.
Examples of initiatives taken at the regional level to
reduce the tangle of PTAs include APEC's Best
Practices for PTAs or the Pan European Cumulation
System, which reduced the distortions of international
economic production within the zone through the
harmonization of rules of origin and diagonal cumulation.
An interesting example of multilateralization at the
multilateral level is the Information Technology
Agreement, which established a mechanism for the
elimination of MFN tariffs on information technology
products and thus made rules of origin and rules of
cumulation non-operative.
Recent research has highlighted the potential cost of
overlapping PTAs and complicated rules of origin to
today's world of geographically fragmented production
chains (Baldwin et al., 2009). There may be a role for
the WTO to reduce these transaction costs by serving
as a forum for the coordination/standardization/
harmonization of preferential rules of origin.74 Another
way that greater coherence can be established has
already been discussed and consists of identifying
“best practices” in PTAs.75 As noted in Section D, the
extent to which deep integration measures in PTAs
have the potential to generate the same sort of costly
spaghetti/noodle bowl as tariff preferences is still
being debated. Baldwin et al. (2009) explore six
different areas, discussing for each of them whether
PTAs have created a spaghetti bowl and how PTA
provisions have been or could be multilateralized.
A final thought with respect to moves towards the
multilateralization of PTAs concerns decision-making
procedures. Several authors (Lawrence, 2006;
VanGrasstek and Sauvé, 2006; Cottier, 2009; Elsig,
2009; Low, 2011) have considered the possibility of
developing a multilateral approach to a modified
consensus rule, often referred to as critical mass
decision-making. The approach proposed by Low
(2011) is very similar to the so-called “code” approach
that emerged in the Tokyo Round agreements on nontariff measures, but which was subsequently
eliminated by the “Single Undertaking” (whereby
nothing is agreed until everything is agreed) that
accompanied the creation of the WTO in 1995. A
revival of the critical mass approach occurred with the
II – The WTO and Preferential Trade Agreements
post-Uruguay
Round
agreements
on
basic
telecommunications and financial services, as well as
the Information Technology Agreement.
Appropriately chosen institutional and procedural
safeguards could protect the system against the risk
of fragmentation and dilution of the multilateral basis
for trade cooperation. Regarding the definition of
critical mass, for example, a simple but effective
approach could be to let the critical mass define itself.
Critical mass would be reached when those prepared
Another important question is whether and when
consensus decision-making would need to be applied
to critical mass initiatives. In the absence of multilateral
participation through a consensus-based process, a
risk exists that a sub-set of the membership could
shape rules from which they benefitted, but at the
expense of members that were not part of the critical
mass. The suggestion here is that critical mass
agreements would need to be approved by consensus
before they enter into force. Not only would the risk of
damaging the interests of non-members of the critical
mass be guarded against, but critical mass agreements
would also remain within the ambit of the multilateral
system.
E.THE MULTILATERAL
TRADING SYSTEM AND PTA s
The adoption of a critical mass approach would make
it possible to multilateralize trade rules without
implicating the entire WTO membership – a proposition
that may look attractive where there is a case for more
broadly shared regulatory approaches to trade but not
necessarily on a global basis. A critical mass may be
said to exist when a sufficiently large subset of the
entire membership agrees to cooperate under the
auspices of the WTO. An important characteristic of
the approach is that agreements do not involve any
discrimination vis-à-vis non-signatory countries.
to go ahead with an agreement consider that support
and commitment for the agreement in the membership
is sufficient. Those left outside would then be
considered too small to undermine the agreement and
there would not be any reason for refusing to apply the
MFN rule in respect of all the benefits to all nonsignatories.
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Endnotes
1
2
3
4
“Systemic effects” are defined for the purpose of this report
as the static and dynamic effects of PTAs on the multilateral
trading system. An example of static effect is the possibility
of conflicting rules, for instance on trade remedies. An
example of a dynamic effect is the impact of a PTA on the
probability of engaging in further multilateral negotiations.
There is some theoretical and empirical work studying the
inverse question of whether multilateralism drives the
proliferation of PTAs. Ethier (1998) and Freund (2000) build
theoretical models where PTA formation is an endogenous
response to the multilateral trading system. Using data on
multilateral tariff cuts and duty-free access concessions
granted by the United States at the tariff-line level, Fugazza
and Robert-Nicoud (2010) find empirical evidence in
support of the claim that past MFN opening sows the seeds
of future preferential opening.
There are practical problems with this argument. First,
assuming the availability of international lump-sum transfers
may not be realistic, and in their absence, it may very well be
that, at some point, some bloc members will veto further
enlargements. Secondly, nothing forces PTA members to
set their external tariffs as assumed by Kemp and Wan and
they may indeed have reasons to set them differently (see
Section C.1).
“Preference erosion” refers to declines in the preference
margin that some exporters enjoy in foreign markets as a
result of preferential trade treatment. It can occur when
export partners eliminate preferences, expand the number
of preference beneficiaries, or lower their MFN tariff without
lowering preferential tariffs proportionately (Alexandraki
and Lankes, 2004).
5
Excluded countries suffer from the PTA because the border
price faced by their exporters falls. From the perspective of
member countries, the gains of moving to global free trade
are better access to third-country markets and more
liberalization in their import markets. However, these gains
are small for low initial tariffs, giving no incentive to PTA
member countries to move to multilateral tariff reductions.
6
However, Amiti and Romalis (2007) argue that for many
developing countries, actual preferential access is less
generous than it appears because of low product coverage
or complex rules of origin. Therefore, lowering tariffs at the
multilateral level (Doha Round), especially on agricultural
goods, is likely to lead to a net increase in market access for
many developing countries.
7
This is the so-called “juggernaut” logic (Baldwin and
Robert-Nicoud, 2008).
8
Note that the effect could be reversed if the PTA resulted in
a higher level of protection for the home import competing
sector. In this case, as argued below, the PTA would inhibit
multilateralism.
9
Enhanced protection is obtained when producers from the
low-(external) tariff member can export all their output to
the high-tariff member without affecting prices there. In that
case, producers in the high-tariff country are not hurt while
producers from the low-tariff country enjoy higher
protection rents (Freund and Ornelas, 2010).
10 As discussed in Section C, Ornelas (2005b), (2005a)
qualifies the argument in models where the external tariff is
endogenous. The possibility that trade-diverting PTAs are
formed is more limited, but cannot be ruled out.
192
11 Schiff and Winters (1998) argue, however, that PTAs based on
such factors are likely to be transitory, since optimum trade
preferences tend to decline over time. In their model, the PTA’s
external trade policy becomes increasingly open over time.
12 Notice that this result is independent of the existence of
political economy motivations in excluded countries. If,
however, the governments of non-member countries put a
disproportionately high value on the profits of producers,
they are even more likely to oppose global trade opening.
13 Since it is not possible to observe the degree of multilateral
liberalization to which a country that is a member of a PTA
would have committed to in its absence, these empirical
studies have to rely on differences in liberalization patterns
over time, across countries or across sectors, making it
harder to identify the causal effect of PTAs.
14 Unilateral tariff reductions have accounted for two-thirds of the
21 percentage point cuts in average weighted tariffs of all
developing countries between 1983 and 2003, according to
the World Bank (2005). Tariff reductions associated with the
multilateral commitments in the Uruguay Round accounted for
about 25 per cent, and the proliferation of regional agreements
amounted to about 10 per cent of the reduction.
15 Both studies find that Uruguay Round liberalization was
smaller in products where preferences were granted.
16 This interpretation is strongly criticized by a number of
scholars (Baldwin, 2009). According to Baldwin (2009), it is
Canada and Mexico’s change of mind that triggered the rise
of regionalism in North America.
17 This and the following paragraph draw on World Trade
Organization (WTO) (2007).
18 As explained in more detail below, the PECS arrangements
came into being because industrial trade was almost
duty-free in Europe, but trade flows were beset by complex
and intertwining origin and cumulation rules. Trade in
information technology products was virtually duty free, but
the impediments to efficiency arising from multiple
preferential arrangements built pressure on governments to
simplify arrangements – hence the ITA.
19 The point is more general than service liberalization. It
applies, for instance, to policies that reduce or eliminate
technical barriers to trade (TBTs) across the board, by way
of regulatory harmonization or mutual recognition. Empirical
evidence suggests that the EU’s single market programme
(a large part of which is based on non-discriminatory
regulation) increased access at least as much for third-party
firms as for EU members (Mayer and Zignago, 2005).
20 First-mover advantage defines cases in which the supplier
that first gets into the market can benefit from a long-lasting
advantage, even if other suppliers are not subsequently
prohibited from entering. See Mattoo and Fink (2004) and
Manger (2008).
21 GATS Article V:6 mandates the establishment of liberal RoOs
for PTAs involving developed countries. The Article establishes
that “A service supplier of any other Member that is a juridical
person constituted under the laws of a party […] shall be
entitled to treatment granted under such agreement, provided
that it engages in substantive business operations in the territory
of the parties to such agreement”. GATS Article V:3(b) provides
that PTAs involving only developing countries may “limit trade
preferences to service suppliers owned or controlled by
persons of the parties”. Yet most PTAs among developing
countries have not taken advantage of this option. Among the
II – The WTO and Preferential Trade Agreements
reasons why countries have agreed to include liberal RoOs in
the GATS and not to use the special and differential treatment
provision specified above, Fink and Jansen (2009) mention:
i) the fact that established non-party service suppliers are
seen as part of the domestic economy; ii) in the presence of
network economies, it is more efficient for services providers
to simultaneously serve several markets, which is made easier
by flexible rules of origin; iii) participation in global production
sharing creates an incentive to abandon idiosyncratic service
standards as a way of boosting the competitiveness of own
exporters and improving the attractiveness of nations to FDI.
23 It should be noted that GATS Article V:6 only recognizes the
interests of juridical, but not of natural persons of third
countries who supply services under mode 4 in the territory
of one of the PTA members. For instance, a Japanese
national with a degree from a French university and a licence
to practice in France who wants to work in Germany would
not be entitled to the treatment granted to EU nationals.
24 According to UNCTAD (2009), 2,676 BITs were in place at
the end of 2008. Eighty-two BITs were signed in 2009, and
six during the first five months of 2010 (United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development, 2010).
25 In the context of investment, MFN requires that all investors
from PTA-member countries are accorded the best
treatment accorded to any other foreign investor. NT
requires that investors from PTA-member countries are
treated as well as domestic investors.
26 NAFTA-based agreements accord the better of MFN and
NT. See Kotschwar (2009) and the discussion of investment
provisions in Section D.
27 The bilateral agreements that flourished in Europe from the
mid-nineteenth century until World War I included such
unconditional non-discrimination clauses. The end result
was de facto multilateral non-discriminatory liberalization
(Lampe, 2009).
28 There are, however, a number of caveats that limit the role
of such MFN clauses as automatic multilateralizers of
preferential treatment. These caveats are discussed in
Section E.2(e) below.
29 See Baldwin et al. (2009) for details.
30 The trade effects of PECS are discussed in Box C.4 of
Section C. For a discussion of the effects of the
“multilateralization” of rules of origin on the multilateral
trading system, see Box E.2.
31 A radical solution would be the elimination of MFN tariffs on
industrial goods, which would render rules of origin
unnecessary. This is obviously politically unpalatable.
32 Article 23.2 of the DSU “prohibits certain unilateral action by a
WTO member”. More specifically, under Article 23.2, a WTO
member “cannot unilaterally: (i) determine that a violation has
occurred, benefits have been nullified or impaired, or that the
attainment of any objective of the covered agreements has
been impeded; (ii) determine the duration of the reasonable
period of time for implementation; or (iii) decide to suspend
33 See the GATT ruling in United States – Margins of
preference, BISD II/11.
34 For a detailed discussion of jurisdiction of international
adjudicative bodies and of these doctrines, see Shany
(2005).
35 This can happen, for example, where the complainant in one
forum is a government, while the complainant in the other
forum is a private party.
36 For a contrary view, see Kuijper (2010).
37 It should be clarified that the existence of conflicting
decisions was not the basis for the reversal of the WTO
panel by the Appellate Body.
38 Notice that the welfare effects of this increased
discrimination are, however, unclear, because there is
potentially both trade creation within the PTA and trade
diversion away from cheaper sources of imports from
non-members.
39 Teh et al. (2009) and Prusa and Teh (2010) map the
anti-dumping provisions of about 80 PTAs, covering almost
50 per cent of worldwide exports. Because anti-dumping
use is governed by the WTO Anti-dumping Agreement, they
expect that if PTA rules have any impact, they will serve to
make AD duties more difficult to impose on PTA members.
This can take a number of forms. Some PTAs increase the
threshold required to apply anti-dumping duties, or in the
event that a duty is applied, either reduces it below the
dumping margin or shortens the applicable duration. Other
PTAs give a role to regional bodies to conduct investigations
and/or review the final determinations of national
authorities.
E.THE MULTILATERAL
TRADING SYSTEM AND PTA s
22 For instance, the Closer Economic Partnership Arrangements
(CEPA) between China and Hong Kong, China and Macao,
China, respectively, follow the wording of GATS Article V:6
very closely. However, Emch (2006) argues that the necessity
to accumulatively comply with six requirements (nature and
scope of business; years of operations; payment of taxes;
business premises; employment of staff; exclusion of
intra-group services) to qualify for the “substantial business
operations” requirement may de facto grant access only to a
few service suppliers, on a selective basis.
concessions and determine the level thereof”. (Appellate Body
Report, US / Canada – Continued Suspension, para. 371).
40 To explain the method, imagine observing anti-dumping
activity against two groups of countries (PTA members and
non-PTA members) for two time periods (pre- and post-PTA
establishment). The PTA countries are “treated” to some
additional anti-dumping rules that possibly affect activity in
the post-PTA period but not in the pre-PTA period. The
non-PTA countries are not exposed to the treatment during
either period. Thus, any observed difference in anti-dumping
activity between the two groups of countries can be
causally attributed to the treatment – the anti-dumping
rules.
41 The discussion in this subsection closely follows Prusa and
Teh (2010).
42 PTAs which exclude PTA partners from global actions
include Australia-Thailand, Australia-US, Canada-Chile,
Canada-Israel, EU-Chile, Group of Three, Mexico-Chile,
Mexico-Israel, Mexico-Nicaragua, Mexico-Northern Triangle,
Mexico-Uruguay, NAFTA, US-CAFTA-DR, US-Jordan and
US-Singapore.
43 Most of the PTAs describe very precisely what “substantial
share” of total imports and “contribute importantly to serious
injury” mean. In some PTAs, “not substantial share of total
imports” means if the partner is not among the top five
suppliers during the most recent three-year period. The
phrase “not contribute importantly to serious injury or threat
thereof” means that the growth rate of imports from the PTA
partner is appreciably lower than the growth rate of total
imports from all sources.
44 In Argentina–Footwear, Argentina included MERCOSUR
imports in the analysis of factors contributing to injury to its
domestic industry. But it excluded MERCOSUR countries from
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world trade report 2011
the application of the safeguard measure. In United States–
Wheat Gluten, the United States excluded Canada from the
application of its safeguard action although imports of wheat
gluten from Canada were included in the investigation phase.
In the United States–Line Pipe case, the United States
excluded imports from its NAFTA partners from the safeguard
measure while including them in the analysis of factors
contributing to injury. And in United States–Steel, the United
States included all sources of imports in its analysis of
increasing imports, serious injury and the causal nexus.
However, it excluded its NAFTA partners, Israel and Jordan
from the application of its safeguard action.
45 While the word parallelism is not found in the text of the
Agreement on Safeguards, the Appellate Body considered
that the requirement of parallelism is found in the language
used in the first and second paragraphs of Article 2 of the
Agreement on Safeguards. See Appellate Body Report,
US –Steel, para. 439.
46 See Pauwelyn (2004) for a critique of the Appellate Body’s
use of this principle.
47 One dispute (between the United States and the Republic of
Korea) in which this issue was given some consideration was
the United States.–Line Pipe case. There the United States
argued that GATT Article XXIV gave it the right to exclude its
NAFTA partners from the scope of the safeguard measure.
The panel accepted the US argument that the exclusion of its
PTA partners from safeguard actions forms part of the
required elimination of “restrictive regulations of commerce”
on “substantially all the trade” among the free trade area
members, which is a condition required by GATT Article XXIV.
The panel decision was subsequently appealed by the
Republic of Korea. On appeal, the Appellate Body declared
the ruling by the panel on Article XXIV as moot and having no
legal effect. The question whether Article XXIV of the GATT
1994 permits imports originating from a PTA partner to be
exempted from a safeguard measure becomes relevant only
in two circumstances. The first was when the imports from
PTA members were not included in the safeguard
investigation. The second was when imports from PTA
members were included in the safeguard investigation it
nevertheless was established explicitly that imports from
sources outside the free-trade area, alone, satisfied the
conditions for the application of a safeguard measure. Since
neither of these applied to the circumstances surrounding the
United States–Line Pipe case, the issue was not relevant to
the case. The Appellate Body was careful to point out though
that, in taking this decision, it was not ruling on the question
whether Article XXIV of the GATT 1994 permits exempting
imports originating in a member of a free-trade area from a
safeguard measure. This decision thus leaves the question of
an appeal to GATT Article XXIV still very much open.
48 However, Baldwin et al. (2009) argue that production
unbundling is likely to soften political opposition to
non-discriminatory deep provisions. See Section E.2 (e).
49 Two minor amendments were made to Article XXIV of the
GATT in 1955-1957. The term “constituent territories” was
replaced with “parties”, and the term “included” was
replaced with “provided for” (Jackson, 1969).
194
50 Certain measures that were linked to the formation of the
European Economic Community or its expansion were
challenged in GATT dispute settlement. (See, for example,
US Action Under Article XXIII (Chicken War) and EEC Citrus
Preferences (and Association Agreements)). At the same
time, as Hudec (1990) notes, the formation of the European
Economic Community meant that disputes between EEC
members were no longer brought to WTO dispute
settlement. He further observed that for some time the EEC
was reluctant to initiate disputes against other contracting
parties fearing that it would invite challenges to EEC
measures.
51 Hudec (1971) suggests that Article XXIV may not have been
“drafted with the developing countries in mind”. He explains
that while the GATT recognizes the right to raise trade
barriers for the purposes of industrial development - that is,
to promote infant industries - the requirements of
Article XXIV may limit this possibility, as they call for
elimination of internal barriers and a status quo ante ceiling
on external barriers.
52 For a history of this provision, see Systemic Issues related to
‘Substantially all the Trade’, Background Note by the
Secretariat (Revision), WT/REG/W/21/Rev.1, 5 February
1998. By contrast, a provision on preferential trade
agreements was not included in the TRIPS Agreement.
53 On 14 December 2010, the General Council adopted a
Decision on a Transparency Mechanism for Preferential Trade
Arrangements (WT/L/806), which was drafted as a result of
the mandate given by the General Council to the Committee
on Trade and Development in 2006. This mechanism covers:
preferential trade agreements falling under paragraph 2 of
the Enabling Clause, with the exception of regional trade
agreements under paragraph 2(c); preferential trade
agreements taking the form of preferential treatment
accorded by any member to products of least-developed
countries; and any other non-reciprocal preferential treatment
authorized under the WTO Agreement. Paragraph 2(c) of the
Enabling Clause refers to “Regional or global arrangements
entered into amongst less-developed contracting parties for
the mutual reduction or elimination of tariffs and, in
accordance with criteria or conditions which may be
prescribed by the CONTRACTING PARTIES, for the mutual
reduction or elimination of non-tariff measures, on products
imported from one another”.
54 Agreements notified under GATT Article XXIV and GATS
Article V are considered by the CRTA. Agreements notified
under the Enabling Clause are considered in the Committee
on Trade and Development (CTD).
55 At the request of the Negotiating Group on Rules, the WTO
Secretariat has prepared a compendium of issues related to
PTAs that have been generated by work within the CRTA
and discussions in other WTO bodies up to 2002 (see
Compendium of Issues related to Regional Trade
Agreements, Background Note by the Secretariat, TN/
RL/W/8/Rev.1, 1 August 2002).
56 These figures correspond to notifications of new regional
trade agreements, as well as accessions to existing ones.
57 Eighty-eight regional trade agreements were considered in
the CRTA and four in the Committee on Trade and
Development.
58 Multilateralism is also considered superior to regionalism
because large countries can behave in a more hegemonic
way when they negotiate bilaterally with smaller countries.
59 See also Davey (2011).
60 A similar point is made by Brown and Stern (2011).
61 The traditional theory of trade agreements focuses its
attention on terms-of-trade effects. In terms-of-trade theory,
the motivation for entering into trade agreements depends on
whether a country can influence the price of its imports
through its trade policy. If two large countries enter into a
trade agreement to escape a prisoners’ dilemma, this
agreement should be multilateral rather than preferential.
This is because if they do not extend the benefit of their
II – The WTO and Preferential Trade Agreements
bilateral agreement to any third country through some form of
MFN treatment, one or the other of the two large countries
could indulge in “bilateral opportunism” by making an
agreement with a third party which excluded the other large
country partner (World Trade Organization (WTO), 2007).
62 Section C presents the Oates decentralization theorem,
which provides the economic rationale for the subsidiarity
principle.
63 See the discussion of TBT commitments in PTAs in Baldwin
et al. (2009).
65 Both the definition of the “other regulations of commerce”
and the question of how the requirement that RTAs should
not result in higher barriers against third parties were
intensely debated.
66 Procedural issues relating to the administration of the PTA
provisions of the Enabling Clause have been addressed
through the Transparency Mechanism for Regional Trade
Agreements.
67 Note that in December 2010 the WTO General Council
adopted a Transparency Mechanism for Preferential Trade
Agreements (WTO document WT/L/806), which extends
the Transparency Mechanism for RTAs to non-reciprocal
preferences.
69 Note that some issues, such as for instance those
pertaining to the internal coherence of WTO provisions that
apply to PTAs, have both a procedural and a substantive or
legal dimension.
70 See Davey (2011). While there does not appear to have
been much consideration of these issues in recent years,
there is now a new proposal on the table and discussions
have restarted. It remains to be seen whether they will be
substantive.
71 See the summary of discussions prepared by the WTO
Secretariat (TN/RL/W/8/Rev.1).
72 For a more detailed economic discussion of the proposals,
see World Trade Report 2007 (World Trade Organization
(WTO), 2007).
73 See Marceau (2007).
74 On the multilateralization of rules of origin, see also Box E.2.
E.THE MULTILATERAL
TRADING SYSTEM AND PTA s
64 See Davey (2011), the overview of the debate in the WTO’s
World Trade Report (2007) and Marceau and Reiman
(2001).
68 Evenett (2009) emphasizes that the WTO General Council
Decision establishing the provisional Transparency
Mechanism (WT/L/671) mentions “consideration” rather
than “examining” or an “evaluation” of RTAs, which, in his
view, suggests that the collective WTO membership does
not want this new mechanism to have “teeth”.
75 A “best practice” has alternatively been defined as a rule
that allows convergence to some multilateral benchmark.
See Plummer (2006) for a possible approach.
195
world trade report 2011
F. Conclusions
An over-arching conclusion of this report is
that regional and multilateral approaches to
trade cooperation need not be incompatible,
but neither can they be seen simply as
substitutes (i.e. arrangements that serve the
same purposes or satisfy the same needs).
Support for an increasingly outward-looking
and inclusive global trading order has been
strong in the period since the end of the
Second World War, and this growing trend
towards openness has manifested itself
through unilateral, bilateral, regional and
multilateral approaches.
196
II – The WTO and Preferential Trade Agreements
Many of these agreements go beyond tariff
commitments and include provisions on a wide range
of behind-the-border or regulatory policy areas.
Increasingly, PTAs involve deep rather than shallow
integration. Many factors explain the interest in deeper
integration, and perhaps why the demand for it has
frequently found expression in PTAs. Trade and
investment links among countries have been growing
to a degree where existing multilateral rules do not go
far enough to manage those tighter bonds. The steady
reduction of tariff barriers has generated pressure on
countries to align divergent national non-tariff policies.
Countries in close geographical proximity to one
another are more likely to be affected by one another’s
trade policy actions, calling for rules tailored to their
regional circumstances. Small developing countries
may want to import best-practice rules and an
institutional framework that has been pre-tested.
Large developed countries may want to export their
regulatory regimes through PTAs. Countries may use
trade cooperation as part of a broader political agenda
of shared interests going beyond purely economic
considerations.
This report has focused particularly on international
production networks as a core explanation for deep
integration. This is not to downplay the possible
importance of the other, often more complex
explanations that elude precise analysis in the absence
of adequate data. International production networks
function by parcelling out various stages of
manufacturing processes to different countries, each
of whom has a cost advantage that contributes to the
success of the whole. In a world where tariffs are
already low, the success of such networks requires
that participating countries have the necessary
infrastructure, institutional framework and enabling
regulations.
Market access can still be a reason for signing PTAs.
Even if preferential tariffs are very low, other border
measures can be used for protection. While
acknowledging this point, the report provides support
for the hypothesis that deep PTAs respond in no small
measure to the exigencies of international production
networks. This analysis is based on the magnitude of
preferential tariff rates, the coverage and contents of
the agreements themselves, econometric estimation,
and case studies of specific PTAs.
Small margins of preference provide evidence that
tariffs are no longer the primary motivation of PTAs.
Preference margins (i.e. the difference between the
preferential tariff and the most-favoured nation – MFN
– rate applied to other trading partners) measured to
take account of the presence of other preferential
suppliers are no greater than 2 per cent in absolute
value for more than 87 per cent of all merchandise
trade. This is not surprising in light of the extent to
which MFN tariffs have been reduced worldwide.
However, in sectors where MFN tariffs are higher than
the average, PTAs have for the most part failed to do a
better job of reducing them.
F. CONCLUSIONs
It is perhaps not surprising that the creation of the
multilateral trading system has not diminished the
allure of bilateral and regional trade agreements. After
all, bilateral trade agreements long pre-dated the
multilateral trading system. The appeal of preferential
trade agreements (PTAs) has grown in recent decades.
This trend has not only been apparent among
traditionally active PTA participants but also new
players who have eschewed preferential trade
agreements in the past. The recent wave of regional
agreements has been remarkable for the sheer
number of PTAs, their geographical spread, the mix of
developed and developing countries involved, and their
sectoral coverage.
Moreover, the proliferation of PTAs implies that the
benefit from entering into an agreement need not be
substantial given the preferential access enjoyed by
other suppliers. As a result of all of this, the value of
trade that receives preferential treatment is no more
than 16 per cent of global merchandise trade if trade
within the EU is excluded from the total, and 30 per
cent if intra-EU trade is included. This number is an
upper limit, since it does not take account of the extent
to which the utilization of those preferential tariffs is
hampered by rules of origin and other administrative
requirements.
In addition to policy areas already covered by WTO
agreements, many recent PTAs include commitments
in areas such as competition policy, investment, and
movement of capital. For the most part, PTA
commitments in these sectors are substantive and
legally enforceable. This is certainly true for those
policy areas – primarily services, investment, technical
barriers to trade and competition policy – which are
essential for production networks. The report provides
new econometric evidence showing that such
provisions increase the degree of production
networking among partner countries. Furthermore, a
closer examination of the integration experience of
some PTAs in Asia and Latin America provides
evidence of the role of international production
networks in their establishment.
The spread of deep PTAs and the weightier role of
non-tariff commitments have important implications
for how to evaluate the role of PTAs and how they
interact with the multilateral trading system.
Viner’s (1950) standard analysis of the trade creation
and trade diversion effects of preferential tariffs
focuses attention on the discriminatory market access
effects of PTAs. However, since preferential tariffs are
not the main focus of PTAs today, this framework
serves less well in identifying the causes and
consequences of deep agreements. In the same vein,
the building-block/stumbling-block imagery does not
197
world trade report 2011
adequately characterize the relationship between
PTAs and the multilateral trading system. Trade
specialists will need to fashion an improved analytical
framework to explain better the evolution of deep
PTAs.
The sheer number of PTAs and continuing momentum
towards establishing more of them suggest that they
are here to stay. They respond to a range of economic
and political motivations. Governments will need to
find a coherent way of fashioning trade policy at the
regional and multilateral level. This means that PTAs
and the multilateral trading system can complement
each other while ensuring that multilateral disciplines
minimize any negative effects from PTAs. If PTAs are
about tariffs, a coherent trade policy requires
disciplines that reduce trade diversion. If, instead,
PTAs are primarily about reducing trade costs and
removing regulatory barriers, something different is
required to achieve coherence between PTAs and the
multilateral trading system. The report has identified a
number of ideas relevant to achieving a coherent trade
policy in a world of deep PTAs. One such idea is that of
subsidiarity, whereby some policy areas may be best
addressed at the regional or bilateral level, whereas
others will require multilateral attention.
Other ideas advanced for promoting a coherent trade
policy are the acceleration of multilateral trade
opening, addressing deficiencies in WTO agreements,
initiatives to complement the existing legal framework
(i.e. soft-law approach), and multilateralizing
regionalism (i.e. extension of existing preferential
arrangements in a non-discriminatory manner to
additional parties). One constraint to bear in mind is
the political feasibility of various options. As the report
makes clear, GATT contracting parties and WTO
members have been tolerant of PTAs and markedly
non-litigious on this subject. This suggests that some
options may be promoted more readily than others.
198
We conclude with a non-exhaustive list of possible
questions that WTO members may see fit to address
as they deal with the problem of creating greater
coherence between PTAs and the WTO.
• If some policy areas are to be subject to multilateral
review and rule-making while others are left to the
regional level, what are the criteria for determining
the boundaries?
• Many non-tariff policy commitments in PTAs are
largely non-discriminatory, at least in intent, and
pose no threat to the multilateral trading system.
However, are there other risks (e.g. regulatory lockin) associated with these policy areas that are not
readily apparent but deserve attention?
• Are the various families of deep PTAs which the
report has been able to identify compatible? Or are
they competing systems that make the task of
creating coherence between PTAs and the
multilateral trading system more difficult?
• Given the large number of PTAs between developed
and developing countries (North-South agreements),
what role do differences in power between these
partners play in shaping the design and content of
PTAs? Is there a role for the WTO in considering the
impact of such differences?
• Will the co-existence of different dispute settlement
systems lead to conflicts between PTAs and the
WTO? To what extent can potential conflict be
addressed either at the level of PTAs or at the WTO?
These are not questions that have easy answers, but
the sooner WTO members reflect upon them, the
greater the prospects for achieving coherence
between PTAs and the WTO.
Statistical appendix
Statistical appendix
Appendix Table 1: Merchandise exports and imports of plurilateral preferential trade agreements,
2008 (Billion dollars and percentage)
World
Intra-PTA
Extra-PTA
Intra-PTA share
(billion dollars) (billion dollars) (billion dollars) in total trade
Extra-PTA
share in total
trade
Intra-PTA share
in all
commodities
Extra-PTA
share in all
commodities
Export Import Export Import Export Import Export Import Export Import Export Import Export Import
ANDEAN Community (CAN)
All commodities
94.3
93.3
7.0
7.8
87.3
85.5
7
8
93
92
100
100
100
100
Manufactures
17.8
69.5
3.6
3.9
14.2
65.6
20
6
80
94
52
50
16
77
2.2
10.2
0.4
0.4
1.9
9.7
18
4
82
96
6
6
2
11
All commodities
966.1
929.4
244.3
222.3
721.7
707.1
25
24
75
76
100
100
100
100
Manufactures
603.4
598.1
152.0
125.0
451.4
473.1
25
21
75
79
62
56
63
67
Parts and components
247.2
254.3
68.4
57.8
178.8
196.5
28
23
72
77
28
26
25
28
All commodities
2,042.7 1,897.2
234.6
353.9 1,808.1 1,543.2
11
19
89
81
100
100
100
100
Manufactures
1,815.0 1,112.6
192.4
294.3 1,622.6
818.3
11
26
89
74
82
83
90
53
121.4
360.0
286.8
16
30
84
70
28
34
20
19
Parts and components
ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA)
Asia Pacific Trade Agreement (APTA)
Parts and components
426.8
408.2
66.8
Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM)
25.5
28.5
4.2
3.5
21.3
25.0
16
12
84
88
100
100
100
100
Manufactures
5.8
14.2
0.6
0.5
5.2
13.7
10
4
90
96
15
14
25
55
Parts and components
0.2
1.7
0.0
0.0
0.2
1.7
12
1
88
99
1
0
1
7
All commodities
Central American Common Market (CACM)
All commodities
24.6
44.3
5.8
4.7
18.7
39.6
24
11
76
89
100
100
100
100
Manufactures
14.0
29.2
3.7
2.8
10.3
26.4
27
10
73
90
64
60
55
67
3.4
6.8
0.4
0.3
3.0
6.5
12
4
88
96
7
6
16
16
5.2
50.8
109.4
10
5
90
95
100
100
100
100
Parts and components
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA)
All commodities
56.7
114.6
Manufactures
16.3
70.5
2.9
2.4
13.5
68.1
18
3
82
97
49
46
26
62
1.2
13.1
0.2
0.5
1.0
12.6
17
4
83
96
4
9
2
12
Parts and components
5.8
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)
All commodities
692.5
456.1
123.1
123.3
569.4
332.8
18
27
82
73
100
100
100
100
Manufactures
155.5
322.7
52.9
48.4
102.6
274.3
34
15
66
85
43
39
18
82
14.1
45.9
7.8
7.2
6.3
38.7
55
16
45
84
6
6
1
12
Parts and components
Economic Community of West African States
All commodities
(ECOWAS) a
70.6
57.5
5.8
5.2
64.7
52.2
8
9
92
91
100
100
100
100
Manufactures
3.7
37.9
1.4
1.3
2.3
36.6
38
3
62
97
24
25
4
70
Parts and components
0.2
5.2
0.1
0.6
0.2
4.6
32
11
68
89
1
11
0
9
19.4
255.5
276.9
7
7
93
93
100
100
100
100
Economic Co-operation Organization (ECO)
All commodities
273.4
296.4
17.9
Manufactures
129.6
173.9
9.0
4.5
120.7
169.4
7
3
93
97
50
23
47
61
21.2
34.3
1.2
0.8
20.0
33.5
6
2
94
98
7
4
8
12
Parts and components
European Free Trade Association (EFTA)
All commodities
373.8
278.7
2.9
2.5
370.9
276.2
1
1
99
99
100
100
100
100
Manufactures
208.9
218.6
1.4
1.4
207.5
217.1
1
1
99
99
49
58
56
79
34.5
33.0
0.4
0.4
34.1
32.6
1
1
99
99
12
17
9
12
Parts and components
European Union (27)
All commodities
5,806.4 6,082.8 3,873.9 3,655.2 1,932.5 2,427.7
67
60
33
40
100
100
100
100
Manufactures
4,416.4 4,064.2 2,852.0 2,661.3 1,564.4 1,402.9
65
65
35
35
74
73
81
58
63
66
37
34
16
17
19
13
Parts and components
984.6
927.4
620.4
608.3
364.2
319.1
199
world trade report 2011
Appendix Table 1: Merchandise exports and imports of plurilateral preferential trade agreements,
2008 (Billion dollars and percentage) (continued)
World
Intra-PTA
Extra-PTA
Intra-PTA share
in total trade
Extra-PTA
share in total
trade
Intra-PTA share
in all
commodities
Extra-PTA
share in all
commodities
Value (b$)
Value (b$)
Value (b$)
Percentage
Percentage
Percentage
Percentage
Export Import Export Import Export Import Export Import Export Import Export Import Export Import
Global System of Trade Preferences (GSTP) b
All commodities
271.5
330.6 1,166.0 1,155.7
19
22
81
78
100
100
100
100
Manufactures
1,437.4 1,486.2
645.6
958.4
142.0
162.5
503.6
796.0
22
17
78
83
52
49
43
69
Parts and components
146.0
266.8
28.1
32.0
117.9
234.8
19
12
81
88
10
10
10
20
703.6
366.3
16.7
25.8
686.9
340.5
2
7
98
93
100
100
100
100
73.3
220.6
10.6
16.2
62.7
204.5
14
7
86
93
63
63
9
60
8.9
36.8
0.8
1.3
8.1
35.5
9
4
91
96
5
5
1
10
100
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)
All commodities
Manufactures
Parts and components
Latin American Integration Association (LAIA)
All commodities
813.9
760.0
131.7
138.2
682.2
621.9
16
18
84
82
100
100
100
Manufactures
351.4
561.6
79.4
81.9
272.0
479.6
23
15
77
85
60
59
40
77
75.3
156.4
13.1
13.5
62.1
142.9
17
9
83
91
10
10
9
23
Parts and components
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
All commodities
2,046.9 2,882.2 1,012.6
952.8 1,034.3 1,929.4
49
33
51
67
100
100
100
100
Manufactures
1,400.0 1,957.4
667.5
607.0
732.5 1,350.4
48
31
52
69
66
64
71
70
442.1
182.6
158.8
211.8
283.4
46
36
54
64
18
17
20
15
6
11
94
89
100
100
100
100
Parts and components
394.3
Pan-Arab Free Trade Area (PAFTA)
All commodities
892.0
607.1
51.0
68.7
840.9
538.5
Manufactures
123.9
364.7
30.2
32.0
93.7
332.7
24
9
76
91
59
47
11
62
15.9
65.4
4.1
3.4
11.7
62.0
26
5
74
95
8
5
1
12
Parts and components
South Asian Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA)
All commodities
211.0
373.6
11.9
7.6
199.1
366.0
6
2
94
98
100
100
100
100
Manufactures
133.5
168.2
5.6
3.9
128.0
164.3
4
2
96
98
47
51
64
45
23.9
29.8
2.0
0.7
21.9
29.1
8
2
92
98
17
10
11
8
Parts and components
Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR)
All commodities
278.4
248.8
48.7
44.9
229.7
203.9
17
18
83
82
100
100
100
100
Manufactures
109.9
181.6
32.9
29.8
77.1
151.8
30
16
70
84
67
66
34
74
19.7
49.6
6.9
6.1
12.8
43.5
35
12
65
88
14
14
6
21
86
83
100
100
100
100
Parts and components
Memo: MERCOSUR plus Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela
All commodities
361.8
296.2
50.5
50.7
311.3
245.5
14
17
Manufactures
113.4
219.1
32.9
33.4
80.5
185.7
29
15
71
85
65
66
26
76
19.9
56.5
6.9
6.6
13.0
49.9
35
12
65
88
14
13
4
20
Parts and components
South Pacific Regional Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement (SPARTECA) a
All commodities
Manufactures
Parts and components
167.1
189.3
16.0
15.7
151.1
173.6
10
8
90
92
100
100
100
100
34.0
141.9
9.3
7.4
24.7
134.5
27
5
73
95
58
47
16
77
6.5
22.8
1.6
1.0
4.9
21.8
24
4
76
96
10
6
3
13
Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership
All commodities
435.2
416.1
3.8
3.3
431.4
412.7
1
1
99
99
100
100
100
100
Manufactures
252.8
262.0
1.9
0.8
251.0
261.1
1
0
99
100
49
25
58
63
Parts and components
136.2
116.0
0.7
0.2
135.5
115.8
1
0
99
100
20
6
31
28
a Figures
refer to 2007 for reasons of data availability.
b Includes
MERCOSUR.
Source: Available reporting countries in the UN Comtrade database.
200
Statistical appendix
Appendix Table 2.A: Merchandise exports of ASEAN countries, 1992-2009 (Billion dollars and percentage)
World
(billion dollars)
ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA)
(billion dollars)
Intra-PTA share in total trade
1992
2000
2008
2009
1992
2000
2008
2009
1992
2000
2008
2009
Cambodia
Agricultural products
0.2
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.2
0.0
0.1
0.1
87
66
84
51
Fuels and mining
products
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
97
-
97
-
Manufactures
0.1
1.3
4.1
4.1
0.0
0.1
0.0
0.0
7
5
1
1
Automotive products
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
76
29
29
59
Office and telecom
equipment
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
7
-
49
10
0.3
1.4
4.4
4.2
0.2
0.1
0.4
0.5
67
9
9
12
5.0
7.8
32.9
25.3
1.0
1.1
4.8
4.2
19
14
15
17
Fuels and mining
products
12.7
18.7
50.6
43.5
0.5
2.0
9.0
8.8
4
11
18
20
Manufactures
Total merchandise
Indonesia
Agricultural products
16.1
35.2
52.7
46.8
2.9
7.5
13.0
11.2
18
21
25
24
Automotive products
0.0
0.4
2.8
1.9
0.0
0.2
1.2
0.9
34
42
42
50
Office and telecom
equipment
0.8
7.3
5.8
6.1
0.2
2.6
2.3
1.9
28
35
39
30
34.0
62.1
137.0
116.5
4.6
10.9
27.2
24.6
13
18
20
21
Total merchandise
Malaysia
Agricultural products
1.8
2.0
4.0
3.2
0.1
0.2
0.6
0.4
3
9
14
13
Fuels and mining
products
0.8
1.1
4.2
2.2
0.0
0.3
1.2
0.6
4
25
30
27
Manufactures
4.0
34.8
40.5
32.8
0.3
5.5
5.3
4.8
6
16
13
15
Automotive products
0.1
0.6
2.2
1.5
0.0
0.2
0.7
0.5
25
28
30
32
Office and telecom
equipment
1.2
25.1
25.7
20.1
0.1
4.7
3.4
3.3
7
19
13
16
9.8
38.1
49.1
38.4
0.6
6.0
7.1
5.8
6
16
14
15
Agricultural products
4.7
3.7
7.2
6.3
0.9
1.3
2.7
2.5
18
36
37
41
Fuels and mining
products
9.3
11.7
67.1
44.4
3.1
4.4
28.8
18.6
34
38
43
42
48.6
117.7
236.9
198.1
10.1
31.4
74.4
58.3
21
27
31
29
0.5
0.7
3.4
2.9
0.2
0.3
1.3
1.1
45
41
37
38
25.7
73.8
121.0
96.6
3.0
15.9
28.8
21.8
12
22
24
23
63.5
137.8
338.2
269.8
14.3
37.7
108.5
81.6
22
27
32
30
Agricultural products
9.9
12.2
31.7
28.0
0.9
1.8
5.9
4.9
9
14
19
17
Fuels and mining
products
0.5
3.0
13.6
9.4
0.2
1.4
6.3
4.7
30
45
46
50
21.7
51.7
127.2
109.4
3.3
9.8
27.3
22.9
15
19
21
21
Automotive products
0.1
2.4
16.2
11.7
0.0
0.4
4.4
3.5
22
15
27
30
Office and telecom
equipment
5.7
18.7
32.5
29.4
1.6
4.0
4.6
4.1
29
21
14
14
32.5
68.8
175.9
152.5
4.5
13.3
39.7
32.5
14
19
23
21
Total merchandise
Singapore
Manufactures
Automotive products
Office and telecom
equipment
Total merchandise
Thailand
Manufactures
Total merchandise
201
world trade report 2011
Appendix Table 2.A: Merchandise exports of ASEAN countries, 1992-2009 (Billion dollars and percentage) (continued)
World
(billion dollars)
ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA)
(billion dollars)
Intra-PTA share in total trade
1992
2000
2008
2009
1992
2000
2008
2009
1992
2000
2008
2009
Viet Nam
Agricultural products
1.0
4.0
14.6
10.7
0.3
0.5
2.2
1.9
26
13
15
18
Fuels and mining
products
0.9
3.9
13.2
9.2
0.1
1.2
3.1
2.9
9
30
24
32
Manufactures
0.6
6.2
34.1
36.9
0.0
0.6
3.2
2.5
4
9
9
7
Automotive products
0.0
0.0
0.5
0.3
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
14
25
9
11
Office and telecom
equipment
0.0
0.7
3.3
4.6
0.0
0.1
0.7
0.6
2
12
20
13
2.6
14.5
62.7
57.1
0.4
2.2
8.6
7.4
15
15
14
13
Agricultural products
31.2
37.8
118.1
94.4
5.1
6.6
20.5
17.9
16
17
17
19
Fuels and mining
products
30.1
48.9
188.5
134.3
6.2
12.3
61.4
44.1
21
25
33
33
117.3
325.8
603.3
537.4
24.5
75.8
151.2
127.5
21
23
25
24
0.9
4.4
26.2
19.2
0.3
1.0
8.0
6.4
34
24
30
33
46.8
177.9
236.1
214.2
8.6
40.9
49.4
43.2
18
23
21
20
183.3
420.9
966.1
795.8
36.6
96.4
242.7
192.9
20
23
25
24
Total merchandise
TOTAL ASEAN a
Manufactures
Automotive products
Office and telecom
equipment
Total merchandise
a Excludes
Brunei Darusalaam and Myanmar due to insufficient data.
Source: UN Comtrade database and Secretariat estimates.
202
Statistical appendix
Appendix Table 2.B: Merchandise imports of ASEAN countries, 1992-2009 (Billion dollars and percentage)
World
(billion dollars)
ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA)
(billion dollars)
Intra-PTA share in
total trade
1992
2000
2008
2009
1992
2000
2008
2009
1992
2000
2008
2009
Cambodia
Agricultural products
0.1
0.2
0.4
0.4
0.1
0.1
0.3
0.3
92
73
84
83
Fuels and mining
products
0.0
0.2
0.9
0.4
0.0
0.2
0.9
0.4
93
98
97
93
Manufactures
0.4
1.0
3.1
3.2
0.1
0.3
1.3
1.1
38
33
43
34
Automotive products
0.1
0.0
0.2
0.2
0.0
0.0
0.1
0.1
16
35
43
33
Office and telecom
equipment
0.0
0.0
0.2
0.2
0.0
0.0
0.1
0.1
70
43
38
31
Total merchandise
0.4
1.9
6.5
6.2
0.2
1.0
3.8
3.2
48
52
58
51
Agricultural products
3.3
5.7
13.3
11.4
0.5
0.8
1.9
1.5
15
13
14
14
Fuels and mining
products
3.2
7.3
35.9
22.2
0.9
2.5
19.1
10.2
29
35
53
46
Indonesia
20.7
20.5
80.0
63.2
1.2
3.5
20.0
16.0
6
17
25
25
Automotive products
Manufactures
1.0
1.9
6.5
3.7
0.0
0.2
2.4
1.3
1
13
38
34
Office and telecom
equipment
1.2
0.7
11.5
8.4
0.1
0.2
3.2
2.0
11
28
27
24
Total merchandise
27.3
33.5
129.2
96.8
2.6
6.8
41.0
27.7
10
20
32
29
Agricultural products
3.0
4.6
13.4
12.3
0.8
1.3
5.7
4.9
27
29
42
40
Fuels and mining
products
3.0
6.4
25.1
15.6
1.5
2.8
10.5
7.2
52
43
42
46
Manufactures
8.6
28.8
39.0
30.8
0.6
4.5
8.7
7.2
7
16
22
23
Automotive products
0.6
1.0
1.7
1.7
0.0
0.1
0.9
0.9
1
11
51
54
Office and telecom
equipment
1.4
15.1
20.2
15.1
0.1
2.2
4.3
3.0
7
15
21
20
15.5
37.0
60.4
45.9
1.4
5.9
15.3
11.7
9
16
25
25
5.4
4.9
10.0
8.8
2.2
1.7
4.0
3.5
40
35
40
40
Fuels and mining
products
10.8
18.3
94.0
64.6
1.7
2.7
19.7
14.1
16
15
21
22
Manufactures
55.0
109.8
204.8
162.4
10.2
28.8
45.7
36.6
19
26
22
23
Malaysia
Total merchandise
Singapore
Agricultural products
1.5
2.4
5.0
3.6
0.0
0.1
0.6
0.4
3
4
12
12
Office and telecom
equipment
Automotive products
17.2
54.1
87.3
67.5
5.6
20.1
26.7
21.1
32
37
31
31
Total merchandise
72.2
134.5
319.8
245.8
14.1
33.3
74.8
59.0
20
25
23
24
Agricultural products
4.2
4.5
11.7
9.4
0.9
0.7
2.0
1.6
21
16
17
18
Fuels and mining
products
4.5
9.4
46.3
30.3
1.8
1.8
9.2
7.9
40
19
20
26
30.7
47.0
114.4
90.1
2.7
8.2
20.8
17.1
9
17
18
19
Automotive products
2.5
2.1
6.0
4.9
0.0
0.2
1.0
0.7
1
7
16
15
Office and telecom
equipment
4.8
14.1
22.3
20.3
1.2
4.0
6.1
5.5
26
28
28
27
Total merchandise
40.7
61.9
178.6
133.8
5.6
11.0
32.2
26.8
14
18
18
20
Thailand
Manufactures
203
world trade report 2011
Appendix Table 2.B: Merchandise imports of ASEAN countries, 1992-2009 (Billion dollars and percentage) (continued)
World
(billion dollars)
ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA)
(billion dollars)
Intra-PTA share in
total trade
1992
2000
2008
2009
1992
2000
2008
2009
1992
2000
2008
2009
Viet Nam
Agricultural products
0.2
1.3
7.9
9.3
0.0
0.5
2.2
2.1
21
38
28
22
Fuels and mining
products
0.2
2.5
15.5
9.2
0.1
1.3
6.9
3.6
60
54
44
40
Manufactures
2.1
11.4
54.2
50.5
0.4
2.5
10.5
9.7
17
22
19
19
Automotive products
0.2
0.3
2.4
3.3
0.0
0.0
0.4
0.4
6
9
18
13
Office and telecom
equipment
0.3
1.0
5.6
6.0
0.0
0.4
1.4
1.4
7
36
26
23
Total merchandise
2.5
15.6
80.7
69.9
0.5
4.4
19.8
15.6
21
28
25
22
Agricultural products
17.9
24.3
63.6
57.1
4.6
5.6
18.7
15.9
16
17
17
19
Fuels and mining
products
24.5
49.1
231.9
151.5
6.6
12.2
70.1
46.0
21
25
33
33
150.4
286.6
597.6
493.1
21.0
62.9
125.7
106.1
21
23
25
24
7.1
9.5
25.8
21.4
0.1
0.7
6.9
5.2
34
24
30
33
Office and telecom
equipment
33.5
117.5
181.5
153.8
9.2
35.1
46.9
39.3
18
23
21
20
Total merchandise
198.4
365.9
931.5
722.0
32.8
82.1
224.6
175.1
20
23
25
24
TOTAL ASEAN a
Manufactures
Automotive products
a Excludes
Brunei Darusalaam and Myanmar due to insufficient data.
Source: UN Comtrade database and Secretariat estimates.
204
Statistical appendix
Appendix Table 3.A: Merchandise exports of CIS countries, 2000-2009
(Billion dollars and percentage)
World
(billion dollars)
Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS) (billion dollars)
Intra-PTA share in
total trade
2000
2007
2008
2009
2000
2007
2008
2009
2000
2007
2008
2009
Armenia
Agricultural products
0.0
0.2
0.2
0.1
0.0
0.2
0.2
0.1
86
84
86
80
Fuels and mining
products
0.1
0.3
0.3
0.3
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
14
4
2
1
Manufactures
0.2
0.6
0.6
0.3
0.0
0.2
0.1
0.1
15
25
24
28
Total merchandise
0.3
1.1
1.1
0.7
0.1
0.3
0.3
0.2
23
29
31
26
Agricultural products
0.1
0.5
0.6
0.5
0.0
0.5
0.5
0.5
37
85
94
83
Fuels and mining
products
1.5
5.1
46.6
13.7
0.1
0.4
0.6
0.7
9
7
1
5
Manufactures
0.1
0.4
0.6
0.4
0.1
0.2
0.5
0.3
61
63
71
76
Total merchandise
1.7
6.1
47.8
14.7
0.2
1.1
1.6
1.5
13
18
3
10
Agricultural products
0.8
2.2
2.6
2.6
0.6
1.7
2.2
2.1
74
75
85
82
Fuels and mining
products
1.5
8.7
12.5
8.1
0.5
0.6
1.6
1.2
32
7
13
15
Manufactures
4.8
12.9
17.2
10.1
3.3
8.5
10.1
5.6
69
66
59
56
Total merchandise
7.3
24.3
32.9
21.3
4.4
11.2
14.4
9.3
60
46
44
44
Agricultural products
0.1
0.3
0.3
0.3
0.1
0.2
0.2
0.2
62
54
66
51
Fuels and mining
products
0.1
0.3
0.3
0.7
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
10
5
6
3
Manufactures
0.1
0.5
0.8
0.4
0.1
0.3
0.3
0.1
53
50
44
22
Total merchandise
0.3
1.2
1.5
1.6
0.1
0.5
0.5
0.3
40
37
36
18
Agricultural products
0.1
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.1
0.1
0.2
0.1
60
66
70
68
Fuels and mining
products
0.1
0.3
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
73
37
68
85
Manufactures
0.1
0.4
0.4
0.2
0.1
0.3
0.3
0.2
69
85
88
85
Total merchandise
0.5
1.1
1.6
1.2
0.2
0.6
0.8
0.5
41
50
48
42
Agricultural products
0.3
0.5
0.6
0.6
0.2
0.3
0.3
0.3
74
53
55
55
Fuels and mining
products
0.0
0.1
0.1
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
23
42
51
7
Azerbaijan
Belarus
Georgia
Kazakhstan
Rep. of Moldova
Manufactures
0.2
0.7
0.9
0.7
0.1
0.2
0.2
0.2
33
33
28
25
Total merchandise
0.5
1.3
1.6
1.3
0.3
0.6
0.6
0.5
58
41
39
39
Russian Federation
Agricultural products
4.5
18.3
18.1
15.9
0.5
3.7
4.6
3.7
11
20
25
23
Fuels and mining
products
61.6
245.2
332.9
206.0
1.9
12.0
18.1
8.4
3
5
5
4
Manufactures
24.4
60.3
78.6
49.3
3.5
17.7
21.0
12.8
14
29
27
26
103.1
352.3
468.0
301.8
13.8
51.1
69.9
46.9
13
15
15
16
Total merchandise
205
world trade report 2011
Appendix Table 3.A: Merchandise exports of CIS countries, 2000-2009
(Billion dollars and percentage) (continued)
World
(billion dollars)
Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS) (billion dollars)
Intra-PTA share in
total trade
2000
2007
2008
2009
2000
2007
2008
2009
2000
2007
2008
2009
Agricultural products
1.6
6.8
11.3
9.9
0.8
2.7
3.7
2.7
48
39
33
27
Fuels and mining
products
2.9
5.8
8.7
4.9
0.6
1.4
2.4
1.5
21
24
28
30
Ukraine
Manufactures
Total merchandise
TOTAL
9.8
36.2
46.6
24.6
3.1
14.3
17.6
9.6
32
39
38
39
14.6
49.3
67.0
39.7
4.5
18.6
23.8
13.9
31
38
36
35
CIS a
8.6
31.4
37.1
31.9
2.8
10.5
13.3
10.6
32
33
36
33
Fuels and mining
products
Agricultural products
76.6
304.4
459.1
268.9
6.2
19.3
29.8
16.3
8
6
6
6
Manufactures
41.3
118.4
155.5
91.8
10.5
43.8
52.9
30.4
25
37
34
33
140.2
484.5
692.5
425.4
27.6
91.9
123.1
79.9
20
19
18
19
Total merchandise
a Excludes
Tajikistan and Turkmenistan due to insufficient data.
Source: UN Comtrade database and Secretariat estimates.
206
Statistical appendix
Appendix Table 3.B: Merchandise imports of CIS countries, 2000-2009 (Billion dollars and percentage)
World
(billion dollars)
Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS) (billion dollars)
Intra-PTA share in
total trade
2000
2007
2008
2009
2000
2007
2008
2009
2000
2007
2008
2009
Armenia
Agricultural products
0.2
0.6
0.8
0.6
0.0
0.3
0.4
0.3
9
54
46
51
Fuels and mining
products
0.2
0.6
0.7
0.6
0.1
0.4
0.4
0.4
55
64
54
65
Manufactures
0.4
1.8
2.4
1.9
0.0
0.4
0.5
0.3
9
22
21
19
Total merchandise
0.8
3.1
4.1
3.2
0.2
1.1
1.3
1.1
19
35
31
34
Agricultural products
0.2
1.0
1.2
1.0
0.1
0.6
0.8
0.6
55
62
64
57
Fuels and mining
products
0.1
0.3
0.3
0.1
0.0
0.1
0.1
0.1
34
46
32
44
Manufactures
0.8
4.4
5.6
4.8
0.2
1.1
1.5
1.2
25
26
26
24
Total merchandise
1.2
5.7
7.2
6.1
0.4
1.9
2.3
1.9
32
33
33
31
Agricultural products
1.2
2.5
3.4
2.6
0.6
1.3
1.7
1.2
51
54
49
46
Fuels and mining
products
2.9
11.1
15.4
12.1
2.8
10.9
15.2
11.9
98
98
98
99
Manufactures
4.1
13.9
19.2
12.9
2.4
6.3
8.6
4.8
59
45
45
37
Total merchandise
8.6
28.7
39.5
28.6
6.0
19.0
26.1
18.2
70
66
66
64
Agricultural products
0.2
0.8
1.0
0.9
0.0
0.5
0.5
0.5
18
55
55
53
Fuels and mining
products
0.1
1.0
1.2
0.8
0.1
0.7
0.8
0.4
86
72
68
52
Manufactures
0.4
3.1
3.8
2.3
0.1
0.6
0.6
0.3
19
18
17
14
Total merchandise
0.7
5.2
6.1
4.2
0.2
1.7
2.0
1.2
32
33
33
29
Agricultural products
0.1
0.4
0.6
0.5
0.0
0.3
0.5
0.4
51
76
79
75
Fuels and mining
products
0.1
0.8
0.3
0.1
0.1
0.8
0.3
0.1
97
98
96
96
Manufactures
0.3
1.2
1.8
1.5
0.1
0.4
0.5
0.4
37
35
27
29
Total merchandise
0.6
2.4
4.1
3.0
0.3
1.5
2.2
1.7
54
63
54
56
Agricultural products
0.1
0.5
0.7
0.5
0.0
0.3
0.3
0.3
14
51
50
50
Fuels and mining
products
0.3
0.8
1.1
0.7
0.2
0.6
0.8
0.5
65
68
68
67
Manufactures
0.4
2.4
3.0
2.0
0.1
0.5
0.6
0.4
19
22
20
19
Total merchandise
0.8
3.7
4.9
3.3
0.3
1.3
1.7
1.1
34
36
35
35
Agricultural products
7.6
26.9
34.3
29.1
2.1
3.1
3.9
3.0
27
12
11
10
Fuels and mining
products
3.5
7.5
10.9
6.0
2.1
4.2
6.3
3.6
58
57
58
60
Manufactures
18.9
154.2
208.3
122.0
3.3
13.1
15.5
8.1
17
9
7
7
Total merchandise
33.9
199.7
267.1
170.8
11.6
29.8
36.6
21.8
34
15
14
13
Azerbaijan
Belarus
Georgia
Kazakhstan
Rep. of Moldova
Russian Federation
207
world trade report 2011
Appendix Table 3.B: Merchandise imports of CIS countries, 2000-2009 (Billion dollars and percentage) (continued)
World
(billion dollars)
Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS) (billion dollars)
Intra-PTA share in
total trade
2000
2007
2008
2009
2000
2007
2008
2009
2000
2007
2008
2009
Agricultural products
1.1
4.6
7.0
5.3
0.3
1.1
1.3
0.9
24
24
19
18
Fuels and mining
products
6.7
18.1
26.4
16.0
6.0
15.6
21.2
14.1
88
86
80
88
Manufactures
5.7
37.4
50.6
23.7
1.8
8.7
10.9
4.7
31
23
22
20
14.0
60.6
85.4
45.4
8.0
25.6
33.6
19.8
58
42
39
44
Agricultural products
11.5
39.8
52.1
43.2
3.6
9.2
11.3
8.8
31
23
22
20
Fuels and mining
products
15.0
44.3
62.4
39.7
12.3
37.1
50.6
33.9
82
84
81
86
Manufactures
36.5
244.3
322.7
193.8
10.6
40.3
48.4
27.9
29
16
15
14
Total merchandise
67.9
341.8
456.1
293.0
30.8
96.5
123.3
78.9
45
28
27
27
Ukraine
Total merchandise
TOTAL
a Excludes
CIS a
Tajikistan and Turkmenistan due to insufficient data.
Source: UN Comtrade database and Secretariat estimates.
208
Statistical appendix
Appendix Table 4.A: Merchandise exports of European Union (15) countries, 1990-2009
(Billion dollars and percentage)
World
(billion dollars)
1990
2000
2008
European Union (15)
(billion dollars)
2009
1990
2000
2008
Intra-PTA share in
total trade
2009
1990
2000
2008
2009
Austria
Agricultural products
3.2
4.5
14.2
11.9
2.1
3.3
8.8
7.3
66
72
62
62
Fuels and mining
products
1.8
2.4
11.6
8.6
1.4
1.6
4.8
3.6
80
65
42
43
Manufactures
36.8
50.5
139.5
105.4
24.8
30.6
72.8
55.5
68
61
52
53
Total merchandise
41.9
63.7
172.2
131.4
28.4
38.8
93.8
72.1
68
61
54
55
13.1
19.4
47.1
40.5
11.4
16.5
38.6
33.5
87
85
82
83
9.1
13.3
59.6
36.1
7.0
10.0
46.1
26.5
77
76
77
73
91.2
144.1
358.6 284.0
71.2
105.0
254.7
199.6
78
73
71
70
118.3
184.8
477.2
370.0
92.9
136.9
346.8 265.5
79
74
73
72
10.6
10.9
22.6
19.8
7.4
6.9
13.4
11.9
70
63
59
60
1.6
3.9
13.1
8.4
1.4
3.4
11.1
6.8
87
87
84
80
Manufactures
20.9
31.5
73.2
59.6
13.6
19.1
39.7
31.6
65
61
54
53
Total merchandise
34.8
49.1
115.7
92.5
22.6
29.8
67.5
52.1
65
61
58
56
Agricultural products
3.2
3.6
6.4
4.1
2.1
2.3
3.1
1.9
65
62
49
45
Fuels and mining
products
1.3
3.0
10.8
6.2
1.1
2.1
6.2
3.5
83
69
57
56
Manufactures
22.0
38.5
78.5
48.4
13.0
20.1
34.1
21.6
59
52
43
45
Total merchandise
26.6
45.5
96.9
62.9
16.2
24.5
45.6
29.7
61
54
47
47
Agricultural products
37.1
35.6
73.7
61.6
27.3
25.3
51.3
42.7
74
71
70
69
Fuels and mining
products
10.8
13.9
45.6
25.5
7.8
9.6
31.1
16.7
73
69
68
65
Manufactures
161.3
238.9
460.3 364.4
101.8
145.0
254.9
197.7
63
61
55
54
Total merchandise
210.0
295.3
594.5
464.1
137.5
184.3
346.7 264.6
65
62
58
57
Agricultural products
23.5
27.8
81.7
72.1
17.5
19.1
54.7
48.1
74
69
67
67
Fuels and mining
products
15.1
21.3
82.8
50.8
10.7
11.6
44.5
27.4
71
54
54
54
Belgium a
Agricultural products
Fuels and mining
products
Manufactures
Total merchandise
Denmark
Agricultural products
Fuels and mining
products
Finland
France
Germany
Manufactures
354.4
459.4 1,201.0
917.5
224.4
243.5
581.1 454.2
63
53
48
50
Total merchandise
398.4
549.6 1,466.1 1,127.8
255.1
311.1
761.5 584.8
64
57
52
52
Greece
Agricultural products
2.6
2.7
5.9
5.6
1.8
1.4
3.0
2.9
71
53
51
51
Fuels and mining
products
1.2
2.4
5.2
3.4
0.7
0.7
2.0
1.3
57
27
38
37
Manufactures
4.3
5.4
13.7
10.7
3.0
2.4
5.1
3.9
70
44
37
37
Total merchandise
8.1
10.8
25.5
20.1
5.5
4.8
10.5
8.2
68
44
41
41
Agricultural products
5.7
6.7
12.9
10.7
4.4
4.8
9.8
8.4
77
72
76
78
Fuels and mining
products
0.6
0.9
2.6
1.8
0.5
0.6
2.2
1.3
83
69
83
71
Manufactures
16.4
65.5
107.5
99.9
13.0
39.5
61.9
56.9
79
60
58
57
Total merchandise
23.8
76.3
127.1
116.9
18.6
47.0
76.4
68.8
78
62
60
59
Ireland
209
world trade report 2011
Appendix Table 4.A: Merchandise exports of European Union (15) countries, 1990-2009 (Billion dollars and percentage) (continued)
World
(billion dollars)
1990
2000
2008
European Union (15)
(billion dollars)
2009
1990
2000
2008
Intra-PTA share in
total trade
2009
1990
2000
2008
2009
Italy
Agricultural products
11.9
16.3
40.0
35.3
8.3
10.6
24.5
21.9
70
65
61
62
6.3
8.2
35.6
21.4
3.4
3.9
15.1
9.1
54
47
43
42
Manufactures
148.1
212.0
449.3 333.9
92.9
117.2
218.3
158.7
63
55
49
48
Total merchandise
168.6
239.9
541.8 405.2
105.8
131.9
264.1
195.4
63
55
49
48
Agricultural products
-
0.6
1.2
1.2
-
0.6
1.2
1.2
-
98
98
98
Fuels and mining
products
-
0.4
1.2
0.8
-
0.3
1.0
0.6
-
76
85
83
Manufactures
-
6.5
14.5
10.6
-
5.4
11.6
8.1
-
83
80
76
Total merchandise
-
7.9
17.7
12.8
-
6.5
14.2
10.1
-
83
80
79
Agricultural products
31.9
32.9
84.5
75.8
26.4
25.1
63.0
56.2
83
76
75
74
Fuels and mining
products
16.5
21.8
71.3
43.8
14.1
19.2
48.3
26.2
86
88
68
60
Manufactures
77.8
124.9
301.1
242.3
58.7
83.1
201.0
160.8
75
66
67
66
131.5
213.4
545.9
431.5
99.3
164.7
386.0 299.2
76
77
71
69
Agricultural products
2.2
2.5
6.4
5.9
1.7
1.9
4.5
4.2
77
77
71
71
Fuels and mining
products
1.1
1.1
5.1
3.3
0.6
0.7
2.9
1.6
60
61
57
48
Manufactures
13.1
20.6
39.9
30.8
10.9
16.9
28.5
22.6
83
82
72
73
Total merchandise
16.4
24.3
55.9
43.4
13.2
19.5
37.0
30.5
81
80
66
70
Agricultural products
9.4
16.9
42.9
38.0
7.0
13.1
32.4
29.0
75
78
76
76
Fuels and mining
products
4.0
6.7
26.2
16.4
2.2
3.2
10.6
6.2
55
48
40
38
Fuels and mining
products
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Total merchandise
Portugal
Spain
Manufactures
41.4
87.8
203.5
162.2
30.3
62.0
132.9
106.1
73
71
65
65
Total merchandise
55.6
113.3
279.2
223.1
39.8
78.9
177.2
142.6
72
70
63
64
Agricultural products
5.4
6.3
14.1
11.8
3.9
4.3
8.9
7.4
72
68
63
62
Fuels and mining
products
3.7
4.9
20.9
12.9
2.8
3.4
14.2
8.4
75
70
68
65
Sweden
Manufactures
47.3
71.1
137.4
98.9
28.6
37.3
70.1
49.3
61
53
51
50
Total merchandise
57.3
86.9
183.9
131.1
35.8
48.6
98.9
69.2
63
56
54
53
Agricultural products
15.0
16.5
29.0
25.3
8.9
9.7
18.0
15.8
60
59
62
62
Fuels and mining
products
19.8
30.4
81.5
50.1
13.3
19.0
51.3
31.7
67
63
63
63
United Kingdom
Manufactures
146.7
218.0
321.2
253.1
80.4
124.0
161.3
123.2
55
57
50
49
Total merchandise
185.5
282.9
457.7
351.2
103.3
160.5
242.6
180.8
56
57
53
51
174.7
203.3
482.6
419.7
130.3
144.9
335.4 292.3
75
71
69
70
92.9
134.6
473.2 289.4
67.1
89.3
291.3
72
66
62
59
Manufactures
1,181.7 1,774.7 3,899.1 3,021.7
766.6
1,051.1
2,127.8 1,649.8
65
59
55
55
Total merchandise
1,476.8 2,243.8 5,157.3 3,983.9
974.0 1,387.9 2,968.7 2,273.8
66
62
58
57
TOTAL EU (15)
Agricultural products
Fuels and mining
products
a Belgium
210
refers to Belgium-Luxembourg in 1990.
Source: UN Comtrade database and Secretariat estimates.
170.8
Statistical appendix
Appendix Table 4.B: Merchandise imports of European Union (15) countries, 1990-2009
(Billion dollars and percentage)
World
(billion dollars)
European Union (15)
(billion dollars)
Intra-PTA share in
total trade
1990
2000
2008
2009
1990
2000
2008
2009
1990
2000
2008
2009
Agricultural products
4.2
5.5
15.4
13.5
2.4
3.8
10.4
9.2
56
70
68
68
Fuels and mining
products
5.0
5.6
29.4
19.1
1.8
2.6
11.6
8.1
35
46
39
42
Austria
Manufactures
40.7
55.6
127.0
100.4
31.3
38.2
83.4
65.2
77
69
66
65
Total merchandise
50.0
68.4
175.0
136.4
35.6
45.1
107.5
84.1
71
66
61
62
Agricultural products
14.7
18.1
44.0
37.5
11.6
12.7
30.7
26.3
78
70
70
70
Fuels and mining
products
16.2
21.2
91.2
52.4
8.3
15.2
65.1
36.4
51
72
71
69
Manufactures
81.7
130.3
329.2
257.6
65.5
88.3
218.6
174.3
80
68
66
68
120.1
171.3
470.7
351.8
92.3
117.3
317.1
238.8
77
68
67
68
Agricultural products
4.8
6.2
15.3
12.6
2.7
3.9
10.2
8.6
56
62
67
68
Fuels and mining
products
2.9
3.3
10.3
6.5
1.4
1.5
4.3
3.0
49
47
42
46
Manufactures
23.1
33.8
81.5
60.9
16.8
24.9
55.8
39.9
73
74
68
66
Total merchandise
31.6
44.5
109.8
82.0
21.3
30.7
71.0
51.9
68
69
65
63
Agricultural products
1.9
2.6
7.8
5.7
0.9
1.5
3.9
3.3
48
58
50
58
Fuels and mining
products
4.4
5.9
23.0
12.2
1.2
1.6
4.4
2.3
28
27
19
19
Belgium a
Total merchandise
Denmark
Finland
Manufactures
20.5
24.6
58.8
38.9
14.1
14.6
32.6
21.9
69
59
55
56
Total merchandise
27.0
33.9
92.2
60.8
16.3
17.6
43.2
29.5
60
52
47
48
Agricultural products
28.9
29.7
64.6
57.2
17.9
19.8
43.3
39.2
62
67
67
69
Fuels and mining
products
31.3
39.0
138.6
83.5
10.2
12.1
44.6
29.1
33
31
32
35
Manufactures
172.1
234.6
490.8
399.1
118.7
148.4
297.2
228.9
69
63
61
57
Total merchandise
233.2
303.8
695.0
540.5
147.0
180.8
385.8
297.8
63
60
56
55
Agricultural products
45.5
41.7
97.0
85.6
28.9
25.1
57.0
50.9
63
60
59
59
Fuels and mining
products
43.8
60.9
220.3
137.4
19.2
19.7
63.6
38.4
44
32
29
28
France
Germany
Manufactures
245.0
337.5
777.2
628.5
153.1
156.4
348.1
274.0
62
46
45
44
Total merchandise
342.5
500.8 1'204.2
938.4
205.1
259.6
565.6
433.6
60
52
47
46
Greece
Agricultural products
3.7
3.8
10.5
9.2
2.7
2.8
7.0
6.2
72
75
66
68
Fuels and mining
products
2.1
4.8
21.1
11.5
0.4
0.3
1.3
0.7
18
7
6
6
Manufactures
13.9
20.7
57.5
46.4
10.4
13.3
35.2
27.1
75
64
61
58
Total merchandise
19.8
29.5
89.3
67.2
13.4
16.6
43.6
34.1
68
56
49
51
Agricultural products
2.6
3.7
9.1
7.9
1.9
2.8
7.6
6.3
74
77
83
80
Fuels and mining
products
1.8
2.7
11.1
7.0
1.4
1.7
8.6
5.0
75
64
77
72
Ireland
Manufactures
15.7
41.4
59.1
42.8
10.7
22.1
33.2
21.7
68
53
56
51
Total merchandise
20.7
50.6
85.0
62.6
14.4
27.7
52.2
35.3
69
55
61
56
211
world trade report 2011
Appendix Table 4.B: Merchandise imports of European Union (15) countries, 1990-2009
(Billion dollars and percentage) (continued)
World
(billion dollars)
European Union (15)
(billion dollars)
Intra-PTA share in
total trade
1990
2000
2008
2009
1990
2000
2008
2009
1990
2000
2008
2009
Agricultural products
31.3
29.8
59.1
50.0
21.0
19.4
36.6
31.2
67
65
62
62
Fuels and mining
products
27.3
33.5
106.6
86.8
6.3
7.0
15.2
13.1
23
21
14
15
Italy
Manufactures
113.1
161.9
347.6
263.6
82.6
107.0
203.2
153.3
73
66
58
58
Total merchandise
180.1
238.1
561.0
412.3
111.4
133.6
263.0
204.3
62
56
47
50
Agricultural products
-
1.2
2.6
2.5
-
1.1
2.6
2.4
-
93
96
95
Fuels and mining
products
-
1.3
5.0
3.3
-
1.2
4.9
2.5
-
98
98
75
Manufactures
-
7.6
16.2
12.5
-
6.2
14.2
11.3
-
81
87
90
Total merchandise
-
10.6
25.4
18.6
-
8.8
22.0
16.5
-
83
87
88
Agricultural products
19.0
20.6
55.8
47.3
11.9
11.3
29.7
24.9
63
55
53
53
Fuels and mining
products
17.1
25.1
90.9
58.9
5.7
8.0
32.5
21.6
33
32
36
37
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Manufactures
89.0
128.8
282.8
220.3
66.8
66.0
143.8
108.2
75
51
51
49
126.0
198.9
494.9
382.2
84.7
109.3
253.3
193.8
67
55
51
51
Agricultural products
3.9
5.5
12.0
9.9
1.8
3.6
8.4
7.4
46
66
70
75
Fuels and mining
products
3.3
5.1
17.9
10.6
0.9
2.0
5.8
3.4
28
40
32
32
Total merchandise
Portugal
Manufactures
18.1
29.1
55.2
43.2
15.5
24.1
45.9
36.3
86
83
83
84
Total merchandise
25.4
39.9
90.1
70.0
18.3
30.0
60.7
51.5
72
75
67
74
Agricultural products
12.3
17.0
43.9
35.7
6.1
9.2
23.6
20.4
50
54
54
57
Fuels and mining
products
13.5
23.4
97.6
56.1
3.0
4.9
18.0
9.7
23
21
18
17
Manufactures
61.6
111.4
275.2
194.4
45.8
81.7
175.4
123.1
74
73
64
63
Total merchandise
87.7
152.9
418.7
287.5
55.2
96.5
218.2
153.9
63
63
52
54
Agricultural products
4.4
5.7
15.7
13.5
2.4
3.6
9.7
8.2
54
62
62
61
Fuels and mining
products
6.8
8.8
30.3
17.6
2.9
4.1
13.3
7.2
42
47
44
41
Manufactures
42.8
54.0
117.0
83.5
29.1
36.0
76.8
53.0
68
67
66
63
Total merchandise
54.5
72.8
169.0
119.9
34.6
47.8
104.9
73.1
64
66
62
61
Agricultural products
29.6
32.0
67.3
57.5
18.4
19.7
43.3
37.2
62
61
64
65
Fuels and mining
products
22.6
23.9
104.2
64.1
6.9
6.3
26.2
14.8
31
26
25
23
Manufactures
169.5
264.3
432.6
334.3
100.8
140.7
232.4
176.5
59
53
54
53
Total merchandise
224.8
339.4
634.4
482.9
126.5
171.8
308.9
233.8
56
51
49
48
Agricultural products
206.8
223.0
520.2
445.8
130.4
140.3
324.2
281.9
63
63
62
63
Fuels and mining
products
198.2
264.2
997.7
627.0
69.6
88.4
319.2
195.3
35
33
32
31
Spain
Sweden
United Kingdom
TOTAL EU (15)
212
Manufactures
1'106.7 1'635.5 3'507.7 2'726.4
761.4
967.9 1'995.8 1'514.7
69
59
57
56
Total merchandise
1'543.2 2'255.4 5'314.8 4'013.2
976.3 1'293.1 2'817.0 2'132.0
63
57
53
53
a Belgium
refers to Belgium-Luxembourg in 1990.
Source: UN Comtrade database and Secretariat estimates.
Appendix Table 5.A: Merchandise exports of MERCOSUR countries, 1990-2009 (Billion dollars and percentage)
World
(billion dollars)
MERCOSUR
(billion dollars)
Intra-PTA share in
total trade
1990
2000
2008
2009
1990
2000
2008
2009
1990
2000
2008
2009
11.3
12.0
37.5
28.2
2.8
2.5
4.4
3.4
25
21
12
12
Fuels and mining
products
2.5
5.4
8.8
7.8
1.0
1.9
2.4
2.1
40
36
28
27
Manufactures
7.1
8.5
21.6
17.8
3.4
4.2
10.7
9.4
47
49
50
53
21.0
26.3
70.0
55.7
7.2
8.6
17.6
14.9
34
33
25
27
15.7
15.5
61.4
57.7
0.9
0.9
3.4
2.5
6
6
6
4
5.2
6.5
44.0
32.7
0.4
0.5
2.6
2.4
7
7
6
7
Argentina
Agricultural products
Total merchandise
Brazil
Agricultural products
Fuels and mining
products
Manufactures
24.6
31.7
86.4
58.1
5.3
7.1
20.9
14.6
22
22
24
25
Total merchandise
46.5
55.1
197.9
153.0
6.6
8.5
26.9
19.4
14
15
14
13
Agricultural products
0.7
0.7
4.0
2.8
0.5
0.5
2.1
1.4
63
67
53
51
Fuels and mining
products
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
96
66
76
65
Manufactures
0.2
0.2
0.4
0.3
0.1
0.1
0.3
0.2
48
54
62
65
Total merchandise
0.9
0.9
4.5
3.2
0.5
0.6
2.4
1.7
60
65
54
52
Agricultural products
1.2
1.3
4.1
4.0
0.5
0.4
0.8
0.9
40
34
20
22
Fuels and mining
products
0.0
0.0
0.2
0.1
0.0
0.0
0.1
0.0
87
92
43
40
Manufactures
0.8
1.0
1.5
1.3
0.5
0.6
0.9
0.8
58
59
61
64
Total merchandise
2.1
2.3
5.9
5.4
1.0
1.0
1.8
1.7
48
45
31
32
29.0
29.4
107.0
92.6
4.7
4.3
10.7
8.1
16
15
10
9
7.7
12.0
53.1
40.6
1.4
2.4
5.1
4.5
18
20
10
11
Manufactures
32.7
41.3
109.9
77.5
9.2
12.0
32.9
25.0
28
29
30
32
Total merchandise
70.5
84.6
278.4
217.2
15.3
18.7
48.7
37.7
22
22
17
17
Paraguay
Uruguay
TOTAL MERCOSUR
Agricultural products
Fuels and mining
products
Memo: Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela
Agricultural products
Fuels and mining
products
Manufactures
Total merchandise
0.6
0.5
0.2
0.1
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
3
3
1
0
15.8
27.7
79.8
54.9
1.6
1.2
1.7
0.0
10
4
2
0
2.6
2.7
3.4
1.6
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
3
4
2
6
19.1
30.9
83.5
56.6
1.7
1.3
1.8
0.1
9
4
2
0
Memo: MERCOSUR including Bolivarian Republic
of Venezuela
Agricultural products
29.6
29.9
107.2
92.7
4.7
4.3
10.7
8.1
16
14
10
9
Fuels and mining
products
23.6
39.6
132.8
95.5
3.1
3.6
6.9
4.5
13
9
5
5
Manufactures
35.3
44.0
113.4
79.1
9.3
12.1
32.9
25.1
26
27
29
32
Total merchandise
89.6
115.6
361.8
273.8
17.1
20.0
50.5
37.8
19
17
14
14
Source: UN Comtrade database and Secretariat estimates.
213
world trade report 2011
Appendix Table 5.B: Merchandise imports of MERCOSUR countries, 1990-2009 (Billion dollars and percentage)
World
(billion dollars)
MERCOSUR
(billion dollars)
Intra-PTA share in
total trade
1990
2000
2008
2009
1990
2000
2008
2009
1990
2000
2008
2009
Agricultural products
1.5
1.6
3.2
2.0
0.5
0.7
2.1
0.9
35
40
66
48
Fuels and mining
products
1.4
1.6
6.3
3.4
0.4
0.7
2.0
1.1
31
44
32
33
Manufactures
17.2
21.9
47.6
34.6
3.7
5.9
16.2
10.8
21
27
34
31
Total merchandise
20.1
25.3
57.5
40.3
4.6
7.2
20.4
12.9
23
29
35
32
Agricultural products
7.2
4.8
9.7
8.2
3.4
2.7
4.3
3.9
47
57
45
48
Fuels and mining
products
8.3
10.0
41.8
22.5
1.6
2.8
2.5
1.9
20
28
6
9
Manufactures
38.2
41.0
121.7
96.9
3.1
3.7
8.8
8.1
8
9
7
8
Total merchandise
53.7
55.9
173.2
127.6
8.2
9.2
15.7
13.9
15
17
9
11
Agricultural products
0.6
0.4
0.6
0.6
0.3
0.3
0.5
0.5
58
75
79
78
Fuels and mining
products
0.2
0.4
1.5
1.1
0.2
0.3
1.1
0.9
86
79
74
88
Manufactures
2.3
1.5
6.9
5.3
0.7
0.6
2.6
1.8
30
40
38
34
Total merchandise
3.1
2.3
9.0
6.9
1.2
1.2
4.2
3.2
39
53
47
46
Agricultural products
0.4
0.5
0.9
0.8
0.3
0.3
0.6
0.6
64
67
68
70
Fuels and mining
products
0.3
0.6
2.9
1.7
0.2
0.3
1.8
1.3
56
54
63
75
Manufactures
2.1
2.4
5.3
4.3
0.9
1.0
2.2
1.8
42
43
41
41
Total merchandise
2.9
3.5
9.1
6.9
1.3
1.7
4.6
3.7
47
48
50
53
9.7
7.3
14.5
11.6
4.5
4.0
7.6
5.9
46
55
53
51
Fuels and mining
products
10.3
12.5
52.4
28.7
2.5
4.1
7.5
5.3
24
33
14
18
Manufactures
59.8
66.8
181.6
141.0
8.4
11.3
29.8
22.4
14
17
16
16
Total merchandise
79.9
86.9
248.8
181.8
15.4
19.3
44.9
33.6
19
22
18
18
Argentina
Brazil
Paraguay
Uruguay
TOTAL MERCOSUR
Agricultural products
Memo: Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela
Agricultural products
2.0
2.0
8.3
6.6
0.4
0.2
2.1
1.8
18
13
25
27
Fuels and mining
products
0.5
0.8
1.3
2.0
0.0
0.0
0.1
0.1
3
2
8
3
8.2
11.8
37.5
29.6
0.4
0.8
3.6
2.7
5
6
10
9
10.8
14.6
47.5
38.7
0.8
1.0
5.8
4.6
7
7
12
12
Manufactures
Total merchandise
Memo: MERCOSUR including Bolivarian Republic
of Venezuela
Agricultural products
11.8
9.3
22.8
18.3
4.9
4.2
9.7
7.7
42
46
42
42
Fuels and mining
products
10.8
13.3
53.7
30.7
2.5
4.1
7.6
5.3
23
31
14
17
Manufactures
68.1
78.6
219.1
170.7
8.8
12.0
33.4
25.2
13
15
15
15
Total merchandise
90.6
101.4
296.2
220.5
16.2
20.4
50.7
38.3
18
20
17
17
Source: UN Comtrade database and Secretariat estimates.
214
Statistical appendix
Appendix Table 6.A: Merchandise exports of NAFTA countries, 1990-2009 (Billion dollars and percentage)
World
(billion dollars)
NAFTA
(billion dollars)
Intra-PTA share in
total trade
1990
2000
2008
2009
1990
2000
2008
2009
1990
2000
2008 2009
Agricultural products
22.3
34.8
54.1
43.7
11.0
22.4
30.3
23.4
49
64
56
54
Fuels and mining
products
23.4
48.3
161.5
93.0
16.3
43.6
136.9
77.7
69
90
85
84
Manufactures
73.3
175.6
214.4
157.2
63.1
159.5
173.3
124.8
86
91
81
79
126.9
277.1
455.7
315.4
95.7
243.0
359.3
240.7
75
88
79
76
3.5
9.0
17.1
16.6
3.1
7.3
13.2
13.2
88
81
77
79
Fuels and mining
products
11.4
18.3
57.8
36.2
6.8
14.3
46.5
29.6
60
78
80
82
Manufactures
11.4
138.8
212.3
171.6
8.9
128.5
178.3
146.5
78
93
84
85
Total merchandise
26.3
166.3
291.3
229.7
18.7
150.2
240.9
193.7
71
90
83
84
Agricultural products
59.4
71.4
140.2
119.7
9.7
19.1
39.5
34.7
16
27
28
29
Fuels and mining
products
24.0
27.8
126.0
88.1
6.3
13.2
41.7
25.7
26
48
33
29
Manufactures
290.5
646.4
973.4
724.9
89.9
245.7
315.9 254.5
31
38
32
35
Total merchandise
392.9
780.3 1,299.9 1,056.7
111.3
288.1
412.4
333.7
28
37
32
32
Canada
Total merchandise
Mexico
Agricultural products
United States
TOTAL NAFTA
Agricultural products
85.2
115.2
211.4
180.0
23.7
48.8
82.9
71.3
28
42
39
40
Fuels and mining
products
58.8
94.4
345.3
217.4
29.4
71.1
225.0
133.1
50
75
65
61
Manufactures
375.2
960.9 1,400.0 1,053.7
161.8
533.7
667.5
525.7
43
56
48
50
Total merchandise
546.1 1,223.7 2,046.9 1,601.8
225.8
681.3 1,012.6
768.1
41
56
49
48
Source: UN Comtrade database and Secretariat estimates.
215
world trade report 2011
Appendix Table 6.B: Merchandise imports of NAFTA countries, 1990-2009 (Billion dollars and percentage)
World
(billion dollars)
NAFTA
(billion dollars)
Intra-PTA share in
total trade
1990
2000
2008
2009
1990
2000
2008
2009
1990
2000
2008 2009
Canada
9.0
15.3
30.3
28.4
5.6
10.2
19.1
18.2
62
67
63
64
Fuels and mining
products
Agricultural products
10.9
18.6
63.4
38.3
4.6
7.0
25.1
14.5
42
37
40
38
Manufactures
92.9
200.7
301.4
242.4
64.1
142.3
181.9
142.4
69
71
60
59
116.5
240.1
408.7
321.1
76.7
162.6
234.4
181.7
66
68
57
57
Agricultural products
5.4
11.0
25.9
20.2
3.7
9.0
20.9
16.2
68
82
81
80
Fuels and mining
products
2.0
8.8
38.3
21.1
1.7
6.5
23.5
14.4
83
74
61
68
Manufactures
18.9
149.7
239.3
188.4
12.7
114.1
115.7
88.1
67
76
48
47
Total merchandise
29.6
179.4
308.6 234.4
20.2
131.7
161.2
120.1
68
73
52
51
Agricultural products
40.0
69.1
115.9
100.7
14.2
28.2
41.1
35.1
36
41
35
35
Fuels and mining
products
84.5
167.6
558.3
311.4
22.5
54.9
179.1
104.7
27
33
32
34
Total merchandise
Mexico
United States
Manufactures
375.7
968.2 1,416.7 1,121.5
81.2
263.8
309.5
241.8
22
27
22
22
Total merchandise
517.5 1,258.1 2,164.8 1,601.9
124.5
370.1
557.1 405.9
24
29
26
25
TOTAL NAFTA
Agricultural products
54.3
95.4
172.1
149.4
23.5
47.4
81.1
69.4
43
50
47
46
Fuels and mining
products
97.4
194.9
660.0
370.8
28.8
68.4
227.7
133.6
30
35
34
36
Manufactures
487.5 1,318.6 1,957.4 1,552.3
158.0
520.3
607.0
472.3
32
39
31
30
Total merchandise
663.6 1,677.6 2,882.2 2,157.4
221.4
664.5
952.8
707.7
33
40
33
33
Source: UN Comtrade database and Secretariat estimates.
216
Statistical appendix
Appendix Table 7: World merchandise exports by product and region, 1990-2009 (Billion dollars and percentage)
Destination
Origin
World
Intra-regional
Value
Value
Share in exports to world
1990
1995
2000
2008
2009
1990
1995
2000
2008
2009
1990
1995 2000 2008 2009
Agricultural
products
414.7
589.4
551.3
1,340.1
1,168.8
225.8
334.8
323.6
774.1
679.7
55
57
59
58
58
Fuels and mining
products
488.3
545.3
854.0
3,521.7
2,262.9
193.3
257.9
368.9
1,432.9
939.9
40
47
43
41
42
World
Manufactures
2,391.2
3,718.8
4,702.3
10,468.2
8,354.7
1,340.7
2,170.5
2,765.0
5,999.4
4,816.6
56
58
59
57
58
•Iron and steel
105.8
154.9
143.4
590.0
326.3
69.8
106.0
95.3
357.1
200.2
66
68
67
61
61
•Chemicals
296.1
485.5
585.2
1,676.1
1,447.1
179.5
303.3
359.4
1,025.6
882.3
61
63
61
61
61
•Office and
telecom
equipment
298.6
604.7
968.7
1,572.0
1,322.8
131.6
301.1
532.1
891.3
767.7
44
50
55
57
58
Electronic data
processing and
office
equipment
...
...
372.1
550.9
462.8
...
...
194.4
286.1
238.9
...
...
52
52
52
Telecom.
equipment
...
...
288.2
602.4
506.4
...
...
163.1
326.6
282.7
...
...
57
54
56
Integrated
circuits and
electronic
components
...
...
308.4
418.8
353.6
...
...
174.7
278.7
246.1
...
...
57
67
70
319.0
459.2
577.8
1,245.8
846.7
207.5
309.3
402.5
780.7
562.6
65
67
70
63
67
...
...
837.4
1,956.7
1,506.7
...
...
484.3
1,081.5
816.9
...
...
58
55
54
•Automotive
products
•Electrical,
non-electrical
and
power-generating machinery
•Textiles
104.4
152.3
157.4
253.4
211.1
70.0
104.7
103.7
145.0
121.0
67
69
66
58
58
•Clothing
108.1
158.4
197.6
364.9
315.6
50.8
77.9
95.0
163.8
143.2
47
50
48
45
45
...
...
118.1
309.6
270.9
...
...
57.0
162.2
141.2
...
...
48
52
52
3,395.4
5,017.7
6,277.2
15,763.3 12,177.6
1,792.8
2,855.2
3,542.4
8,389.5
6,593.1
53
57
56
53
54
Agricultural
products
85.2
119.7
115.3
211.2
178.8
23.8
36.8
49.1
83.1
70.5
28
31
43
39
39
Fuels and mining
products
58.8
65.6
94.3
345.5
217.5
29.4
39.1
71.2
225.3
133.3
50
60
75
65
61
375.2
631.5
963.2
1,389.3
1,129.8
162.0
303.2
535.0
669.8
534.9
43
48
56
48
47
•Scientific and
controlling
instruments
Total merchandise
North America
Manufactures
•Iron and steel
6.3
11.4
11.3
35.5
21.0
4.1
7.0
8.9
23.8
13.6
66
62
79
67
65
•Chemicals
47.9
76.8
102.7
228.9
197.8
13.9
25.5
40.1
80.0
67.3
29
33
39
35
34
•Office and
telecom
equipment
57.9
121.2
208.1
208.0
173.7
16.0
41.9
92.2
96.4
87.1
28
35
44
46
50
Electronic data
processing and
office
equipment
...
...
74.9
61.6
53.3
...
...
29.3
28.0
26.2
...
...
38
46
49
Telecom.
equipment
...
...
63.9
91.1
78.7
...
...
41.0
57.3
50.7
...
...
64
63
64
Integrated
circuits and
electronic
components
...
...
69.3
55.4
41.7
...
...
21.9
11.1
10.2
...
...
32
20
24
65.4
110.7
158.5
209.3
143.1
55.0
89.5
140.4
151.3
108.1
84
81
89
72
76
...
...
190.6
273.9
220.8
...
...
99.4
129.7
103.5
...
...
52
47
47
6.1
10.0
15.7
16.5
13.2
2.4
5.0
10.8
9.2
7.6
39
50
69
56
57
•Automotive
products
•Electrical,
non-electrical
and power
generating
machinery
•Textiles
217
world trade report 2011
Appendix Table 7: World merchandise exports by product and region, 1990-2009 (Billion dollars and percentage) (continued)
Destination
Origin
World
Intra-regional
Value
Value
Share in exports to world
1990
1995
2000
2008
2009
1990
1995
2000
2008
2009
1990
3.0
10.4
19.3
10.6
9.4
1.0
5.6
13.5
8.1
7.0
33
53
70
76
75
...
...
38.7
62.2
56.4
...
...
12.8
20.5
18.7
...
...
33
33
33
547.7
856.5
1,225.0
2,035.2
1,602.4
226.1
394.8
682.8
1,013.4
768.7
41
46
56
50
48
Agricultural
products
36.2
51.4
52.8
156.3
139.7
3.9
9.5
9.8
27.3
22.6
11
18
19
18
16
Fuels and mining
products
37.5
42.1
67.7
258.3
178.3
5.4
10.5
15.9
60.2
41.2
14
15
24
23
23
Manufactures
•Clothing
•Scientific and
controlling
instruments
Total merchandise
1995 2000 2008 2009
South and
Central America
44.3
50.9
73.0
172.9
125.6
7.5
20.2
24.7
73.4
55.6
17
40
34
42
44
•Iron and steel
5.5
6.3
6.5
22.0
12.4
0.8
1.5
1.5
6.1
3.8
15
23
23
28
31
•Chemicals
5.1
9.2
11.5
37.1
28.7
1.9
4.5
6.1
16.9
13.8
37
49
53
46
48
•Office and
telecom
equipment
4.7
1.0
4.3
6.0
4.9
0.1
0.3
1.2
2.7
1.9
2
29
28
45
38
...
...
2.3
1.6
1.5
...
...
0.3
0.3
0.3
...
...
14
20
21
Telecom.
equipment
...
...
1.7
3.1
2.3
...
...
0.8
2.3
1.5
...
...
48
73
65
Integrated circuits
and electronic
components
...
...
0.3
1.2
1.1
...
...
0.0
0.0
0.1
...
...
11
4
6
2.9
5.2
7.7
23.1
15.1
0.7
3.8
4.4
15.1
11.1
25
73
57
66
73
...
...
6.7
20.8
15.3
...
...
2.6
9.5
7.0
...
...
39
45
46
•Textiles
1.9
2.2
2.1
4.0
3.2
0.4
1.2
1.3
2.9
2.4
20
55
61
72
75
•Clothing
3.4
5.6
11.7
12.7
9.9
0.4
0.6
0.6
2.1
1.2
12
10
5
17
13
...
...
1.1
2.3
2.2
...
...
0.2
0.6
0.5
...
...
18
25
24
120.3
149.0
197.8
603.4
458.9
17.3
40.3
50.6
161.4
120.0
14
27
26
27
26
Agricultural
products
194.3
264.9
244.4
603.2
528.3
154.1
207.3
193.1
486.0
425.7
79
78
79
81
81
Fuels and mining
products
124.6
144.1
204.3
767.4
482.6
100.4
117.8
163.3
611.7
380.2
81
82
80
80
79
1,328.7
1,842.0
2,125.5
4,946.1
3,879.2
954.9
1,307.2
1,532.8
3,532.4
2,748.1
72
71
72
71
71
68.2
85.0
71.2
265.6
146.7
51.3
65.6
57.0
203.5
106.4
75
77
80
77
73
•Chemicals
197.1
297.9
341.4
972.9
860.9
141.7
215.4
241.6
704.3
605.6
72
72
71
72
70
•Office and
telecom
equipment
96.9
169.3
287.6
421.3
334.9
74.6
124.3
214.9
319.1
260.5
77
73
75
76
78
Electronic data
processing and
office
equipment
...
...
115.2
160.3
131.2
...
...
94.2
131.6
107.4
...
...
82
82
82
Telecom.
equipment
...
...
112.9
191.8
154.5
...
...
82.5
144.0
121.0
...
...
73
75
78
Integrated
circuits and
electronic
components
...
...
59.5
69.2
49.2
...
...
38.2
43.5
32.1
...
...
64
63
65
176.7
243.0
290.1
682.7
470.5
138.7
189.0
232.0
523.4
369.3
79
78
80
77
79
Electronic data
processing and
office
equipment
•Automotive
products
•Electrical,
non-electrical
and power
generating
machinery
•Scientific and
controlling
instruments
Total merchandise
Europe
Manufactures
•Iron and steel
•Automotive
products
218
Statistical appendix
Appendix Table 7: World merchandise exports by product and region, 1990-2009 (Billion dollars and percentage) (continued)
Destination
Origin
World
Intra-regional
Value
Value
Share in exports to world
1990
1995
2000
2008
2009
1990
1995
2000
2008
2009
1990
...
...
401.6
1018.7
763.4
...
...
258.7
618.1
442.1
...
...
64
61
58
•Textiles
56.7
70.3
62.3
92.9
71.8
45.6
55.0
48.2
69.8
53.8
80
78
77
75
75
•Clothing
48.8
62.7
64.5
132.4
112.2
40.5
51.1
53.4
109.9
95.0
83
82
83
83
85
...
...
49.9
124.0
105.7
...
...
30.5
73.5
61.7
...
...
61
59
58
1,685.8
2,328.4
2,634.0
6,469.1
5,016.0
1,223.4
1,692.7
1,928.1
4,711.3
3,619.5
73
73
73
73
72
6.0
16.5
12.9
46.6
39.2
-
5.8
3.9
15.4
13.1
-
35
30
33
33
Fuels and mining
products
32.9
53.0
84.6
465.8
284.0
-
13.9
10.1
55.7
32.1
-
26
12
12
11
Manufactures
17.1
45.0
43.8
172.7
108.8
-
18.4
15.2
64.3
40.5
-
41
35
37
37
•Electrical,
non-electrical
and
powergenerating
machinery
•Scientific and
controlling
instruments
Total merchandise
1995 2000 2008 2009
Commonwealth
of Independent
States (CIS)*
Agricultural
products
•Iron and steel
2.7
13.3
14.3
66.4
36.4
-
3.3
2.7
15.3
8.7
-
25
19
23
24
•Chemicals
3.6
10.4
9.7
39.7
26.9
-
3.2
2.3
8.3
6.4
-
31
23
21
24
•Office and
telecom
equipment
0.4
0.9
0.6
1.9
1.6
-
0.6
0.3
0.5
0.4
-
61
44
24
27
Electronic data
processing and
office
equipment
...
...
0.1
0.3
0.3
-
...
0.1
0.1
0.1
-
...
66
36
29
Telecom.
equipment
...
...
0.3
1.3
1.0
-
...
0.1
0.2
0.2
-
...
42
19
23
Integrated
circuits and
electronic
components
...
...
0.2
0.3
0.3
-
...
0.0
0.1
0.1
-
...
31
35
37
1.7
2.5
2.2
8.1
3.5
-
1.8
1.7
6.9
2.6
-
70
79
85
73
...
...
5.2
19.8
14.3
-
...
3.3
13.6
9.0
-
...
63
69
63
•Automotive
products
•Electrical,
non-electrical
and
powergenerating
machinery
•Textiles
0.4
1.7
1.3
2.3
1.8
-
0.9
0.7
1.1
0.9
-
51
50
49
47
•Clothing
1.3
1.3
1.3
2.0
1.5
-
0.3
0.2
0.6
0.5
-
22
15
30
36
...
...
0.5
1.6
1.3
-
...
0.3
0.7
0.6
-
...
53
45
42
58.1
118.4
145.7
702.8
451.6
-
38.2
29.3
136.9
86.9
-
32
20
20
19
Agricultural
products
16.6
22.0
18.5
42.1
39.1
2.0
2.4
3.2
8.4
8.2
12
11
18
20
21
Fuels and mining
products
56.2
49.8
87.4
393.7
245.7
1.8
2.9
4.5
21.8
14.5
3
6
5
6
6
Manufactures
•Scientific and
controlling
instruments
Total merchandise
Africa
21.1
30.9
35.8
98.2
73.8
2.4
5.6
5.6
21.2
18.6
12
18
16
22
25
•Iron and steel
2.4
3.6
3.3
11.8
6.7
0.3
0.8
0.4
2.0
1.6
15
21
12
17
24
•Chemicals
3.4
5.0
5.1
20.9
14.2
0.5
1.2
1.5
5.4
4.5
14
23
29
26
32
•Office and
telecom
equipment
0.3
0.7
1.0
2.7
2.4
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.5
0.5
11
15
20
20
23
...
...
0.1
0.5
0.5
...
...
0.1
0.2
0.3
...
...
51
49
55
Electronic data
processing and
office
equipment
*Due to insufficient data in 1990, the 1990 column for CIS refers to 1995.
219
world trade report 2011
Appendix Table 7: World merchandise exports by product and region, 1990-2009 (Billion dollars and percentage) (continued)
Destination
Origin
World
Intra-regional
Value
Value
Share in exports to world
1990
1995
2000
2008
2009
1990
1995
2000
2008
2009
1990
Telecom.
equipment
...
...
0.4
1.3
1.1
...
...
0.1
0.3
0.2
...
...
36
23
22
Integrated
circuits and
electronic
components
...
...
0.5
0.9
0.8
...
...
0.0
0.0
0.0
...
...
2
3
4
0.5
0.9
1.7
7.6
5.3
0.2
0.4
0.4
1.8
1.5
33
48
24
24
27
...
...
3.3
13.1
10.4
...
...
0.8
3.3
3.0
...
...
23
25
29
•Textiles
1.5
1.6
1.4
2.4
2.2
0.2
0.4
0.3
0.6
0.6
17
22
21
26
26
•Clothing
3.5
6.1
7.1
11.0
9.5
0.1
0.2
0.2
0.5
0.4
2
3
2
4
4
...
...
0.3
0.8
0.8
...
...
0.1
0.3
0.2
...
...
19
37
31
106.0
111.9
148.6
557.4
383.9
6.2
11.0
13.7
55.0
44.9
6
10
9
10
12
4.4
6.4
6.1
18.8
18.2
1.1
2.4
2.9
9.9
10.5
26
38
48
53
58
112.5
108.5
195.4
751.3
469.1
3.9
4.1
3.8
25.6
20.1
3
4
2
3
4
•Automotive
products
•Electrical,
non-electrical
and
powergenerating
machinery
•Scientific and
controlling
instruments
Total merchandise
1995 2000 2008 2009
Middle East
Agricultural
products
Fuels and mining
products
Manufactures
20.2
34.2
64.7
235.5
188.0
3.6
4.9
16.2
85.6
74.9
18
14
25
36
40
•Iron and steel
0.2
1.0
1.1
6.5
4.9
0.1
0.5
0.6
4.7
3.6
40
48
59
73
75
•Chemicals
5.2
10.0
13.8
54.6
43.3
0.6
1.3
2.0
7.6
8.1
11
13
14
14
19
•Office and
telecom
equipment
1.1
2.7
9.3
22.8
19.8
0.1
0.1
1.5
10.6
8.3
8
3
16
47
42
Electronic data
processing and
office
equipment
...
...
1.8
7.1
5.1
...
...
0.5
3.6
3.2
...
...
30
51
62
Telecom.
equipment
...
...
5.8
14.1
10.7
...
...
0.9
6.6
4.9
...
...
16
46
45
Integrated
circuits and
electronic
components
...
...
1.8
1.5
4.0
...
...
0.0
0.4
0.2
...
...
1
28
6
0.4
1.0
3.2
25.8
18.4
0.2
0.4
1.6
13.3
10.9
53
41
51
52
59
...
...
7.1
28.4
22.0
...
...
2.6
16.1
11.8
...
...
37
57
53
•Textiles
1.0
1.6
5.6
11.2
7.7
0.1
0.2
3.1
6.5
4.5
6
11
56
58
58
•Clothing
1.0
1.9
2.5
6.9
5.5
0.1
0.1
0.5
2.8
2.6
7
6
18
41
49
...
...
1.1
3.1
2.3
...
...
0.1
0.7
0.4
...
...
7
24
18
138.4
150.4
268.0
1,023.1
689.7
8.6
11.6
23.3
124.8
106.8
6
8
9
12
16
Agricultural
products
72.0
108.5
101.2
261.9
225.5
40.9
70.6
61.6
144.0
129.1
57
65
61
55
57
Fuels and mining
products
65.9
82.1
120.2
539.7
385.6
52.4
69.6
100.1
432.7
318.4
80
85
83
80
83
584.6
1,084.3
1,396.3
3,453.5
2,849.5
210.3
510.9
635.5
1,552.7
1,344.0
36
47
46
45
47
•Iron and steel
20.7
34.2
35.8
182.1
98.1
13.2
27.4
24.3
101.7
62.4
64
80
68
56
64
•Chemicals
33.7
76.1
100.9
321.9
275.3
20.9
52.3
65.7
203.1
176.5
62
69
65
63
64
•Automotive
products
•Electrical,
non-electrical
and
powergenerating
machinery
•Scientific and
controlling
instruments
Total merchandise
Asia
Manufactures
220
Statistical appendix
Appendix Table 7: World merchandise exports by product and region, 1990-2009 (Billion dollars and percentage) (continued)
Destination
Origin
World
Intra-regional
Value
Value
Share in exports to world
1990
1995
2000
2008
2009
1990
1995
2000
2008
2009
1990
137.2
309.0
457.8
909.4
785.6
40.9
133.8
221.9
461.6
409.0
30
43
49
51
52
Electronic data
processing and
office
equipment
...
...
177.7
319.5
270.9
...
...
69.9
122.2
101.5
...
...
39
38
38
Telecom.
equipment
...
...
103.4
299.8
258.2
...
...
37.6
115.9
104.1
...
...
36
39
40
Integrated
circuits and
electronic
components
...
...
176.7
290.2
256.5
...
...
114.5
223.5
203.4
...
...
65
77
79
71.4
95.8
114.5
289.2
190.8
12.7
24.4
21.9
68.8
59.2
18
25
19
24
31
...
...
222.8
582.0
460.4
...
...
116.9
291.4
240.5
...
...
53
50
52
•Textiles
36.8
64.8
69.0
124.0
111.1
21.3
42.1
39.3
54.8
51.3
58
65
57
44
46
•Clothing
47.1
70.4
91.1
189.2
167.8
8.8
20.1
26.8
39.8
36.4
19
29
29
21
22
...
...
26.6
115.6
102.3
...
...
13.2
65.8
59.1
...
...
50
57
58
739.0
1,303.1
1,658.1
4,372.4
3,575.2
311.1
666.6
814.7
2,186.8
1846.4
42
51
49
50
52
Agricultural
products
51.1
80.9
73.2
209.8
178.7
16.1
30.8
25.8
83.5
73.9
31
38
35
40
41
Fuels and mining
products
45.1
55.3
85.8
387.3
269.9
17.2
28.0
44.8
221.1
163.9
38
51
52
57
61
300.4
644.4
927.6
2,721.3
2,311.6
75.4
222.3
314.3
919.8
816.6
25
35
34
34
35
•Office and
telecom
equipment
•Automotive
products
•Electrical,
non-electrical
and
powergenerating
machinery
•Scientific and
controlling
instruments
Total merchandise
1995 2000 2008 2009
Developing Asia
Manufactures
7.3
15.2
20.1
136.0
66.0
2.8
8.7
9.8
53.0
31.2
38
58
49
39
47
•Chemicals
•Iron and steel
16.6
42.8
62.1
244.1
206.2
8.7
26.6
35.4
123.0
108.3
53
62
57
50
53
•Office and
telecom
equipment
69.3
200.3
347.7
803.6
704.8
16.2
65.6
129.8
329.0
294.3
23
33
37
41
42
Electronic data
processing and
office
equipment
...
...
141.6
293.7
251.5
...
...
38.6
85.3
70.5
...
...
27
29
28
Telecom.
equipment
...
...
72.1
264.6
233.5
...
...
19.6
78.4
69.3
...
...
27
30
30
Integrated
circuits and
electronic
components
...
...
134.1
245.3
219.8
...
...
71.6
165.3
154.4
...
...
53
67
70
4.5
14.1
24.1
113.2
84.9
0.9
3.2
3.6
21.3
19.5
20
23
15
19
23
...
...
112.6
408.8
338.7
...
...
46.2
144.8
126.8
...
...
41
35
37
•Automotive
products
•Electrical,
non-electrical
and
powergenerating
machinery
•Textiles
30.7
57.1
61.5
116.0
104.6
14.6
31.5
28.5
40.6
38.2
48
55
46
35
37
•Clothing
46.4
69.5
90.2
188.2
166.9
1.6
4.4
9.7
14.0
11.5
3
6
11
8
7
...
...
10.9
91.9
82.1
...
...
3.4
47.1
43.0
...
...
32
51
52
402.3
793.2
1,101.7
3,372.5
2,815.3
109.9
286.6
389.5
1,241.5
1,071.1
27
36
35
37
38
•Scientific and
controlling
instruments
Total merchandise
221
world trade report 2011
Appendix Table 7: World merchandise exports by product and region, 1990-2009 (Billion dollars and percentage) (continued)
Destination
Origin
World
Intra-regional
Value
Value
Share in exports to world
1990
1995
2000
2008
2009
1990
1995
2000
2008
2009
1990
1995 2000 2008 2009
Agricultural
products
41.1
66.0
56.8
167.5
137.8
10.7
20.5
16.7
53.6
45.4
26
31
29
32
33
Fuels and mining
products
38.7
46.7
73.3
332.1
235.6
14.4
20.8
31.7
156.9
113.1
37
44
43
47
48
256.0
519.1
707.7
1,389.9
1,186.9
54.3
165.1
205.6
407.8
362.7
21
32
29
29
31
Developing Asia
excluding China
Manufactures
•Iron and steel
6.0
10.9
15.7
65.0
42.4
1.7
4.9
4.7
23.2
16.1
28
45
30
36
38
•Chemicals
12.8
34.2
50.0
164.8
144.2
5.6
16.9
20.0
54.7
46.3
44
49
40
33
32
•Office and
telecom
equipment
66.5
186.0
304.2
421.3
358.3
14.3
59.8
101.4
152.5
136.2
22
32
33
36
38
Electronic data
processing and
office
equipment
...
...
122.9
116.9
94.2
...
...
29.4
33.2
27.7
...
...
24
28
29
Telecom.
equipment
...
...
52.6
102.6
84.7
...
...
12.7
23.8
18.9
...
...
24
23
22
Integrated
circuits and
electronic
components
...
...
128.7
201.8
179.4
...
...
59.3
95.6
89.6
...
...
46
47
50
4.0
13.4
22.5
84.5
65.0
0.6
2.8
3.0
14.2
12.4
14
21
13
17
19
...
...
83.1
193.3
158.8
...
...
29.6
60.5
51.5
...
...
36
31
32
•Textiles
23.5
43.2
45.4
50.7
44.7
8.9
18.1
14.9
15.0
14.0
38
42
33
30
31
•Clothing
36.5
44.4
54.1
67.8
59.7
0.9
2.2
1.9
2.6
2.4
3
5
4
4
4
...
...
8.3
56.3
50.7
...
...
2.1
6.2
5.9
...
...
25
11
12
340.2
644.4
852.5
1,941.8
1,613.7
80.3
211.4
258.0
631.5
534.7
24
33
30
33
33
Agricultural
products
290.3
394.1
373.3
833.0
722.5
224.2
293.0
285.6
615.0
533.1
77
74
77
74
74
Fuels and mining
products
186.4
217.4
312.5
1,190.2
768.7
157.1
175.5
260.6
916.4
557.7
84
81
83
77
73
1,943.7
2,793.6
3,390.6
6,727.8
5,280.1
1,495.0
1,993.3
2,532.0
4,765.0
3,702.7
77
71
75
71
70
83.4
106.6
94.1
320.8
186.7
60.9
74.4
70.6
226.5
120.2
73
70
75
71
64
•Chemicals
256.0
396.2
475.7
1,259.8
1,110.9
191.9
288.9
361.5
950.1
833.6
75
73
76
75
75
•Office and
telecom
equipment
220.6
385.9
570.5
675.7
536.8
166.8
263.1
387.6
432.7
343.4
76
68
68
64
64
Electronic data
processing and
office
equipment
...
...
214.4
236.9
192.9
...
...
170.0
177.7
142.1
...
...
79
75
74
Telecom.
equipment
...
...
187.8
271.4
218.2
...
...
138.2
187.6
152.9
...
...
74
69
70
Integrated
circuits and
electronic
components
...
...
168.4
167.5
125.7
...
...
79.3
67.4
48.5
...
...
47
40
39
301.5
416.7
506.7
1,003.6
670.8
263.3
343.4
435.8
764.2
519.8
87
82
86
76
78
•Automotive
products
•Electrical,
non-electrical
and
powergenerating
machinery
•Scientific and
controlling
instruments
Total merchandise
Developed
economies
Manufactures
•Iron and steel
•Automotive
products
222
Statistical appendix
Appendix Table 7: World merchandise exports by product and region, 1990-2009 (Billion dollars and percentage) (continued)
Destination
Origin
World
Intra-regional
Value
Value
Share in exports to world
1990
1995
2000
2008
2009
1990
1995
2000
2008
2009
1990
...
...
668.9
1,402.7
1,056.6
...
...
454.6
867.8
626.0
...
...
68
62
59
•Textiles
67.4
84.2
79.1
105.7
81.9
52.9
59.8
56.7
73.3
56.2
79
71
72
69
69
•Clothing
50.9
65.5
68.5
123.1
104.5
45.4
53.0
55.8
104.0
89.5
89
81
82
85
86
...
...
100.9
201.2
174.3
...
...
71.4
135.6
115.8
...
...
71
67
66
2,496.6
3,536.2
4,212.4
9,044.7
7,019.4
1,914.9
2,554.9
3,168.0
6,469.9
4,938.5
77
72
75
72
70
Agricultural
products
111.8
167.8
165.1
460.5
407.1
34.1
65.5
65.6
231.7
210.3
31
39
40
50
52
Fuels and mining
products
262.7
266.2
456.9
1,865.7
1,210.1
65.8
95.9
183.4
908.0
625.4
25
36
40
49
52
Manufactures
•Electrical,
non-electrical
and
powergenerating
machinery
•Scientific and
controlling
instruments
Total merchandise
1995 2000 2008 2009
Developing
economies
397.4
822.0
1,268.0
3,567.6
2,965.8
117.6
317.2
467.7
1,633.8
1,404.1
30
39
37
46
47
•Iron and steel
16.0
28.6
35.0
202.7
103.2
7.6
16.1
17.5
119.3
71.9
48
56
50
59
70
•Chemicals
32.1
71.0
99.8
376.6
309.3
16.3
43.9
62.1
231.6
198.6
61
62
62
62
64
•Office and
telecom
equipment
76.2
216.3
397.6
894.4
784.4
19.0
74.7
148.0
403.2
358.3
25
35
37
45
46
Electronic data
processing and
office
equipment
...
...
157.6
313.7
269.6
...
...
43.8
105.6
89.6
...
...
28
34
33
Telecom.
equipment
...
...
100.2
329.8
287.2
...
...
29.0
126.5
108.5
...
...
29
38
38
Integrated
circuits and
electronic
components
...
...
139.8
251.0
227.6
...
...
75.1
171.0
160.1
...
...
54
68
70
12.6
35.4
69.0
234.0
172.3
2.9
12.6
17.9
103.6
80.7
23
36
26
44
47
...
...
163.3
534.3
435.8
...
...
65.5
254.3
216.9
...
...
40
48
50
•Textiles
35.4
63.8
77.0
145.4
127.3
19.3
41.8
46.7
84.3
74.5
55
66
61
58
59
•Clothing
54.4
85.8
127.8
239.8
209.6
4.2
9.2
17.7
41.6
35.3
8
11
14
17
17
...
...
16.8
106.8
95.3
...
...
4.8
59.4
54.2
...
...
29
56
57
793.4
1,284.0
1,919.1
6,015.9
4,706.7
220.1
487.3
725.7
2,828.2
2,286.5
28
38
38
47
49
•Automotive
products
•Electrical,
non-electrical
and
powergenerating
machinery
•Scientific and
controlling
instruments
Total merchandise
Source: Network of world merchandise trade tables from WTO International Trade Statistics 2010, supplemented with older network
tables and Secretariat estimates prior to 2000.
223
world trade report 2011
Appendix Table 8: Preferential trade by importer, preferential margin and MFN rate
Importer
Share of trade by preferential margin (PM) and MFN rate (in per cent of total trade)
Share of
imports from
countries
Non-preferential imports
MFN zero
Preferential imports
receiving
preferences
PM
PM PM PM
MFN MFN MFN MFN
PM
MFN
(in per cent
10.1% 5.1% 2.6% 0.1%
10.1% 5.1% 2.6% 0.1%
with
no
Total above
Total above
Total
of total
to
to
to
to
to
to
to
to
pref. pref.
20%
20%
trade)
20% 10% 5% 2.5%
20% 10% 5% 2.5%
TradeTotal
weighted
trade
pref.
(billion
margin
dollars)
(%
points)
TOTAL with
EU-intra
64.0
29.6
1.5
2.5
7.5
8.4
9.8 21.7
0.6
2.2
5.4
7.3
6.2
47.3 27.9
19.4
1.4
13,552
2.1
TOTAL
without
EU-intra
50.0
16.3
0.5
1.3
3.9
4.0
6.5 30.2
0.8
3.0
7.5 10.2
8.7
52.3 25.3
27.0
1.2
9,745
1.0
EU-intra
100.0
63.7
3.9
5.5
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
34.4 34.4
0.0
1.8
3,807
4.9
EU-extra
69.8
16.9
0.3
2.2
3.0
5.3 26.1
0.6
2.6
4.4
6.9
11.5
41.9
14.6
0.5
2,287
0.9
United
States
48.1
23.1
0.7
0.7
1.9
3.9 15.9 33.7
0.5
2.5
4.5
6.1 20.1
42.8 16.5
26.3
0.4
2,098
0.7
16.7 19.6 18.0
56.5
China
28.4
5.8
0.1
0.2
1.6
1.0
2.8
41.7
0.5
2.4 19.2 14.0
5.6
48.4 15.4
32.9
4.2
1,034
0.3
Japan
50.0
6.0
0.0
0.1
0.6
3.6
1.7 12.5
1.0
1.9
4.8
0.5
80.4 38.5
41.9
1.1
748
0.2
Korea, Rep. of
36.7
9.5
0.0
0.1
1.1
2.4
5.9 59.2
1.9
1.2 20.6 32.4
3.1
30.2
13.7
16.4
1.2
434
0.3
Canada
80.3
35.4
0.1
1.6 25.9
4.7
3.0
9.1
0.1
2.3
5.5
0.5
0.7
55.4
42.1
13.3
0.1
371
2.2
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0 100.0
0.0 100.0
0.0
369
0.0
Mexico
75.8
48.2
5.9
9.9
31.2
0.7
0.5 10.3
1.1
3.3
5.9
0.0
0.0
38.1 22.7
15.4
3.4
303
9.3
Singapore
62.6
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0 100.0 62.6
37.4
0.0
243
0.1
2.1
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0 26.0
1.0
1.5
4.3 12.5
6.7
73.9
2.1
71.9
0.0
232
0.0
0.3 35.3
41.1
2.0
10.2
4.4
5.8
4.9
215
0.2
20.2 15.5 28.4
6.2
13.3
4.9
8.4
1.4
188
1.3
7.3 24.2
0.0
52.5 36.7
15.8
0.3
187
0.6
Hong Kong,
China
Taipei,
Chinese
4.3
India
41.1
5.0
0.1
0.0
0.9
1.0
3.0 79.9
1.2
Russian
Federation
38.8
14.1
0.6
3.3
2.3
5.9
2.1
71.2
0.9
Australia
64.3
13.5
0.0
0.1
1.2
9.8
2.4 33.8
0.0
Turkey
86.3
39.7
0.3
1.5
7.1
21.6
3.1
1.2
6.0
8.6
2.6
36.9
31.2
5.7
1.8
186
1.9
Switzerland
89.4
53.9
1.3
3.5
8.7
9.8 30.6
7.7
0.6
0.3
0.9
0.7
5.2
38.2 33.4
4.8
0.2
182
2.2
Brazil
16.0
12.3
2.9
4.1
3.8
0.4
1.0 50.4
2.0
35.2
6.6
1.2
5.4
36.9
3.5
33.4
0.5
172
2.0
5.9
5.1
0.0
0.0
0.0
5.1
0.0 72.2
0.1
0.0
0.0 70.7
1.4
22.5
0.8
21.6
0.2
153
0.2
0.8
0.0
United Arab
Emirates
10.7 20.1
2.2
Malaysia
38.4
4.5
0.8
1.6
0.8
1.0
0.1 10.2
4.2
1.6
78.0 28.8
49.1
7.4
143
0.7
Thailand
18.6
7.2
0.8
0.7
1.3
2.3
2.0 53.6
3.9
4.5 14.3 15.6 15.3
39.2
8.8
30.4
0.0
126
0.6
Indonesia
47.9
24.3
0.9
0.6
2.8
4.0 16.0 33.3
1.1
2.7
37.7 12.9
24.9
4.6
74
0.9
Source: ITC TradeMap, WITS (TRAINS), UN Comtrade, US ITC, TARIC.
224
n/a
3.6
4.5 16.0
9.0
Statistical appendix
Appendix Table 9: Preferential trade by importer, duties and average preference margin
Trade and duties (billion dollars)
Indicators (in per cent)
MFN duties
over
imports
Pref. duties
over
imports
Tradeweighted
preferential
margin
(percentage
points)
Total
imports
MFN duties
Duties with
pref.
Duties
“saved"
Pref. duties
over MFN
duties
13,552
491.8
210.8
281.0
42.9
3.6
1.6
2.1
TOTAL
without
EU-intra
9,745
306.4
210.8
95.7
68.8
3.1
2.2
1.0
EU-intra
3,807
185.4
0.0
185.4
0.0
4.9
0.0
4.9
EU-extra
2,287
57.2
36.3
20.9
63.4
2.5
1.6
0.9
United States
2,098
42.7
27.8
14.9
65.1
2.0
1.3
0.7
China
1,034
32.4
29.8
2.6
92.0
3.1
2.9
0.3
Japan
748
11.2
9.4
1.7
84.3
1.5
1.3
0.2
Korea, Rep. of
434
32.0
30.9
1.2
96.4
7.4
7.1
0.3
Canada
371
11.5
3.5
8.0
30.7
3.1
1.0
2.2
Hong Kong,
China
369
0.0
0.0
0.0
...
0.0
0.0
0.0
Mexico
303
33.5
5.2
28.3
15.6
11.1
1.7
9.3
Singapore
243
0.5
0.1
0.3
30.3
0.2
0.1
0.1
Taipei,
Chinese
232
3.7
3.7
0.0
99.9
1.6
1.6
0.0
India
215
13.6
13.3
0.3
97.4
6.3
6.2
0.2
Russian
Federation
188
14.8
12.4
2.4
83.9
7.9
6.6
1.3
Australia
187
5.8
4.6
1.2
79.1
3.1
2.5
0.6
Turkey
186
7.6
4.1
3.5
53.5
4.1
2.2
1.9
Switzerland
182
5.6
1.5
4.1
26.5
3.1
0.8
2.2
Brazil
172
15.1
11.7
3.4
77.7
8.8
6.8
2.0
United Arab
Emirates
153
5.9
5.5
0.4
93.5
3.9
3.6
0.2
Malaysia
143
4.2
3.2
1.0
77.0
2.9
2.3
0.7
Thailand
126
6.5
5.8
0.8
88.3
5.2
4.6
0.6
74
2.7
2.0
0.7
73.8
3.6
2.7
0.9
Importer
TOTAL with
EU-intra
Indonesia
Source: ITC TradeMap, WITS (TRAINS), UN Comtrade, US ITC, TARIC.
225
world trade report 2011
Appendix Table 10: Preferential trade by exporter, 30 largest exporters
Exporter
Share of
Share of trade by preferential margin (PM) and MFN rate (in per
exports
to
Non-preferential exports
Preferential exports
countries
granting
preferPM
PM
PM
PM
MFN MFN MFN
ences
PM
MFN
10.1% 5.1% 2.6% 0.1%
10.1% 5.1% 2.6%
(in per Total above
Total above
to
to
to
to
to
to
to
cent of
20%
20%
20% 10% 5% 2.5%
20% 10% 5%
total
trade)
TOTAL
50.0
China
EU-extra
16.3
0.5
1.3
3.9
54.6
5.5
0.0
0.1
0.5
20.7
13.1
0.4
1.1
3.7
United
States
39.0
21.7
1.2
2.5
15.8
Japan
4.8
0.5
0.2
0.0
4.0
10.2
MFN zero
n/a
MFN
0.1%
with no
Total
to
pref. pref.
2.5%
6.5
30.2
0.8
3.0
2.4
2.4
38.4
0.6
8.5
9.9
3.2
4.8
42.1
0.7
4.9
12.8
1.8
0.4
30.2
0.9
2.1
7.4
9.0
0.1
0.1
0.1
57.7
1.2
2.7 20.8
16.4
16.5
39.6
3.6 36.0 2.3
TradeTotal weighted
trade
pref.
(billion margin
dollars)
(%
points)
8.7
52.3
25.3 27.0 1.2 9,744.5
13.2
6.1
55.4
13.3
10.4
43.1
10.8 46.5
Coverage
(share of
total
exports
covered
by
dataset in
per cent)
1.0
89
25.6 29.7 0.7 1,406.0
0.2
90
6.9 36.1 1.7 1,231.9
0.8
92
16.8 29.7 1.6 1,011.0
2.8
86
703.9
0.1
91
Canada
80.1
45.7
1.1
0.6
5.3
5.7
33.0
7.5
0.3
0.5
2.0
1.9
2.8
46.4
34.1 12.4 0.3
419.0
1.4
96
Korea, Rep. of
43.6
7.7
0.0
0.0
0.1
0.5
7.2
39.5
0.7
2.2
10.0
14.6
11.9
51.0
17.5 33.5 1.8
358.6
0.1
90
Russian
Federation
81.2
5.7
0.0
0.0
0.1
3.4
2.2
16.5
0.9
0.1
3.1
4.0
8.4
77.6
65.4 12.2 0.2
325.3
0.2
80
1.1
0.1
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.1
39.7
0.5
2.7
13.5
16.2
6.7 58.3
0.5 57.8 1.9
284.3
0.0
93
33.7
4.3
0.0
0.0
0.0
3.6
0.6
41.1
0.0
0.0
2.0
17.9
29.4 25.1 0.1
273.1
0.2
88
Taipei,
Chinese
Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia
17.5 33.2
21.2
54.5
Mexico
97.8
63.9
3.6
2.2
7.4
1.8
0.1
0.1
0.6
0.9
0.1
34.0
32.4
1.6 0.3
263.1
3.0
94
Malaysia
73.9
14.0
0.2
0.4
2.1
5.0
6.3
14.1
0.3
0.9
4.1
7.0
1.9
70.2
49.3 20.9 1.6
211.3
0.6
93
Switzerland
67.0
34.1
0.4
1.1
5.1
9.8
17.8
14.9
0.1
1.5
8.1
4.0
1.3 48.9
31.8 17.2 2.0
191.7
1.2
90
9.4
2.9
0.0
0.0
0.1
0.3
2.4
21.1
3.0
0.8
4.2
9.1
4.0
75.4
5.9 69.5 0.6
167.3
0.1
90
Singapore
63.9
18.9
0.3
0.8
5.1
5.7
6.9
13.3
0.3
0.4
2.1
3.3
7.2 66.4
39.1 27.3 1.4
161.8
0.9
86
Thailand
88.5
26.8
0.8
1.0
5.1
12.9
7.1
15.1
1.8
2.7
3.9
4.1
India
76.8
25.9
0.0
0.1
2.5
11.1
12.2
24.7
0.8
3.2
5.9
12.6
Brazil
74.8
15.3
1.2
1.3
1.8
6.5
4.5
26.4
2.0
2.4
4.1
Norway
85.0
18.1
0.1
0.7
7.4
5.2
4.7
8.7
0.2
0.5
2.3
Indonesia
90.7
20.6
0.6
0.7
3.0
8.4
7.8
15.6
1.2
3.1
United
Arab
Emirates
9.5
3.8
0.0
0.0
0.1
2.3
1.4
27.9
0.1
Turkey
84.8
64.8
0.4
20.5
17.7
15.3
10.9
16.9
Iran,
Islamic
Rep.
69.3
2.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
1.1
0.7
Australia
7.6 4.0
152.9
1.5
87
2.2 48.3 35.8 12.5 1.1
151.6
0.8
81
8.3
9.6 56.9
150.5
1.2
73
1.5
4.3
72.9 64.9
8.0 0.3
140.0
0.8
97
3.7
5.8
1.9
61.3
54.8
6.6 2.4
139.1
1.0
92
0.1
4.3
22.5
0.9 68.0
4.8 63.3 0.3
115.7
0.1
81
0.3
2.5
2.3
10.8
1.0
17.6
13.3
4.3 0.8
91.6
5.0
81
22.6
0.1
0.0
1.4
19.4
1.8
75.4
48.1 27.3 0.1
91.5
0.1
91
2.6
54.1 46.5
40.6 16.2 1.4
Nigeria
88.5
48.4
0.0
0.0
0.1
0.3
48.1
9.0
0.0
0.0
0.1
8.8
0.0
42.0
30.7 11.3 0.6
80.9
0.1
93
South
Africa
70.4
21.5
0.1
0.2
3.1
7.8
10.2
15.1
0.2
0.8
4.8
7.0
2.3
62.4 46.0 16.4 1.0
76.5
0.8
80
Venezuela,
Bolivarian
Rep. of
88.2
2.9
0.0
0.1
0.9
1.4
0.6
71.5
0.0
0.0
1.1
1.2 69.2
74.1
0.1
90
25.5
16.8
8.7 0.0
Kuwait
11.6
5.6
0.0
0.0
0.0
5.5
0.1
39.1
0.1
0.0
1.5
25.4
12.2
55.2
6.0 49.2 0.1
72.0
0.3
90
Philippines
84.9
11.6
0.9
0.3
1.7
5.5
3.3
7.6
0.9
2.2
1.1
2.5
0.9
78.9
64.7 14.2 1.9
69.3
0.7
97
Algeria
93.7
4.1
0.0
0.0
0.6
1.3
2.2
31.8
0.0
0.0
1.0
1.9 28.8
Chile
95.4
27.3
0.5
2.5
8.5
4.6
11.3
7.0
0.4
1.3
0.3
0.6
Qatar
11.8
2.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
1.5
0.5 28.9
0.0
0.0
1.0
27.3
Source: ITC TradeMap, WITS (TRAINS), UN Comtrade, US ITC, TARIC.
226
7.5
cent of total trade)
61.6 55.3
6.2 2.5
66.0
0.1
97
59.5
4.0 2.2
62.3
1.7
90
6.4 62.7 0.0
60.4
0.1
95
4.5 63.5
0.5
69.1
Statistical appendix
Appendix Table 11: Shares of preferential trade and duty reductions from reciprocal preference
schemes by importer
Importer
Preferential imports under reciprocal regimes /
all preferential imports (per cent)
Duty reduction under reciprocal regimes /
overall duty reduction (per cent)
Total
77.1
87.7
EU-extra
59.5
68.1
United States
74.0
87.2
China
99.5
99.2
Japan
27.4
25.4
Korea, Rep. of
99.1
98.6
Canada
86.8
91.6
Mexico
100.0
100.0
Singapore
100.0
100.0
Taipei, Chinese
70.2
87.7
India
94.3
97.7
100.0
100.0
Australia
80.1
92.1
Turkey
75.5
80.4
Switzerland
91.8
90.5
Brazil
100.0
100.0
United Arab
Emirates
100.0
100.0
Malaysia
100.0
100.0
Thailand
100.0
100.0
Indonesia
100.0
100.0
Russian
Federation
Source: ITC TradeMap, WITS (TRAINS), UN Comtrade, US ITC, TARIC.
227
world trade report 2011
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TECHNICAL NOTES
Technical notes
Composition of regions and other economic groupings
Regions
North America
Bermuda
Canada*
Mexico*
United States of
America*
Other territories in the region not elsewhere specified (n.e.s.)
South and Central America and the Caribbean
Antigua and Barbuda*
Chile*
El Salvador*
Netherlands Antilles
Saint Vincent and the
Grenadines*
Argentina*
Colombia*
Grenada*
Nicaragua*
Suriname*
Bahamas**
Costa Rica*
Guatemala*
Panama*
Trinidad and Tobago*
Barbados*
Cuba*
Guyana*
Paraguay*
Uruguay*
Belize*
Dominica*
Haiti*
Peru*
Bolivarian Rep. of
Venezuela*
Bolivia, Plurinational
State of*
Dominican Republic*
Honduras*
Saint Kitts and Nevis*
Brazil*
Ecuador*
Jamaica*
Saint Lucia*
Other territories in the region n.e.s.
Europe
Andorra**
Denmark*
Iceland*
Montenegro**
Austria*
Estonia*
Ireland*
Netherlands*
Slovenia*
Spain*
Belgium*
Finland*
Italy*
Norway*
Sweden*
Bosnia and
Herzegovina**
France*
Latvia*
Poland*
Switzerland*
Bulgaria*
FYR Macedonia*
Liechtenstein*
Portugal*
Turkey*
Croatia*
Germany*
Lithuania*
Romania*
United Kingdom*
Cyprus*
Greece*
Luxembourg*
Serbia**
Czech Republic*
Hungary*
Malta*
Slovak Republic*
Other territories in the region n.e.s.
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)
a
Armenia*
Georgia a
Moldova*
Turkmenistan
Azerbaijan**
Kazakhstan**
Russian Federation**
Ukraine*
Belarus**
Kyrgyz Republic*
Tajikistan**
Uzbekistan**
Other territories in the region n.e.s.
Africa
Algeria**
Congo*
Guinea*
Morocco*
Angola*
Côte d’Ivoire*
Guinea-Bissau*
Mozambique*
South Africa*
Sudan**
Benin*
Dem. Rep. of the
Congo*
Kenya*
Namibia*
Swaziland*
Botswana*
Djibouti*
Lesotho*
Niger*
Tanzania*
Burkina Faso*
Egypt*
Liberia**
Nigeria*
Togo*
Burundi*
Equatorial Guinea**
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya**
Rwanda*
Tunisia*
Cameroon*
Eritrea
Madagascar*
São Tomé and Príncipe**
Uganda*
Cape Verde*
Ethiopia**
Malawi*
Senegal*
Zambia*
Central African Republic*
Gabon*
Mali*
Seychelles**
Zimbabwe*
Chad*
Gambia*
Mauritania*
Sierra Leone*
Comoros**
Ghana*
Mauritius*
Somalia
Other territories in the region n.e.s.
Middle East
Bahrain*
Israel*
Lebanese Republic**
Saudi Arabia, Kingdom of*
Iran, Islamic Rep. of**
Jordan*
Oman*
Syrian Arab Republic
Iraq**
Kuwait*
Qatar*
United Arab Emirates*
Yemen**
Other territories in the region n.e.s.
Asia
Afghanistan**
Hong Kong, China*
Malaysia*
Papua New Guinea*
Timor Leste
Australia*
India*
Maldives*
Philippines*
Tonga*
Bangladesh*
Indonesia*
Mongolia*
Samoa**
Tuvalu
* WTO members
** Observer governments
a Georgia is not a member of the Commonwealth of Independent States but is included in this group for reasons of geography and similarities
in economic structure.
239
world trade report 2011
Composition of regions and other economic groupings
Regions
Bhutan**
Japan*
Myanmar*
Singapore*
Vanuatu**
Brunei Darussalam*
Kiribati
Nepal*
Solomon Islands*
Viet Nam*
Cambodia*
Korea, Republic of*
New Zealand*
Sri Lanka*
China*
Lao People's Dem.
Rep.**
Pakistan*
Taipei, Chinese*
Fiji*
Macao, China*
Palau
Thailand*
Other territories in the region n.e.s.
Other Groups
ACP (African, Caribbean and Pacific countries)
Angola
Cuba
Haiti
Niger
South Africa
Antigua and Barbuda
Dem. Rep. of the
Congo
Jamaica
Nigeria
Sudan
Bahamas
Djibouti
Kenya
Niue
Suriname
Barbados
Dominica
Kiribati
Palau
Swaziland
Belize
Dominican Republic
Lesotho
Papua New Guinea
Timor Leste
Benin
Equatorial Guinea
Liberia
Rwanda
Togo
Botswana
Eritrea
Madagascar
Saint Kitts and Nevis
Tonga
Burkina Faso
Ethiopia
Malawi
Saint Lucia
Trinidad and Tobago
Burundi
Fiji
Mali
Saint Vincent and the
Grenadines
Tuvalu
Cameroon
Gabon
Marshall Islands
Samoa
Uganda
Central African
Republic
Gambia
Mauritania
São Tomé and Príncipe
United Republic of
Tanzania
Chad
Ghana
Mauritius
Senegal
Vanuatu
Comoros
Grenada
Micronesia
Seychelles
Zambia
Zimbabwe
Congo
Guinea
Mozambique
Sierra Leone
Cook Islands
Guinea-Bissau
Namibia
Solomon Islands
Côte d’Ivoire
Guyana
Nauru
Somalia
Egypt
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya
Morocco
Africa
North Africa
Algeria
Tunisia
Sub-Saharan Africa
Western Africa
Benin
Gambia
Guinea-Bissau
Mauritania
Senegal
Burkina Faso
Ghana
Liberia
Niger
Sierra Leone
Cape Verde
Guinea
Mali
Nigeria
Togo
Burundi
Central African
Republic
Congo
Equatorial Guinea
Rwanda
Cameroon
Chad
Dem. Rep. of the Congo
Gabon
São Tomé and Príncipe
Ethiopia
Mauritius
Somalia
United Republic of
Tanzania
Djibouti
Kenya
Seychelles
Sudan
Uganda
Eritrea
Madagascar
Côte d’Ivoire
Central Africa
Eastern Africa
Comoros
Southern Africa
Angola
Lesotho
Mozambique
South Africa
Zambia
Botswana
Malawi
Namibia
Swaziland
Zimbabwe
Territories in Africa not elsewhere specified
Asia
East Asia (including Oceania)
Australia
Indonesia
Mongolia
Samoa
Tuvalu
Brunei Darussalam
Japan
Myanmar
Singapore
Vanuatu
Cambodia
Kiribati
New Zealand
Solomon Islands
Viet Nam
China
Lao People’s Dem. Rep.
Papua New Guinea
Taipei, Chinese
Fiji
Macao, China
Philippines
Thailand
Hong Kong, China
Malaysia
Korea, Republic of
Tonga
Afghanistan
Bhutan
Maldives
Pakistan
Bangladesh
India
Nepal
West Asia
Other countries and territories in Asia and the Pacific not elsewhere specified
240
Sri Lanka
Technical notes
Composition of regions and other economic groupings
Other Groups
LDCs (Least-developed countries)
Afghanistan
Angola
Bangladesh
Benin
Bhutan
Burkina Faso
Comoros
Kiribati
Myanmar
Sudan
Congo, Dem. Rep. of
Lao People’s Dem. Rep.
Nepal
Timor Leste
Djibouti
Lesotho
Niger
Togo
Equatorial Guinea
Liberia
Rwanda
Tuvalu
Eritrea
Madagascar
Samoa
Uganda
Ethiopia
Malawi
São Tomé and Príncipe
United Republic of
Tanzania
Burundi
Cambodia
Central African
Republic
Gambia
Maldives
Senegal
Vanuatu
Guinea
Mali
Sierra Leone
Yemen
Guinea-Bissau
Mauritania
Solomon Islands
Zambia
Chad
Haiti
Mozambique
Somalia
Singapore
Taipei, Chinese
Ecuador
Peru
Six East Asian traders
Hong Kong, China
Malaysia
Korea, Republic of
Thailand
Regional Integration Agreements
Andean Community (CAN)
Bolivia, Plurinational
State of
Colombia
ASEAN (Association of South East Asian Nations) / AFTA (ASEAN Free Trade Area)
Brunei Darussalam
Cambodia
Indonesia
Malaysia
Philippines
Thailand
Lao People's Dem. Rep.
Myanmar
Singapore
Viet Nam
Honduras
Nicaragua
CACM (Central American Common market)
Costa Rica
El Salvador
Guatemala
CARICOM (Caribbean Community and Common Market)
Antigua and Barbuda
Belize
Guyana
Montserrat
Saint Vincent and the
Grenadines
Bahamas
Barbados
Dominica
Haiti
Saint Kitts and Nevis
Suriname
Grenada
Jamaica
Saint Lucia
Trinidad and Tobago
CEMAC (Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa)
Cameroon
Central African
Republic
Chad
Congo
Equatorial Guinea
Gabon
COMESA (Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa)
Burundi
Comoros
Congo, Dem. Rep. of
Djibouti
Egypt
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya
Rwanda
Uganda
Eritrea
Madagascar
Seychelles
Zambia
Ethiopia
Malawi
Sudan
Zimbabwe
Kenya
Mauritius
Swaziland
ECCAS (Economic Community of Central African States)
Angola
Central African
Republic
Dem. Rep. of the
Congo
Gabon
Burundi
Cameroon
Chad
Equatorial Guinea
Rwanda
São Tomé and Príncipe
Congo
ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States)
Benin
Burkina Faso
Cape Verde
Côte d'Ivoire
Guinea
Mali
Gambia
Guinea- Bissau
Niger
Senegal
Sierra Leone
Ghana
Liberia
Nigeria
Togo
Liechtenstein
Norway
Switzerland
Estonia
Ireland
Netherlands
Spain
Finland
Italy
Poland
Sweden
France
Latvia
Portugal
United Kingdom
Germany
Lithuania
Romania
Greece
Luxembourg
Slovak Republic
Hungary
Malta
Slovenia
EFTA (European Free Trade Association)
Iceland
European Union (27)
Austria
Belgium
Bulgaria
Cyprus
Czech Republic
Denmark
241
world trade report 2011
Composition of regions and other economic groupings
Regional Integration Agreements
GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council)
Bahrain, Kingdom of
Kuwait
Oman
Qatar
Saudi Arabia, Kingdom of
Paraguay
Uruguay
United Arab Emirates
MERCOSUR (Southern Common Market)
Argentina
Brazil
NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement)
Canada
Mexico
United States
SAPTA (South Asian Preferential Trade Arrangement)
Bangladesh
Bhutan
India
Nepal
Pakistan
Sri Lanka
Maldives
SADC (Southern African Development Community)
Angola
Botswana
Congo, Dem. Rep. of
Lesotho
Mauritius
South Africa
Zambia
Madagascar
Mozambique
Swaziland
Zimbabwe
Malawi
Namibia
United Republic of
Tanzania
WAEMU (West African Economic and Monetary Union)
Benin
Burkina Faso
Côte d'Ivoire
Mali
Guinea-Bissau
Niger
WTO members are frequently referred to as “countries”, although
some members are not countries in the usual sense of the word
but are officially “customs territories”. The definition of
geographical and other groupings in this report does not imply
an expression of opinion by the Secretariat concerning the
status of any country or territory, the delimitation of its frontiers,
nor the rights and obligations of any WTO member in respect of
WTO agreements. The colours, boundaries, denominations and
classifications in the maps of the publication do not imply, on the
part of the WTO, any judgement on the legal or other status of
any territory, or any endorsement or acceptance of any boundary.
242
Senegal
Togo
Throughout this report, South and Central America and the
Caribbean is referred to as South and Central America. The
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela; Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region of China; the Republic of Korea; and the
Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and
Matsu are referenced as Bolivarian Rep. of Venezuela; Hong
Kong, China; Korea, Republic of; and Taipei, Chinese respectively.
ABBREVIATIONS AND SYMBOLS
Abbreviations and symbols
ACP
ADB
AFAS
AFTA
AGOA
ALADI
ALALC
AMU
APEC
APTA
ASEAN
ATC
AVE
BEC
BITs
BOP
CACM
CAFTA
CAN
CARICOM
CBTPA
CBERA
CEFTA
CEPA
CER
CGE
CIS
COMECON
COMESA
CRTA
CTC
CUs
CUSFTA
DDA
DR-CAFTA
DSU
EAC
ECA
ECCAS
ECO
ECOWAS
ECSC
EEA
EEC
EFTA
EIA
EPA
EU
FDI
f.o.b.
FTAA
FTAs
GATS
GATT
GCC
GDP
GPA
GSP
GSTP
HS
IDB
IMF
IPRs
ITA
ITC
ITO
JETRO
African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States
Asian Development Bank
ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services
ASEAN Free Trade Area
African Growth and Opportunity Act
Latin American Integration Association
Latin American Association of Free Commerce
Arab Maghreb Union
Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation
Asia Pacific Trade Agreement
Association of Southeast Asian Nations
Agreement on Textiles and Clothing
ad valorem equivalent
broad economic categories
bilateral investment treaties
balance of payment
Central American Common Market
Central American Free Trade Area
ANDEAN Community
Caribbean Community and Common Market
Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act
Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act
Central European Free Trade Area
Closer Economic Partnership Arrangements
Closer Economic Relations
computable general equilibrium
Commonwealth of Independent States
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
Committee on Regional Trade Agreements
change in tariff classification
customs unions
Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement
Doha Development Agenda
Dominican Republic-Central American Free Trade Agreement
Dispute Settlement Understanding
East African Community
Economic Commission for Africa
Economic Community of Central African States
Economic Co-operation Organization
Economic Community of West African States
European Coal and Steel Community
European Economic Area
European Economic Community
European Free Trade Agreement
Economic Integration Agreement
Economic Partnership Agreement
European Union
foreign direct investment
free on board
Free Trade Area of the Americas
free trade agreements
General Agreement on Trade in Services
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
Gulf Cooperation Council
gross domestic product
Government Procurement Agreement
Generalized System of Preferences
Global System of Trade Preferences
Harmonized System
Inter-American Development Bank
International Monetary Fund
intellectual property rights
Information Technology Agreement
International Trade Centre
International Trade Organization
Japan External Trade Organization
243
world trade report 2011
LAIA
LDCs
LPA
MERCOSUR
MFN
MNC
MTS
NAFTA
NT
OAU
PAFTA
PECS
PM
PSA
PTAs
PUR
RCA
REC
RIA
RoOs
RoW
RPM
RTAA
SACU
SADC
SAFTA
SAPP
SITC
SMEs
SPS
TBTs
TPP
TRIMs
TRIPS
UNCTAD
US
VC
VCLT
WITS
Latin American Integration Agreement
least-developed countries
Lagos Plan of Action
Southern Common Market
most-favoured nation
multi-national corporation
multilateral trading system
North American Free Trade Agreement
national treatment
Organization of African Unity
Pan-Arab Free Trade Area
Pan-European Cumulation System
preference margin
partial scope agreement
preferential trade agreements
preference utilization rate
revealed comparative advantage
regional economic community
regional integration arrangement
rules of origin
rest of the world
relative preference margin
Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act
Southern Africa Customs Union
Southern African Development Community
South Asian Free Trade Area
Southern African Power Pool
Standard International Trade Classification
small and medium-sized enterprises
sanitary and phytosanitary
technical barriers to trade
Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership
trade-related investment measures
trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
United States
value content
Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties
World Integrated Trade System
The following symbols are used in this publication:
…
not available
0
figure is zero or became zero due to rounding
-
not applicable
US$
United States dollars
€
euro
£
UK pound
244
List of figures, tables, boxes and maps
List of figures, tables, boxes and maps
I
World trade in 2010
Figures
Figure 1
Growth in volume of world merchandise trade and GDP, 2000-10
20
Figure 2
Volume of world merchandise trade, 1990-2010
21
Figure 3
Ratio of world exports of goods and commercial services to GDP, 1980-2010
25
Figure 4
World exports of manufactured goods by product, 2007-10
27
Figure 5
Nominal dollar exchange rates, January 2000 - February 2011
29
Table 1
GDP and merchandise trade by region, 2007-10
22
Table 2
Export prices of selected primary products, 2000-10
23
Table 3
World exports of merchandise and commercial services, 2005-10
24
Table 4
Exports of automotive products by major exporting regions, 2008-10
27
Monthly merchandise exports and imports of selected economies, January 2006 - January 2011
37
App. Table 1
World merchandise trade by region and selected economies, 2010
31
App. Table 2
World exports of commercial services by region and selected country, 2010
32
App. Table 3
Merchandise trade: leading exporters and importers, 2010
33
App. Table 4
Merchandise trade: leading exporters and importers (excluding intra-EU (27) trade), 2010
34
App. Table 5
Leading exporters and importers in world trade in commercial services, 2010
35
App. Table 6
Leading exporters and importers of commercial services excluding intra-EU (27) trade, 2010
36
Tables
Appendix figure
App. Fig. 1
Appendix tables
II The WTO and Preferential Trade Agreements: From co-existence to coherence
B. Historical background and current trends
Figures
Figure B.1
Cumulative number of PTAs in force, 1950-2010, notified and non-notified PTAs, by country group
55
Figure B.1a
Average number of PTAs in force per country, 1950-2010, notified and non-notified PTAs, by country group
55
Figure B1b
Average number of PTA participants per WTO member, 1950-2010, notified PTAs 56
Figure B.2
Cumulative number of intra- and cross-regional PTAs in force, 1950-2010, notified and non-notified PTAs
58
Figure B.3
Cumulative number of bilateral PTAs and types of plurilateral PTAs in force, 1950-2010, notified and non-notified PTAs
60
Figure B.4
Type of PTAs in force, 2010, notified and non-notified PTAs
62
Figure B.5
Cumulative number of PTAs, 1950-2010, notified and non-notified PTAs, by scope of coverage
62
Figure B.6
Share of intra-PTA trade in world merchandise exports, 1990-2008
64
Figure B.7
Shares of selected PTAs in total world exports between PTA members, 2008
68
Figure B.8
Intra-regional trade shares in world by manufacturing sector, 1990-2009
71
Figure B.9
Shares of intra-regional trade in total imports by region, 1965-2005
72
Figure B.10
Preferential trade by importer, 2008, shares by preference margins and MFN rates
74
245
world trade report 2011
Figure B.11
Preferential trade by exporter (30 largest exporters), 2008, shares by preference margins and MFN rates
75
Figure B.12
Preferential trade by exporter (25 exporters with highest trade-weighted preferential margin), 2008, preference margins
76
Figure B.13
Preference utilization rate (PUR) of US preferential regimes (sorted by eligible exports), 2008
80
Figure B.14
Preference utilization rate (PUR) of EU preferential regimes (sorted by eligible exports), 2008
81
Table B.1
Total and average number of PTAs in force, 2010, notified and non-notified PTAs, by region, regional type and country group
57
Table B.2
“Network” of PTAs in force, 2010, notified and non-notified PTAs, by region
59
Table B.3
Intra- and cross-regional PTAs in force, 2010, notified and non-notified PTAs, by region and time period
59
Table B.4
Number of bilateral PTAs and types of plurilateral PTAs in force, 2010, notified and non-notified PTAs, by country group and regional type
61
Table B.5
Number of goods and services PTAs in force, 2010, notified and non-notified PTAs, by country group, level of participation and regional type
63
Table B.6
World merchandise trade between PTAs, 1990
65
Table B.7
World merchandise trade between PTAs, 2008
66
Table B.8
Preferential trade by agreement/type of regime, 2008, selected regimes
77
Table B.9
Preferential trade by country group, 2008
78
Table B.10
Preferential trade by product group, 2008
79
Table B.11
Preference utilization rate (PUR) by product group, 2008
82
Table B.12
Firms’ utilization of PTA preferences
83
Rules of origin in PTAs: transaction costs and the spaghetti-bowl phenomenon
84
Map B.1
Membership in PTAs in force, 2010, notified and non-notified PTAs, by country
58
Map B.2
Intra-regional and extra-regional merchandise exports of WTO regions, 1990-2009
69
Tables
Box
Box B.1 Maps
C. Causes and effects of PTAs: is it all about preferences?
Figures
Figure C.1
The PTA diagram’s trade pattern
100
Figure C.2
Home PTA with Partner 1: trade creation
101
Figure C.3
Home PTA with Partner 2: trade diversion
102
Figure C.4
Effects of PTAs in services
104
Shallow versus deep integration
110
Table
Table C.1
Boxes
246
Box C.1
PTA case studies
98
Box C.2
Trade creation and trade diversion effects
101
Box C.3
The effects of PTAs in services
103
Box C.4
Lessons from the EU experience in relaxing rules of origin (RoOs)
109
Box C.5
Determinants of the regionalization of production networks
112
List of figures, tables, boxes and maps
Appendix figures
App. Fig. C.1
Open trade and MFN tariffs
118
App. Fig. C.2
PTA price and quantity effects
118
App. Fig. C.3
Welfare effects of preferential liberalization
119
Empirical findings on trade creation and trade diversion
120
Appendix table
App Table C.1
D. Anatomy of preferential trade agreements
Figures
Figure D.1
MFN tariff trends in developing countries by region
124
Figure D.2
World MFN applied tariff trends
125
Figure D.3
Preferential reductions of tariff rates above 15 per cent, 2007
125
Figure D.4
Relative preference margins by region, 2000 and 2007
128
Figure D.5
Covered and enforceable WTO+ provisions over time
131
Figure D.6
Covered and enforceable WTO-X provisions over time
131
Figure D.7
Number of agreements covering WTO+ provisions
132
Figure D.8
Number of agreements covering WTO-X provisions
132
Figure D.9
Number of WTO+ and WTO-X provisions
133
Figure D.10
Sector coverage in PTAs in comparison with GATS commitments and DDA offers
134
Figure D.11
Proportion of services subsectors subject to new or improved commitments in PTAs, compared to GATS (by member)
135
Figure D.12
GATS+ commitments in PTAs by sector, modes 1 and 3
137
Figure D.13
Proportion of PTAs with selected provisions in investment chapter
139
Figure D.14
Total number of provisions in investment chapter over time
139
Figure D.15
Percentage of PTAs by TBT provision
141
Figure D.16
Average degree of TBT integration by level of development
141
Figure D.17
Sector-specific competition provisions in PTAs
143
Figure D.18
Competition disciplines in PTAs over time
144
Figure D.19
Share of parts and components in intra-regional trade
147
Figure D.20
FDI flows to ASEAN-5 and as share of FDI to developing countries, 1970-92
148
Figure D.21
Costa Rica’s share of US FDI flows to Central America, 1982-2008
150
Table D.1
Share of tariff lines and trade by level of competition-adjusted preference margin, 2000 and 2007
127
Tables
Table D.2
WTO+ and WTO-X policy areas in PTAs
129
Table D.3
Patterns of TBT integration across regions (percentage of PTAs by provision and region)
142
Table D.4
ASEAN-5 exports, 1967-92
147
Table D.5
Costa Rica’s preferential trade agreements
149
Table D.6
Costa Rica’s two-way trade with the United States, 1995-2008
150
Table D.7
Costa Rica’s two-way trade with China, 1995-2008
150
Box D.1
Measurement of the value of preferences
126
Box D.2
Legal enforceability
129
Boxes
247
world trade report 2011
Appendix figure
App. Fig. D.1
Variations in the level of commitments offered in different PTAs: Australia, Chile, Republic of Korea, Singapore and United States
163
App. Table D.1
List of PTAs and results of HMS mapping
157
App. Table D.2
Acronyms and members
160
Appendix tables
App. Table D.3
List of services agreements in the database used for this report
161
App. Table D.4
The effects of deep integration on production networks
162
App. Table D.5
The effects of trade in parts and components on deep integration
162
E. The multilateral trading system and PTAs
Figures
Figure E.1
PTAs in force at the time of the request for consultations, 1995-2010
176
Figure E.2
Intra-PTA anti-dumping initiations
180
Table E.1
Frequency of requests for consultations, by development level and existence of PTAs
in force between the parties, 1995-2010
176
Table E.2
Requests for consultations, by year and subsequent procedures, 1995-2010
177
Table E.3
WTO Agreements cited in the requests for consultations, 1995-2010
178
Table E.4
Anti-dumping initiations by PTA status
180
Box E.1
Investment provisions in international agreements: is there a potential for third-party discrimination?
170
Box E.2
Making rules of origin more compatible with the multilateral trading system
172
Box E.3
Methodology
179
Tables
Boxes
Statistical appendix
248
App. Table 1
Merchandise exports and imports of plurilateral preferential trade agreements, 2008
199
App. Table 2.A
Merchandise exports of ASEAN countries, 1992-2009
201
App. Table 2.B
Merchandise imports of ASEAN countries, 1992-2009
203
App. Table 3.A
Merchandise exports of CIS countries, 2000-2009
205
App. Table 3.B
Merchandise imports of CIS countries, 2000-2009
207
App. Table 4.A
Merchandise exports of European Union (15) countries, 1990-2009
209
App. Table 4.B
Merchandise imports of European Union (15) countries, 1990-2009
211
App. Table 5.A
Merchandise exports of MERCOSUR countries, 1990-2009
213
App. Table 5.B
Merchandise imports of MERCOSUR countries, 1990-2009
214
App. Table 6.A
Merchandise exports of NAFTA countries, 1990-2009
215
App. Table 6.B
Merchandise imports of NAFTA countries, 1990-2009
216
App. Table 7
World merchandise exports by product and region, 1990-2009
217
App. Table 8
Preferential trade by importer, preferential margin and MFN rate
224
App. Table 9
Preferential trade by importer, duties and average preference margin
225
App. Table 10
Preferential trade by exporter, 30 largest exporters
226
App. Table 11
Shares of preferential trade and duty reductions from reciprocal preference schemes by importer
227
WTO MEMBERS
WTO members
(As of end May 2011)
Albania
Angola
Antigua and Barbuda
Argentina
Armenia
Australia
Austria
Bahrain, Kingdom of
Bangladesh
Barbados
Belgium
Belize
Benin
Bolivia, Plurinational State of
Botswana
Brazil
Brunei Darussalam
Bulgaria
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cambodia
Cameroon
Canada
Cape Verde
Central African Republic
Chad
Chile
China
Colombia
Congo
Costa Rica
Côte d’Ivoire
Croatia
Cuba
Cyprus
Czech Republic
Democratic Republic of the Congo
Denmark
Djibouti
Dominica
Dominican Republic
Ecuador
Egypt
El Salvador
Estonia
European Union
Fiji
Finland
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM)
France
Gabon
The Gambia
Georgia
Germany
Ghana
Greece
Grenada
Guatemala
Guinea
Guinea Bissau
Guyana
Haiti
Honduras
Hong Kong, China
Hungary
Iceland
India
Indonesia
Ireland
Israel
Italy
Jamaica
Japan
Jordan
Kenya
Korea, Republic of
Kuwait
Kyrgyz Republic
Latvia
Lesotho
Liechtenstein
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Macao, China
Madagascar
Malawi
Malaysia
Maldives
Mali
Malta
Mauritania
Mauritius
Mexico
Moldova
Mongolia
Morocco
Mozambique
Myanmar
Namibia
Nepal
Netherlands
New Zealand
Nicaragua
Niger
Nigeria
Norway
Oman
Pakistan
Panama
Papua New Guinea
Paraguay
Peru
Philippines
Poland
Portugal
Qatar
Romania
Rwanda
Saint Kitts and Nevis
Saint Lucia
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines
Saudi Arabia, Kingdom of
Senegal
Sierra Leone
Singapore
Slovak Republic
Slovenia
Solomon Islands
South Africa
Spain
Sri Lanka
Suriname
Swaziland
Sweden
Switzerland
Chinese Taipei
Tanzania
Thailand
Togo
Tonga
Trinidad and Tobago
Tunisia
Turkey
Uganda
Ukraine
United Arab Emirates
United Kingdom
United States of America
Uruguay
Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of
Viet Nam
Zambia
Zimbabwe
249
WOrld Trade repOrT 2011
previous World Trade reports
trade in natural resources
World Trade
Report 2010
World Trade Report
  
World Trade Report 2010
The World  Trade  Report  2010  focuses  on  trade  in  natural  resources, 
such as fuels, forestry, mining and fisheries. The Report examines the 
characteristics  of  trade  in  natural  resources,  the  policy  choices 
available  to  governments  and  the  role  of  international  cooperation, 
particularly of the WTO, in the proper management of trade in this sector.  
A  key  question  is  to  what  extent  countries  gain  from  open  trade  in 
natural resources. Some of the issues examined in the Report include 
the role of trade in providing access to natural resources, the effects  
of  international  trade  on  the  sustainability  of  natural  resources,  
the  environmental  impact  of  resources  trade,  the  so-called  natural 
resources curse, and resource price volatility. 
The  Report  examines  a  range  of  key  measures  employed  in  natural 
resource  sectors,  such  as  export  taxes,  tariffs  and  subsidies,  and 
provides  information  on  their  current  use.  It  analyses  in  detail  the 
effects of these policy tools on an economy and on its trading partners.  
Finally, the Report provides an overview of how natural resources fit 
within the legal framework of the WTO and discusses other international 
agreements  that  regulate  trade  in  natural  resources.  A  number  of 
challenges are addressed, including the regulation of export policy, the 
treatment of subsidies, trade facilitation, and the relationship between 
WTO rules and other international agreements.  
Trade in natural resources
2010
Trade in natural resources
TheWorldTradeReport2010focusesontradeinnaturalresources,suchasfuels,forestry,mining
and fisheries. The Report examines the characteristics of trade in natural resources, the policy
choicesavailabletogovernmentsandtheroleofinternationalcooperation,particularlyoftheWTO,
inthepropermanagementoftradeinthissector
“I believe not only that there is room for mutually beneficial negotiating trade-offs that encompass
natural resources trade, but also that a failure to address these issues could be a recipe for
growing tension in international trade relations. Well designed trade rules are key to ensuring
that trade is advantageous, but they are also necessary for the attainment of objectives such as
environmental protection and the proper management of natural resources in a domestic setting.”
Pascal Lamy, WTO Director-General
9 789287 037084
trade Policy Commitments and Contingency measures
WORLD TRADE REPORT 2009 -
World Trade Report
The World Trade Report is an annual publication that aims to deepen understanding
about trends in trade, trade policy issues and the multilateral trading system.
Trade Policy Commitments
and Contingency Measures
Trade Policy Commitments and Contingency Measures
The theme of this year’s Report is “Trade policy commitments and contingency
measures”. The Report examines the range of contingency measures available in
trade agreements and the role that these measures play. Also referred to as escape
clauses or safety valves, these measures allow governments a certain degree of
flexibility within their trade commitments and can be used to address circumstances
that could not have been foreseen when a trade commitment was made. Contingency
measures seek to strike a balance between commitments and flexibility. Too much
flexibility may undermine the value of commitments, but too little may render the rules
unsustainable. The tension between credible commitments and flexibility is often
close to the surface during trade negotiations. For example, in the July 2008 miniministerial meeting, which sought to agree negotiating modalities – or a final blueprint
– for agriculture and non-agricultural market access (NAMA), the question of a
“special safeguard mechanism” (the extent to which developing countries would be
allowed to protect farmers from import surges) was crucial to the discussions.
WORLD TRADE
REPORT 2009
2009
One of the main objectives of this Report is to analyze whether WTO provisions
provide a balance between supplying governments with necessary flexibility to face
difficult economic situations and adequately defining them in a way that limits their
use for protectionist purposes. In analyzing this question, the Report focuses
primarily on contingency measures available to WTO members when importing and
exporting goods. These measures include the use of safeguards, such as tariffs and
quotas, in specified circumstances, anti-dumping duties on goods that are deemed to
be “dumped”, and countervailing duties imposed to offset subsidies. The Report also
discusses alternative policy options, including the renegotiation of tariff commitments,
the use of export taxes, and increases in tariffs up to their legal maximum ceiling or
binding. The analysis includes consideration of legal, economic and political
economy factors that influence the use of these measures and their associated
benefits and costs.
The 2009 Report examines the range and role of contingency measures available in trade
agreements. One of the Report’s main objectives is to analyse whether WTO provisions provide a
balance between supplying governments with the necessary flexibility to face difficult economic
situationsandadequatelydefiningtheseinawaythatlimitstheiruseforprotectionistpurposes.
ISBN 978-92-870-3513-4
Cover photos (from left to right): Image copyright Quayside, 2009; Image copyright Christian Lagerek, 2009; Image copyright Guido Vrola, 2009;
9 789287 035134
trade in a Globalizing World
WORLD TRADE REPORT 2008 - Trade in a Globalizing World
World Trade Report
The World Trade Report is an annual publication that aims to deepen understanding
about trends in trade, trade policy issues and the multilateral trading system.
International trade is integral to the process of globalization. Over many years,
governments in most countries have increasingly opened their economies to international trade, whether through the multilateral trading system, increased regional
cooperation or as part of domestic reform programmes. Trade and globalization
more generally have brought enormous benefits to many countries and citizens.
Trade has allowed nations to benefit from specialization and to produce more
efficiently. It has raised productivity, supported the spread of knowledge and new
technologies, and enriched the range of choices available to consumers. But deeper
integration into the world economy has not always proved to be popular, nor have
the benefits of trade and globalization necessarily reached all sections of society.
As a result, trade scepticism is on the rise in certain quarters.
2008
The purpose of this year’s Report, whose main theme is “Trade in a Globalizing World”,
is to remind ourselves of what we know about the gains from international trade
and the challenges arising from higher levels of integration. The Report addresses
a range of interlinking questions, starting with a consideration of what constitutes
globalization, what drives it, what benefits does it bring, what challenges does it pose
and what role does trade play in this world of ever-growing inter-dependency. The
Report asks why some countries have managed to take advantage of falling trade
costs and greater policy-driven trading opportunities while others have remained
largely outside international commercial relations. It also considers who the
winners and losers are from trade and what complementary action is needed from
policy-makers to secure the benefits of trade for society at large. In examining
these complex and multi-faceted questions, the Report reviews both the theoretical
gains from trade and empirical evidence that can help to answer these questions.
WORLD TRADE
REPORT 2008
Trade in a Globalizing World
The2008Reportprovidesareminderofwhatweknowaboutthegainsfrominternationaltradeand
highlightsthechallengesarisingfromhigherlevelsofintegration.Itaddressesthequestionofwhat
constitutesglobalization,whatdrivesit,whatbenefitsitbrings,whatchallengesitposesandwhat
roletradeplaysinthisworldofever-growinginter-dependency.
ISBN 978-92-870-3454-0
sixty years of the multilateral trading system : Achievements and Challenges
world trade organization
WORLD TRADE REPORT
2007
world trade report
2007
2007
On1January2008themultilateraltradingsystemcelebratedits60thanniversary.TheWorldTrade
Report2007celebratesthislandmarkanniversarywithanin-depthlookattheGeneralAgreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and its successor the World Trade Organization — their origins,
achievements,thechallengestheyhavefacedandwhatthefutureholds.
iSBn 978-92-870-3401-4
exploring the Links between subsidies, trade and the Wto
world trade organization
2006
WORLD TRADE REPORT
2006
WORLD TRADE REPORT
TheWorldTradeReport2006focusesonhowsubsidiesaredefined,whateconomictheorycantell
usaboutsubsidies,whygovernmentsusesubsidies,themostprominentsectorsinwhichsubsidies
are applied and the role of the WTO Agreement in regulating subsidies in international trade. The
Reportalsoprovidesbriefanalyticalcommentariesoncertaintopicaltradeissues.
2006
trade, standards and the Wto
world trade organization
WORLD TRADE REPORT
2005
2006
250
WORLD TRADE REPORT
2005
The World Trade Report 2005 seeks to shed light on the various functions and consequences of
standards,focusingontheeconomicsofstandardsininternationaltrade,theinstitutionalsettingfor
standard-setting and conformity assessment, and the role of WTO agreements in reconciling the
legitimatepolicyusesofstandardswithanopen,non-discriminatorytradingsystem.
Previous World Trade Reports
Coherence
world trade organization
2004
WORLD TRADE REPORT
2004
WORLD TRADE REPORT
The World Trade Report 2004 focuses on the notion of coherence in the analysis of interdependent
policies: the interaction between trade and macroeconomic policy, the role of infrastructure in trade
and economic development, domestic market structures, governance and institutions, and the role of
international cooperation in promoting policy coherence.
2006
Trade and Development
world trade organization
2003
The World Trade Report 2003 focuses on development. It explains the origin of this issue and offers
a framework within which to address the question of the relationship between trade and development,
thereby contributing to more informed discussion.
WORLD TRADE REPORT
2003
WORLD TRADE REPORT
2006
251
What is the World
Trade Report?
The World Trade Report is an
annual publication that aims to
deepen understanding about
trends in trade, trade policy
issues and the multilateral
trading system.
Using this report
The 2011 World Trade Report
is split into two main parts.
The first is a brief summary
of the trade situation in 2010.
The second part focuses on
the special theme of preferential
trade agreements.
Find out more
Website: www.wto.org
General enquiries:
[email protected]
Tel: +41 (0)22 739 51 11
This report is also available in
French and Spanish.
To order, please contact:
WTO Publications
World Trade Organization
154, rue de Lausanne
CH-1211 Geneva 21
Tel: (41 22) 739 52 08
Fax: (41 22) 739 54 58
Email: [email protected]
Online WTO bookshop:
http://onlinebookshop.wto.org
ISBN 978-92-870-3764-0
Printed in Switzerland
Cover designed by triptik
Report designed by Services Concept
© World Trade Organization 2011
Image credits (cover):
Cover top left – Brian Jackson – iStockphoto
Cover left centre – Hande Guleryuz Yuce – iStockphoto
Cover bottom left – geopaul – iStockphoto
Cover bottom centre – Christian Lagereek – iStockphoto
Cover bottom right – René Mansi – iStockphoto
Cover image top right – Heather Sapey-Pertin
World Trade Report 2011 The WTO and preferential trade agreements: From co-existence to coherence
World Trade Report
The ever-growing number of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) is a
prominent feature of international trade. The World Trade Report 2011
describes the historical development of PTAs and the current landscape
of agreements. It examines why PTAs are established, their economic
effects, and the contents of the agreements themselves. Finally it
considers the interaction between PTAs and the multilateral trading
system.
Accumulated trade opening – at the multilateral, regional and unilateral
level – has reduced the scope for offering preferential tariffs under
PTAs. As a result, only a small fraction of global merchandise trade
receives preferences and preferential tariffs are becoming less
important in PTAs.
The report reveals that more and more PTAs are going beyond
preferential tariffs, with numerous non-tariff areas of a regulatory
nature being included in the agreements.
Global production networks may be prompting the emergence of these
“deep” PTAs as good governance on a range of regulatory areas is far
more important to these networks than further reductions in already
low tariffs. Econometric evidence and case studies support this link
between production networks and deep PTAs.
The report ends by examining the challenge that deep PTAs present to
the multilateral trading system and proposes a number of options for
increasing coherence between these agreements and the trading
system regulated by the WTO.
9 789287
037640
World Trade
Report 2011
The WTO and preferential trade agreements:
From co-existence to coherence

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